

Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine

The Breach of International Humanitarian Law by the
Russian Federation



The Global Accountability Network

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The Global Accountability Network's Ukraine Task Force Presents:

**RUSSIAN WAR CRIMES AGAINST UKRAINE:
THE BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SECOND EDITION**

December 2022

LEAD WRITERS: Kelly Adams, Christopher Arima, Kanalya Arima, Mia Bonardi, Pheobe Juel

GAN CONTRIBUTORS: Alexa Thein, Alexandra Lane, Anchal Saxena, Anthony Emmi, Avery Walke, Bradley Balach, Caroline Atlas, Daniel Bonsangue, Dessi-Ann Yetman, Elizabeth Broderick, Frank H. Stolba III, Harper Fox, Ian Braddock, Jason Barnes, Jenny Cowan, Jodi Green, Joel Shambaugh, Julie Yang, Kajol Raju, Katherine Marsh, Madeleine Kay McDaniel, Maggie Mabie, Maria Pobedinsky, Marjoria Romeyn-Sanabria, Meghan Stamps, Miguel Andrés Cruz, Richard Sellwood, Sage Grant, S.L. Moppert, Sarah Joan Scott, Shelly Feldman, Spencer Luckwitz, Sydney Krause, Theresea Barrett, Todd Jones, Yuree Nam, Irlanda Hernandez, Kate Metzger, and Annika Stimac.

UBA CONTRIBUTORS: Нікіта Куніцин, Юлія Соломаха, Sergii Bordyug, Ганна Свириденко, Kristina Mysenko, Valeriia Liamzienko, Polina Klykova, Volodymyr Lezhnin, Павло Тодорович, Юрій Сторожук, Валерія Якимчук, Маруна Ковтун-Salnikova, Ann Orzhekhovska, Nataliia Krynytska, Nataliia Volchenko, Anna Zubar, Леонід Мельніков, Olena Ustyomenko, Amaliia Abdullaieva, Daryna Maksymchuk, Maksym Iatsyna, Yana Grygorenko, Yaroslav Mandrykin, Юлія Бруско, Anastasiia Pavlyk, Tetiana Berezna.

EDITORS: Kelly Adams, Christopher Arima, Kanalya Arima, Mia Bonardi, Professor David M. Crane

THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK'S UKRAINE TASK FORCE, 2022

PROJECT LEADER: Professor David M. Crane, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court of Sierra Leone

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Mia Bonardi

DIRECTORS: Kelly Adams, Christopher Arima, Kanalya Arima, Matthew McCartin

The Ukraine Task Force (UKTF) aims to produce non-partisan, high quality analysis of open-source materials and to catalogue that information relative to applicable bodies of law; including, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The UKTF primarily creates documentation products in a narrative and graphical format, as well as a quarterly and annual trend analysis of ongoing crimes. Furthermore, the UKTF publishes issue-specific white papers. Its clients include Transnational NGOs, the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, and the Public Interest International Law & Policy Group (PILPG).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document will primarily cover the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Russian Federation from 24 February to 28 July 2022. The basis of this report is founded upon open-source research and evidence collection by an inter-collegiate investigative team from across the United States, collecting reports, photographic, and video evidence of crimes perpetrated in Ukraine. The contents of this document will provide the reader with a brief, but important, historical overview of Ukraine and its relationship with the Russian Federation. In addition, it will articulate the international legal mechanisms of accountability, identify individuals most responsible for the commission of crimes in Ukraine, and provide a series of representative charges to be used in an international criminal tribunal. In its conclusion, this paper calls upon the international community to respond by utilizing the available international accountability mechanisms, as the Russian Federation is openly committing crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. For the reader's reference, Section V contains a command-and-control diagram produced by the Global Accountability Network's Ukraine Task Force and its dedicated researchers.

In addition, this document contains appendices that provide the reader more detailed information regarding the Russian Federation's criminal activity in Ukraine. Appendix A is a sample draft of an international criminal indictment against President Putin. Notably, the crime narrative present in the first addition. Due to length and the status of ongoing investigations, the second edition will omit the narrative from the appendix. Instead, Appendix B will supplant the crime narrative and provide a more detailed breakdown of the violations of International Humanitarian Law, as well as documenting violations of the Ukrainian Penal Code.

Appendix C is a comprehensive dossier detailing the command-and-control structure of the Russian political and military senior leadership. This dossier lists the individuals responsible for the atrocities in Ukraine, and documents relevant information surrounding their responsibility and complicity. Appendix D is a GAN-UKTF white paper detailing considerations for establishing a special tribunal in Ukraine. Appendix E is the GAN-UKTF proposal for a Resolution by the United Nations General Assembly and accompanying proposal for a Statute of a Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the crime of aggression.

Notably, there are omissions from this document that are deserving of discussion and further analysis. The efforts of the Global Accountability Network's Ukraine Task Force do not end here. This is only the Second Edition, and the Ukraine Task Force will continue its investigations and analyses of crimes committed in Ukraine.

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY PROFESSOR DAVID M. CRANE*

Only the dead have seen the end of the war.

~ George Santayana

The historian John Keegan said that the history of mankind is the history of war, and the history of war is the history of mankind. With that, mankind has placed limits to the carnage of conflict with a set of laws to protect those found on the battlefield such as the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and especially civilians in and around the conflict. Failure in those protections puts an armed force in legal jeopardy under the violations of international humanitarian law, specifically the laws of armed conflict.

For decades, after the horror of two world wars, the world came together united, setting down a charter of United Nations who agreed to settle their disputes peaceably, resorting to force as a last resort. Through a series of conventions, treaties, and protocols, international humanitarian law sought to limit the scourge of war and to protect peoples around the world. It seemed at the beginning of the new century, twenty-two years ago, conventional conflict was a thing of the past. To control the dirty little wars that flared up from time to time, mankind used the laws of armed conflict to ensure a limitation of the extent of the damage that conflicts bring.

Despite all this, these dirty little wars proliferated with all parties ignoring the law that governs conflict. The result was the creation of a general set of accountability mechanisms that held those who perpetrated conflict by ignoring the set laws accountable. Under the concept that the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun, mankind developed an ability to hold heads of state, dictators, thugs, and their henchmen accountable under law. It seemed hopeful that laws governing conflict and international criminal law would reign in the beast of impunity. It was not to be.

An unanticipated rise of populism and nationalism has caused a political circumstance that has seen the international rule of law and the paradigm of the United Nations principle of peace questioned and weakened. In an apparent age of the strongman, nations have turned inward, and tyrants used this geopolitical moment to strengthen their positions domestically and regionally. Such a tyrant, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, clings to the false hope of a risen Soviet Union has seized on this moment to take the Ukraine in whole or in part back to Russia where he claims it belongs. This is a false premise, and the result of this deluded vision is an illegal invasion of a sovereign nation's territorial integrity. An act of aggression, an international crime.

This act of aggression has resulted in an international armed conflict not seen since the 1940's. The conduct of the invading Russian armed forces has been reprehensible, particularly the intentional targeting of protected persons and places. These are war crimes and crimes against humanity. Vladimir Putin, as head of those armed forces and the commanders, should be held accountable for bearing the greatest responsibility for these international crimes.

This paper will lay out the facts and circumstances, for the first time in a considered way, these international crimes. It is an initial review with a continued subsequent effort to capture all of the alleged crimes perpetrated by Russian Federation armed forces. The methods used in this review are based on tried-and-true procedures used by the world's first hybrid international criminal court, the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone, to account for the crimes of another sitting head of state, President Charles of Taylor of Liberia. He was arrested, indicted, tried under law,

and found guilty of aiding and abetting the murder, rape, mutilation, and maiming of around 1.2 million human beings.

We have done this once before and we can do it again with the International Criminal Court prosecuting the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity and a United Nations backed Special Court for Ukraine, the world's second hybrid international war crimes tribunal. Its mandate to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the aggression against Ukraine must include President Vladimir Putin. You will see the beginning of that effort in this paper, which aims to show clear evidence of international crimes committed by Russian Federation armed forces and a sample indictment of Vladimir Putin for all of the international laws he has violated.

II. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

The Russian Federation, led by President Vladimir Putin, invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 by stating that the goal is to “demilitarise and de-Nazify the nation.”¹ In addition, on the day of the attack, Vladimir Putin called the invasion a “special military operation” in which the words were circulated as propaganda domestically in Russia.² Grounded in baseless claims and state-sponsored lies,³ Russia invaded Ukraine seeking a quick surrender, only to be met by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leading the defense of the nation with a call on Ukrainians to take up arms.⁴

The Russian government invaded Ukraine on three fronts through Belarus, east of Ukraine, and from the south of Ukraine.⁵ Since the first day of invasion, Russia has continued its attacks on not just Ukrainian military, but its civilian population as well, forcing approximately 3.5 million Ukrainians to leave Kyiv.⁶ Furthermore, there have been reports of war crimes by Russian government through its acts of shelling an orphanage,⁷ maternity hospital,⁸ children's hospital.⁹

* Professor David M. Crane, author of *Every Living Thing: Facing Down Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs in West Africa--A Story of Justice*, was the founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone from 2002 to 2005 after being appointed by Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. He served with the rank of Under-Secretary General and indicted the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, the first sitting African head of state in history to be held accountable. Prior to this position, he served over 30 years in the U.S. government. He holds a J.D. from Syracuse University, a M.A. in African Studies and a B.G.S. in History from Ohio University.

¹ Paul Kirby, *Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?*, BBC NEWS <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ Alexander Marrow, *Ukraine's Zelenskiy calls on citizens to fight, promises weapons*, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-calls-citizens-fight-promises-weapons-2022-02-24/>.

⁵ James Hookway & Yaroslav Trofimov, *Why Russia is Invading Ukraine and What Putin Wants*, WSJ (Mar. 29, 2022, 11:58 AM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-war-invasion-whats-happening-11646157211>.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ Jen Kirby & Jonathan Guyer, *Russia's war in Ukraine, explained: Putin's invasion in February began Europe's first major war in decades*, VOX <https://www.vox.com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasion-explained> (last updated Mar. 6, 2022).

⁸ *Ukraine war: Three dead as maternity hospital hit by Russian air strike*, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60675599>.

⁹ Tim Lister et al., *Mariupol children's hospital bombing one of many attacks on medical facilities since Russian invasion, WHO says*, CNN (Mar. 10, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/10/europe/russia-invasion-ukraine-03-10-intl/index.html>.

The international response has increased since the initial invasion. Economic sanctions against the Russian government and Vladimir Putin, as well as Russian oligarchs, have crippled the Russian war-fighting effort.¹⁰ Russian banks have been blocked from engaging in global transactions and its economy has taken a hit from the economic sanctions.¹¹ Further, the U.S. and European nations have provided military equipment to Ukrainian government.¹²

From Stalin's USSR to Putin's Russia, time and time again, Ukraine's nationhood has been in peril.¹³ From starving 3 million Ukrainians to the invasion of the territories in Donbas in which Ukrainians were raped and murdered, Ukraine is no stranger to attacks on its nationhood.¹⁴ Ukrainians are fighting back, with the memory of atrocities and oppression by the Russian state still festering as an open wound.¹⁵ Yet, this will not be enough. The people of Ukraine are not in this fight alone, and the international system of justice must step up and fulfill its role as a mechanism of accountability. Without it, the painful and brutal history of Ukrainian occupation will continue unabated, leaving democracy and justice around the world in peril.

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRECEDING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

A. *Brief Description*

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe that regained its independence in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.¹⁶ Use of "the" before "Ukraine" is a rejected usage by both the Ukrainian government in its Declaration of Independence and Constitution as well as western media.¹⁷ The capital of Ukraine is Kyiv (the Russian "Kiev" pronunciation and spelling are also

¹⁰ Hookway & Trofimov, *supra* note 5.

¹¹ Kirby & Guyer, *supra* note 7.

¹² Hookway & Trofimov, *supra* note 5.

¹³ Olga Tokariuk, *Ukraine won't Surrender (Apologies to Certain Europeans)*, CEPA (Mar. 16, 2022), <https://cepa.org/ukraine-wont-surrender-apologies-to-certain-europeans/>.

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Chrystina Lapchak, *Independence: Over 90% Vote Yes in Referendum; Kravchuk Elected President of Ukraine*, UKRAINIAN WEEKLY (Dec. 8, 1991), https://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/1991/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1991-49.pdf.

¹⁷ *Resolution On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., http://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); *The Constitution of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/254k/96-bp#Text> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); Tom Geoghegan, *Ukraine or the Ukraine: Why do some country names have 'the'?*, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (June 7, 2012), <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-18233844>; Adam Taylor, *Why Ukraine Isn't 'The Ukraine,' And Why That Matters Now*, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2013), <https://www.businessinsider.com/why-ukraine-isnt-the-ukraine-and-why-that-matters-now-2013-12>; Katy Steinmetz, *Ukraine, Not the Ukraine: The Significance of Three Little Letters*, TIME (Mar. 5, 2014), <https://time.com/12597/the-ukraine-or-ukraine/>; Franklin Foer, *It's Not 'The' Ukraine*, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2022), <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/02/defending-ukraine/622063/>.

rejected).¹⁸ “Ukraine” means borderland.¹⁹ Ukraine borders Russia to the east and northeast; Belarus to the north; Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the west; Romania and Moldova to the south; and has a coastline along the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea (See Figure 1). The Dnieper River flows through the center of Ukraine (See Figure 1).



Figure 1, Image Credit: Encyclopædia Britannica

B. Eurasian Chernozem Belt

The Eurasian Chernozem Belt—a rich, fertile soil, high in humus, phosphorus, and phosphoric acids—runs across two-thirds of Ukraine.²⁰ In addition to Ukraine, the Eurasian

¹⁸ Steinmetz, *supra* note 2; Jerome Socolovsky, *Kyiv or Kiev: Why people disagree about how to pronounce the Ukrainian capital's name*, NPR (Jan. 25, 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/01/25/1075357281/how-do-you-pronounce-kyiv>; Mark Rice-Oxley, *How to pronounce and spell 'Kyiv', and why it matters*, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/how-to-pronounce-and-spell-kyiv-kiev-ukraine-and-why-it-matters>; Ruby Mellen, *It's Ukraine, not 'the' Ukraine. And Ukrainians want you to get it right*, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2019), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/01/its-ukraine-not-ukraine-ukrainians-want-you-get-it-right/>.

¹⁹ *Ukraine*, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/ukraine> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (explaining “from Russian or Polish *Ukraina*, literally “border, frontier,” from *u-* “at” + *krai* “edge.” So called from being regarded as the southern frontier of Poland or Russia.”); Steinmetz, *supra* note 2 (explaining “Ukraine’s name is thought to come from the Slavic word for borderland”).

²⁰ Stepan Pozniak, *Chernozems of Ukraine: past, present and future perspectives*, 70 SCIENDO 193 (2019) (explaining “‘Chernozem’ is a Ukrainian word and has a national meaning. It is often used in everyday life, folklore and even in poems. In the soil nomenclature of various countries and international World Reference Base for Soil Resources (IUSS Working Group WRB 2015), the term is used without a translation.”); *Soils of Ukraine*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (last visited Mar. 19, 2022), <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/Soils>; Marques Hayes, *What Is The Central Black Earth Region Famous For?*, WORLDATLAS (Sept. 18, 2017), <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-central-black-earth-region-famous-for.html>.

Chernozem Belt also cuts across parts of Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Siberia.²¹ USAID notes “With over 41 million hectares of agricultural land, covering 70 percent of the country, agriculture is Ukraine’s largest export industry.”²² Ukraine is the fifth-largest wheat exporter in the world, the third-largest barley exporter, and the first-largest sunflower seed exporter.²³ The flag of Ukraine, consisting of equal horizontal stripes of blue over yellow, is a nod to its fertile soil because it represents “blue skies over golden wheat fields.” (See figure 2).²⁴



Figure 2, Image Credit: WorldAtlas

Foreign investment has targeted Ukraine for its fertile soils.²⁵ However, “Since 2001, there has been a moratorium prohibiting transfers of a major part of agricultural land. Therefore, most

²¹ *Earth from Space: Chernozem cropland*, THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Earth_from_Space_Chernozem_cropland; Marques Hayes, *supra* note 5.

²² *Private Sector on the Frontlines of Land Reform to Unlock Ukraine’s Investment Potential*, USAID (Jan. 20, 2022), <https://www.usaid.gov/ukraine/news/private-sector-frontlines-land-reform-unlock-ukraine’s-investment-potential>.

²³ *Corn Exports by Country in 1000 MT*, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=corn&graph=exports> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); *Barley Exports by Country in 1000 MT*, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=barley&graph=exports> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); *Sunflowerseed Oil Exports by Country in 1000 MT*, INDEX MUNDI, <https://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=sunflowerseed-oil&graph=exports> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).

²⁴ *Flag of Ukraine*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/flag-of-Ukraine> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); *Ukrainian Flag Day*, OFF. WEBSITE OF UKR., <https://ukraine.ua/stories/ukrainian-flag-day/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); Amanda Holpuch, *U.S. flag makers are rushing to fill orders for Ukrainian flags*, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/us/ukraine-flag-sales.html>.

²⁵ John Vidal, *Fears for the world’s poor countries as the rich grab land to grow food*, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 3, 2009), <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/jul/03/land-grabbing-food-environment>; Laetitia Van Eeckhout, *Ukraine: forgotten granary of Europe*, THE GUARDIAN (July 20, 2010), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/20/ukraine-grain-farming-exports>. See also Oane Visser, *Persistent*

agricultural companies, regardless of their shareholders' residency (Ukrainian or foreign), do not own agricultural land and instead lease it for agribusiness from individual landowners."²⁶ On March 31, 2020, the Ukrainian Parliament passed the law that, starting July 1, 2021 allows Ukrainian citizens to purchase agricultural land and starting January 1, 2024 allows Ukrainian companies owned by Ukrainian shareholders to purchase agricultural land.²⁷ Under the law, "Foreigners and companies with foreign shareholders or beneficiaries cannot purchase agricultural land (whether directly or through a Ukrainian company) and will get this right only if a national referendum decides so."²⁸ However, a substantial part of Ukraine's most productive agricultural land is located in its eastern regions, parts currently under Russian attack. (See Figure 3).²⁹

Figure 3 on next page.

farmland imaginaries: celebration of fertile soil and the recurrent ignorance of climate, 38 AGRIC. AND HUM. VALUES 313 (2021).

²⁶*Doing Agribusiness in Ukraine: Legal Guidance for Foreign Investors*, MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN POL'Y & FOOD OF UKR. (July 2021); Bate Toms, *Ban on farmland sales to foreigners risks starving Ukraine of investment*, ATL. COUNCIL (Apr. 21, 2020), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ban-on-farmland-sales-to-foreigners-risks-starving-ukraine-of-investment/>.

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Id.*

²⁹ Alex Smith, *A Russia-Ukraine War Could Ripple Across Africa and Asia*, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 22, 2022), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/22/russia-ukraine-war-grain-exports-africa-asia/>.

Ukraine: Wheat Production



USDA Foreign Agricultural Service
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (Rosstat for Crimea Oblast)
Average Wheat Production 2016-2020

Ukraine: Barley Production



USDA Foreign Agricultural Service
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (Rosstat for Crimea Oblast)
Average Barley Production 2016-2020

Ukraine: Sunflower Seed Production



USDA Foreign Agricultural Service
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine (Rosstat for Crimea Oblast)
Average Sunflower Seed Production 2016-2020

Figure 3, Image Credit: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service

C. Soviet-Era Ukraine

1. *Holodomor*

The irony of Ukraine having some of the most fertile soils in the world is that it also suffered one of the deadliest famines human history has knowledge of.³⁰ More than 3.9 million Ukrainians perished of hunger between 1931 and 1934.³¹ In *Red Famine: Stalin's War On Ukraine*, Anne Applebaum explains how the famine was described at the time as the *Holodomor* “a term derived from the Ukrainian words for hunger—*holod*—and extermination—*mor*.”³² The Soviet Communist Party, led by Joseph Stalin, perpetrated genocide against Ukrainians using a dual systematic strategy to bring about the “Sovietization of Ukraine.”³³ The strategy consisted of first, the *Holodomor*, and second, “the repression of the Ukrainian intellectual and political class[—]Anyone connected to the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic, which existed for a few months from June 1917, anyone who promoted the Ukrainian language or Ukrainian history, anyone with an independent literary or artistic career, was liable to be publicly vilified, jailed, sent to a labour camp or executed.”³⁴ Furthermore, “Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer who invented the word ‘genocide,’ spoke of Ukraine in this era as the ‘classic example’ of his concept.”³⁵ Despite the fact that from 1933 until 1991 the Soviet Union refused to recognize that a famine even took place, seventeen United Nations countries and Vatican City now recognize the *Holodomor* as genocide, including the United States, Australia, Canada, and Poland.³⁶

³⁰ Joe Hasell & Max Roser, *Famines*, OUR WORLD IN DATA, <https://ourworldindata.org/famines#victims-of-individual-famines> (last updated Dec. 7, 2017).

³¹ ANNE APPLEBAUM, *RED FAMINE: STALIN'S WAR ON UKRAINE* xxvi (2017); *Demographic Research: Holodomor: The Real Number of Its Victims and Evidence of Its Man-Made Nature*, HARV. UNIV., <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/demographic-research> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (“In 1933, Ukraine had a total mid-year population of 29.6 million.”).

³² *Id.*

³³ *Id.* at xxvii.

³⁴ *Id.* at xxvi. (“The Soviet Union’s disastrous decision to force peasants to give up their land and join collective farms; the eviction of “kulaks,” the wealthier peasants, from their homes At the height of the crisis, organized teams of policemen and party activists, motivated by hunger, fear, and a decade of hateful and conspiratorial rhetoric, entered peasant households and took everything edible: potatoes, beets, squash, beans, peas, anything in the oven and anything in the cupboard, farm animals and pets As the famine spread, a campaign of slander and repression was launched against Ukrainian intellectuals, professors, museum curators, writers, artists, priests, theologians, public officials and bureaucrats.”)

³⁵ *Id.* at xxvii.

³⁶ *Id.* at xxviii (explaining “The Soviet state destroyed local archives, made sure that death records did not allude to starvation, even altered publicly available census data in order to conceal what had happened.”); Alya Shandra, *See which countries recognize Ukraine's Holodomor famine as genocide on an interactive map*, EUROMADIAN PRESS (Nov. 24, 2018), <https://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/24/see-which-countries-recognize-ukraines-holodomor-famine-as-genocide-on-an-interactive-map/> (also including Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, and Ukraine).

2. Chernobyl

The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster was the worst nuclear power plant disaster in history.³⁷ On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear plant in northern Ukraine (about 80 miles north of Kyiv) exploded, releasing 400 times more radiation than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. (See Figure 4).³⁸ On April 27, 50,000 residents of the close town Pripyat were evacuated.³⁹ While the Soviet government tried to keep the nuclear disaster a secret, the radioactive fallout was devastatingly conspicuous to the international community.⁴⁰



Figure 4, Image Credit: UKTF Team

After 206 days, an initial Sarcophagus was erected above the disaster site to contain further radiation.⁴¹ This initial Sarcophagus was replaced in 2017 by a new “tomb” which took two decades to make, is the biggest object humans have ever moved—Bigger than Wembley Stadium and taller than the Statue of Liberty—and it will entomb the disaster site for 100 years. (See Figure 5).⁴²

³⁷ ADAM HIGGINBOTHAM, *MIDNIGHT IN CHERNOBYL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST NUCLEAR DISASTER* (2019); SERHII PLOKHY, *CHERNOBYL: THE HISTORY OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE* (2018); *Chernobyl, HISTORY* (Apr. 24, 2018), <https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/Chernobyl> (last updated Apr. 23, 2021).

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ SVETLANA ALEXIEVICH, *VOICES FROM CHERNOBYL* (2006); KATE BROWN, *MANUAL FOR SURVIVAL: A CHERNOBYL GUIDE TO THE FUTURE* (2020); *Chernobyl, supra* note 37; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx> (last updated Mar. 2022).

⁴⁰ *See supra* note 37.

⁴¹ Christian Borys, *A vast new tomb for the most dangerous waste in the world*, BBC (Jan. 3, 2017), <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170101-a-new-tomb-for-the-most-dangerous-disaster-site-in-the-world>; *Chernobyl, supra* note 37.

⁴² Borys, *supra* note 41.



Figure 5, Image Credit: BBC

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces took control of all the facilities of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.⁴³ The control levels of gamma radiation dose rates in the Chernobyl exclusion zone were exceeded—likely due to “disturbance of the top layer of soil from movement of a large number of heavy military machinery through the exclusion zone and increase of air pollution.”⁴⁴ On March 9, 2022, the Chernobyl nuclear plant lost connection to the grid but later on March 14 external power was restored and the plant was reconnected to Ukraine’s electricity grid.⁴⁵

3. *Ukraine Declaration of Independence*

Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991.⁴⁶ “In Ukraine, from the end of August through December 1991, the Communist Party of Ukraine was dissolved, its property was nationalized, and the KGB was banned, while party and ideological pluralism was established and all individuals living on the soil of the Ukrainian socialist republic were granted citizenship in the emerging independent state.”⁴⁷ The Constitution of Ukraine was

⁴³ *Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy*, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/russian-military-operation-and-ukraine-s-nuclear-p.aspx> (last updated Mar. 30, 2022); *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, *supra* note 39.

⁴⁴ *Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy*, *supra* note 28; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, *supra* note 39. See also *Unprotected Russian soldiers disturbed radioactive dust in Chernobyl’s ‘Red Forest’, workers say*, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2022, 2:27 AM EDT), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/unprotected-russian-soldiers-disturbed-radioactive-dust-chernobyls-red-forest-2022-03-28/>; @visegrad24, TWITTER (Mar. 30, 2022, 5:53 PM), <https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1509287796065845250?s=20&t=75AqZ6G9wTNulxQILew2Yw>.

⁴⁵ *Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy*, *supra* note 43; *Chernobyl Accident 1986*, *supra* note 39.

⁴⁶ *Resolution On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine*, VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKR., http://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Rres_Declaration_Independence_rev12.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2022); Mykhailo Minakov, *Three Decades of Ukraine’s Independence*, WILSON CTR. (Sept. 13, 2021), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/three-decades-ukraines-independence>; Nikola Antonov, *Ukraine Declares Independence, Sets Referendum*, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 1991), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/25/ukraine-declares-independence-sets-referendum/ee9266e3-dd83-4568-b7e5-40715ca0c77a/>.

⁴⁷ Minakov, *supra* note 46.

adopted on June 28, 1996.⁴⁸ The Post-Soviet democratization of Ukraine, while having its ups and downs, has existed as an independent and sovereign state.⁴⁹ However, Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, the war in the Donbas that left portions of Luhansk and Donetsk in the hands of Russian-backed separatists, and the current Russian invasion of the entirety of the Ukrainian territory threatens its independence and sovereignty.⁵⁰

D. *Russia-Ukraine War*

In 2004, Viktor Yushchenko became the first president of Ukraine who was not a part of the Communist Party.⁵¹ He was a member of the Our Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc party that ran on an anti-corruption platform.⁵² His opposing party, Viktor Yanukovich, was Kremlin.⁵³ During his presidential campaign, he was found to be poisoned slowly by dioxin, an assassination attempt, which ultimately disfigured his face.⁵⁴

On October 31, the election results declared Yanykovich the winner.⁵⁵ The clearly rigged election enraged Ukrainians who took to the streets to protest the election results by flooding the streets while wearing orange, Yushchenko's campaign color.⁵⁶ On November 23, 2004, the Orange Revolution signaled an end to speech suppression and an increase of European identity for the Ukrainians, which further separated them from Russia.⁵⁷

The Orange Revolution consisted of approximately 500,000 people, including Ukrainian youths marching in the Independence Square.⁵⁸ This is one of the first instances in modern Ukraine where the people found semblance of taking back their political power after losing it for so long.⁵⁹

The importance of the Orange Revolution is highlighted by the confidence that Kremlin had in his chosen contender, Yanukovich.⁶⁰ Vladimir Putin traveled to Kyiv on election day's eve to advise Ukrainians on the importance of voting for Yanukovich, exasperating Ukrainian's negative sentiment towards Kremlin.⁶¹

⁴⁸ *The Constitution of Ukraine*, *supra* note 17.

⁴⁹ Minakov, *supra* note 46; Alexander J. Motyl, *Ukraine's Democracy is (Almost) All Grown Up*, FOREIGN POL'Y (Aug. 28, 2019), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/28/ukraines-democracy-is-almost-all-grown-up/>; Brian Mefford, *Ukraine at 30; Europe's frontline democracy*, ATL. COUNCIL (July 6, 2021), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-at-30-europes-frontline-democracy/>; Oksana Huss & Oleksandra Keudel, *Ukraine: Executive Summary*, FREEDOM HOUSE, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2021> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).

⁵⁰ Minakov, *supra* note 46; Ivana Kottasová, *Why Donbas is at the heart of the Ukraine crisis*, CNN NEWS (Feb. 21, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/19/europe/donbas-ukraine-russia-intl-cmd/index.html>.

⁵¹ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 350-1.

⁵² *The Orange Revolution and the Yushchenko presidency*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Orange-Revolution-and-the-Yushchenko-presidency#ref986651> (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Id.* (noting that he made a full recovery after the attack).

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ Peter Dickinson, *How Ukraine's Orange Revolution shaped twenty-first century geopolitics*, ATL. COUNCIL (Nov. 22, 2020), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-ukraines-orange-revolution-shaped-twenty-first-century-geopolitics/>.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ *Id.*

The Orange Revolution both liberated Ukraine and tightened Kremlin's hold on its own Russian population.⁶² The Russian Government began a Pro-Putin youth movement, which started in April 2005 to establish an unbreakable relationship to the Russian government, comparable to that of the Hitler Youth organization.⁶³

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ordered a recount of the votes against the wishes of Yanykovich supporters.⁶⁴ After the recount, Yushchenko was declared the winner.⁶⁵

1. *Revolution of Dignity/Maidan Revolution/Euromaidan*

The Orange Revolution of 2004, culminating in the election of Viktor Yushchenko on December 26, 2004, brought with it the hope that Ukraine was making a final turn away from the corruption and authoritarianism which plagued the post-Soviet world and towards a closer relationship with the West.⁶⁶ Those hopes foundered on factionalism, a challenging economic environment, and changes to the Ukrainian constitution demanded by supporters of Yushchenko's predecessor Viktor Yanukovich, which sharply limited the powers of the President and heightened political rivalries at the expense of effective reform.⁶⁷

After his re-election in 2010, Yanukovich quickly undid all the constitutional changes which his supporters and others had used to hamstring his rival Yushchenko and added new powers for his own benefit—both politically and personally.⁶⁸ He took control of the courts, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and turned the police and the state security service (the SBU) into agents of his regime rather than servants of the State.⁶⁹ In 2011, he had his most prominent opponent, former Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko tried, convicted, and imprisoned on corruption charges related to an unfavorable gas deal with Russia.⁷⁰ He also manipulated election laws and elections to ensure that his defeat in 2004 could not be repeated.⁷¹ Yanukovich continued making economic overtures with the EU, however, pursuing the possibility of a closer relationship with the EU even as he personally enriched himself and his family at the expense of the country.⁷² By late 2013, Ukraine was on the verge of default due in part to the transfer of over \$70 billion into foreign accounts controlled by Yanukovich, his family, and his friends.⁷³

As economic default loomed and the national mood turned sour, Ukrainians turned toward the EU for relief.⁷⁴ On November 28, 2013, two long-negotiated agreements signifying political

⁶² Dickinson, *supra* note 57.

⁶³ Dickinson, *supra* note 57.

⁶⁴ *Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Viktor-Yushchenko> (last updated Feb. 19, 2022).

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ SERHII PLOKHY, *THE GATES OF EUROPE, A HISTORY OF UKR.* 334-35 (2021).

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹ Bodhan Harasymiw, *Euromaidan Revolution*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CE%5CU%5CEuromaidanRevolution.htm> (last visited March 20, 2022).

⁷² *Id.*

⁷³ PLOKHY, *THE GATES OF EUROPE*, *supra* note 66, at 338.

⁷⁴ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 338.

association and economic integration, the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, would be signed in Vilnius, Lithuania.⁷⁵ These agreements would open the country to badly needed foreign investment and allow for free trade of Ukrainian goods across the EU. They would also serve as a bulwark against Russian efforts to turn Ukraine back to its sphere of influence.⁷⁶ Many Ukrainians, particularly students, professionals, and city-dwellers believed their future lay with Europe and the West and not a return to the lesser status of a Russian vassal state – Malorossia “Little Russia.”⁷⁷ When Yanukovich announced a suspension of the agreement a week before the signing, Ukrainians were not happy and some took to the streets.⁷⁸

The protests began with a Facebook post by Mustafa Nayyem on November 21, 2013, calling students to assemble in Kyiv’s Independence Square – the Maidan.⁷⁹ The students and their supporters demanded that the agreement process continue but, while Yanukovich did attend the EU summit, he refused to sign the agreements.⁸⁰ Protests grew and clashes with the police intensified on the outskirts of the Maidan.⁸¹ On November 30, the Berkut, a special operations unit of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior attempted to clear the protesters from the square in an operation so violent it galvanized that nation.⁸²

What had been a limited protest became a national movement.⁸³ 700,000 people attended a rally in the Maidan the next day and the protest area was turned into an encampment with barricades, a mechanism of self-government, logistical support, and militia modeled on the Cossacks of Ukrainian history.⁸⁴ The Maidan protesters did not align themselves with any specific political party, but instead represented a range of political, economic, and cultural views and perspectives.⁸⁵ A small but vocal percentage of the protesters were nationalists connected with far-right political movements, an unfortunate reality which the Russian government and others would later use to tar the entire movement.⁸⁶

The Berkut made another effort to clear the square on December 11 but were successfully rebuffed and two days later, Yanukovich offered overtures to leaders of the movement offering amnesty for detained Maidan participants and the identification of government security officers who took part in the worst of the violence.⁸⁷ At the same time, however, he also concluded a deal with Russia for \$15 billion in economic aid, a renegotiation of gas prices, and the lifting of an existing blockade on Ukrainian imports.⁸⁸ The infusion of Russian money and economic support,

⁷⁵ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 338.

⁷⁶ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 338.

⁷⁷ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 338.

⁷⁸ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 338.

⁷⁹ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁸⁰ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁸¹ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁸² Eric Sof, *Once Upon a Time Was BERKUT*, <https://special-ops.org/berkut-ukraine> (last viewed Mar. 30, 2022). (It is noteworthy that the Berkut in Crimea appear to have acted en masse as Russian agents when the Russian Army invaded Crimea in February 2014.)

⁸³ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁸⁴ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁸⁵ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 339.

⁸⁶ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 339.

⁸⁷ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁸⁸ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

along with the minor concessions to the protesters might have resolved the crisis in Yanukovich's favor, but video of journalist and activist Tetiana Chornovol's brutal beating outside of Kyiv enflamed the nation once more and on December 29 the protesters presented the Manifesto of the Maidan which called for, among other things, international sanctions against Yanukovich, his family, and his friends.⁸⁹ Mass demonstrations closed out the year as over half a million people filled the Square on New Year's Day.⁹⁰



Figure 6, Image Credit: Atlantic Council

All government efforts to discredit, disrupt, and disperse the protests failed and so on January 16, 2014, the Supreme Council, at Yanukovich's direction, passed a sweeping package of laws which criminalized anything that could be interpreted as connected to the Maidan protests and limiting free speech, privacy, and due process to such a degree that even his Chief of Staff resigned in protest.⁹¹ This marked a new phase of the Maidan movement, where the protests quickly accelerated into revolution.⁹² Government forces, backed by Russian operatives, became more violent, beating and shooting protesters indiscriminately and abducting the wounded from hospitals for detention, torture, and in some instances execution.⁹³ Although Yanukovich continued offering small concessions, including the installation of two opposition politicians in the government, the actions of his security forces belied any promises he made.⁹⁴ The conflict culminated in a battle on the Maidan and in nearby government buildings from February 18 – 20 when government security forces and police, including the SBU and the Berkut, backed by snipers and at Viktor Yanukovich's direction, killed 60 people.⁹⁵ This, along with the threat of more international sanctions imposed on them personally, was too much for the Supreme Council and with mediation by representatives from Poland, Germany, France, and a special envoy from

⁸⁹ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹⁰ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹¹ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹² Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹³ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹⁴ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹⁵ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66.

Russia, an agreement was reached on February 21 to reinstate the 2004 Constitution, suspend the Interior Minister who controlled the SBU and the Berkut, and free Yuliia Tymoshenko.⁹⁶ By the time the agreement was concluded, Viktor Yanukovich was on the run, moving first to Kharkiv, and then to Crimea, before turning up in Russia to announce that he was still President of Ukraine.⁹⁷ The Supreme Council disagreed, and declared that he had abandoned his office before scheduling new elections for May 2014.⁹⁸

Exact numbers are uncertain but over 100 protesters, subsequently enshrined in the national memory as the “Heavenly Hundred” and at least 13 police and security officers were killed during the Euromaidan, or Revolution of Dignity.⁹⁹ The Revolution stands as a statement of Ukrainian independence and identity, as well as a belief in the rule of law, and it is likely not a coincidence that after Yanukovich’s departure and the subsequent revelations of the close relationship between his administration and the Russian regime, that the Russians seized the Crimea outright and instigated Russophone separatist movements in Luhansk and Donets.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, Putin himself claimed that he made the decision to “return” Crimea to Russia on February 22 when Yanukovich was in transit to Moscow.¹⁰¹ Without a compliant Ukrainian government to facilitate his ends, he would have to turn to more aggressive options.¹⁰²

2. *Crimea*

Just as Ukraine has been a borderland for more than a millennium, the Crimean Peninsula also has seen successive waves of invasion and settlement. Ukraine’s location, dominating the Black Sea and the mouths of several large rivers (the Dniro, Dniester, Don, Danube, and Kuban) made it an attractive target for regional powers hoping to control trade, its mountains offered a refuge for remnants of earlier cultures seeking safety, and the Mediterranean climate on its coast drew colonists hoping to take advantage of its agricultural and economic opportunities.¹⁰³ Mongols and Turkic Tartars, were the final major wave of settlement prior to the modern era and by the mid-15th Century they dominated the peninsula as the Khanate of the Crimean Tatars.¹⁰⁴ They sacked Kyiv in 1482.¹⁰⁵ For the next 300 years they would shift their allegiance between the Ottoman Empire, the Hetmanate (representing Ukrainian Cossacks), Muscovy, and Muscovy’s successor, Russia, which annexed Crimea in 1783.¹⁰⁶ The Russians, hoping to cement control of their new territory, encouraged colonization and by 1917 Crimea was a multi-ethnic region of

⁹⁶ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹⁷ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹⁸ Harasymiw, *supra* note 71.

⁹⁹ *Five Years After Euromaidan: Justice for The Victims ‘Still Not Even In Sight’*, RFE/RL (Feb. 19, 2019, 18:25 GMT), <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-maidan-justice-victims-amnesty-fifth-anniversary/29779358.html>.

¹⁰⁰ PLOKHY, *THE GATES OF EUROPE*, *supra* note 66, at 340.

¹⁰¹ PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 340.

¹⁰² PLOKHY, *supra* note 66, at 341.

¹⁰³ Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., *Crimea*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5C%5CR%5CCrimea.htm> (last visited Mar. 30, 2022) (As early as the 6th century BCE, the Greeks were building city-states on the Crimean coast. In the ensuing eight centuries, Scythians, Romans, Goths, Huns, Byzantines, Khazars, Venetians, Genoese, Armenians, Jews, and Slavs (under the Kyvian Rus) would all claim or settle parts of Crimea).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, Armenians, and Bulgarians, though the first three groups would make up the largest percentages of the populations.¹⁰⁷

Following the 1917 Revolution, Ukraine attempted to claim Crimea as Ukrainian territory.¹⁰⁸ The Crimeans signed an agreement with the provisional Ukrainian government which would have given Crimea status as an autonomous region within the Ukrainian National Republic.¹⁰⁹ However, when the Bolsheviks took power in 1919, they instead designated Crimea as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.¹¹⁰ Status as an ASSR was initially beneficial to the Tatar population in the 1920's as Tatar language and culture were promoted and given special status in the region in a way similar the promotion of Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian SSR.¹¹¹ But in both Ukraine and Crimea the Soviet Union's cultural policies reversed dramatically in the 1930's.¹¹² Under Stalin, the Soviets aggressively pursued Russification; in Crimea this meant the language of advanced schooling and government was Russian, to the detriment of Ukrainian and Tatar speakers and the Tatar people were persecuted.¹¹³ This persecution led some Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea to welcome the German occupation of the region during WWII and some members of both groups actively collaborated, assisting not just the occupation but also the extermination of most of Crimea's Jewish population.¹¹⁴

When the Soviets retook Crimea, the Tatars were collectively declared a traitor population and forcibly removed from their homeland to controlled settlements in Siberia and Uzbekistan.¹¹⁵ Of the roughly 240,000 people removed (this number also includes Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, and the Jewish Krymchak people who survived the Nazi death squads) substantial numbers died—estimates range from a low as 20% to as high as 50% within 5 years.¹¹⁶ The survivors and their descendants were subsequently barred from returning to Crimea and, although they were officially exonerated as a group in 1960, the USSR refused to recognize them as a unique ethnicity but instead only as former inhabitants of Crimea and left in place the 1956 decree forbidding their return home.¹¹⁷ Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and after Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika reforms allowed for Tatar return, only 1.5% of the population of Crimea was Tatar.¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁷ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹⁰⁸ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹⁰⁹ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹¹⁰ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹¹¹ Bohdan Kravtsiv & Volodymyr Kubijovyč, *Russification*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR. (1993), <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CR%5CU%5CRussification.htm>.

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ J. Otto Pohl, *The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars*, INT'L COMM. FOR CRIMEA, <https://iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html> (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).

¹¹⁴ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

¹¹⁶ Pohl, *supra* note 113.

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

¹¹⁸ *Ethnic Composition of the Crimea, 1979 and 1989*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/picturedisplay.asp?linkpath=pic\C\R\Crimea_Table4.jpg (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).

After the Nazi murder of the Jews and the Soviet expulsion of the Tatars, the Soviets began resettling Crimea in the late 1940's with a mixture of Russians and Polish Ukrainians.¹¹⁹ In 1954, Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.¹²⁰ Shortly after the transfer, work began on the North Crimean Canal, to bring much needed water from the Dnipro River to the peninsula.¹²¹ The resulting network of canals, reservoirs, locks, and pumps supported cities, particularly those on the drier south coast of Crimea, and extensive agriculture operations.¹²² Notably, the canal begins in the Kherson Oblast, not in Crimea, and thus control of the water flow remained in Ukrainian hands after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.¹²³ Ukraine subsequently dammed the canal after Russia refused to pay for the use of the water.¹²⁴

Russification efforts continued both in Ukraine and in Crimea after Stalin's death with some degree of success.¹²⁵ In 1989, the majority of people in Crimea identified themselves as Russians and Russian-speakers.¹²⁶ Despite this, however, the vote for Ukrainian independence on December 1, 1991 passed in the region by 54%.¹²⁷ With independence, larger numbers of Tatars also began to return and by the mid-1990s it is estimated that close to 250,000 Tatars had made it back to Crimea where they began to rebuild their culture.¹²⁸ These efforts were disrupted by the February 26, 2014 Russian invasion.¹²⁹ After the initial seizure of the Crimean Parliament, Russia moved quickly, and with the aid of a small pro-Russian separatist party which had previously been able to muster only 4% of the vote and turncoat police and security forces, they engineered a Russian annexation referendum in mid-March 2014.¹³⁰ Those favoring annexation claimed that 97% of voters supported their efforts, (in one district, Sevastopol, they reported a pro-Russian vote of 123% of registered voters).¹³¹ Following the referendum, on March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin asked the Russian Legislature to formalize Russia's annexation of Crimea.¹³² Since the annexation, leaders of the Crimean Tatar community have been arrested by Russian state security forces and, in a reprise of the fate suffered by their parents and grandparents, banned from returning to their homeland.¹³³

¹¹⁹ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹²⁰ *Id.*

¹²¹ Ihor Stebelsky, *North Crimean Canal*, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CN%5CO%5CNorthCrimeanCanal.htm> (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).

¹²² *Id.*

¹²³ *Id.*

¹²⁴ *Id.* (On 26 February 2022, after securing control of the region, the Russian military blew up the dam, reopening the flow of water from the canal.)

¹²⁵ Kravtsiv & Kubijovyč, *supra* note 111.

¹²⁶ *Ethnic Composition of the Crimea, 1979 and 1989*, *supra* note 103.

¹²⁷ Kubijovyč et al., *supra* note 103.

¹²⁸ Pohl, *supra* note 113.

¹²⁹ PLOKHY, *THE GATES OF EUROPE*, *supra* note 66, at 340-1.

¹³⁰ *Id.*

¹³¹ *Id.*

¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ Press release, Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, *IDEE Condemns Forced Exile of Crimean Tatar Leaders* (Oct. 25, 2017), <https://idee.us.org/idee-condemns-forcible-expulsion-of-crimean-tatar-leaders/>.

¹³³ *Id.*



Figure 7, Image Credit: Encyclopedia Britannica

3. The Donbas

The Donbas, coming from the words Donets Basin, is a region in south-eastern Ukraine that carries its own historical, cultural, and economic value.¹³⁴ The region borders both Ukraine and Russia.¹³⁵ It contains two provinces called Donetsk and Luhansk.¹³⁶ The region was predominantly used for a coal-steel industry in early 1900s.¹³⁷ The region includes common day cities of Mariupol, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The population's rapid growth in the region happened in a span of 60 years, in which the population grew from 700,000 to approximately 7 million people.¹³⁸



Figure 8, Image Credit: The Interpreter

¹³⁴ *Donets Basin*, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/donets_basin (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).

¹³⁵ Bill Hutchinson & Patrick Reevell, *What are the Ukraine 'separatist' regions at the crux of the Russian Invasion*, ABC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2022, 5:08 AM), <https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-separatist-regions-crux-russian-invasion/story?id=83084803#:~:text=The%20Donbas%20contains%20two%20provinces,Moscow%20armed%20and%20helped%20establish.>

¹³⁶ *Id.*

¹³⁷ HIROAKI KUROMIYA, *FREEDOM AND TERROR IN THE DONBAS: A UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN BORDERLAND, 1870S - 1990S* 14 (2002).

¹³⁸ *Id.* at 17.

The wage pay in Donbas was better than that of the surrounding regions; however, the dangers of working in the mines were proportional to the increased pay.¹³⁹ The dangers of the coal mining industry was not changed for the better by either the October Revolution or the First World War.¹⁴⁰ Some recreational activities included fist fighting whether it be between women or men which is aided by the rise in alcoholism in that region during the first half of the 20th century.¹⁴¹

The two common languages spoken in the Donbas region are Russian and Ukrainian.¹⁴² In addition, the thriving industrialists in Donbas were Russians and so Russian became the language for the workers in the mining industry there.¹⁴³ However, there were people of many ethnicities coexisting, such as Russians, Ukrainians, and Tartars (who are of Turkic ethnic group).¹⁴⁴ Naturally, when many types of people live together, a class structure is born.¹⁴⁵ In Donbas, the Tartars and Muslims were routinely targeted by the Slavs.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the villages were usually a monolith, meaning that the Ukrainians and Russians rarely lived together in a village; it was either Ukrainians or Russians only.¹⁴⁷ The tensions between Ukrainians and Russians were quite obvious in cities and workers' settlements.¹⁴⁸ It gave way to name calling, constant brawls (especially over women) which took the form of knife fights, and hostile treatments.¹⁴⁹

The Donbas is sometimes referred to as the 'Wild East' because of how of the many misfits that it attracted – such as the “runaway serfs, religious dissidents, criminals and black marketeers.”¹⁵⁰ Some people fled to the Donbas to hide from police authorities where they can circumvent the rules there.¹⁵¹

Nikita Khrushchev grew up in Donbas and identified himself as a proletarian instead of a Ukrainian because of the class's peasantry connotation.¹⁵² The Great Terrors, including in the years 1937 – 1938 was part of Stalin's and Khrushchev's plan as well, in which the Ukrainian Communist Party was purged violently to kill the idea of Ukrainian freedom.¹⁵³ After the purge ended in 1940, the region was devastated and the people there started to rebuild from scratch. The region was revitalized from the 1960s and most of the population chose to speak Russian so as to be able to pursue more opportunities and the Ukrainian language became a “backwards language.”¹⁵⁴

¹³⁹ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 27.

¹⁴⁰ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 20.

¹⁴¹ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 28, 31.

¹⁴² KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 42.

¹⁴³ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 9.

¹⁴⁴ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 42.

¹⁴⁵ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 42.

¹⁴⁶ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 42.

¹⁴⁷ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 42-3.

¹⁴⁸ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 43.

¹⁴⁹ KUROMIYA, *supra* note 137, at 43.

¹⁵⁰ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 131.

¹⁵¹ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 131.

¹⁵² APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 292.

¹⁵³ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 291-2.

¹⁵⁴ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 292.

By 1980s, the idea of Ukrainian national movement was almost obsolete, with some activists still advocating in cities.¹⁵⁵ A Majority of Russians and Ukrainians thought of Ukraine as a Russian province by that point.¹⁵⁶

IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

A. *History of the Geneva Conventions*

Swiss businessman Henry Durant is widely credited as the father of modern international humanitarian law due to his work in founding the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) after witnessing the brutality of war on the battlefield in Solferino, Italy, in 1859.¹⁵⁷ Durant’s work led to the creation of the first iteration of the Geneva Convention of the Wounded on the Field of Battle (“Geneva I”) in 1864, which contained ten articles providing for the protection of hospitals, medical workers, and medical aid during times of armed conflict.¹⁵⁸ These humanitarian protections for injured combatants were expanded in first in 1906, and again in 1929 in the aftermath of World War I, with changes to Geneva I as well as the creation of the original Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”).¹⁵⁹

The atrocities committed during World War II, however, highlighted the major gaps in the existing international humanitarian legal framework.¹⁶⁰ With significant input from both states and the ICRC, Geneva I¹⁶¹ and III¹⁶² were updated and two further treaties were drafted.¹⁶³ These two new conventions included the Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (“Geneva II”)¹⁶⁴, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (“Geneva IV”).¹⁶⁵ All four Geneva Conventions entered into force on October 21, 1950, and were widely adopted by States throughout the 20th Century.¹⁶⁶ Two additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were drafted and adopted in 1977, and one final Protocol was drafted and adopted in 2005.¹⁶⁷ As all four Genevas as well as the First and Second Protocols have been widely adopted,

¹⁵⁵ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 293.

¹⁵⁶ APPLEBAUM, *supra* note 31, at 293.

¹⁵⁷ *Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols*, AMERICAN RED CROSS (Apr. 2011),

https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanitarian_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ *Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 1864*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (last visited Mar. 31, 2022), <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/120>.

¹⁵⁹ *Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July 1929*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/305> (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).

¹⁶⁰ *The Geneva Conventions of 1949: origins and current significance*, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement-120809.htm> (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).

¹⁶¹ See Geneva Convention I.

¹⁶² See Geneva Convention III.

¹⁶³ *Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols*, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols (last updated June 10, 2019).

¹⁶⁴ See Geneva Convention III.

¹⁶⁵ See Geneva Convention IV.

¹⁶⁶ The Conventions were ratified by 74 States in the 1950s, 48 States during the 1960s, 20 States during the 1970s, 20 States during the 1980s, 26 States during the 1990s, and by 7 States in the 2000s, bringing the current total of ratifications to 194 States; *cf. supra*, note 163.

¹⁶⁷ *Supra*, note 163 (168 States have ratified the First Protocol, and 177 States have ratified the Second Protocol).

the principles contained within can also be applied as customary international humanitarian law when necessary.¹⁶⁸

B. *The Conventions*

1. *Object/Purpose of the Conventions*

The Geneva Conventions are intended to provide protections to medical personnel, prisoners of war, injured or surrendering members of the armed forces, and civilians or other non-combatants during times of both international and non-international armed conflict as well as in times of peaceful occupation.¹⁶⁹ Each Convention contains specific provisions that provide a minimum standard of treatment to which State parties must adhere during the course of any armed conflict or occupation. This minimum standard of treatment generally requires that State parties treat all protected persons with dignity; for example, State parties are not permitted to submit captured protected persons to any type of mutilation, torture, or other humiliating treatment, nor are State parties permitted to take hostages, kill surrendering opponents, perform extrajudicial killings, or interfere with humanitarian aid or civilian evacuation routes.¹⁷⁰

2. *Protected Persons Under the Conventions*

Each of the Geneva Conventions provides specific protections to a different category of persons who may be at risk during an armed conflict or peaceful occupation. Geneva Convention I provides protections for sick or wounded members of armed forces and ad hoc militia groups, and Geneva Convention II provides protections for members of the armed forces who are sick, injured, or otherwise predisposed while at sea during an armed conflict.¹⁷¹ Geneva Convention III provides protections for prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention IV provides broad protections for any person who is not protected by Geneva Conventions I, II, or III.¹⁷² Geneva Convention IV further states that protected persons who are “wounded and sick,” as well as “expectant mothers,” are granted “particular protection and respect.”¹⁷³ In essence, the Geneva Conventions protect every individual impacted by an armed conflict or peaceful occupation except healthy, uninjured, and uncaptured individuals who are members of the armed forces or other ad hoc militias.

3. *Selected Protections Within the Conventions*

i. *Hospital Protections*

Each of the four Geneva Conventions contains multiple provisions providing specific protections to hospitals, ad hoc medical facilities, medical personnel, and medical transport equipment. Geneva Convention I provides these protections in Articles 19 – 37, prohibiting State Parties from targeting, bombing, destroying, or otherwise attacking established hospitals and ad hoc medical facilities, medical transport, and medical personnel that have been established to provide medical care to wounded and sick members of armed forces.¹⁷⁴ Geneva II provides these

¹⁶⁸ See Theodor Meron, *The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law*, 81 THE AMERICAN J. OF INT’L L. 348, 348-70 (1987).

¹⁶⁹ Geneva Conventions common art. 2 & 3.

¹⁷⁰ See generally Geneva Conventions.

¹⁷¹ See Geneva Convention I, art. 12; Geneva Convention II, art. 13.

¹⁷² See Geneva Convention III, art. 4; Geneva Convention IV, art. 4.

¹⁷³ Geneva Convention IV, art. 16.

¹⁷⁴ See Geneva Convention I, arts 19-37.

same general protections to hospital ships and other medical assistance provided to sick and wounded soldiers on the high seas.¹⁷⁵

Geneva Convention IV expands this prohibition on attacks on hospitals to civilian hospitals. Per Article 18 of Geneva Convention IV, civilian hospitals and medical facilities, including maternity hospitals, “may in no circumstances be the object of attack” and “at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.”¹⁷⁶ The only circumstance in which civilian medical facilities can lawfully be the target of attack under Geneva Convention IV is enumerated in Article 19, which states that civilian hospitals which are used to “commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.”¹⁷⁷ The act of providing medical service and other care to troops is not considered to be “harmful to the enemy,” and even when a civilian hospital is engaging in qualifying harmful conduct, a State party must first provide a warning to a civilian hospital before stripping it of its protection.¹⁷⁸ State parties are also required to refrain from targeting or otherwise attacking medical transport units.¹⁷⁹

ii. *Humanitarian Protections*

The Geneva Conventions all contain provisions that require State parties to treat all protected persons with a general standard of care. Geneva Convention I contains multiple provisions detailing the level of care that State Parties must provide to injured and sick members of armed forces, including providing a sufficient level of food, water, shelter, and medical care, and refraining from any type of discrimination.¹⁸⁰ Geneva Convention I also prohibits State parties from engaging in any type of medical experimentation, torture, or other degrading or humiliating treatment and requires State parties to record and identify any enemy individuals who may fall under their care or control.¹⁸¹ Geneva Convention II requires this same level of treatment for members of armed forces on the high seas, and Geneva Convention III requires this same level of treatment for prisoners of war.¹⁸² Geneva Convention IV requires that State parties take reasonable measures to protect civilians from the impact of military operations, and requires states to provide a heightened level of human treatment.¹⁸³ This level of protection for internees includes access to sufficient food, water, shelter, and medical care, but also requires State parties to permit internees to engage in religious and other important cultural practices, to maintain humane working conditions for internees, and to permit internees a certain level of contact with individuals outside of the internment.¹⁸⁴

4. *Application of the Convention by International Tribunals*

The Geneva Conventions have been used in a wide array of international litigation, including contentious cases in front of the International Court of Justice and international arbitral tribunals, and in international criminal litigation. In *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo*, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) alleged multiple breaches of the Geneva Conventions by Uganda, including killing, injuring, and despoiling DRC nationals of their property, by failing

¹⁷⁵ Geneva Convention II, arts. 22-40.

¹⁷⁶ Geneva Convention IV, art. 18.

¹⁷⁷ Geneva Convention IV, art. 19.

¹⁷⁸ Geneva Convention IV, art. 19.

¹⁷⁹ Geneva Convention IV, art. 21,22.

¹⁸⁰ Geneva Convention I, arts. 12-18.

¹⁸¹ Geneva Convention I, art. 16.

¹⁸² Geneva Convention II, art. 12-18; Geneva Convention 12-16.

¹⁸³ Geneva Convention IV, arts. 13-26, Part III.

¹⁸⁴ See Geneva Convention IV, arts. 83 – 116.

to take adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and by failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control for having committed the above acts.¹⁸⁵ The Court found that, among other things, the failure of the Ugandan forces to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants during the course of the armed conflict constituted a breach of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law.¹⁸⁶ The Court also found that Uganda's shelling of medical facilities, religious buildings, educational buildings, and civilian escape routes constituted a breach of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law.¹⁸⁷

The Geneva Conventions were also integral to the *Eritrea v. Ethiopia* arbitration, in which both parties to the arbitration were found to have breached the Conventions and international humanitarian law. The Commission found multiple breaches on each side of the conflict, including breaches for conduct involving both civilians and prisoners of war. Ethiopia was found in violation of multiple articles of Geneva Convention IV for unlawfully expelling Ethiopian nationals of Eritrean descent who did not hold dual citizenship, and for the inhuman conditions of deportation on some of these convoys to Eritrea.¹⁸⁸ Eritrea was found in breach of Article 35 of Geneva Convention IV for failing to ensure that some Ethiopian nationals who were lawfully expelled were allowed the opportunity to collect their personal property.¹⁸⁹ Among other things, Eritrea was also found in breach of multiple articles of Geneva Convention IV regarding both its unlawful detainment of Ethiopian nationals as well as the unsanitary conditions, denial of due process, and frequent abuse to which the Ethiopian nationals were subjected.¹⁹⁰

C. Overview and Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court ("ICC") was established in 1998 by the Rome Statute, and acts as a permanent international criminal tribunal under which individuals who commit or attempt to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression may be prosecuted and held accountable for their conduct.¹⁹¹ Per the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction when one of these four core international crimes was committed and the crimes were committed by a State party national, in the territory of a State party, or in a State that has accepted jurisdiction of the Court.¹⁹² Alternatively, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where the crimes were referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the UN Security Council pursuant to the resolution adopted in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.¹⁹³

The Prosecutor may begin an investigation before issuing a warrant if the crimes were referred by the UN Security Council or if a State Party requests an investigation for crimes that appear to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the Court.¹⁹⁴ Otherwise, the Prosecutor must seek authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber to begin an investigation *proprio motu* (on its

¹⁸⁵ *Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda*, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005 ¶ 68.

¹⁸⁶ *Id.* at ¶ 76.

¹⁸⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸⁸ *Civilian Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 17 December 2004.

¹⁸⁹ *Id.*

¹⁹⁰ *Id.*

¹⁹¹ Rome Statute art. 5.

¹⁹² Rome Statute art. 12.

¹⁹³ Rome Statute art. 13.

¹⁹⁴ Rome Statute art. 14.

own initiative) based on information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.¹⁹⁵ If the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court based on the criteria listed above, it shall authorize the investigation.¹⁹⁶

D. *Crimes Against Humanity*

Article 7 of the Rome Statute details the scope of the potential crimes against humanity that may be charged by the Prosecutor. A crime against humanity is defined as any of the listed acts as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”¹⁹⁷ This statute has a mens rea of knowledge to find someone guilty of a crime against humanity, but this element does not require that the perpetrator had actual knowledge of the attack, details of the plan, or policy of the state organization.¹⁹⁸ In order for the Prosecutor to successfully charge an individual with a crime against humanity under Article 7, the Prosecutor must be able to establish that the conduct was committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population” pursuant to a State policy, and that the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.¹⁹⁹

Crimes against humanity that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC include murder, extermination, enslavement, forced deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and other sex crimes, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and other inhuman acts “of a similar character.”²⁰⁰ Article 7 of the Rome Statute, as well as the Rome Statute Elements of Crimes supplement, provide further clarification on what types of conduct fall within the scope of crimes against humanity. For example, a charge of enslavement under Article 7(1)(c) must include the exercise of “the right of ownership” over a person, which includes human trafficking.²⁰¹ Likewise, in order for the Prosecutor to successfully charge an individual with enforced disappearance under Article 7(1)(i), the Prosecutor must establish that the individual intended to remove the disappeared persons from “the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”²⁰²

Since its establishment, the Prosecutor has charged and tried multiple individuals for violations of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. In *The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga*, the Prosecutor charged Germain Katanga, the Commander of the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and Brigadier-General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) with crimes against humanity in relation to an attack on Bogoro, a village in the Ituri district of the DRC, that took place in February 2003.²⁰³ The Prosecutor alleged that Katanga and his co-perpetrators directed this attack against civilians to raze Bogoro and its predominantly Hema civilian population, and implemented this plan by engaging in widespread killing and imprisonment, destroyed civilian homes, raped civilian women and girls, and prevented civilians

¹⁹⁵ Rome Statute art. 15.

¹⁹⁶ Rome Statute art. 15.

¹⁹⁷ Rome Statute art. 7(1)

¹⁹⁸ ICC Elements Art. 8(2)

¹⁹⁹ See Rome Statute art. 7(2)(a).

²⁰⁰ Rome Statute arts. 7(1)(a)-(k).

²⁰¹ Rome Statute art. 7(2)(c) (However, this crime must also satisfy the element regarding the existence of a widespread attack on a population, and therefore a non-State organization conducting human trafficking for financial reasons would likely not fall under the scope of art. 7(1)(c)).

²⁰² Rome Statute art. 7(2)(h).

²⁰³ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07- Warrant of Arrest, Judge Kuenyehia, 7 (July 2, 2007).

from fleeing.²⁰⁴ The FRPI also pillaged the property mainly of Hema civilians of Bogoro after the attack, and abducted women and girls from Bogoro and used them as “wives” of FRPI combatants.¹⁰ Among other things, Katanga was charged as an accessory to murder under Article 7(1)(a) and was found guilty.²⁰⁵ He was sentenced to twelve years in prison for his crimes.²⁰⁶

The Appellate Court’s acquittal of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in *The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo* illustrates the level of direct control an individual must have in order to be liable for the conduct of those under his or her command. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo was President and Commander-in-chief of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (“MLC”), and was originally convicted by the Trial Court for the murders and rapes of all the soldiers under his direction, even though the Prosecutor did not establish that Bemba had control of the conduct of these soldiers.²⁰⁷ The Appeals Chamber found that Bemba could not be held criminally liable for the acts of all MLC troops during the CAR operation for multiple reasons.²⁰⁸ Among other issues, Appeals Court found the trial court failed to recognize the limitations Bemba faced in investigating and prosecuting these crimes given his role as a remote commander of troops in a foreign country²⁰⁹ and that MLC relied heavily on the cooperation of CAR authorities during the time in question.²¹⁰

E. War Crimes

As with Article 7 and crimes against humanity, Article 8 defines the scope of what conduct constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. In order for any of the conduct listed under Article 8, it must be committed during a time of either international or non-international armed conflict.²¹¹ The first section of Article 8 establishes that any “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions constitute a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, including wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering, extensive destruction of property, depriving prisoners of war various rights, unlawful deportation or transfer of individuals, and the taking of hostages.²¹² The second section of Article 8 outlines various other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including but not limited to launching intentional or indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations, targeting civilian infrastructure or religious, cultural, medical, or educational institutions, subjecting individuals to unnecessary medical experimentation, and the use of various types of inhuman weapons or projectiles.²¹³ In order to convict an individual of a war crime, the Prosecutor must establish that the individual directed or participated in the conduct.²¹⁴

War crimes are some of the most common charges brought by the Prosecutor. In *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi*, Al Mahdi was convicted under Article 8 of the Rome

²⁰⁴ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07-Pre-Trial Chamber I, Judge Kuenyehia, ¶ 17 (Sept. 30, 2008).

²⁰⁵ *Prosecutor v. Katanga*, ICC-01/04-01/07-Trial Chamber II, Judge Cotte, ¶ 7 (Mar. 7, 2014).

²⁰⁶ *Katanga Case*, INT’L CRIM. CT. PROJECT (last visited Mar. 31, 2022), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/katanga>.

²⁰⁷ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, ICC-01/05-01/08- Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, ¶ 30 (June 8, 2018).

²⁰⁸ *Id.* at ¶33

²⁰⁹ *Id.* at ¶25

²¹⁰ *Id.*

²¹¹ See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a-e) (This differs from Article 7 crimes against humanity, which can be committed during peacetime so long as the conduct is still part of a widespread State policy).

²¹² Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(a)(i-vii).

²¹³ See Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(b)(i-xxvi).

²¹⁴ ICC Elements, art. 8.

Statute.²¹⁵ Al Mahdi was an alleged member of Ansar Eddine, which was a movement associated with the terrorist group Al Qaeda. Al Mahdi was charged under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute with intentionally directing attacks toward multiple religious and cultural institutions, including nine mausoleums and one mosque. These attacks had no military objective, and the destruction of the religious and historical buildings was considered as a serious matter by the people in the community. In order to convict Al Mahdi of this crime, the Prosecutor needed to establish that he had directed the attack, that the attacks targeted on or more buildings dedicated to one of the purposes enumerated in the statute, that he intended these buildings to be the target of the attack, and that the conduct took place within the context of an armed conflict.

There are five elements for Article 8 (2) (e) (iv), war crime of attacking protected objects: (1) The perpetrator directed an attack; (2) The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives; (3) The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack; (4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict, and that he was aware of the existence of the armed conflict.²¹⁶ The Trial Court determined that these elements were met, and Al Mahdi was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison for his involvement in these war crimes.²¹⁷

V. MOST RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

This section will identify the individuals most responsible for the war crimes being committed in Ukraine by Russia. It will provide a brief overview of the role the individual holds in the Russian senior leadership and a biography. Figure 9 at the end of this section contains a full list of the command and control of Russian senior leadership, and more can be read regarding the senior leadership in Appendix D.

This section is not an exhaustive list, but merely an introduction to those responsible at the highest levels. Notably, this section will begin with the individual most responsible for the current perpetration of crimes against humanity in Ukraine — Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

Figure 9 on next page.


²¹⁵ *The Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi*, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15-171, 27 Sep. 2016.

²¹⁶ *Id.*

²¹⁷ *Id.* (Al Mahdi's sentence was reduced by the Appellate Court by two years and will be complete on Sep. 18, 2022).

Command & Control Diagram

See Key Leader Biographies in Appendix C of the white paper for more information on individuals.



A. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is the President of the Russian Federation, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Chairman of the Russian Security Council.²¹⁸ Moreover, Putin is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 336 of the 450 in the State Duma.²¹⁹ United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland.²²⁰ While Putin is not the official leader of the United Russia party, he is the de facto leader of it and the party fully supports his policies.²²¹

On February 24, 2022, Putin announced that Russian armed forces were launching a “special military operation” in eastern Ukraine.²²² In his speech announcing such an operation, Putin claimed that Russia sought the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine.²²³ Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government was a Nazi government and that it was committing genocide against Russians speaking Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine.²²⁴ Within minutes of Putin’s speech, explosions were reported across Ukraine, including in locations such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region.²²⁵

Notably, on March 18, 2022, Putin attended a concert at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow to commemorate the eighth anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea.²²⁶ At that rally, Putin reiterated his false claims that Ukraine was committing genocide against Russian-speaking individuals in the Donbas and stated that it was the main reason for the invasion.²²⁷ He also stated that “[f]or a world without Nazism,” Russia “will definitely implement all [of its] plans” in Ukraine.²²⁸

²¹⁸ The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, *Vladimir Putin*, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Mar. 9, 2022), <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Putin>.

²¹⁹ *State Duma seats distribution in Russia 2021, by faction*, STATISTA (Mar. 23, 2021), <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1196615/state-duma-composition-in-russia/>.

²²⁰ See, e.g., Henry E. Hale, *The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development*, 12 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 169 (2004).

²²¹ See Andrey Pertsev, *A New Role for United Russia*, CARNEGIE MOSCOW CTR. (Dec. 2, 2018) (discussing how Putin is not directly affiliated with the United Russia Party, nor holds an official role. Instead, he utilizes United Russia for his own political gain.).

²²² Andrew Osborn & Polina Nikolskaya, *Russia’s Putin authorises ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine*, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/>.

²²³ See Anton Troianovski, *Why Vladimir Putin Invokes Nazis to Justify His Invasion of Ukraine*, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/17/world/europe/ukraine-putin-nazis.html>.

²²⁴ See *id.*; see also Max Fisher, *Putin’s Baseless Claims of Genocide Hint at More Than War*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/19/world/europe/putin-ukraine-genocide.html>.

²²⁵ Jordan Williams, *Explosions heard in major Ukrainian cities following Putin’s announcement*, THE HILL (Feb. 23, 2022), <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/595609-explosions-heard-in-major-ukraine-cities-following-putin-announcement>.

²²⁶ Tara John et al., *Putin Celebrates anniversary of Crimea annexation at stadium rally amid Russia’s onslaught of Ukraine*, CNN (Mar. 18, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/18/europe/russia-putin-ukraine-invasion-rally-intl/index.html>.

²²⁷ *Id.*

²²⁸ *Id.*

B. Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov

As the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov is the highest-ranking officer of the Russian Armed Forces and the senior-most uniformed military officer.²²⁹ This position is comparable to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²³⁰ Gerasimov was born on September 8, 1955, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, Soviet Union.²³¹ From 1971 to 1973, Gerasimov attended the Kazan Suvorov Military School.²³² From 1973 to 1977, he attended the Kazan Higher Tank Command School.²³³ Following his studies at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, Gerasimov was assigned to the post of commander of a Mechanized Infantry platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District.²³⁴ From 1993 to 1995, Gerasimov was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District.²³⁵

From 1984 to 1987, Gerasimov studied at the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy. Finally, from 1995 to 1997, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.²³⁶ Following his graduation from the General Staff academy, Gerasimov served as the First Deputy Army Commander within the Moscow Military District as well as the commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War.²³⁷

In 2006, Gerasimov became the commander of the Leningrad Military District before being moved to command the Moscow Military District in 2009.²³⁸ On December 23, 2010, Gerasimov became the deputy Chief of the General Staff.²³⁹ In 2012, he was assigned to command the Central Military District. On November 6, 2012, Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.²⁴⁰

In February 2013, Gerasimov published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” in the Russian trade-paper *Military-Industrial Kurier*.²⁴¹ In this article, Gerasimov laid out a new theory of modern warfare.²⁴² According to *Politico*, this new theory, known as the Gerasimov Doctrine, “took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war, and laid out a new theory of modern warfare—one that looks more like hacking an enemy’s society than attacking it head-on.”²⁴³ Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has

²²⁹ See Ellen Mitchell, *Top Russian commander arrives in Belarus for war games*, THE HILL (Feb. 9, 2022), <https://thehill.com/policy/defense/593598-top-russian-commander-arrives-in-belarus-for-war-games>.

²³⁰ Valeriy Gerasimov, RUSS. MINISTRY OF DEF. (n.d.),

https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/deputy/more.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee.

²³¹ Due to Russian-sponsored websites crashing or becoming inoperable during the construction of this paper, this information cannot be cited. For further reading, see *infra* Appendix D.

²³² *Id.*

²³³ *Id.*

²³⁴ *Id.*

²³⁵ *Id.*

²³⁶ *Id.*

²³⁷ *Id.*

²³⁸ *Id.*

²³⁹ *Id.*

²⁴⁰ *Id.*

²⁴¹ Molly K. McKew, *The Gerasimov Doctrine*, POLITICO MAG. (Oct. 2017),

<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538/>.

²⁴² *Id.*

²⁴³ *Id.*

grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness . . . [a]ll this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.”²⁴⁴

C. *Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky*

Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky is a member of the General Staff, responsible for disseminating the Commander-in-Chief’s policies, transmits his orders, and oversees the execution of such orders.²⁴⁵ Bogdanovsky was born on January 17, 1957, in Predgorny, Russia, Soviet Union.²⁴⁶ Bogdanovsky attended the Yekaterinburg Suvorov Military School from 1972 to 1974, and then the Moscow Higher Military Command school between 1974 and 1978.²⁴⁷ From 1984 to 1987, he attended the Frunze Military Academy. From 1994 to 1996, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.²⁴⁸

In 1978, Bogdanovsky joined the Soviet Army, where he served as a reconnaissance platoon commander, company commander, chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion, commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary from 1978 to 1984.²⁴⁹ From 1987 to 1994, Bogdanovsky was the chief of staff of fortified areas, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, and chief of staff of a motorized rifle division. From 1996 to 2006, he was the Chief of the 392nd Pacific Center for Training Junior Specialists of Motorized Rifle Forces.²⁵⁰ He also served, during this time, as the Chief of Staff and Commander of the 35th Army.²⁵¹

Between June 2006 and January 2008, Bogdanovsky was the Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District.²⁵² Following this post, from January 2008 to March 2009, he was the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.²⁵³ Between March 24, 2009, and January 9, 2011, Bogdanovsky was the Commander of the Leningrad Military District.²⁵⁴ On January 9, 2011, Putin issued a decree that appointed Bogdanovsky to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training.²⁵⁵

On December 13, 2012, Bogdanovsky was promoted to the rank of Colonel General.²⁵⁶ Following this promotion, he became the commander of the Central Military District; a position he held until June 12, 2014. On June 12, 2014, Putin once again promoted Bogdanovsky by Decree of the President, this time to the position of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed

²⁴⁴ McKew, *supra* note 241.

²⁴⁵ See Franz-Stefan Gady, *Putin Sends Russian Military to North Korea*, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 11, 2015), <https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/putin-sends-russian-military-to-north-korea/>.

²⁴⁶ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁴⁷ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁴⁸ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁴⁹ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵⁰ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵¹ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵² *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵³ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵⁴ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵⁵ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵⁶ *Supra*, note 233.

Forces of Russia.²⁵⁷ Between September 29, 2015, and October 1, 2015, Bogdanovsky took part in negotiations on coordination of actions with the Israel Defense Forces during Russia's military intervention in Syria. For his involvement in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Bogdanovsky was included in a Canadian sanctions list.

D. *Igor Olegovich Kostyukov*

Igor Olegovich Kostyukov is the Director of Russian Military Intelligence, heading the main intelligence department of the Russian General Staff and providing the military with intelligence.²⁵⁸ Kostyukov was a member of both the Soviet and Russian Navies and is currently an Admiral in the Russian Navy.²⁵⁹

Kostyukov was born on February 21, 1961, in Amur Oblast, RSFSR, USSR.²⁶⁰ On Nov 22, 2018, he was appointed the acting Director of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Department (GBU) following the death of Igor Korobov, who had held the role prior.²⁶¹ In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral.²⁶² Kostyukov is the first naval officer to hold the office of the Director of the GBU.²⁶³ While not much information is available on Kostyukov, it has been noted that he is a hardliner.²⁶⁴ He has been awarded the "Hero of Russian Federation" award.²⁶⁵ In addition, he was a high-ranking participant of the Syrian military operation and was praised by President Vladimir Putin, emphasizing his outstanding merits in Syria.²⁶⁶

E. *Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov*

Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov is the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, commanding the entirety of the Russian ground forces during the invasion of Ukraine.²⁶⁷ Salyukov was born on May 21, 1955, in Saratov, Russian SFSR, USSR.²⁶⁸ In 1977, Salyukov graduated from the Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School with a gold medal.²⁶⁹ In 1985, he graduated from the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy with high honors.²⁷⁰ In 1996,

²⁵⁷ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁵⁸ ANDREW S. BOWEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46616, RUSSIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2021).

²⁵⁹ *See id.*

²⁶⁰ *See Russia's GRU: New Chief, Same Goals*, WARSAW INST. (Dec. 10, 2018), <https://warsawinstitute.org/russias-gru-new-chief-goals/>.

²⁶¹ *Id.*

²⁶² *Cf. Russia's GRU: New Chief, Same Goals*, *supra* note 106, with Mike Eckel, *Coup Plots, Poison, Hacking, Sabotage: What Is The GRU's Unit 29155?*, RADIO FREE EUR. (Apr. 24, 2021) (showing that in 2018, Kostyukov held the position of vice-Admiral and that by 2021 he had been promoted to the position of Admiral.).

²⁶³ *Russia's GRU: New Chief, Same Goals*, *supra* note 106.

²⁶⁴ *See* Douglas London, *Putin, the emperor with no clothes*, CNN (Mar. 5, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/04/opinions/putins-war-ukraine-kremlin-power-london/index.html>.

²⁶⁵ *Russia's GRU: New Chief, Same Goals*, *supra* note 106.

²⁶⁶ *Id.*

²⁶⁷ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁶⁸ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁶⁹ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷⁰ *Supra*, note 233.

Salyukov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.²⁷¹

From 1977 to 1982, Salyukov held the positions of (i) platoon officer, (ii) company officer, and (iii) Chief of the staff for the Battalion Commander in the Kyiv Military District.²⁷² From 1985 to 1994, he held the positions of (i) Deputy Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, (ii) Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, and (iii) Deputy Commander of a Guards tank division in the Moscow Military District.²⁷³ From 1994 to 1997, he held the positions of (i) Commander of the 81st Guards Motor Rifle Division, (ii) Chief of the staff and Army Commander (35th Army), and (iii) Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.²⁷⁴

From 2005 to 2008, he served as the Chief of the Staff-First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.²⁷⁵ From 2008 to 2010, he held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.²⁷⁶ From 2010 to 2014, he was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. From May 2014 to the present, Salyukov holds the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.²⁷⁷

On February 23, 2022, the E.U. added Salyukov to its sanction list for being “responsible for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”²⁷⁸

VI. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

This section will detail egregious crimes committed on behalf of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The section will focus on the Russian Federation’s targeting of medical facilities, indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, willful causing of great suffering of civilians, murder, abduction and detainment of government officials and the taking of hostages, targeting of journalists and members of the press, bombing of evacuation and humanitarian routes, forced deportation of Ukrainian citizens, and genocide.

Similar to the previous section, this will not be exhaustive list of crimes committed in Ukraine by the Russian federation. Instead, this section aims to highlight certain representative crimes that indicate an intentional pattern of destruction, aggression, and murder. Further reading and analysis of war crimes committed in Ukraine can be found in Appendices B and C. Furthermore, an example indictment of Vladimir Putin for perpetration of these crimes can be found in Appendix A.

²⁷¹ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷² *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷³ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷⁴ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷⁵ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷⁶ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷⁷ *Supra*, note 233.

²⁷⁸ Jacopo Barigazzi & David M. Herszenhorn, *EU targets Putin’s inner circle with sanctions*, POLITICO (Feb. 23, 2022), <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-targets-putin-inner-circle-sanctions/>.

A. *Unlawful Targeting of Medical Facilities*

Intentional destruction of medical facilities²⁷⁹ and murder²⁸⁰ are violations of the Rome Statute. Further, unlawful targeting of civilian medical facilities²⁸¹ and the unlawful killing of civilians²⁸² are violations of the Geneva Conventions. The Russian military, led by Vladimir Putin, targeted and bombed multiple protected hospital units in Mariupol, Zhtomyr, and Kharkiv.

- In Mariupol on March 9, 2022, the Russian military bombed a maternity hospital in Mariupol, unlawfully killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 17 civilians.²⁸³
- In Zhtomyr on March 2, 2022, the Russian military bombed a children's hospital in Zhtomyr, injuring an unknown number of civilians.²⁸⁴
- In Kharkiv on March 11, 2022, the Russian military bombed a psychiatric hospital.²⁸⁵ In addition, between February 24 and March 21, 2022, the Russian military targeted, bombed, or otherwise compromised a total of 64 protected medical facilities, unlawfully killing at least fifteen civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.²⁸⁶

B. *Use of Indiscriminate Cluster Munitions*

Willful killing²⁸⁷ and extensive destruction of property carried out unlawfully and wantonly²⁸⁸ are violations of the Rome Statute. Further, attacks on a civilian population are a violation of the Geneva Convention.²⁸⁹ The Russian military has frequently used indiscriminate cluster munitions²⁹⁰ that killed and injured civilians in Okhlyrka, Vuhledar, and Kharkiv.

²⁷⁹ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(ix).

²⁸⁰ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a).

²⁸¹ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

²⁸² Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

²⁸³ *Mariupol Maternity Hospital Destroyed By Russian Air Strike, Triggering Global Horror, Outrage*, RADIOFREEEUROPE RADIOLIBERTY (hereinafter RFERL) (last updated Mar. 9, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mariupol-hospital-bombed-russia/31744934.html>.

²⁸⁴ Laurie Churchman, *Russia bombs Ukrainian maternity hospital in Zhytomyr as mothers and children 'flee to basement'*, THE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 2, 2022), <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-zhytomyr-hospital-bomb-b2026632.html>.

²⁸⁵ Natalia Zinets & Matthias Williams, *Ukraine says Russian forces hit psychiatric hospital but no one hurt*, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-hit-psychiatric-hospital-ukraine-regional-governor-2022-03-11/>.

²⁸⁶ *See Surveillance System For Attacks On Health Care (SSA)*, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [hereinafter WHO], <https://extranet.who.int/ssa/LeftMenu/PublicReportList.aspx?start=2022-02-24&end=2022-03-18&countryList=229&typeList=0> (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).

²⁸⁷ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(i).

²⁸⁸ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).

²⁸⁹ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

²⁹⁰ For further reading on the dangers of cluster munitions *see Cluster Munitions*, HUM. RTS. WATCH [hereinafter HRW] <https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/cluster-munitions> (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).

- In Okhtyrka on February 25, 2022, Russian military forces struck a nursery and elementary school with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least one civilian and injuring at least three civilians.²⁹¹
- In Vuhledar on February 24, 2022, Russian military forces struck a hospital with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring 10 civilians, and damaging the hospital and one ambulance.²⁹²
- In Kharkiv on or around February 28, 2022, Russian military forces struck multiple civilian residences with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing an unknown number of civilians, injuring an unknown number of civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.²⁹³ In addition, on February 28, 2022, Russian military forces struck multiple civilian residences with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing four civilians, burning alive a family of two adults and three children, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.²⁹⁴

C. Willfully Causing Great Suffering and Murder of Civilians

Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health²⁹⁵ and murder²⁹⁶ are both violations of the Rome Statute. In addition, unlawful killing of civilians²⁹⁷ and indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas²⁹⁸ are violations of the Geneva Conventions.

- In Mariupol, on March 16, 2022, the Russian military bombed a theatre being used to shelter civilians, unlawfully killing at least 300 civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.²⁹⁹

²⁹¹ *Ukraine: Cluster munitions kill child and two other civilians taking shelter at a preschool*, AMNESTY INT'L (Feb. 27, 2022), <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/ukraine-cluster-munitions-kill-child-and-two-other-civilians-taking-shelter-at-a-preschool/>.

²⁹² *Ukraine: Russian Cluster Munition Hits Hospital*, HRW (Feb. 25, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/25/ukraine-russian-cluster-munition-hits-hospital#>.

²⁹³ *Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Launched Into Kharkiv Neighborhoods*, HRW (Mar. 4, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/ukraine-cluster-munitions-launched-kharkiv-neighborhoods>.

²⁹⁴ George Sargent, Eleanor Whalley, Alessandra Prentice, & Natalia Zinets, *Ukraine's Kharkiv struck by cluster bombs, experts say*, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraines-kharkiv-struck-by-cluster-bombs-experts-say-2022-03-01/>.

²⁹⁵ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(iii).

²⁹⁶ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(i).

²⁹⁷ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

²⁹⁸ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

²⁹⁹ *'300 dead' in Russian Mariupol theatre attack, Ukraine claims*, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 25, 2022), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/25/ukraine-says-300-died-in-russian-strike-on-mariupol-theater>.

D. *Abduction and Detainment of Government Officials and the Taking of Hostages*

Taking of Hostages³⁰⁰ and detention and severe deprivation of liberty³⁰¹ are violations of the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions. Notably, Pripjat, Melitopol, Dniprorudne, Velykoburlutska, and Beryslav have endured such violations on a large scale.

- In Pripjat on February 24, 2022, Russian military forces seized the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and held at least 100 civilians hostage.³⁰² These civilian hostages were not provided basic amenities, including soap or water, and were not provided adequate food, water, or medicine.³⁰³ The civilian hostages were forced to perform labor related to the upkeep of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.³⁰⁴
- In Melitopol on March 11, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Ivan Federov and held him hostage for five days.³⁰⁵ Mr. Federov was released in a prisoner exchange on March 16, 2022.³⁰⁶
- In Dniprorudne on March 13, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Yevhen Matveyev.³⁰⁷ As of March 31, 2022, Mr. Matveyev has not been released from Russian custody.
- In Velykoburlutska on March 17, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Viktor Tereshchenko from his office.³⁰⁸ Mr. Tereshchenko was released on March 18, 2022, and went to the hospital for injuries sustained as a result of the Russian military.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁰ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(viii); Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³⁰¹ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(e); Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³⁰² Ben Tobias, *Ukraine war: Chernobyl workers' 12-day ordeal under Russian guard*, BBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60638949>.

³⁰³ *Id.*: see also James Callery, *Chernobyl technicians held 'like prisoners in a Russian concentration camp'*, THE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2022), <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chernobyl-technicians-held-like-prisoners-in-a-russian-concentration-camp-5zz6cxxd5#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThey%20can%20take%20a%20shower,is%20no%20supply%20of%20medicines.>

³⁰⁴ *Chernobyl workers held 'hostage' amid fears for reactor safety*, FRANCE24 (Mar. 16, 2022), <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220316-chernobyl-workers-held-hostage-amid-fears-for-reactor-safety>.

³⁰⁵ Meredith Deliso, *Kidnapped Ukrainian mayor freed in 'special operation,' officials say*, ABCNEWS (Mar. 17, 2022), <https://abcnews.go.com/International/kidnapped-ukrainian-mayor-freed-special-operation-ukrainian-government/story?id=83486933>.

³⁰⁶ *Id.*

³⁰⁷ Isabelle Khurshudyan, Annabelle Timsit, & Timothy Bella, *Reports of Russia abducting two mayors signal ominous new phase of Ukraine invasion*, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/13/ukraine-mayor-abduction-kidnapping-dniprorudne-yevhen-matveev/>.

³⁰⁸ Josh Pennington & Hira Humayun, *Mayor of Velykoburlutska in northeastern Ukraine "captured" by Russian forces, Kharkiv official says*, CNN (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-17-22/h_d08a14ef69458acb3ce95b5530170485.

³⁰⁹ Olena Mankovska & Francesca Giuliani-Hoffman, *Mayor of Velykoburlutska community released after being "captured" by Russians, Kharkiv governor says*, CNN (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-18-22/h_a2c3157f6fb63f39bfc78a366719187c.

- In Beryslav on March 19, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Oleksandr Shapovalov.³¹⁰ Mr. Shapovalov remains in Russian custody as of March 31, 2022.

E. *Targeting of Journalists and Members of the Press*

Targeting and killing of civilian journalists a violation of Articles 2 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Article 71 of the Additional Protocol I.³¹¹ In addition, intentionally launching indiscriminate attacks against civilians is a violation of the Rome Statute.³¹² Kyiv has witnessed numerous such violations.

- In Kyiv, on March 13, 2022, Russian military forces shot at and unlawfully killed journalist Brent Renaud and injured journalist Juan Arrendondo.³¹³
- In addition, on March 14, 2022, the Russian military shelled and unlawfully killed journalists Oleksandra “Sasha” Kuvshynova and Pierre Zakrzewski and seriously injured journalist Benjamin Hall.³¹⁴
- Including the above crimes, Russian military forces have unlawfully killed at least five journalists, injured seven journalists, and abducted six journalists since February 24, 2022.

F. *Bombing of Evacuation and Humanitarian Routes*

Targeting civilian escape routes³¹⁵ and interfering with the delivery of humanitarian aid³¹⁶ are violations of the Geneva Convention. Further, intentionally directing attacks toward the civilian population³¹⁷ and murder³¹⁸ are violations of the Rome Statute. Thus far in the conflict, Mariupol, Irpin, and Lyman have suffered numerous such violations.

- In Mariupol, on March 7, 2022, Russian military forces planted butterfly mines in a proposed civilian evacuation route in an attempt to seriously injure civilian evacuees.³¹⁹ In addition, on March 8, 2022, Russian military forces shelled a civilian

³¹⁰ Olena Roschina, *Kherson region: Russian occupiers kidnap mayor of Beryslav and activist*, UKRAYINSKA PRAVDA (Mar. 21, 2022), <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/21/7333376/>.

³¹¹ Geneva Conventions common art. 2, Oct. 21, 1950.; Art. 71 of the Additional Protocol I.

³¹² Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).

³¹³ Stefan Becket, *American journalist Brent Renaud shot and killed by Russian forces in Ukraine*, CBS NEWS, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/brent-renaud-ukraine-russia-american-journalist-killed/> (last updated Mar. 14, 2022).

³¹⁴ *Two journalists killed near Kyiv*, EUR. FED’N OF JOURNALISTS (Mar. 15, 2022), <https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2022/03/15/two-journalists-killed-near-kyiv/>.

³¹⁵ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³¹⁶ Geneva Conventions common art. 2.

³¹⁷ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ii).

³¹⁸ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a).

³¹⁹ David Hambling, *Russia Accused Of Using Air-Dropped Butterfly Mines To Block Ukrainian Evacuation Route*, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2022), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/03/10/russia-reportedly-blocks-ukrainian-evacuation-route-with-air-dropped-butterfly-mines/?sh=78794c141a32>.

evacuation route from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Mariupol and preventing civilians from evacuation Zaporizhzhia.³²⁰

- In Irpin, on March 6, 2022, Russian military forces fired indiscriminately at a civilian evacuation route, unlawfully killing four civilians.³²¹
- In Lyman, on March 13, 2022, Russian military forces performed an airstrike which indiscriminately struck a civilian evacuation train, killing one civilian and injuring one civilian.³²²

G. *Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Citizens*

Deportation of a population,³²³ enforced disappearance of persons,³²⁴ and unlawful deportation³²⁵ are each a violation of the Rome Statute. Mariupol, Donetsk, and Luhansk have had frequent occurrences of open and forcible deportation of Ukrainian citizens on behalf of the Russian Federation.

- In Mariupol, beginning on March 20, 2022, Russian military forces forcibly deported at least 15,000 Ukrainian citizens to the Taranog region of Russia while depriving them of all official Ukrainian documentation, including passports.³²⁶ At least some of these Ukrainian citizens are being transferred to other locations in southwestern Russia to perform forced labor.³²⁷
- In Donetsk and Luhansk, beginning on March 21, 2022, Russian military forces forcibly deported at least 2,389 Ukrainian citizen children to various locations within the Russian Federation.³²⁸

H. *Crimes of Aggression*

Crimes of aggression, enumerated in article 8 *bis* of the Rome Statute, were added to the statute in 2010 and generally prohibit State conduct that is intended to position an individual to

³²⁰ Matthias Williams, *Ukraine Says Russia Is Shelling Evacuation Route From Encircled Mariupol*, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2022), <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-03-08/ukraine-says-russia-is-shelling-evacuation-route-from-encircled-mariupol>.

³²¹ Lynsey Addario, *Russian forces fire on evacuees, leaving 4 people dead outside Kyiv.*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 6, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/world/europe/ukraine-irpin-civilian-death.html>.

³²² Anders Anglesey, *Russia Launches Deadly Strike on Evacuee Train, Ukraine Says*, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-deadly-strike-refugee-train-ukraine-war-kramatorsk-lviv-1687523>.

³²³ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(d).

³²⁴ Rome Statute art. 7(1)(i).

³²⁵ Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(vii).

³²⁶ Pavel Polityuk & Timothy Heritage, *Mariupol says 15,000 deported from besieged city to Russia*, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/mariupol-says-15000-deported-besieged-city-russia-2022-03-24/>.

³²⁷ *Claims Mariupol residents taken to Russia for forced labour*, Associated Press (hereinafter AP) (Mar. 20, 2022), <https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/03/20/claims-mariupol-residents-taken-to-russia-for-forced-labour/>.

³²⁸ Irene Nasser & Teele Rebane, *Ukraine accuses Russia of forcibly deporting more than 2,000 children*, CNN (Mar. 22, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-22-22/h_4bbe7803db45db77ceef1ab33beb6489.

“exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”³²⁹ At the time of this publication, the ICC has not convicted an individual of the charge.

Currently, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression over the situation because neither Ukraine nor Russia are a party to the ICC.³³⁰ The ICC would have jurisdiction over crime of aggression if the United Nations Security Council asked the ICC to investigate.³³¹ However, Russia has a veto power on the UNSC and has since exercised it already by vetoing a resolution that denounces its invasion of Ukraine.³³²

Another avenue, through Article 14 of the Rome Statute, provides jurisdiction over crime of aggression when a State Party refers the situation to the Prosecutor of crimes happening within the jurisdiction of the court and the Prosecutor acts. However, this method also does not apply to the case at hand because neither Ukraine nor Russia is party to the ICC.³³³

A more viable avenue is through the United Nations General Assembly, authorized under Article 9.³³⁴ Through Article 9, the General Assembly members need to meet the required two-thirds majority vote in order to pass resolutions or answers to “important questions” regarding international peace and security.³³⁵

To convict based on crimes of aggression, the Prosecutor must prove three elements: (1) the perpetrator is either a political or military leader,³³⁶ (2) “the perpetrator was involved in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of such a State act of aggression,”³³⁷ and (3) the crime of aggression must be in violation of the definition from General Assembly (“G.A.”) Resolution 3314³³⁸ and the UN Charter.³³⁹ Moreover, the G.A. Resolution 3314 defines the act of aggression as an “invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State...however temporary.”³⁴⁰

Here, as also discussed in Section V, Vladimir Putin, and other top military and political leaders are the perpetrators.³⁴¹ Putin, under the guise of “special military operations,” sent Russian military into Ukraine on three different fronts. Such an act shows the plan and execution of the invasion.³⁴² The invasion is by the Russian Federation in the borders of Ukraine, a State by its own

³²⁹ Rome Statute art. 8.

³³⁰ Mike Corder, *Crime watch: ICC prosecutor is monitoring Ukraine invasion*, AP NEWS (Feb 26, 2022), <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-joe-biden-boris-johnson-international-criminal-court-413cf82bdbaf516e8f33eca7359d2101>.

³³¹ *Id.*

³³² Vanessa Romo, *Russia vetoes UN Security Council resolution that denounces its invasion of Ukraine*, NPR (Feb. 25, 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/02/25/1083252456/russia-vetoes-un-security-council-resolution-that-denounces-its-invasion-of-ukra>.

³³³ Rome Statute, Art. 14.

³³⁴ Derek Jinks, *Does the U.N. General Assembly have the authority to establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Syria?*, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014), <https://www.justsecurity.org/10721/u-n-general-assembly-authority-establish-international-criminal-tribunal-syria/>.

³³⁵ *Id.*

³³⁶ *Definition of the crime of aggression*, PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN & THE GLOBAL INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF AGGRESSION, <https://crimeofaggression.info/role-of-the-icc/definition-of-the-crime-of-aggression/> (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).

³³⁷ *Id.*

³³⁸ G.A. Res. 3314, at 142-3 (Dec. 14, 1974),

https://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/General_Assembly_%20Resolution_%203314.pdf.

³³⁹ *Definition of the crime of aggression*, *supra* note 225.

³⁴⁰ G.A. Res. 3314, *supra* note 227, at 143.

³⁴¹ *See infra* Section V.

³⁴² *See infra* Section II.

right.³⁴³ Thus, the crime of aggression charge is warranted, and is most likely to be charged under Article 9 of the U.N. Charter.

VII. CONCLUSION

Since the invasion, Ukrainian citizens have been forced to endure kidnappings, property destruction, starvation, terror, shellings, and murder at the hands of the Russian Federation. As is consistent with the complex and intricate history of Ukraine, Russia once again seeks to assert its dominance and control of the territory in wanton violation of international law and Ukrainian sovereignty. As of the writing of this document, President Zelenskyy continues to lead his country and seek peace for its citizens, while the Russian Federation continues its campaign of atrocities meant to terrorize Ukraine and strip it of its national identity.

There is no clearer violation of the laws of humanity. At its most basic elements, international law and the laws of humanity establish self-determination and self-expression of a people as fundamental rights free from infringement by foreign powers. President Putin, and the rest of his Russian Federation political and military command seek to upend these values and establish a new world order with authoritarianism, terror, and oppression at its center. The international community cannot remain silent, and the road does not end at sanctions — it begins.

Justice and accountability must take center stage as a response to this new Age of the Strongman. The international bodies of justice have remained silent in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma, China, Venezuela, and so many other countries and conflicts for far too long. It cannot remain silent in Ukraine. The international legal mechanisms are there and have worked in the past to hold perpetrators of crimes against humanity accountable. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone have shown that countering injustice and enforcing accountability is possible. However, the international criminal accountability system cannot remain a tool to wield against only African nations or areas lying in the remnants of a dissolved state.

The time to act is now. Further investigative inquiries over a consistent period with proper access and funding will be required to fully capture the criminal activity of the Russian Federation's terror campaign in Ukraine. This document, and the accompanying appendices, merely provides a snapshot of the crimes that have taken place in Ukraine.

Innocent civilians and non-combatants have suffered for too long in the face of international silence and acquiescence. Those civilians and non-combatants have shouted out in anguish, while the international community remains with folded arms, depressingly silent. However, February 24, 2022, marks an opportunity to change the tides and bring accountability, peace, and justice at the center of the new world order. It is an opportunity that cannot be missed.

³⁴³ See *infra* Section II.



THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK

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THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK

A

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

THE SPECIAL COURT FOR UKRAINE

THE PROSECUTOR

Against

**VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor, Special Court for Ukraine, charges:

VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN

with **THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE PRE-24 FEBRUARY 2022 NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE DONBAS, AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, AND OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND WAR CRIMES, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5, 6, and 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE** as set forth below:

THE ACCUSED

1. **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN** (“the **ACCUSED**”) was born on 7 October 1952 in Leningrad, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, now known as Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation.

Prepared by the Global Accountability Network

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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2. At all times relevant to this Indictment, a state of armed conflict existed within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, as established on November 4, 1991, by the “Law of Ukraine”. The armed conflict has characteristics of both an international armed conflict between the states of Ukraine and the Russian Federation and a non-international armed conflict between Ukraine and its regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively referred to as “the Donbas”.
3. At all times relevant to this indictment, a nexus existed between the armed conflict within the territorial boundaries of Ukraine and all acts or omissions charged herein as violations of the various sources of international humanitarian law and/or the law of armed conflict, including treaties, conventions, and those international norms and precedents constituting customary international law for the purpose of this Tribunal.
4. For the purposes of this Indictment, organized armed factions involved in this conflict include the Armed Forces of Ukraine (“AFU”), the State Border Guard Services of Ukraine (“SBGSU”), the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (“AFRF”), and elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (“AFB”).
5. For purposes of this Indictment, irregular and/or non-state combatants include the Donetsk People’s Militia (“DPM”), the Lugansk People’s Militia (“LPM”), and various mercenary groups (collectively “Russian backed mercenaries”), including, but not limited to the Wagner Group (“WG”).
6. The AFRF is the official state military of the Russian Federation.
7. The AFU is the official state military of Ukraine.
8. The SBGSU is, while not under the control of the military, effectively the equivalent of a state military force and/or organized state militia and coast guard of Ukraine, and is organized as such.
9. The AFB is the official state military of the Republic of Belarus.
10. The AFU consists of ground forces, an air force, a navy including sea, air, and infantry components, an air assault force, and special operations forces. The AFU also includes a national guard component called the Territorial Defense Forces (“TDF”) which includes, since February 2022, a Foreign Legion, the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine (“ILTDU”), which permits foreign nationals to formally enlist in the TDF of

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Ukraine as regular troops. The Russian Federation has refused to recognize members of the ILTDU as lawful combatants and members of the organized military of Ukraine, despite their status as such under Ukrainian law.

11. The AFRF is comprised of the Russian Ground Forces, Russian Navy, Russian Aerospace Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Airborne Forces, and Special Operations Forces.
12. The AFRF is under the direct control of the Security Council of Russia. Every decision made by the Security Council of Russia is approved by the President of the Russian Federation, who then issues decrees or orders implementing these decisions.
13. The AFB is under the command and control of the President of the Republic of Belarus via the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, over which the President has *de facto* complete control. The AFB consists of ground forces, an air force, and air defense forces.

THE INCEPTION AND EXPANSION OF THE ARMED CONFLICT

14. In 1991, Ukraine and the Russian Federation gained full independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Much of the geographical territories of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation have periodically been incorporated into larger entities including the Russian Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ukraine, a state with a population of roughly 44 million before the conflict at issue in the Indictment has a large Russian-speaking population and ethnic Russian population.
15. Since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ukraine and its people have developed close ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and its members and the European Union (“EU”) and its members. Ukraine has expressed interest in joining both NATO and the EU.
16. After the election of Viktor Yanukovich to the Presidency of Ukraine in 2010 however, he began to move Ukraine away from the EU and NATO and took steps to develop closer ties with the Russian Federation. The result was substantial civil unrest in Ukraine. Protests began in 2013 and by early 2014, the conditions in Ukraine were close to that of an internal armed conflict between those supporting the turn back towards the Russian Federation and those in favor of joining the EU and NATO.
17. The **ACCUSED** admits to having held a lengthy meeting with his security and defense officials regarding the occupation and annexation of Crimea, a region of Ukraine on or

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about 22-23 February 2014, when former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, fled Ukraine for Russia in the wake of protests and democratic movement colloquially known as the “Euromaidan” movement later transforming into the pro-democracy uprising called the “Revolution of Dignity” in Ukraine. The **ACCUSED** has publicly admitted that he gave the order to “...bring Crimea back into Russia” at the conclusion of the meeting.

18. The Crimean Peninsula has been a part of both Ukraine and the Russian Empire, and even after the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its port of Sevastopol has remained, with Ukrainian approval, the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
19. On 27 February 2014, members of the AFRF without insignia, under the direction of the **ACCUSED** began to occupy the Crimean Peninsula, commencing the international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
20. On 16 March 2014, with the support of the Russian Federation, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine.
21. On 18 March 2014, the Russian Federation formally annexed Crimea, in violation of international law and the Russian Federation’s written commitments to Ukraine.
22. On or about 6 April 2014, with the backing of the Russian Federation, pro-Russian Federation separatist groups staged protests in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively referred to as the Donbas.
23. On 7 April 2014, the self-proclaimed Donetsk People Republic (“DPR”) and on 27 April 2014, the Lugansk People’s Republic (“LPR”) was declared. Thereafter, referendums were held and both the DPR and LPR declared independence from Ukraine in May 2014.
24. An armed conflict ensued between Russian-backed irregular forces of the DPR and LPR and both regular and irregular forces of Ukraine. The conflict persisted for eight years and Ukraine suffered casualties in excess of 14,000. It remains unclear how many civilians and irregular forces were killed in the conflict between February 2014 and 23 February 2022.
25. Between February 2014 and 23 February 2022, the armed conflict in the Donbas was primarily a non-international armed conflict by virtue of the widespread use of pro-government and anti-government irregular forces and militias in opposition to the AFU and pro-Ukrainian irregular forces. There was both direct and indirect involvement of the AFU and AFRF.

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26. Commencing in the autumn of 2021, the AFRF began a substantial buildup of troops, equipment, and supplies along the Russian and Belarusian borders with Ukraine, as well as in the occupied Crimea. During the buildup, the **ACCUSED** and his administration repeatedly assured the world that the Russian Federation “had no plans” to invade Ukraine.
27. On 21 February 2022, the **ACCUSED** stated, in a public address to the Russian People, that the Russian Federation would recognize the DPR and LPR as independent from Ukraine, which it did on 22 February 2022.
28. On 24 February 2022, during a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, chaired by the delegation of the Russian Federation that had recently assumed the rotating Presidency of the Council, to address tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the AFRF, at the direction of **ACCUSED**, escalated the eight-year armed conflict between Ukraine the Russian Federation drastically by expanding the war across Ukraine.
29. Wider hostilities commenced at the direction of the **ACCUSED** when the AFRF commenced an armed attack on the territory of Ukraine, with the aerial and naval bombardment of multiple targets in Ukraine and a ground offensive along multiple fronts, including from occupied Crimea and the territory of the Republic of Belarus into Ukraine.
30. The attack spanned most of the Ukrainian territory, but was focused in the Kyiv region, Northeastern Ukraine centered around Kharkiv and Sumy, Eastern Ukraine including the Donbas region, and Southern Ukraine from Mykolaiv to Mariupol, as well as on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
31. The **ACCUSED** and all members of the AFRF engaged in fighting within Ukraine were required to abide by international humanitarian law and the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts and to the United Nations Charter, to which the Russian Federation bound itself by virtue of the Alma-Ata Protocol signed 21 December 1991 by 11 former member states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine, by which Protocol, the Russian Federation became a successor state at the United Nations to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
32. All offenses alleged herein were committed within the territory of Ukraine on or after 22 February 2014.
33. All acts and omissions charged herein as Crimes Against Humanity were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population of Ukraine.

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34. All acts and omissions charged herein as War Crimes were committed as part of a non-international armed conflict (Donbas 2014-2022) and an international armed conflict in Crimea (2014-Present).
35. The words civilian or civilian population used in this Indictment refer to persons who took no part in the hostilities, or who were no longer taking an active part in the hostilities.

INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED

36. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 35, which are associated by reference.
37. **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, the ACCUSED** last assumed the Office of the President of the Russian Federation on 7 May 2012. He had previously served in the role from 7 May 2000 through 7 May 2008. From 7 May 2008 through 7 May 2012, the **ACCUSED** served as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.
38. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the **ACCUSED** has been the President of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the Security Council of Russia.
39. In order to destabilize Ukraine, which the **ACCUSED** has claimed to be a fiction, to eliminate, in whole or in part, the Ukrainian national group by erasing the Ukrainian culture and national identity, and to expand the territory of the Russian Federation, the **ACCUSED**, with the assistance and complicity of, and acting in concert with, the Security Council of Russia, the Republic of Belarus and its armed forces and President, and the AFRF, directed the AFRF, non-state combatants, including the militias of the DPR and LPR, and mercenaries such as the WG, to conduct organized armed attacks on the territory of Ukraine, the AFU, the SBGSU, and Ukrainian civilian population.
40. Throughout the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the AFRF, under the authority, command and control of the **ACCUSED**, engaged in widespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population of Ukraine.
41. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the **ACCUSED** supported and encouraged all actions of the Security Council of Russia, the AFRF, and other combatants under his direction, acting in concert with the Security Council of Russia, the command staff of the AFRF, the non-state combatants of the DPR, LPR, and mercenary groups.

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42. The **ACCUSED** and the Security Council of Russia shared a common plan, purpose, and/or design (joint criminal enterprise) that was to use the AFRF and non-state combatants to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Ukraine, as evidenced by the “Russian Donbas Doctrine” first announced by DPR President Denis Pushilin and adopted by DPR and LPR, which called for a union state with the Russian Federation, in clear violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, guaranteed by international law, the Minsk Agreements, and the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 5 December 1994.
43. The crimes alleged in this Indictment, including but not limited to aggression, unlawful killings, abductions, forced deportation, targeting of journalists and civilians, and prevention of humanitarian aid, were either actions within the joint criminal enterprise or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise.
44. **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN**, the **ACCUSED**, by his acts or omissions, is individually criminally responsible for each of the crimes alleged in this Indictment, which crimes the **ACCUSED** planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or in whose planning, preparation or execution the **ACCUSED** otherwise aided and abetted, or which crimes were within a joint criminal enterprise in which the **ACCUSED** participated or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise in which the **ACCUSED** participated.
45. In addition, or alternatively, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN**, the **ACCUSED**, while holding positions of superior responsibility and exercising command and control over his subordinates, is criminally responsible for the crimes alleged. The **ACCUSED** is individually vicariously responsible for the criminal acts of his subordinates, including all members of the AFRF, in that he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the **ACCUSED** failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

CHARGES

46. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 47, which are associated by reference.

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47. At all times relevant to this Indictment, members of the AFRF and non-state combatants, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to the Security Council of Russia and **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN**, the **ACCUSED**, conducted armed attacks throughout the territory of Ukraine, including but not limited to Kyiv, Northeastern Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine including the Donbas, and Southern Ukraine. Targets of the armed attacks included civilians and humanitarian assistance personnel.
48. The attacks included, but were not limited to, widespread and systematic unlawful killings of civilians and journalists, the intentional and/or reckless destruction of numerous medical facilities and cultural institutions, the taking of civilian hostages, the forced deportation of Ukrainian citizens, and the targeting of humanitarian assistance efforts.
49. The Prosecutor alleges, in the following Counts, numerous representative actions constituting violations of international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict, however, it should be noted that these offenses are not the sole instances of unlawful conduct and that the full breadth and scope of the joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy shall be the subject of the trial of the **ACCUSED**, and the **ACCUSED** is hereby placed on notice that the Prosecutor intends to and shall present evidence of further conduct in support of its case against the accused as to each Count stated in this Indictment.

COUNT 1: THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

50. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 49, which are associated by reference.
51. The **ACCUSED**, at all times relevant to this Indictment, was a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political and/or military action of the Russian Federation.
52. The **ACCUSED**, by his own public statements, engaged in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to wit: the **ACCUSED** through his own actions and omissions between 22 February 2014 and 31 March 2022, engaged in a course of conduct that directly caused aggressive actions to be taken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

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53. The **ACCUSED** was directly involved in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the use of armed force by the State of the Russian Federation against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and/or political independence of Ukraine.
54. The **ACCUSED** directly precipitated the use of armed force by the Russian Federation in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to which the Russian Federation is bound by virtue of the Alma-Ata Protocol.
55. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which defines aggression, the **ACCUSED** participated in numerous acts of aggression against Ukraine constituting collectively, and individually, the Crime of Aggression.
56. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the invasion or attack by the AFRF upon the territory of Ukraine and the military occupation of wide swaths of the territory of Ukraine, including, but not limited to the unlawful occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the occupation of the cities of Kherson and Mariupol in 2022.
57. The **ACCUSED**, and his subordinates, provided material support to armed irregular groups and mercenaries within the territorial bounds of Ukraine commencing in February 2014, most notably by providing arms, equipment, and other support to irregular armed groups of the DPR and LPR during the non-international armed conflict in the Donbas between Ukraine, the DPR, and the LPR.
58. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the AFRF bombardment of the territory of Ukraine and/or the use of weapons by the Russian Federation against the territory of Ukraine.
59. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the blockade of the ports and/or coasts of Ukraine by the AFRF, including the blockade, and in some cases the occupation of several ports of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
60. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the attack by the AFRF on the land, sea, or air forces, or marine and air fleets of Ukraine.
61. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the use of AFRF forces, which at the commencement of hostilities between the Russian

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Federation and Ukraine in 2014, were within the territory of Ukraine with the agreement of Ukraine pursuant the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet, signed by the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 28 May 1997. The treaty, among other things, provided for the leasing of the Port of Sevastopol and basing of the AFRF's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Ukraine, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement. A further such offense was committed by the extension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's presence in Ukraine beyond 2017, the termination of the agreement.

62. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of an act of aggression by the Republic of Belarus against Ukraine, when, acting in concert with his co-conspirators, the Republic of Belarus and its President, Alexander Lukashenko, the **ACCUSED** encouraged the Republic of Belarus to allow its territory, to be placed at the disposal of the Russian Federation in furtherance of the aforementioned joint criminal enterprise, to be used by the Russian Federation for perpetrating one or more acts of aggression against Ukraine.
63. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the sending by or on behalf of the Russian Federation, of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries into Ukrainian territory, which have carried out acts of armed force against Ukraine of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
64. Each of the foregoing offenses in and of themselves constitutes a separate Crime of Aggression and are charged in the alternative.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN**, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 1: The Crime of Aggression, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5 of UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 and customary international law.**

COUNTS 2 – 3: UNLAWFUL TARGETING OF MEDICAL FACILITIES

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65. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 64, which are associated by reference.
66. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** targeted and bombed multiple protected hospital units. Hospital units included, but were not limited to, the following:

Mariupol

67. On 9 March 2022, the AFRF bombed a maternity hospital in Mariupol, unlawfully killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 17 civilians.

Zhytomyr

68. In March 2022, the AFRF bombed a children's hospital in Zhytomyr, injuring civilians.

Kharkiv

69. On 11 March 2022, the AFRF bombed a psychiatric hospital in Kharkiv.
70. Between 24 February 2022 and 21 March 2022, the Russian military targeted, bombed, or otherwise compromised a total of 64 protected medical facilities, unlawfully killing at least fifteen civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN**, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 2: Intentional destruction of medical facilities, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ix) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

Count 3: Murder, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(a) OF THE ROME STATUTE

**COUNTS 4-5: USE OF INDISCRIMINATE FORCE AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS,
INCLUDING THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS**

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71. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 70, which are associated by reference.
72. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** engaged in the widespread and systematic use of indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas and targets, including, but not limited to, the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions that killed and injured civilians. Instances of the indiscriminate targeting of civilians included, but were not limited to, the following:

Okhtyrka

73. On 25 February 2022, AFRF forces struck a nursery and elementary school in Okhtyrka with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least one civilian and injuring at least three civilians.

Vuhledar

74. On 24 February 2022, the AFRF struck a hospital in Vuhledar indiscriminately with cluster munitions, thereby unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring 10 civilians, and damaging the hospital and one ambulance.

Kharkiv

75. On or around 28 February 2022, the AFRF struck multiple civilian residences in the Kharkiv region indiscriminately with cluster munitions, thereby unlawfully killing at least nine civilians, injuring at least 37 civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.
76. On 3 March 2022, the AFRF struck multiple civilian residences in the Kharkiv region indiscriminately with cluster munitions, thereby unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring at least 16 civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.

Mariupol

77. Starting on or around 12 March 2022, the AFRF began a barrage of constant shelling in the town of Mariupol. The shelling has interrupted humanitarian aid and civilian access to basic necessities and has killed at least 1,500 civilians.

Irpin

78. Starting on or around 6 March 2022, the ARF began a barrage of constant shelling in the town of Irpin, killing at least five civilians and injuring civilians.

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By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 4: Willful killing, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute**

Count 5: Extensive destruction of property carried out unlawfully and wantonly, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute;**

COUNTS 6 – 7: WILLFULLY CAUSING GREAT SUFFERING AND MURDER OF CIVILIANS

79. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 78, which are associated by reference.
80. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** bombed a theatre being used to shelter civilians in Mariupol, Ukraine, that at the time of such targeting, was clearly marked in the Russian language with the word “Children”, thereby intentionally and unlawfully killing at least 300 civilians and injuring numerous other civilians.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 6: Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(iii) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

And:

Count 7: Murder, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(i) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

COUNT 8 – 9: ABDUCTION AND DETAINMENT OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

81. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 80, which are associated by reference.

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

82. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** abducted and detained multiple public officials, including but not limited to:

Melitopol

83. On 11 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Ivan Federov and held him hostage for five days. Mr. Federov was released in a prisoner exchange on 16 March 2022.

Dniprorudne

84. On 13 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Yevhen Matveyev. As of 25 March 2022, Mr. Matveyev has not been released from Russian custody.

Velykoburlutska

85. On 17 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Viktor Tereshchenko from his office. Mr. Tereshchenko was released on 18 March 2022 and went to the hospital for injuries sustained because of the Russian military.

Beryslav

86. On 19 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Oleksandr Shapovalov. Mr. Shapovalov remains in Russian custody as of 25 March 2022.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 8: Taking of Hostages, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(viii) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

And:

Count 9: Detention and Severe Deprivation of Liberty, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(e) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

COUNTS 10 – 11: TAKING OF HOSTAGES

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

87. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 86, which are associated by reference.
88. On 24 February 2022, Russian military forces seized the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near Pripyat, Ukraine, and held at least 200 civilians hostage until 21 March 2022. These civilian hostages were not provided basic amenities, including soap or water, and were not provided adequate food, water, or medicine. The civilian hostages were forced to perform labor related to the upkeep of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 10: Taking of Hostages, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(viii)**

Count 11: Detention and Severe Deprivation of Liberty, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(e) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

COUNTS 12 – 13: TARGETING OF JOURNALISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESS

89. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 88, which are associated by reference.
90. The Russian military, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** targeted and killed multiple civilian journalists and other members of the press, including but not limited to:

Kviv:

91. On 13 March 2022, Russian military forces shot at and unlawfully killed journalist Brent Renaud and injured journalist Juan Arrendondo.
92. On 14 March 2022, the Russian military shelled and unlawfully killed journalists Oleksandra “Sasha” Kuvshynova and Pierre Zakrzewski and seriously injured journalist Benjamin Hall.
93. Including the above crimes, Russian military forces have unlawfully killed at least five journalists, injured seven journalists, and abducted six journalists since 24 February 2022.

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 12: Murder, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(a) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

Count 13: Intentionally launching indiscriminate attacks against civilians, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(iv) OF THE ROME STATUTE

COUNTS 14 – 15: BOMBING OF EVACUATION AND HUMANITARIAN ROUTES

94. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 93, which are associated by reference.
95. The Russian military, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** targeted civilian evacuation routes and killed multiple civilians, including but not limited to:

Mariupol

96. On 7 March 2022, Russian military forces planted butterfly mines in a proposed civilian evacuation route in an attempt to seriously injure civilian evacuees.
97. On 8 March 2022, Russian military forces shelled a civilian evacuation route from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Mariupol and preventing civilians from evacuating Zaporizhzhia.

Irpin

98. On 6 March 2022, Russian military forces fired indiscriminately at a civilian evacuation route, unlawfully killing four civilians.

Lyman

99. On 13 March 2022, Russian military forces performed an airstrike that indiscriminately struck a civilian evacuation train, unlawfully killing one civilian and injuring one civilian.

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 14: Intentionally directing attacks toward the civilian population, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(ii) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

And:

Count 15: Murder, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(a) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

COUNTS 16 – 18: FORCED DEPORTATION OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS

100. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 99, which are associated by reference.
101. The Russian military, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** began forcibly deporting Ukrainian citizens to Russia, including but not limited to:

Mariupol

102. Starting on 20 March 2022, Russian military forces have forcibly deported at least 15,000 Ukrainian citizens to the Taranog region of Russia while depriving them of all official Ukrainian documentation, including passports. At least some of these Ukrainian citizens are being transferred to other locations in southwestern Russia to perform forced labor.

Donbas

103. Starting on 21 March 2022, Russian military forces have forcibly deported at least 2,389 Ukrainian citizen children to various locations within the Russian Federation.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

Count 16: Deportation of population, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(d) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

And:

Count 17: Enforced disappearance of persons, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(i) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

And:

Count 18: Unlawful deportation, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(vii) OF THE ROME STATUTE**

COUNTS 19: ATTACKS UPON NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES

104. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 103, which are associated by reference.

Chernobyl

105. On 24 February 2022, the AFRF seized the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near Pripjat, Ukraine, and held at least 200 civilians hostage until 21 March 2022. These civilian hostages were not provided basic amenities, including soap or water, and were not provided adequate food, water, or medicine. The civilian hostages were forced to perform labor related to the upkeep of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Zaporizhzhia

106. On or about 4 March 2022, the AFRF under the command and control of the **ACCUSED**, attacked the largest nuclear electrical power station in Europe, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant causing a large fire at an adjacent building, before seizing the plant. The fire posed a substantial risk to the nuclear power plant and could have resulted in radiological disaster impacting the surrounding area as well as non-combatant states across Europe.

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 30: Attacks upon works and installations containing dangerous forces, to wit: nuclear electrical generating stations, a **VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 56 OF THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I) and ARTICLE 15 OF THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL II).**

COUNTS 20: RECRUITMENT, USE, AND FINANCING OF MERCENARIES

107. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 106, which are associated by reference.
108. Beginning with the invasion of Crimea in 2014, the **ACCUSED** and his co-conspirators, recruited, used, and financed mercenaries engaged in offensive operations within the territorial boundaries of Ukraine.
109. At some point between 24 February 2022 and 31 March 2022, the AFRF began recruiting, enlisting, and transporting mercenary soldiers from the Syrian Arab Republic to act as mercenaries in the conflict in Ukraine. As of 31 March 2022, the AFRF has enlisted at least 300 soldiers to work as mercenaries.
110. The Russian Federation has offered each mercenary approximately \$7,000 per month to travel to Ukraine and participate in the conflict.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN** is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

Count 20: Recruitment, Use, and Financing of Mercenaries, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE RECRUITMENT, USE, FINANCING, AND TRAINING OF MERCENARIES.

Dated this 6 day of April 2022

The Prosecutor



THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK

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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
02/25/2022	Black Sea	Albawaba, "Russian Invasion of Ukraine from Feb. 24 to Feb. 27," https://www.albawaba.com/news/live-updates-russian-invasion-ukraine-1467594 . NHK World-Japan, "Report: Russian missile hits Japanese freighter in Black Sea," https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20220226_13/ .	1 injured when a Japan-owned cargo ship was struck by a missile off the Ukrainian coast	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
02/25/2022	Gorlovka, Ukraine	Reliefweb, "Attacks on Education in Ukraine (17 February – 02 March 2022)," https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/attacks-education-ukraine-17-february-02-march-2022 . Save the Children, "Ukraine: Attacks on Schools Endangering Children's Lives and Futures," https://www.savethechildren.net/news/ukraine-attacks-schools-endangering-children-s-lives-and-futures .	2 teachers killed when a missile struck a school, which also suffered broken windows and collapsed walls	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	
02/25/2022	Kyiv, Ukraine	Manchester Evening News, "Horror photos show Kyiv buildings in ruins after Russian rocket strikes hit Ukraine capital overnight," https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-attacks-bombing-pictures-kyiv-23213509 . New York Times, "Ukrainian Officials Report Missile Attacks in Kyiv," https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/24/world/russia-attacks-ukraine .	3 injured when a building in a civilian neighborhood was hit by rocket fragments during a Russian missile strike/rocket crash into a Kyiv residential village	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	

02/25/2022	Mariupol, Ukraine	<p>Amnesty International, “Ukraine: Cluster munitions kill child and two other civilians taking shelter at a preschool,” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/ukraine-cluster-munitions-kill-child-and-two-other-civilians-taking-shelter-at-a-preschool/.</p> <p>Reliefweb, “Attacks on Education in Ukraine (17 February – 02 March 2022),” https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/attacks-education-ukraine-17-february-02-march-2022.</p>	School No. 48 was struck by a missile and damaged, windows having been blown in and pockmarked with metal fragments	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Article 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	
02/25/2022	Obolon District, Ukraine	<p>1 News, “Russian tank runs over Ukrainian civilian car; driver survives,” https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/02/26/russian-tank-runs-over-ukrainian-civilian-car-driver-survives/.</p> <p>NY Post, “Russian tank maliciously crushes civilian car with driver inside,” https://nypost.com/2022/02/25/russian-tank-maliciously-crushes-civilian-car-with-driver-inside/.</p>	1 civilian man injured when a tank swerved to drive over his vehicle while still in it and then reversed back over it	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 153; Art. 126; Art. 127; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	

02/25/2022	Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Amnesty International, "Ukraine: Cluster munitions kill child and two other civilians taking shelter at a preschool," https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/ukraine-cluster-munitions-kill-child-and-two-other-civilians-taking-shelter-at-a-preschool/.</p> <p>Save the Children, "Ukraine: Attacks on Schools Endangering Children's Lives and Futures," https://www.savethechildren.net/news/ukraine-attacks-schools-endangering-childrens-lives-and-futures.</p>	at least 3 people killed, including 1 child, and 1 child injured while hiding in a preschool when Russian forces dropped cluster munitions on the nursery/kindergarten	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 75(2)(a)</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438</p>	
02/25/2022	Pripyat, Ukraine	<p>Bloomberg News, "Ukraine President says 137 killed, including civilians, in video address," https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-24/russia-ukraine-what-to-know-as-russia-attacks-ukraine.</p> <p>7News, "Chernobyl power plant employees held hostage by Russian forces, radiation levels rising," https://7news.com.au/news/ukraine/chernobyl-power-plant-employees-held-hostage-by-russian-forces-radiation-levels-rising-c-5845948.</p>	92 power plant operational personnel were taken hostage by Russian forces	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(e); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(c)(iii)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 75(2)(c); AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 371; Art. 146; Art. 147; Art. 349</p>	Reported by Ukrainian ambassador Oksana Markarova; radiation levels increasing since Russian capture of the power plant

02/25/2022	Zmiinyi Island	<p>Al-Jazeera, "Kyiv to honor troops killed defending 'Snake Island'," https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/russian-warship-go-f-yourself-kyiv-to-honour-slain-troops.</p> <p>BBC News, "Snake Island: Ukraine says soldiers killed after refusing to surrender," https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60522454.</p> <p>Kyiv Independent, "Border guards were killed defending Ukraine's Zmiinyi Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea," https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/13-border-guards-were-killed-defending-ukraines-zmiinyi-island-snake-island-in-the-black-sea/.</p>	13 border guards were killed in a Russian bombardment	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(b)(xi) Art. 8(2)(b)(xii)</p>		<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122</p>	<p>Reported by Advisor to the Interior Minister Anton Heraschenko.</p> <p>Treacherous Killing.</p> <p>No quarter.</p>
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
02/26/2022	Chernihiv	UP, "'Grad" shelling in Chernihiv, Ukrainian Armed Forces destroy occupiers' column" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326134/ image https://usukraine.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ukraine-pravda.jpg	Oleksandr Gashpar, an eyewitness, told Suspil'ne that Russian Grad rocket launchers shattered windows in the regional hospital in the surgeries building, the old boiler room and in the hospital's canteen.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	Kind of looks like Chernihiv City Hospital № 4 51.481910, 31.265322.
02/26/2022	Chernihiv, 51.5212, 31.3249	Amnesty International "Ukraine: Cluster munitions kill child and two other civilians taking shelter at a preschool" https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/ukraine-cluster-munitions-kill-child-and-two-other-civilians-taking-shelter-at-a-preschool/ Independent "War crime" – Ukraine preschool hit with cluster bombs, killing child and two adults sheltering inside" https://www.independent.ie/world-news/europe/war-crime-ukraine-preschool-hit-with-cluster-bombs-killing-child-and-two-adults-sheltering-inside-amnesty-says-41391538.html	Explosive weapon, likely an artillery shell, hits second story of kindergarden.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52(3)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 371; Art. 438	
02/26/2022	Pripyat, Chornobyl 51.388621, 30.093389	UP, "Chornobyl nuclear power plant operational, staff held hostage" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326199/	Acting General Director of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant Valery Seida and staff who were on duty on the day of the invasion of powerplant are among hostages being held by Russian army.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii); Art. 7(1)(e)	AP I Art. 75(2)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 371; Art. 438	

02/26/2022	Torets near Volokhiv Yar in Kharkiv region, Kharkiv-Izum route	UP, "Russian invaders opened fire at a public bus in Kharkiv region, killed civilians" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326204/ LB https://en.lb.ua/news/2022/02/28/9521_russian_troops_fire_bus.html	"Five persons are dead, six are wounded." Russian forces fire on public bus. Among the dead are two 42-year old women, two men aged 18 and 22, and another man whose age is currently unknown.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)(a)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	
02/26/2022	Kharkiv	Reuters "Ukraine says Russian troops blow up gas pipeline in Kharkiv" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russian-troops-blow-up-gas-pipeline-kharkiv-2022-02-27/ Kyiv Independent/State Special Communications Service of Ukraine Video https://twitter.com/i/status/1497728382875938816	Russian troops blew up a natural gas pipeline, causing potential environmental disaster	Russia		AP I Art. 55(1)		
02/26/2022	Kharkiv	UP, "In Kharkiv region, the Russian invaders are using internationally-banned butterfly mines" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326201/ Polish News, "Ukraine attacked by Russia. Butterfly mines in the Kharkiv region" https://polishnews.co.uk/ukraine-attacked-by-russia-butterfly-mines-in-the-kharkiv-region/	Ukrainian defenders found internationally banned cluster bombs with butterfly mines (the so-called "Lepestok" mines)	Russia	Art. 7(1)(h); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444 Art. 439; Art. 440 Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*	

02/26/2022	Kharkiv at 40a Buchmy Street, 50.026617, 36.364217	UP, "Russian troops shot a journalist in Kherson and struck an apartment building in Kharkiv" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326302/ Ukrainian Crisis Media Center, "Shot journalist, ambulance and apartment building shelling: Russian war crimes in Ukraine" https://uacrisis.org/en/shot-journalist-ambulance-and-apartment-building-shelling-russian-war-crimes-in-ukraine	Residential building targeted by missile.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 371; Art. 438	
02/26/2022	Kherson	UP, "Russian troops shot a journalist in Kherson and struck an apartment building in Kharkiv" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326302/ Video: https://twitter.com/i/status/1497635178805698562	"Dilerbek Shukurovych Shakirov, a civilian journalist for the "Around You" information weekly and a member of the "House of Hope" charitable foundation, was shot dead from a car with an automatic weapon near the village of Zelenivka in Kherson.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 79	ERDR under Part 2 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 126; Art. 127	

02/26/2022	Solom'yans'kyi district, st. Lobanovsky, 6, Kyiv 50.422209, 30.462892 (apartment building) 50.415613, 30.439812 (fire video)	<p>UP, "Russian missile hits an apartment building in Kyiv" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326038/</p> <p>Images: https://image.cnbcfm.com/api/v1/image/107021358-1645865269429-gettyimages-1238768444-AA_26022022_628349.jpeg?v=1645865293&w=929&h=523</p> <p>https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arcanglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/HP7RGNEW5YI6ZOZROT6ANQFDUU.jpg&w=916</p> <p>Dmytro Kuleba Tweet at 8:54 am https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1497465107961499649?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwrm%5E1497465107961499649%7Ctwgr%5Ehb_1_8%7Cwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnbc.com%2F2022%2F02%2F25%2Frussia-ukraine-news-us-europe-impose-sanctions-as-attack-continues.html</p> <p>Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/26/kyiv-residential-tower-hit-by-missile-as-fighting-rages-mayor</p> <p>Video of fire near airport: https://twitter.com/isstatus/1497481524530319365</p>	Russian missiles attack residential Solom'yans'kyi district near airport. Apartment damaged by missile strike. Other buildings were reportedly damaged by the missile attacks. Fires recorded on video.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	Geolocation from "Pesto Café" and "iHelp" in one of images.
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02/26/2022	Kyiv 50.532197, 30.660273	LB, "5 explosions happened in Kyiv close to TPP-6 (thermal power plant) with 3-5 minutes time difference (information added)" https://en.lb.ua/news/2022/02/26/9247_5_explosions_happened_kyiv_close.html	The explosions in Kyiv started around 20:35. In accordance with data provided by the Kyiv City State Administration there were 5 explosions that happened beside thermal powerplant, TPP-6, within 3-5 minutes from each other.	Unknown	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	
02/26/2022	bridge near the village of Stoyanka was blown up on the Kyiv-Zhytomyr highway	UP, "A bridge blown up on the Kyiv-Zhytomyr highway. One child dead, several people wounded" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326073/ Video of collapsed bridge : https://t.me/UkraineNow/2758	Two men and two women were injured and one approximately 8 year old boy died from a bridge near the village of Stoyanka being blown up on the Kyiv-Zhytomyr highway	Unknown when or who destroyed bridge	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 126; Art. 127	
02/26/2022	Kyiv	UP, "Shelling in Kyiv: one child killed, 4 people wounded" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326263/	Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital says artillery shelling results in a child being killed, two adults and two children injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 71	ERDR under Part 2 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Art. 112; Art. 113 Art. 115; Art. 434 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 126; Art. 127	
02/26/2022	Kyiv, on Central'na Street in the town of Borodyanka	UP, "Missile hits house in Kyiv region: 3 dead" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326192/ Nezavisne, https://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/svijet/Projektilom-pogodjena-kuca-u-Kijevskoj-regiji-ima-zrtava/706673	Missile strike on private home kills 3 civilians.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 126; Art. 127	

02/26/2022	Mariupol	UP, "Airstrike near Mariupol: more victims, nine wounded, among them a child" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326237/	40 houses are damaged from Russian airstrike.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I: Art. 51, Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	
02/26/2022	Mariupol	UP, "Invaders carried out an air raid in the suburbs of Mariupol: at least three people died" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326173/	house of Stepan Mahsma, the Mariupol district chairman, came under fire following Russian Airstrike.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	
02/26/2022	Mariupol	UP, "Invaders carried out an air raid in the suburbs of Mariupol: at least three people died" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326173/	At least three civilians were killed and six injured following Russian Airstrike.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 126; Art. 127	
02/26/2022	Sartanav	UP, "Airstrike near Mariupol: more victims, nine wounded, among them a child" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326237/	Russian invaders executed an airstrike on the town of Sartanav near Mariupol. At least four persons were killed, and nine, among them a child, wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	ERDR under Part 2 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 126; Art. 127; Art. 126; Art. 127	

02/26/2022	Ohtyrka	<p>IFJ, "Two Danish journalists shot and injured, now evacuated". https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-freedom/article/ukrainian-two-danish-journalists-shot-and-injured-now-evacuated.html</p> <p>Forbes "Хроніка війни, день третій. Битва за Київ. Тільки перевірена інформація" https://forbes.ua/news/khronika-viyni-den-tretiy-bitva-za-kiiv-tilki-perevirena-informatsiya-26022022-3912</p>	Danish reporter Stefan Weichert and photographer Emil Filtenborg Mikkelsen were shot by unidentified attackers when they were on their way to a shelled kindergarten in the town of Ohtyrka, north-east of Ukraine.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 126; Art. 127	
02/26/2022	Okhtyrka, Sumy region	<p>UP, "Strikes on a military unit and residential neighbourhood – 70 wounded", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326159/</p>	Three missile strikes on a military unit along with shelling of residential neighborhoods, injuring about 70 people. One woman killed. A child wounded on 2/25/22 dies.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127	

02/26/2022	Volnovakha	Pavlo Kyrylenko post: https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/494882795527613 video: https://twitter.com/i/status/1497504221742125056	15 civilians were killed from Russian firings of Grads and artillery. Multiple households, including two apartment blocks, were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 4 (2)(a); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 57	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440 Art. 121; Art. 122 Art. 126; Art. 127	
02/26/2022	Zmiinyi Island	UP, "Russia has seized a civilian rescue ship near Zmiinyi (Snake Island)" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326261/	a civilian rescue ship "Saphir" that was on a humanitarian mission was seized and is detained by Russian warships near Zmiinyi (Snake) Island.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I Art. 22	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
02/27/2022	Black Sea	Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine https://www.facebook.com/mvs.gov.ua/posts/320428143446175	Two civilian ships: tanker Athena and cargo Princess Nicole, were captured by Russians. Almost 50 civilian crew members taken prisoner.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii); Art. 7(1)(e)	AP II Art. 4(2)(c); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75(2)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 371	
02/27/2022	Kharkiv	The Guardian, "Liz Truss says 'nowhere left to hide' for Putin allies – as it happened" https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/feb/26/russia-ukraine-latest-news-fighting-kyiv-zelenskiy-assault-putin-capital	Gas pipeline catches on fire following attack	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I: Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433; Art. 371	
02/27/2022	Kherson , 46°44'47.1" N 33°23'35.0" E	Social Media https://mobile.twitter.com/kgb_files/status/1498018166705950730 , https://www.facebook.com/tsyhipa/posts/5629532223740046 IPR https://www.iphronline.org/ru-war-crimes-in-ua-4.html#_ftn1	Russians fire on civilian car, LP BT8338BX , killing one and injuring three.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(i)	AP II Art. 4(2)(c); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75(2)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444	
02/27/2022	Kyiv, Bucha (children's clinic) 50.547629, 30.208815	Censor.net, "Bucha after shelling by Russian occupiers: civilian buildings and private houses are on fire. Source: https://censor.net/en/p3319726 " https://censor.net/en/photo_news/3319726/bucha_after_shelling_by_russian_occupiers_civilian_buildings_and_private_houses_are_on_fire_photo Ukrinform, "Russian shell hits apartment building in Bucha, Kyiv region" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3414481-russian-shell-hits-apartment-building-in-bucha-kyiv-region.html	Civilian buildings destroyed by bombing, including a Children's Clinic.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	

02/27/2022	Kyiv, Vasyilkiv	The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/feb/26/russia-ukraine-latest-news-fighting-kyiv-zelenskiy-assault-putin-capital Image: https://twitter.com/UKRINFORM/status/1497727467267760132/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1497727467267760132%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_%26ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2Flive%2F2022%2Ffeb%2F26%2Frussia-ukraine-latest-news-fighting-kyiv-zelenskiy-assault-putin-capital%3Fpage%3Dwith%3Ablock-621ad1f38f08db56730fd2eefilterKeyEvents%3Dfalse	Oil terminal on fire from Russian attack	Russia		AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 51(4)(a)		
02/27/2022	Kyiv, Irpin, Ozernaya St.	Video https://t.me/dsns_telegram/3988	Three houses caught fire as a result of the shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 51(4)(c)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	
02/27/2022	Kyiv	Video https://www.facebook.com/100003480699663/posts/4765805120212131/	Russians shoot civilian man and dog	Russia		AP I Art. 52(2)		
02/27/2022	Luhansk, Happiness and Luhansk	Forbes, "Хроніка війни. 27 лютого. Київ відбиває атаки, світ готує посилені санкції, хакери б'ють Росію" https://forbes.ua/news/khronika-viyni-27-lyutogo-kiiv-chekae-na-obstrili-27022022-3939 Sergei Gaugau https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidai.10ga/posts/132382285967830	Private and apartment buildings affected by shelling, evacuation not possible, no access to food or water	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 51(4)(a)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	

02/27/2022	Mariupol	<p>BBC, "Ukraine conflict: The civilian lives lost to Russia's war" https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60547807</p> <p>Greek Prime Minister https://twitter.com/PrimeministerGR/status/1497677174924529670?s=20&t=eg1GBhqO4RbjPDHEqI045A</p> <p>Property damage video https://twitter.com/i/status/1497535835675189250</p>	10 Greek civilians killed by airstrike, civilian property damage.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4 (2)(a); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 57;</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433</p>	
02/27/2022	Okhlyrka District	<p>KI "Russians shoot down a bus with civilians in Okhlyrka district of Sumy Oblast" https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/russians-shoot-down-a-bus-with-civilians-in-okhlyrka-district-of-sumy-oblast/</p> <p>UP, "In the Sumy region, invaders shot bus with civilian people, didn't allow ambulance to pass" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/27/7326450/</p> <p>Dmytro Zhyvytsky https://t.me/Zhyvytsky/457</p>	Russians fire on civilian bus, casualties unknown. Russians preventing access to medical care.	Russia		<p>AP I Art. 10; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 51(4)(a)</p>		
02/27/2022	Volnovakha	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/495591338790092</p>	Bombing damages apartment buildings, infrastructure facilities, and a hospital. No water or electricity.	Russia		<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 57</p>		

02/27/2022	Zhytomyr	<p>Reuters "Ukrainian official says missiles launched from Belarus to Ukraine" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-official-says-missiles-launched-belarus-ukraine-2022-02-27/</p> <p>Video: https://twitter.com/i/status/1497983566499614722</p> <p>Names of dead https://zhzh.com.ua/en/society/2022-02-27-12594.html</p>	Missiles launched from Belarus and hit an airport. At least 2 dead and at least 3 injured.	Belarus/Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8 (2)(a)(i); Art. 8 (2)(a)(iii); Art. 8 (2)(a)(iv); Art. 8 (2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 4 (2)(a); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 57	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	the victims are a 41-year-old police major Volodymyr Solodchuk, deputy head of police Sector No. 1 of the Korosten district police department and a 40-year-old police major Ivan Geraimchuk, response inspector of the patrol police of sector of police work of the Korosten DPD
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
02/28/2022	Chernihiv	<p>OCHA, "Ukraine: Civilian casualties as of 24.00 28 February 2022" https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-civilian-casualties-2400-28-february-2022-enruuk;</p> <p>Forbes, "Monday, February 28. Russia's War On Ukraine: News and Information From Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/02/28/monday-february-28russias-war-on-ukraine-breaking-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=d9c9a8419227;</p> <p>RFERL, "Russian Rocket Blamed For Building Blaze in Northern Ukraine" https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russian-invasion-fire/31728004.html</p>	A missile hit a residential building, which set two of the lower floors on fire and injured on woman.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196;	

02/28/2022	Kharkiv	OCHA, "Ukraine: Civilian casualties as of 24.00 28 February 2022" https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-civilian-casualties-2400-28-february-2022-enruuk	Multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) hit residential areas in Kharkiv, resulting in 6 adults killed, 3 children killed, 34 adults injured, and 3 children injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art.115; Art.121; Art.122; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196;	
02/28/2022	Kharkiv	Forbes, "Monday, February 28. Russia's War On Ukraine: News and Information From Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/02/28/monday-february-28russias-war-on-ukraine-breaking-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=d9c9a8419228	An estimated 87 houses were damaged by during an assault on Kharkiv by Russian forces.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 153; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196;	
02/28/2022	Kharkiv	Forbes, "Monday, February 28. Russia's War On Ukraine: News and Information From Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/02/28/monday-february-28russias-war-on-ukraine-breaking-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=d9c9a8419227	Kharkiv was shelled by artillary between 1400 and 1500, Kyiv time. The shelling killed 15 military personnel, injured 16 civilians, and killed at least one civilian.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122	
02/28/2022	Kharkiv	The Guardian, "'Horrendous' rocket attack kills civilians in Kharkiv as Moscow 'adapts its tactics'" https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/ukraine-several-killed-by-russian-rocket-strikes-in-civilian-areas-of-kharkiv#:~:text=He%20said%20four%20people%20were,city%2C%20land%20among%20residential%20buildings.https://ukraine.bellinccat.com/https://t.me/Tsaplienko/1319	A family was caught in their car and burned alive following missile attacks.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	

02/28/2022	Moskovskiy District, Kharkiv	Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Launched Into Kharkiv Neighborhoods" https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/ukraine-cluster-munitions-launched-kharkiv-neighborhoods	A video uploaded to Telegram at 11:29 a.m. on February 28th, 2022, shows what appear to be cluster munitions hitting the Moskovskiy district of Kharkiv.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	
02/28/2022	Shevchenkivskiy District, Kharkiv	Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Launched Into Kharkiv Neighborhoods" https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/ukraine-cluster-munitions-launched-kharkiv-neighborhoods NEED ANOTHER CITE	A video uploaded to Telegram at 12:55 p.m., and a video uploaded to Twitter at 2:23 p.m. show what appear to be cluster munitions hitting Shevchenkivskiy District.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	
02/28/2022	Ivankiv, north of Kyiv	Forbes, "Monday, February 28. Russia's War On Ukraine: News and Information From Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyaSoldak/2022/02/28/monday-february-28-russias-war-on-ukraine-breaking-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=d9c9a8419227 ; NYT, "Treasured Paintings Burned in Russian Invasion, Ukrainian Officials Say" https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/28/arts/design/maria-primachenko-paintings-destroyed-ukraine.html ; https://ukraine.bellinecat.com/ ; https://t.me/ukraina_novosti/17365	"In the town of Ivankiv, north of Kyiv, Russian troops set fire to a museum of local lore. Unique paintings by Ukrainian artist Maria Pryimachenko were destroyed."	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52, AP II Art. 16	Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 428	

02/28/2022	Makariv	<p>RFERL, "Video Shows Elderly Couple Being Killed By Russian Armored Column" https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-makariv-russian-tanks-civilian-car-destroyed-killed/31744637.html;</p> <p>Twitter https://twitter.com/ArmedForcesUkr/status/1501162662369103872?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Cwtterm%5E1501162662369103872%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fukraine.bellingcat.com%2F;</p> <p>https://twitter.com/shcherbinainn/status/1498404775939002380?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Cwtterm%5E1498404775939002380%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fukraine.bellingcat.com%2F</p>	A BMP armored vehicle variant destroys a car, killing the two elderly occupants.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	
02/28/2022	Mariupol	<p>CNN, "Show this to Putin': A 6-year-old girl killed in Ukraine" https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/europe/gallery/ukraine-girl-killed/index.html;</p> <p>Twitter https://twitter.com/EMaloletka/status/1497988226711273476?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Cwtterm%5E1497988226711273476%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fukraine.bellingcat.com%2F;</p> <p>https://ukraine.bellingcat.com/</p>	A six year old girl was with her family at the supermarket when shelling started. She was wounded and brought to a hospital. Doctors were unable to revive her.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	

02/28/2022	Severodonetsk	<p>Interfax, "Case opened into fact of shelling civilians in Severodonetsk – prosecutor's office" https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/804551.html;</p> <p>Ukrinform, "One dead, several others wounded in Russian artillery attack on Severodonetsk" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3416007-one-dead-several-others-wounded-in-russian-artillery-attack-on-severodonetsk.html</p>	Shelling killed one woman, and seriously injured three other civilians, damaged residential buildings, and civilian vehicles	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122	
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03/01/2022	Kyiv	Reuters, "Russia bombards Ukraine urban areas as armed convoy stalls" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-isolation-intensifies-ukraine-fighting-rages-2022-03-01/;	A Russian missile hit a TV tower in Kyiv, near the Babyn Yar Holocaust memorial site. It killed at least 5 people.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 52	Art.188; Art. 194; Art.263; Art. 341	
03/01/2022	Zhytomyr Highway, west out of Kyiv	The Kyiv Independent, "Russian soldiers kill mother of two as she drives family to safety" https://kyivindependent.com/national/russian-soldiers-shoot-dead-mother-of-two-as-she-drives-family-to-safety/	A family including a father, mother, eight year old son, and 10 year old son, was escaping Kyiv when a Russian sniper shot the mother in the head through the windshield. The husband got out, and as he pulled his older son out of the car, the sniper shot him in the right leg. He went back for his younger son, and the sniper shot his younger son's leg. Then, the sniper the father in his other leg. A Russian convey gave medical aid to the survivors, and let the wife's parent's pick them up. They did not let the family take the wife's body.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51	Art.112; Art.113; Art.115; Art. 121; Art. 122	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/02/2022	Chernihiv	ABC, "Russia-Ukraine War: What to know on Day 7 of Russian assault" https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-state-of-the-union-address-kyiv-business-1fc732f01985f1b57e8dc5e7e411805f	2 cruise missiles hit hospital and authorities work to determine number of casualties	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 12; AP II Art. 11	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/02/2022	Kharkiv	Aljazeera, "Russia's invasion of Ukraine: List of key events from day seven" https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-list-of-key-events-from-day-seven Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HLSPoWoKNk ABC, "Sorting fact, disinformation amid Russian war on Ukraine" https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sorting-fact-disinformation-amid-russian-war-ukraine-83200673 Reuters, "Anger and disbelief amidst the rubble in Ukraine's Kharkiv" https://www.reuters.com/world/anger-disbelief-amidst-rubble-ukraines-kharkiv-2022-03-02/ NY Times, "What Happened on Day 9 of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine" https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/04/world/russia-ukraine/videos-show-widespread-destruction-in-civilian-areas-of-kharkiv	Russian air attacks on residential areas killed at least 21 people and wounded 112 over the past 24 hours. Kharkiv National University building was destroyed by shelling. Russian strike hit the regional police and intelligence headquarters. 4 more people died and nine more people were wounded air and rocket strikes on residential buildings continued. A hospital was attacked and the barracks of a flight school caught on fire after an air raid.	Russia	Art. 7(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 11; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 7; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 153; Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 298; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	

03/02/2022	Kherson	<p>NY Times, "First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets" https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/kherson-ukraine-russia.html?searchResultPosition=27</p> <p>CNN, "March 3, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news" https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-03-22/h_908c3139eb50f5ee8be88aa09b27c6f8</p>	<p>Port city on the Black Sea seized by Russian troops. After several days of fighting, 300 Ukrainian civilians and fighters left dead. Civilians trapped with no power and food shortage. Utility workers tried to fix damaged pipes and downed lines, but came under fire from snipers.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 438; Art. 442</p>	
03/02/2022	Irpın, Kyiv	<p>ABC, "Sorting fact, disinformation amid Russian war on Ukraine" https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sorting-fact-disinformation-amid-russian-war-ukraine-83200673</p>	<p>Rocket hit a multi-story residential building. Casualties unknown.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13;</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341</p>	

03/02/2022	Kyiv	<p>Cardiovascular Business, "War in Ukraine: Doctor from pediatric cardiology clinic shot dead" https://www.cardiovascularbusiness.com/topics/patient-care/war-ukraine-doctor-pediatric-cardiology-clinic-shot-dead#:~:text=Healthcare%20Viktor%20Liashko.-,Marina%20Kalabina%2C%20an%20anesthesiologist%20with%20the%20Center%20for%20Pediatric%20Cardiology,announced%20the%20news%20on%20Facebook.</p> <p>iNews, "Ukraine: Health worker shot dead in Kyiv by Russian forces as she drove injured nephew to hospital" https://inews.co.uk/news/ukraine-health-worker-shot-dead-kyiv-russian-forces-drove-injured-nephew-hospital-1493557</p> <p>AP, "Russia-Ukraine War: What to know on Day 7 of Russian assault" https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-state-of-the-union-address-kyiv-business-1fc732f01985f1b57e8dc5e7e411805f</p>	<p>Russian soldiers killed Marina Kalabina, after firing at her car as she was driving her wounded nephew to the hospital. Missile strike on train station as thousands of civilians try to flee. Powerful explosion was reported between the Southern Railway Station and the Ibis hotel where Ukraine's Defense Ministry is near. Station suffered minor damage.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i);</p>	<p>Com Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 7</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 414; Art. 444</p>	
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03/02/2022	Mariupol	<p>Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gg2FuyrhTtk&t=63s</p> <p>ABC, "Sorting fact, disinformation amid Russian war on Ukraine" https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sorting-fact-disinformation-amid-russian-war-ukraine-83200673</p> <p>AP, "Russia-Ukraine War: What to know on Day 7 of Russian assault" https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-state-of-the-union-address-key-business-1fc732f01985f1b57e8dc5e7e411805f</p>	Crowded urban areas were attacked, killing and severely injuring civilians. 1 boy died and 2 were wounded by Russian shelling. A woman also suffered severe wounds to her face from the same strike.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(h); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 3(a)	Art. 50(3); Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444	
03/02/2022	Port of Olvia— located in the Dnipro-Bug river estuary on the Black Sea coast, 15km (nine miles) south of Mykolaiv and about 110 km (70 miles) east of Odessa	<p>Reuters, "Two cargo ships hit by blasts around Ukraine, one seafarer killed" https://www.reuters.com/world/bangladesh-cargo-ship-hit-by-missile-crew-member-killed-bangladesh-official-2022-03-03/</p> <p>UNB, "Bangladeshi killed in rocket attack on ship" https://unb.com.bd/category/bangladesh/ukraine-conflict-bangladeshi-killed-in-rocket-attack-on-ship/88555</p> <p>FleetMon, "Bangladeshi bulk carrier hit by Russian Navy missile: 1 crew died UPDATE VIDEO" https://www.fleetmon.com/maritime-news/2022/37481/bangladeshi-bulk-carrier-hit-russian-navy-missile-/</p>	Missile launched from Russian Navy ship struck Bangladeshi vessel docked in Ukrainian port. Killed crew member, Hadisur Rahman.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 414; Art. 444	

03/02/2022	Zaporizhzhia	<p>Ukrinform, "Three people were killed and four others were wounded in Russian shelling of Vasylivka city" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3419187-russian-troops-shell-hospital-in-zaporizhia-region-killing-three-and-wounding-four.html</p> <p>Mind, "Russian soldiers shot a hospital in Vasylivka: civilians died" https://mind.ua/en/news/20237095-russian-soldiers-shot-a-hospital-in-vasylivka-civilians-died</p>	Russian troops fired on a hospital. 4 civilians were seriously injured and 3 were killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i);	AP I Art. 12; AP I Art. 51; AP II Art. 11	Art. 50(3); Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444
03/02/2022	Zhytomyr	<p>Ukrinform, "Commissioner for Human Rights: 21 children killed, 55 wounded due to Russian invaders' actions" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3418108-commissioner-for-human-rights-21-children-killed-55-wounded-due-to-russian-invaders-actions.html</p> <p>Video https://twitter.com/MFA_Ukraine/status/1498904318027649027?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwrm%5E1498904318027649027%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Esl_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.hindustantimes.com%2Fworld-news%2Fwatch-russian-forces-bomb-a-maternity-hospital-in-zhytomyr-101646207121581.html</p> <p>Hindustan Times, "Russian forces bomb a maternity hospital in Zhytomyr"</p>	Maternity house was destroyed. Russian troops continue shelling health institutions and ambulance cars. 1 child was killed and 6 children were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(h); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 12; AP I Art. 77; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 3(a)	Art. 50(3); Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/03/2022	Chernihiv	Daily Sabah, "Russian airstrikes in residential area kill 47 in Ukraine's Chernihiv" https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/russian-airstrikes-in-residential-area-kill-47-in-ukraines-chernihiv Forbes, "Thursday, March 3. Russia's War On Ukraine: News And Information From Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/03/03/thursday-march-3-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=3b1b6e03b5f NY Times, "What Happened on Day 8 of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine" https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/03/world/russia-ukraine/footage-shows-the-moment-a-ukrainian-residential-area-came-under-bombardment	Russian airstrikes in a residential district. 47 people were killed. Troops launched a missile on multi-story residential area in the city center, attacked 2 schools and private homes. More than 40 residential buildings caught fire. No military facilities were in the vicinity.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix); 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/03/2022	Kharkiv	VOA, "Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, March 3, 2022" https://www.voanews.com/a/in-photos-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-march-3-2022/6468484.html	Three schools and a cathedral were attacked. Several shops near the city council building were also damaged.	Russia	8(2)(b)(ix); 8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I Art. 15(5), AP I Art. 52(2), AP I Art. 53. AP II Art. 9; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 16	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/03/2022	Kherson	CNN, "March 3, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news" https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-03-22/h_13aec47b37002b5def61b0ec159e2c8c	Armed Russian forces completely occupied the regional state administration building. Civilians suffer severe lack of food and medicine. Significant looting by Russian troops.	Russia	8(2)(b)(xvi); 8(2)(b)(xiii); 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I, Art. 51	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 442; Art. 438	

03/03/2022	Kyiv	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russian-troops-in-streets-of-kherson-may-or-says-liveblog	At least four major blasts in the capital, unclear where the targets were, or whether there were civilian casualties.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I: Art. 51(4)(a)	Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341	
03/03/2022	Mariupol	Washington Post, "Mariupol, key Ukrainian port, under siege and out of water: 'We are being destroyed'" https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/03/ukraine-mariupol-siege-russia-invasion/	Russian soldiers destroyed bridges and trains and obstructed water, power, and food supply. Water towers and electricity substations were hit. Civilians trapped. At least 10 people killed in the past two days and more than 150 injured in the city's only functioning hospital. Russian soldiers looted grocery stores and banks.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xvi); 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 18(2); Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 442; Art. 438	
03/03/2022	Zaporizhzhia	NY Times, "What Happened on Day 8 of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine" https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/03/world/russia-ukraine Aljazeera, "Ukraine nuclear power plant attack" https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/4/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-attack-all-you-need-to-know NY Times, "A fire breaks out at a nuclear plant during a Russian assault, Ukraine says" https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/world/europe/nuclear-plant-fire-zaporizhzhia-video.html	Russian troops shelled a hospital killing 3 Ukrainians. Russian forces captured Zaporizhzhia Nuclear power complex near Enerhodar. Russian armored vehicles passed through town and opened fire along the way to the plant. Fire broke out after Russians fired at buildings in the power plant. Fighting around nuclear power complex was so fierce, wounded civilians were unable to be moved to a hospital.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 12; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 56; AP II Art. 15; Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/04/2022	Chernihiv	Ukrinfrom, "17 killed in enemy shelling in Chernihiv region over past day" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3420885-17-killed-in-enemy-shelling-in-cher-nihiv-region-over-pa-st-day.html MenaFn, "Ukraine - 17 killed in enemy shelling in Chernihiv region over past day" https://menafn.com/1103800818/Ukraine-17-killed-in-enemy-s-helling-in-Chernihiv-region-over-past-day	17 civilians killed, 13 injured when Russian aircraft bombed residential areas	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 50(3); Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	
03/04/2022	Mariupol	Global News, "Ukraine-Russia war: Scenes of despair, resolve in Mariupol city" https://globalnews.ca/news/8661476/mariupol-ukraine-russia-invasion-war/ Twitter https://twitter.com/InnaSovsun/status/1499749205522407426?cxt=HHwWhICz9Zr9ltApAAAA https://twitter.com/po-litblogme/status/1500779861169872900	Indiscriminate shelling of residential areas. Civilian death count unknown. At least one child killed.	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 3(a); Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 50(3); Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 115	
03/04/2022	Mariupol	REUTERS, "Besieged Ukrainian city of Mariupol appeals for help" https://www.reuters.com/world/besieged-ukrainian-city-mariupol-is-running-out-food-mayor-2022-03-04/ NYT, "No Internet, No Electricity: Life Under Siege in Mariupol" https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/europe/100000008239378/mariupol-destruction.html?searchResultPosition=39 Twitter https://twitter.com/France24_en/status/1500152913603219456	Loss of water, heat, electricity, and food as city is hit with shelling.	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(e)(i); 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 54(1)	Art. 50(3); Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 442; Art. 438	

03/04/2022	Markhalivka	Reuters, "Two children, 5 adults killed in Russian air strike in Kyiv region, say Ukraine police" https://www.reuters.com/world/two-children-5-adults-killed-russian-air-strike-kyiv-region-say-ukraine-police-2022-03-04/	A Russian air strike on a rural residential area killed at least 7 people on Friday, including 2 children	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 3 (a)	Art. 50(3); Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292	
03/04/2022	Fastiv district, Kyiv region	UKRINFORM, "Russian invaders fired on village in Kyiv region, killing two adults and three children" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3420309-russian-invaders-fired-on-village-in-kyiv-region-killing-two-adults-and-three-children.html	Shelling of residential area killed 5 people, including 3 children	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 3 (a); AP II Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 50(3); Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196;	
03/04/2022		Ukrinform, "U.S. Embassy in Ukraine calls Russian attack on Zaporizhia NPP war crime" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3420072-us-embassy-in-ukraine-calls-russian-attack-on-zaporizhia-npp-war-crime.html Reuters, "Ukraine officials say fire at nuclear power plant erupted outside the perimeter," https://kfgo.com/2022/03/03/ukraine-officials-say-fire-at-nuclear-power-plant-erupted-outside-the-perimeter/ Video https://youtu.be/fR0A1cCSQUk	Russians fired on the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, and seized it under their control. Training facility caught on fire. Ground line communications with the staff were cut.	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 56(1); AP II Art. 15	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196;	
03/04/2022	Zhytomyr	Republic World, "School in Ukraine; s Zhytomyr in Ruins After Airstrike by Russian Sukhoi Jets" https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/school-in-ukraine-s-zhytomyr-in-ruins-after-airstrike-by-russian-sukhoi-jets-article.html	8:30 a.m. airstrikes destroy city school. carried out by three Sukhoi fighter jets, that took off from Belarus airfields.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/05/2022	Borodyanka	Reuters, "Russian forces take over psychiatric hospital in central Ukraine, governor says" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-take-over-psychiatric-hospital-central-ukraine-governor-says-2022-03-05/	Russian forces seize control of psychiatric hospital. Patients running out of water and medication.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 10; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 7	Art. 188 Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433 Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	
03/05/2022	Mariupol	Ukrinform, "Russians fire towards area of green corridor in Mariupol- Defense Ministry" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3421331-russians-fire-towards-area-of-green-corridor-in-mariupol-defense-ministry.html BBC News, "Siege of Mariupol: Fresh Russian attacks throw evacuation into chaos" https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60629851 BBC News, "Mariupol: Fires, no water, and bodies in the street" https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60637338 BBC News, "Siege of Mariupol: Fresh Russian attacks throw evacuation into chaos" https://web.archive.org/web/20220306024228/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60629851	Russian forces fired on civilians, despite agreement or a humanitarian corridor between Volnovakha and Mariupol	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 12; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 11	Art. 50(3)	

03/05/2022	Zatoka, Odesa region	<p>Ukrinform, "Russia bombards Odesa region with cluster munition- Bellingcat expert" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3420582-russia-bombards-odesa-region-with-cluster-munition-bellingcat-expert.html</p> <p>Video https://youtu.be/NNAN7S1pqV4</p> <p>Bellingcat, "These are the Cluster Munitions Documented by Ukrainian Civilians" https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2022/03/11/these-are-the-cluster-munitions-documented-by-ukrainian-civilians/</p> <p>NY Post, "Russia accused of using 'cluster bombs' in Ukraine as civilian casualties surge" https://nypost.com/2022/03/04/russia-accused-of-using-cluster-bombs-in-ukraine-as-civilian-casualties-surge/</p>	<p>Air-dropped cluster munition (local authorities recovered RBK-500, RBK-250). Typically submunitions do not detonate, frequently killing curious children. Munitions dropped on residential town.</p>	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I: Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 50(3); Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 439; Art. 440; Art. 444; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/06/2022	Donetsk	CNN, "March 6, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news" https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-06-22/h_bd606b8e7d45d21282aa4d01a4e9ff00	Russian artillery strike, three wounded	Russia	7(1)(k); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 153; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Donetsk City	CNN, "March 6, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news" https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-06-22/h_bd606b8e7d45d21282aa4d01a4e9ff00	Air strike next to hospital with three reported injured	Russia	7(1)(k); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 153; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Hulyaipole	Aletia, "These churches in Ukraine are in ruins as a result of Russian artillery fire and bombs" https://aleteia.org/2022/03/11/these-churches-in-ukraine-are-in-ruins-as-a-result-of-russian-artillery-fire-and-bombs/ <i>See also</i> https://ukraine.bellingcat.com	Destruction of church by artillery fire	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 15(5); AP II Art. 9	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Kharkiv	HRW, "Ukraine: Deadly Attacks Kill, Injure Civilians, Destroy Homes" https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/18/ukraine-deadly-attacks-kill-injure-civilians-destroy-homes Perild, "Shelling of a supermarket in Pyatikhatki: four dead, 15 wounded" https://www.perild.com/2022/03/07/shelling-of-a-supermarket-in-pyatikhatchki-four-dead-15-wounded/	Strike on a line of civilians queueing outside of a supermarket. Multiple small impacts indicate cluster munitions	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 7(1)(k); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 153; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444	

03/06/2022	Buzova, Kyiv oblast	LiveMap, "2 Russian army tanks targeted school and residential houses in Buzova village of Kyiv region" https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/6-march-2-russian-army-tanks-targeted-school-and-residential	School damaged by explosion	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52(3)	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Bobrik, Kyiv region	rferl, "These Are Relatively Whole Bodies': The Aftermath Of Russia's Battle For Voznesensk" https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-voznensensk/31759715.html	Voznesens'ka Tservka church damaged by strike	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 15(5); AP II Art. 9	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Irpin	CNN, "March 6, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news" https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-06-22/h_df9ab48ad1fad80d3c93045684e45a8b NY Times, "Russian forces fire on evacuees, leaving 4 people dead outside Kyiv. The attack in Irpin, west of the capital, suggested either direct targeting of evacuees or disregard for the risk of civilian casualties" https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/world/europe/ukraine-irpin-civilian-death.html?smid=wa-share	Russian military airstrike kills family in Irpin, Ukraine, a town on the western outskirts of Kyiv	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 153; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444	

03/06/2022	Irpin	HRW, "Russian Assault Kills Fleeing Civilians" https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/08/ukraine-russian-assault-kills-fleeing-civilians#	At least eight fleeing civilians killed as Russian forces bombarded an intersection that hundreds of civilians were using to flee	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 153; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Vinnytsia	The Kyiv Independent, "Zelensky: 8 rockets fired at Vinnytsia, airport destroyed" https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/zelensky-8-rockets-fired-at-vinnytsia-airport-destroyed/ Aljazeera, "'Russian attack destroys airport' as Zelenskyy urges no-fly zone" https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/6/russian-attack-destroys-airport-as-zelenskyy-urges-no-fly-zone	Strike on Vinnytsia Havryshivka International Airport	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 57; AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/06/2022	Ovruch, Zhyomyr region	Yahoo, "Multiple Homes Damaged in North Ukraine Strikes" https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/multiple-homes-damaged-north-ukraine-100320613.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2x1LnNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAATM3qRNpdCpizxL_H1rZDAGtjxkzovsXBHFpYtsufpE1V7lyPJZBHqf9nkdvdLIJ3VxxWQY6K2ofLyTzcx_K4D9wCsOvJenqRNDA5im0vofWOXWD7o0kfiDmVXe_F9z_j4qNbI005C3Drj3u6dQwqxyuThNkd3L_4RVSp Ukrinform, "Two houses destroyed in enemy air strikes on Ovruch" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3422337-two-houses-destroyed-in-enemy-air-strikes-on-ovruch.html	Extensive damage to homes from a strike. CCTV indicates event happened at 2:25am.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/10/2022	Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast	Facebook, Mayor of Nizhyn, https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.mihlich/posts/pfbid02AkucdX9WF7BCok88onrYyjJHC1nkBnvtYxhQprn7gCMi3ykLUMK6hzaq6nyArkJKl	2 civilians killed, 8 civilians injured. Nizhyn shelled by "Uragan" multiple rocket launcher system. Due to the explosion 40 meters of a heating pipeline were damaged, windows in school, kindergarten and family medicine clinic were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/10/2022	Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, Head of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration, https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/503028468046379 Telegram, Ukraine's National Police, https://t.me/UA_National_Police/2311	2 civilians killed, 4 civilians injured. The Russian troops killed 2 more residents of the region: 1 in Mariupol and 1 in the village of Terny in the Liman district. Four people were injured: 1 each in Mariupol, Kramatorsk, Terny and Myronivske.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/10/2022	Kharkiv, Ukraine	Telegram, Head of Kharkiv Regional Military Administration, https://t.me/synegubov/2593 Kharkiv Regional Military Administration, https://kharkivoda.gov.ua/news/114857	The city of Kharkiv was shelled about 29 times at night. Several residential buildings, Kharkiv National Agrarian University and the hostel are damaged. The North Saltivka district was shelled, the gas pipeline was damaged - 30% of the city's residents were left without gas supply, a fire broke out at the site of the shelling. With a heavy volley fire system "Smerch" there were damaged Nikolsky Shopping Center and residential buildings.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/10/2022	Slobozhanske village, Izium district, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, https://www.facebook.com/MNS.GOV.UA/posts/329700355864527 https://www.facebook.com/MNS.GOV.UA/posts/pfbid02aJoLEkty3VziGs3EbtH61pYdsUCqJSjoMEDSdRKBWEQAuE6qdQ3PgaGbxGZtAwcccl	At night, as a result of another shelling of the village, a shell hits a private residential building. As a result of the destruction of the building under the rubble, 2 women, 1 man and 2 children died (5 civilians killed). The 5-year-old girl managed to survive. She was injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	

03/10/2022	Zolochiv village, Bogodukhiv district, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	Telegram, Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/3002	The Russian Armed Forces carried out artillery shelling of the village. As a result of shelling, 2 residential buildings were completely destroyed, 2 more were damaged. A 56-year-old local resident died. 2 women were injured and admitted to the hospital.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/10/2022	Makariv, Bucha district, Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, National Police in Kyiv region, https://www.facebook.com/pol.kyivregion/posts/326606579503665	2 civilians killed. Servicemen of the Russian troops shot from an armored personnel carrier a car with pensioners (72-year-old man and a 68-year-old woman died as a result of the shelling).	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii);	AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122;	
03/10/2022	Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://www.facebook.com/lug_gp.gov.ua/posts/270940515223712	As a result of the shelling of the city of Kreminna by Russian troops, private residential houses, electric poles and gas pipelines, and the premises of the railway station were damaged. There were no military facilities on this territory.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292	
03/10/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/264?single Facebook, National Police in Lugansk Oblast, https://www.facebook.com/policeLG/posts/335817265242056 Facebook, Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://www.facebook.com/lug_gp.gov.ua/posts/270355698615527	During the day, Russian troops shelled the territory of the cities of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and Rubizhne almost continuously. The police registered 34 incidents of shelling. 6 civilians injured Servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces and members of illegal armed groups controlled by Russia fired on civilian objects and critical infrastructure objects. As a result of shelling, a home for the elderly was damaged. Rubizhanskyi cardboard packaging plant was damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	Treacherous killing.

03/10/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, Serhiy Haidai https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3309 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/264?single</p> <p>Facebook, National Police in Lugansk Oblast, https://www.facebook.com/policeLG/posts/335817265242056</p>	<p>During the day, Russian troops shelled the territory of the cities of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and Rubizhne almost continuously. The police registered 34 incidents of shelling.</p> <p>1 civilian killed, 2 civilians injured.</p> <p>The Ice Sports Palace in Severodonetsk was burned down due to shelling by the Russian troops.</p> <p>Trade tents, residential buildings were on fire, gas pipelines have been cut in several streets.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	
03/10/2022	Korosten, Zhytomyr Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Facebook, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Zhytomyr Oblast, https://www.facebook.com/MNSZhytomyr/posts/291697209761080</p> <p>Twitter, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, https://twitter.com/DPSU_ua/status/1501988652896903175?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw</p>	<p>1 civilian killed, 2 more suffered burns and died in the hospital as a result of the shelling by Russian planes taking off from a Belarusian airfield. A car service stations, a private garage and a furniture shop were destroyed. Multi-apartment two-story and one-story residential buildings, an administrative building and a water supply were damaged.</p>	Russia Belarus	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/11/2022	Chernihiv, Ukraine	Telegram, Head of the Chernihiv Regional State Administration, https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/370 Facebook, Operational Command "North", https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/2096195833894537 Facebook, Director of the Museum https://www.facebook.com/laievsky/posts/531686299834717	Night airstrikes by Russian aviation left Chernihiv city without water supply (a breakthrough in the water pipeline). In Chernihiv, Russian occupiers bombed the Yuri Gagarin Stadium, as well as a nearby library building (three bombs dropped on the city, while not stopping the artillery fire). 2 people were killed and 2 were injured as a result of an airstrike on the stadium. Russian occupiers shelled the building of the Vasyl Tarnovsky Museum of Ukrainian Antiquities.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/11/2022	Dnipro, Ukraine	Twitter, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, https://twitter.com/SESU-UA/status/1502172282038349825 REUTERS, "Air strikes in Ukraine's Dnipro kill one, emergency services say", https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/air-strikes-ukraines-dnipro-kill-one-emergency-services-2022-03-11/	1 civilian killed, a strike near a kindergarten and an apartment building, as well as a strike that hit a two-story shoe factory and caused fire.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/11/2022	Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, Head of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration, https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/503719324643960	Russian troops killed 2 civilians in the village of Petrivskiyi near the town of Vugledar, 2 civilians in the village of Yevgenivtsi, 1 civilian in the village of Novoandriivtsi, and 1 civilian in the village of Rubtsi of the Lyman community.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	

03/11/2022	Lyman territorial community, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Facebook, Mayor of the Lyman city council, https://www.facebook.com/aleksandr.poriadok/posts/480313920496671</p> <p>Ukraine's National Police, https://dn.npu.gov.ua/news/obstril/operativne-zvedennya-policziji-donechchini-na-11-bereznya-2022-roku/</p>	<p>In the morning, the plane of the Russian Federation carried out an airstrike on the Lyman territorial community of the Donetsk region. On the territory of the community, the following civil infrastructure and private houses were affected by hostilities:</p> <p>in the village Yatskivka - approximately 190 private houses and shops;</p> <p>in the village Rubtsi - kindergarten, school, cultural center building, 15 private houses;</p> <p>in the village Lozove - 6 private houses;</p> <p>in the village Terny - administration building, kindergarten, school, 24 private houses and a church;</p> <p>in the village Kryva Luka - the building of the cultural center, 3 private houses, a metal bridge over the river Siversky Donets.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	
03/11/2022	Dergachi, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Facebook, City Mayor, https://www.facebook.com/108437557650553/posts/472525624575076/?app=fbl</p> <p>Associated Press Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWWYMczwHLQ</p>	<p>The residential sector and objects of housing and communal infrastructure were being intensively shelled, at least 3 civilians were killed and 1 was injured.</p> <p>The building of the emergency department, buildings of the Dergachi Central Hospital, the House of Culture were damaged.</p> <p>The city was completely cut off from gas supply due to projectiles hitting a high-pressure gas pipeline, there was no electricity in several areas of the city.</p> <p>The video shows a expended cluster rocket canisters impaled in the ground.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292</p>	

03/11/2022	Kharkiv, Ukraine	<p>Facebook, The State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=329288445909083&id=100064837892613</p> <p>Independent, "Ukraine says Russia has bombed a facility with a nuclear reactor in Kharkiv", https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-russia-kharkiv-nuclear-reactor-b2033581.html</p> <p>Twitter, Ukrainian Red Cross, https://twitter.com/RedCrossUkraine/status/1502013346312249352</p>	<p>Russian planes bombed Kharkiv institute with experimental nuclear reactor "Neutron Source". The external power supply system, the air conditioning system, the cooling system of the klystron gallery of the linear electron accelerator and buildings (directly at the nuclear installation, as well as pumping and cooling towers, isotope laboratories) were damaged. There has been no change in background radiation so far.</p> <p>Regional office of Ukrainian Red Cross damaged during widespread shelling in Kharkiv as Russian forces attempted to seize the city.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	
03/11/2022	Oskil, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Telegram, Oleh Synegubov, governor of the Kharkiv region, https://t.me/synegubov/2603</p> <p>REUTERS, "Ukraine says Russian forces hit psychiatric hospital but no one hurt", https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-hit-psychiatric-hospital-ukraine-regional-governor-2022-03-11/</p> <p>Facebook, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Kharkiv Oblast, https://www.facebook.com/MNSKHARKIV/posts/332241555612011</p>	<p>The Russian military bombed a psychiatric hospital. There were 30 staff and 330 patients inside, 50 of them immobile. All staff and patients were reportedly in a basement bomb shelter at the time of the attack and there were no casualties.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263</p>	

03/11/2022	Brovary district, Kyiv Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Telegram, the Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, https://t.me/DIUkraine/123</p> <p>Facebook, the Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/269459998698761</p>	During an attempt to evacuate from the village of Peremoga in the Kyiv region towards the village of Gostroluchcha, the Russian military shot a column of civilians, consisting only of women and children. 7 civilians died as a result of the shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii);	AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122;	
03/11/2022	Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Facebook, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidai.109a/posts/138026882070037</p>	56 civilians killed (people who lived to their old age in the house died on the spot) as a result of firing by Russian armed forces from a tank at a nursing home. There are only 15 survivors. They were abducted by the occupiers and taken to the occupied territory in Svatove to the regional geriatric facility.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	Treacherous Killing
03/11/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/280 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/468</p> <p>Facebook, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Luhansk region, https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/326569442837466</p> <p>Facebook, National Police in Luhansk Region, https://www.facebook.com/policeLG/posts/338441948312921</p>	As a result of the shelling a house for the elderly, residential houses were on fire. There was broken a gas pipeline. 4 people, including 1 child, were under the rubble. Russian troops shelled the Rubizhne city multidisciplinary hospital. As a result of the shelling, the obstetrics and gynecology department were completely destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/11/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Facebook, Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://www.facebook.com/lug.gp.gov.ua/posts/270941415223622</p> <p>Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/280</p>	The Russian armed forces and members of illegal armed groups controlled by Russia fired at civilian objects and objects of critical infrastructure in the city of Severodonetsk. Buildings and a vehicle were damaged as a result of the shelling. There were no military facilities in this area. 2 civilians were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	

03/11/2022	Stara Krasnyanka village, Kreminna district, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://www.facebook.com/lug_gp.gov.ua/posts/272071318443965	Servicemen of the armed forces of the Russian Federation shot a VAZ-2110 car with a driver and a passenger on the highway on the outskirts of the village of Stara Krasnyanka, Luhansk region. As a result of the shelling, a man and a woman died on the spot (2 civilians were killed), unidentified persons in military uniform shot at a Volkswagen Polo car, as a result of which the driver was wounded, and a 58-year-old female passenger was killed (1 civilian killed, 1 injured).	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii);	AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122;	
03/11/2022	Zolote, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://www.facebook.com/lug_gp.gov.ua/posts/270937701890660 Facebook, National Police in Luhansk Region, https://www.facebook.com/policeLG/posts/336453675178415	As a result of the shelling by Russian forces, 1 civilian was killed, 1 civilian was injured and taken to the hospital. On the territory of the city, residential buildings were damaged, power lines were cut, gas pipelines were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
03/11/2022	Mykolaiv, Ukraine	Telegram, Mykolaiv City Council, https://t.me/mykolaivrada/907 https://t.me/mykolaivrada/930 https://t.me/mykolaivrada/933 https://t.me/mykolaivrada/940 Facebook, Head of the Regional Health Care Department, https://www.facebook.com/maxim.beznosenko/posts/pfbid035DPw6m4kFVP6APeFLXcGNw3pDE63JucUkd6YRepYPHtddLewQnVcY854HHtm3cWl Suspilne Media, https://suspilne.media/217536-zalisiti-vse-ce-mi-ne-mozemo-ak-pracue-mikolaivskij-zoopark-pid-cas-vijni/	8 civilians injured. Among 160 residential buildings were damaged after the air strike and shelling by the Russian military. The building of the Mykolaiv Regional Oncology Hospital in Mykolaiv came under fire from the Russian military. In the premises of the hospital, windows glass was broken. As a result of the shelling from rocket launchers using cluster munitions, the Russian military damaged gas pipelines in several city districts. Two cluster bombs and one Uragan MSW projectile hit the Mykolaiv Zoo. On the Mykolaiv-Voznesensk highway "R-06", in the area of the village of Gurivka, the Russian military fired upon two civilian cars - a truck with products and a passenger car.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	

03/11/2022	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukraine	<p>ABC, "Kidnapped Ukrainian mayor freed in 'special operation,' officials say", https://abcnews.go.com/International/kidnapped-ukrainian-mayor-freed-special-operation-ukrainian-government/story?id=83486933</p> <p>Facebook, Mayor Ivan Fedorov, https://www.facebook.com/IvanFedorovMelitopol/posts/pfbid029ZEEQDdHwjod6rcrW1rvCrTFez5TZNBodXpgwy6K4ZKAJan2oNDYTEeViJftnELol</p>	<p>The Russian military abducted mayor Ivan Fedorov and held him hostage for five days. Fedorov was freed in a prisoner swap on March 16.</p>	Russia	Art. (8)(2)(a)(viii); Art. 8(2)(c)(iii)	AP I Art. 3(1)(b); AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 147; Art. 349	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/12/2022	Chernihiv, Ukraine	Facebook, Chernihiv Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://www.facebook.com/prokuraturachernigiv/posts/1432015797250623 Facebook, Chernihiv Regional Administration, https://www.facebook.com/cg.gov.ua/posts/334641885372521	During the bombing the hotel "Ukraine", located in the center of the city, was destroyed. Residential buildings were destroyed or damaged. During the day, 3 people were died, 1 was injured in 5 fires as a result of shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/12/2022	Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	National Police in Donetsk Region, https://dn.npu.gov.ua/news/obstril/operativne-zvedennya-policziji-donechchini-na-13-bereznya-2022-roku/ Facebook, Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) https://www.facebook.com/verkhovna.rada.ukraine/posts/331708452328544	Russian troops shelled 22 towns and villages, among them: Mariupol, Volnovakha, Vugledar, Terny, Yevgenivka, Yatskivka, Taramchuk, Olhynka, Polne, Stepne, Sweetke, Petrivske, Prechistivka. As a result of the shelling, at least 52 objects were damaged - residential buildings, a church, three shops, a gas pipeline, as well as 2 official cars. The Holy Dormition Lavra in Svyatohirsk was fired upon. As a result of the explosions, the temple and hotel buildings were damaged. There were 529 adults and 200 children in the room, and 200 people in the other room. As a result of the explosions, 32 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 53	Art. 178; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263	

03/12/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Twitter, MFA of Ukraine, https://twitter.com/MFA_Ukraine/status/1502555077089034245?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1502555077089034245%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fhromadske.radio%2Fnews%2F2022%2F03%2F12%2Fu-mariupoli-okupanty-obstrilialy-mechet-de-khovaiut-sia-pomad-80-liudey</p> <p>Facebook, Adviser to the mayor of Mariupol, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=503560321286722&id=100048982762482</p> <p>Telegram, Azov regiment, https://t.me/polkazov/4149</p>	<p>The mosque in Mariupol was shelled by Russian troops. More than 80 adults and children are hiding there from the shelling.</p> <p>6 people died in Mariupol due to Russian aerial bombs: 2 of them were children, many were injured.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 53</p>	<p>Art. 178; Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	
03/12/2022	Kharkiv, Ukraine	<p>Telegram, the State Emergency Service in Kharkiv Oblast, https://t.me/DSNS_Kharkiv/1296</p> <p>Telegram, Head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration, https://t.me/synegubov/2625</p> <p>Suspilne Media, https://suspilne.media/216646-svidka-u-harkovi-potrapila-pid-obstril-feldserka-svidkoi-otrimala-porannen/</p>	<p>1 civilian killed, 2 injured.</p> <p>The Kharkiv Regional Clinical Traumatology Hospital came under fire, 70% of the facade windows were damaged and wards were destroyed, 2 churches were damaged. An emergency team came under fire, a paramedic was injured. On the Belgorod highway in the area of St. Batumska Street, a civilian car carrying 2 men was targeted. One was saved.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	
03/12/2022	Shevelivka village, Balakliya community, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	<p>Telegram, Suspilne Media, https://t.me/suspilnekharkiv/9339</p>	<p>The center for social and psychological rehabilitation of children came under fire from the occupiers. The children and staff were in shelter, which saved their lives. A neighboring apartment building was also destroyed.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263</p>	

03/12/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/362 https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/349 Facebook, the State Emergency Service in Luhansk Region, https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/327311662763244	1 killed, 4 injured, including 2 children As a result of the shelling, the premises of the local hospital were damaged, sports and secondary schools, an apartment in a multi-story building, a shop and a garage caught fire.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/12/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/362 Facebook, the State Emergency Service in Luhansk Region, https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/327311662763244	As a result of the shelling, 11 residential buildings caught fire, a fire broke out in the workshop of the pipe factory and the cardboard packaging plant.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/12/2022	Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Telegram, Head of the Luhansk Regional State Administration, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/362 Facebook, the State Emergency Service in Luhansk Region, https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/327311662763244	1 civilian killed, 2 injured the building was damaged as a result of the shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/12/2022	Orihiv district, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukraine	Facebook, Office of the Prosecutor General, https://www.facebook.com/pgopro.gov.ua/posts/329210965908410	3 civilians killed. Servicemen of the armed forces of the Russian Federation ran with a tank over a car that stopped on the roadside between the villages of Nesteryanka and Myrne of the Orihiv district. The father and his 2 sons, whom he tried to evacuate, died.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/19/2022	Chernihiv	Romanenko V. (2022, March 19). Russian troops shelled a hospital in Chernihiv: operated patients - in the corridors at a temperature of +10°. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332881/	Chernihiv hospital was damaged. All the windows were broken and operated patients are lying in the corridors at a temperature of +10-11 degrees Celsius	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. (8)(2)(b)(iii)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/19/2022	Chernihiv	Truha.Ukraine. (2022, March 19). Chernihiv was bombarded again today. This time the residential area "Remzavod" was damaged. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/truexanewsua/34753	Russia bombarded residential area in Chernihiv, several buildings were ruined.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Chernihiv	Romanenko V. (2022, March 19). Russian troops destroyed the ski base in Chernihiv. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332779/	Russians destroyed ski base.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Velyka Kostromka, Dnipropetrovsk region	Karlovsykyi D. (2022, March 19). The occupiers hit the village on the approaches to Kryvyi Rih from "Grady". <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332879/	Russia struck village with Grad. One residential house and infrastructure objects were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk region	Dnepr Seychas: news, war, raids. (2022, March 19). The occupiers fired on Zelenodolsk, - this was reported at the local headquarters of the UTG. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/dnipro_now/18246	Due to strikes several residential buildings were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	

03/19/2022	Avdiivka, Donetsk region	TSN (2022, March 19). Russian occupiers shelled Avdiivka: there are dead and wounded. TSN.ua. https://tsn.ua/ato/rotskyi-okupanti-obstrilyali-avdiyivku-ye-zagibli-ta-poraneni-2013448.html	Residential house, shop and administrative building were struck. At least two people died and three were wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Donetsk, Luhansk regions	Suspilne. (2022, March 21). The occupiers illegally took 2,389 children to the territory of the Russian Federation - Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <i>Suspilne Novyny</i> . https://suspilne.media/219761-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-dendvadcat-sostij-onlajn/?anchor=live_1647865050&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps	occupying troops illegally took 2,389 children from the temporarily occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the territory of the Russian Federation.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(d); Art. 7(2)(d); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(b)(viii)	GC IV Art. 24; GC IV Art. 49; GC IV Art. 34; AP I Art. 78; AP I Art. 85(4)(a)	Art. 146-1; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	The Kyiv Independent [@KyivIndependent] . (2022, March 19). <i>🚩 Mariupol council: Russian occupiers forcibly move thousands of Mariupol residents to Russia. The civilians were allegedly taken to camps where</i> [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/kyivindependent/status/1505258123434639360 ; Karlovskiy D. (2022, March 19). The occupiers forcefully take people from Mariupol to the territory of the Russian Federation. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332840/	Civilians from Mariupol were allegedly taken to camps where Russians checked their phones and documents and then forcibly moved some of them to remote cities in Russia.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV Art. 24; GC IV Art. 49; GC IV Art. 34; AP I Art. 78; AP I Art. 85(4)(a)	Art. 146-1; Art. 438	

03/19/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Anadolu Agency [@anadoluagency] (2022, March 19). <i>A Turkish citizen who has been living in Mariupol, Ukraine captured a video showing the moments of the bombardments that</i> [Video Attached]. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/anadoluagency/status/1505085009027379203	Russia bombed port area and factory in Mariupol.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Karlovsykyi D. (2022, March 19). The people of Mariupol, who fled the city to the outskirts, are dying of hunger. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332887/	Russians do not provide food and water to civilians. At the same time it does not allow civilians to leave the area or for Ukraine to evacuate them. As the result, civilianst are dying from hunger.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. (8)(2)(b)(iii); Art. (8)(2)(b)(xxv)	Art. 3(1)(a); GC IC Art. 55; GC IC Art. 59; GC IC Art. 60; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 70; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/19/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Mazurenko A. (2022, March 19). Russians put white bandages on the people of Mariupol to confuse Ukrainian defenders - said Azov. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332747/	Russians put white bandages on arms of civilians in Mariupol. At the same time, these white bandages are worn by russian soldiers as distinguishing mark. They do this to mislead the Ukrainian army, for them to take civilian as russian soldier.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii)	Art. 3(1)(b); GC IV Art. 82; AP I Art. 51(7)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	TSN (2022, March 20). The whole family was killed: the prosecutor's office launched an investigation into the shelling of the Russian Federation in Donetsk region. <i>TSN.ua</i> . https://tsn.ua/ato/vbilivsyu-rodinu-prokuratura-rozpochala-rozsliduvannya-cherez-obstrili-rf-na-donechhini-2014501.html	The Russian Federation bombarded the residential quarters of the city of Mariupol. A young girl with her father and grandmother died in one of the houses damaged by shelling. Art school No. 12 in the Left Bank district of the city, which served as a shelter for almost 400 civilians - children, women and the elderly - was also destroyed. The number of victims os unknown.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51, AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	

03/19/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Jimmy [@JimmySecUK] (2022, March 19). <i>The first visual confirmation of the Russian TOS-1a thermobaric MLRS being fired in Ukraine.</i> 🇺🇦 [Video Attached]. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1505257107351867395	Russian TOS-1a thermobaric MLRS were fired in Ukraine	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)	Art. 3	Art. 438, Art. 439; Art. 440	Possibly prohibited weapon.
03/19/2022	Maryinka, Donetsk region	Necro Mancer [@666_mancer] (2022, March 19). <i>#Maryinka, Russian "liberators" denazified the church of the Moscow Patriarchate</i> [Video Attached]. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505227438942531586	Russian missile damaged church.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 53; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Volnovakha, Donetsk region	Suspilne.(2022, March 19). In Volnovaha, the Russian occupiers captured more than 20 activists - said Denisova. <i>Suspilne.Novyny.</i> https://suspilne.media/219344-u-volnovas-i-rosijski-okupanti-v-zali-u-polon-ponad-20-aktivistiv-denisova/	Russians captured nearly 20 people, who were previously in the lists "to be killed or sent to camps".	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV Art. 24; GC IV Art. 49; GC IV Art. 34; AP I Art. 78, AP I Art. 85(4)(a)	Art. 113, 146-1; 438	
03/19/2022	Kharkiv	TSN (2022, March 20). In Kharkiv, five people, including a child, died during the night shelling. <i>TSN.ua.</i> https://tsn.ua/ato/u-harkovi-pid-chas-nichogo-obstrilu-zaginu-lo-p-yatero-lyudey-z-okrema-ditina-201433.html	Russian struck residential building, five civilians died, including a child.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	This occurred during night 19-20 March.
03/19/2022	Kharkiv	Suspilne (2022, March 19). Shelling of Kharkiv: There are dead, and fires have also broken out. <i>Ukrainska Pravda.</i> https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332844/	Russia shelled residential area in Kharkiv. Because of this residential buildings were damaged, the number of dead and wounded civilians is unknown.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	

03/19/2022	Kharkiv region	Suspilne Kharkiv. (2022, March 19). Five civilians died under Russian shelling in the Izyum district - head of the Kharkiv military administration Oleg Synegubov, 5:50 p.m., March 19. [Image attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/suspilnek_harkiv/9867	Five civilians died because of Russian strikes.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Pisochyn, Kharkiv region	Suspilne.Kharkiv. (2022, March 19). Pisochyn As a result of shelling on March 18, one person was injured, 10 houses were damaged, a car was burned, and several others were damaged. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/suspilnek_harkiv/9850	Due to stikes, one person was wounded, ten houses were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Kherson	Karlovsykyi D. (2022, March 19). Kherson Oblast: the occupiers are taking cars from the residents, they did not miss the rubber convoy. Ukrainiska Pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332805/ ; TSN (2022, March 19). Russian occupiers did not allow humanitarian aid to enter Kherson region - people were left without baby formula and insulin. TSN.ua. https://tsn.ua/ato/russian-occupiers-did-not-allow-humanitarian-aid-to-enter-kherson-region-people-were-left-without-baby-formula-and-insulin-2014099.html	Russians were looting, entered civilians' housed, took staff and cars from civilians. They broke into the house of the village head of Staraya Zburivka, and spent the night there. For reinsurance, they held him hostage for a day. Also, russians did not allow cars with humanitarian aid to enter the city.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii); Art. (8)(2)(b)(iii)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 33; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 146-1; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 414; Art. 432; Art. 433; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/19/2022	Bucha district, Kyiv region	TSN (2022, March 19). The occupiers launched an airstrike on the villages of the Buchan district: photo. TSN.ua. https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/okupanti-zavdali-aviaudaru-po-selischam-buchanskogo-rayonu-foto-video-2013826.html	Russia dropped four shells on the transport infrastructure between the village of Piskivka and the village of Myhalki. As a result, no victims known, but several buildings were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 3; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 277; Art. 438	

03/19/2022	Makariv, Kyiv region	Pyndor I. (2022, March 19). As a result of the shelling of Makarov, seven civilians were killed and five more were wounded. <i>24 Channel</i> . https://24tv.ua/vnasli-dok-obstrilu-makarova-zaginuli-semero-t-sivilnih-shhe-5_n1911699	As a result of aviation strike, seven civilians were killed, five were wounded. Several residential and administrative and other buildings were destroyed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk region	DSNS Ukraine. (2022, March 19). On March 19, as a result of shelling, a residential building was destroyed in the city of Rubizhne, in the Luhansk region, and people were trapped under the rubble. On the spot [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/dsns_telegram/5007 ; Balachuk I. (2022, March 19). In Rubizhny, a house collapsed due to shelling: 3 dead. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332780/ ; TSN (2022, March 20). The Russian army is shelling Rubizhnye: two children died yesterday. TSN.ua. https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyska-armiya-obstrily-uye-rubizhne-minuloyi-dobi-zaginulo-dvoje-ditey-2014291.html	As a result of rocket strike, residential building was damaged, at least one woman and two children died, one child was wounded. In total during 19 March Russian army destroyed 24 houses in Rubizhne and Severodonetsk.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Sumy region	Kalatur A. (2022, March 19). The head of Sumy Region: Russians, with the help of local people, kidnap and torture people. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332646/	In Sumy region Russians enter villages and loot, make a mess. Cases of torture and abduction of people are also known.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxi)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(b); GC IV Art. 24; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 33; GC IV Art. 34; GC IV Art. 49; GC IV Art. 147; AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 78; AP I Art. 85(4)(a)	Art. 126; Art. 127; Art. 146-1; Art. 432; Art. 433; Art. 438	

03/19/2022	Trostianets, Sumy region	Kalatur A. (2022, March 19). The Russians shelled the hospital in Trostianets. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332650/	The Russians shelled the hospital in Trostianets. No victims are known	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	GC IV Art. 27; Art. 53; Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; Art. 52; Art. 85(2); Art. 85(3)(a); Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	TSN (2022, March 19). Zaporizhzhia is Shelled from Prohibited Weapons, Municipal Community Nationalized Russian Metal and Crafts Body Armor. <i>TSN.ua</i> . https://tsn.ua/ato/zaporizhzhia-is-shelled-from-prohibited-weapons-municipal-community-nationalized-russian-metal-and-crafts-body-armor-2013517.html	Russians were shelling the nearby villages around Zaporizhzhia using prohibited weapons despite absence of military facilities. A village 20 kilometers away from Zaporizhzhia was pounded by cluster bombs that explode in the air, use scattering projectile and leave 15-meter-wide shell pits. After cluster bombs, the outskirts of the village were also hit by Russian BM-30 Smerch.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	Prohibited weapon was used
03/19/2022	Budo-Vorobyi, Zhytomyr region	Ukrinform. (2022, March 19). In Zhytomyr Oblast, Russian artillery shelled the village of Budo-Vorobyi. There were no casualties or injuries. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/ukrinform_news/58634	As a result of the artillery strike, several buildings in village were ruined.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 3; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Korosten district, Zhytomyr region	Roshchina O. (2022, March 19). Zhytomyr region: a building was destroyed by shelling in the Korosten district. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332723/	Russian missile damaged residential building, no victims are known	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/19/2022	Narodychi, Zhytomyr region	24 Channel. (2022, March 19). In the village of Narodychi in Zhytomyr Oblast, the occupiers launched an airstrike on a grain warehouse. Grain was stored [Image attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/chanel24/30347	Rocket strike destroyed grain warehouse	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	GC IV Art. 51; GC IV Art. 52; GC IV Art. 55; GC IV Art. 59; GC IV Art. 60; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 70; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 438; Art. 442	

03/19/2022	Pryvar, Zhytomyr region	Ovruch city council. (2022, March 19). Over the course of two days on March 18-19, 2022, the enemy launched rocket attacks on the Velikofosnian and Rakivshchyna Starostyn Districts. So, on March 18 at 10:00 a.m. and on March 19 at 10:05 a.m. on the territory [Image attached]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/ovruch.in.ua/posts/332507858902192 ; Tyshchenko K. (2022, March 19). Russian troops completely destroyed a village in Zhytomyr Region. Ukrainska Pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/19/7332818/	Helicopter attacked village Pryvar, as the result the village is totally ruined. There are no victims, as all people were hiding in bombshelters.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/20/2022	Andriivka, Chernihiv region	Hromadske radio. (2022, March 20). In Chernihiv region, the occupiers "detained" the village headman and the school principal. Hromadske radio. https://hromadske.radio/news/2022/03/20/na-chernihivshchyni-okupanty-zatrymaly-selyshchnoho-starostu-ta-dyrektorku-shkoly	russians kidnapped the village headman Mykola Budalovskyi and the local deputy school director Tetiana Bezlyudna.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV Art. 34; AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146-1; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Chernihiv	Karlovskiy D. (2022, March 20). Chernihiv: a shell of the occupiers blew up a car that was delivering water to people. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333105/	As a result, of artillery strike car that supplied water to citizens was hit, 2 civilians died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 55; GC IV Art. 59; GC IV Art. 60; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 70; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Nizhyn, Chernihiv region	Ukrinform. (2022, March 20). The Russian invaders began shelling Nizhyn and continue to conduct chaotic fire on Chernihiv. Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3434739-rosijski-zagarniki-obstrilali-nizyn.html	The Russian invaders began shelling Nizhyn and continue to conduct chaotic fire on Chernihiv.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Ukrinform. (2022, March 20). The city of Mariupol was shelled by four ships of the Russian Navy. A separate special purpose unit reports this on its Telegram channel. Telegram. https://t.me/ukrinform_news/58965	Russian navy shelled Mariupol.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Kahovka, Kherson region	Petrenko R. (2022, March 20). In Kakhovka, the Russians released the journalist after 8 days of torture. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333041/	Russians released journalist, who was kidnapped on 12 March. He was tortured: humiliated, threatened, russians told him that he would be killed. He did not have enough food and water, during some days he stayed without water at all.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV Art. 3; GC IV Art. 2; GC IV Art. 34; GC IV Art. 147; AP I Art. 75(2)(b); AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 126; Art. 127; Art. 146-1; Art. 438	

03/20/2022	Muzykivka, Kherson region	Suspilne. (2022, March 20). There are wounded, one was blown up by a mine - the situation in the temporarily occupied Muzykivka in the Kherson region. Suspilne Novyny. https://suspilne.media/219651-e-poraneni-odin-pidirvavsana-namini-situacia-u-timca-sovo-okupovani-j-muzykivci-na-hersonsini/	1 civilian killed, 2 wounded as result of landmine explosion in Muzykivka, Kherson region. Also, the occupiers destroyed and took away the equipment of local farmers and businesses.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art.53; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 33; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 432; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Irpin, Kyiv region	Irpin Life. (2022, March 20). In Irpen, the Bible seminary caught fire as a result of shelling. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/irpininteresting/4356	Due to air strike Bible seminary caught fire.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 53; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Kyiv	Klychko V. (2022, March 20). Friends! Several explosions in the Podilsk district of the capital. In particular, from the information at the moment, some houses and on the territory of one of the shopping centers. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/1305 ; Suspilne. (2022, March 21). Klytschko: as a result of shelling, a shopping center burned down, 6 residential buildings were damaged. <i>Suspilne Novyny</i> . https://suspilne.media/219761-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-dendvadcat-sostij-onlajn/?anchor=live_1647856008&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps	Due to strikes in Kyiv, several buildings and mall were damaged, 8 people died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	

03/20/2022	Kyiv	Suspilne. (2022, March 21). As a result of a shell hit in the Svyatoshyn district, two people were hospitalized, and more than 200 others were evacuated by the Kyiv City Military Administration. <i>Suspilne Novyny</i> . https://suspilne.media/219761-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-dendvadcat-sostij-onlajn/?anchor=live_1647825648&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; Romanenko V. (2022, March 20). In Kyiv, a projectile landed in the yard of a high-rise building: 5 victims are currently known. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333046/	Russia struck residential area. As a result 2 people were wounded, 8 buildings, 2 schools and 2 kindergartens were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32, AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Zabuiannia, Kyiv region	Tyshchenko K. (2022, March 20). Kyiv region: airstrike in Buchansky district, fighting in four communities. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333097/	Russia shelled village Zabuiannia. Information on victims is unknown.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Kreminna, Luhansk region	Balachuk I. (2022, March 20). In Kreminnaya, the Russians shelled a home for the elderly from a tank: 56 were killed - OVA. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333028/	Russian soldiers fired at close range from a tank at a home for the elderly, as a result of which 56 people were killed, 15 more people were kidnapped by the occupiers.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(a)(viii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 34; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 146-1; Art. 282; Art. 438	This happened on 11 March, but became known later.

03/20/2022	Kostiantynivka, Mykolaiv region	Dumska - Odesa news. Ukraine. (2022, March 21). Report on the shelling of cities ! In the Mykolaiv region, a residential building in the village of Konstantinovka came under fire from the invaders, as a result of which 3 people. [Image Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/dumskaya_net/33264	Russia struck civilian house, at least 3 people died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Trostanets, Sumy region	Ukrinform. (2022, March 20). Russian invaders threw a grenade at the civilians of the city of Trostyanets - two men were killed. Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3434932-u-trostanets-rosijski-zagarbniki-kinuligranatu-v-mirnih-ziteliv-dvoe-zagiblih.html	Russian invaders threw a grenade at the civilians, two men were killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 115; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia region	hromadske [@HromadskeUA]. (2022, March 20). <i>In Berdyansk, people went to a peaceful protest against the occupiers - they were detained and beaten.</i> [Video Attached]. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/hromadskeua/status/1505518919884357635 ; Romanenko V. (2022, March 20). In Berdyansk, people demonstrated against the occupation: they were beaten and detained. <i>Ukrainska Pravda.</i> https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333036/	Russian troops were beating and detaining peaceful protesters. Russians undressed some civilians and searched their staff. In addition, the Russian occupiers fired into the air.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 47; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 75(a)(1); AP I Art. 75(a)(3); AP I Art. 75(a)(4); AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/20/2022	Energodar, Zaporizhzhia region	Petrenko R. (2022, March 20). The occupiers kidnapped the deputy mayor of Energodar - the city council. <i>Ukrainska Pravda.</i> https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333019/	Russians kidnapped First Deputy Mayor Ivan Samoedyuk.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV, Art. 34; AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146-1; Art. 438	This happened on 19 or 20 March.

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/21/2022	Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk region	Dnepr Operatyvnyi / War. (2022, March 21) A few hours ago, the invaders fired at the city of Zelenodolsk (Kryvyi Rih district, Dnipropetrovsk region) from Grads. Telegram. https://t.me/dnepr_operativ/11681	Russians shelled city with Grads.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Avdiivka, Donetsk region	Suspilne. (2022, March 21). The Russian occupiers shelled Avdiivka from aviation and artillery. Suspilne Novyny. https://suspilne.media/219905-rosijski-okupanti-z-aviacii-ta-artilerii-obstrilali-avdiivku/ ; Khomenko V. (2022, March 21). Five people were killed by shelling in Avdiivka in a day, and a 9-year-old girl was killed in Mariupol. Suspilne Novyny. https://suspilne.media/220124-za-dobu-v-avdiivci-pid-cas-obst-riliv-zaginulo-5-ludej-a-v-mariupoli-zaginu-la-9-ricna-divcinka/	Russians shelled Avdiivka. As a result, at least 5 people died, 19 were wounded, 15 buildings caught fire.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Donetsk region	Khomenko V. (2022, March 21). Five people were killed by shelling in Avdiivka in a day, and a 9-year-old girl was killed in Mariupol. Suspilne Novyny. https://suspilne.media/220124-za-dobu-v-avdiivci-pid-cas-obst-riliv-zaginulo-5-ludej-a-v-mariupoli-zaginu-la-9-ricna-divcinka/	Due to russian shelling 2 people were wounded in Ocheretyn and at least 3 more in Pokrovsk.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Kizilova S. (2022, March 21). Mariupol: Russians fired at evacuation buses with children, there are casualties. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333384/	Russians fired at evacuation buses with children, 6 children were wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	

03/21/2022	Tsurkuny, Kharkiv region	Balachuk I. (2022, March 22). Kharkiv region: the occupiers kidnapped the village head again. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333322/	Russians kidnapped head of village Mykola Sikalenko.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV Art. 34; AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146-1; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Kherson	Ukrainska Pravda (2022, March 21). Kherson: Russians broke up a pro-Ukraine rally, some were injured. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333302/	Russians pelted pro-Ukrainian demonstrators with stun grenades and opened fire. Some people were wounded, the exact number is unknown.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Mykolaiv	Suspilne Mykolain. (2022, March 21). In Mykolaiv, one of the city's medical facilities came under fire from the Russian military. The video shows the consequences of the shelling. No one was injured in the shelling of the medical facility. [Video Attached]. Telegram. https://t.me/suspilne-mykolaiv/6120	Russian struck hospital, the building is damaged, but no victims are known.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. (8)(2)(b)(iii)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/21/2022	Odesa	Protsepova K. (2022, March 21). The Russian Federation shelled Odesa with ship artillery - OVA spokesman. <i>Suspilne Novyny</i> . https://suspilne.media/219821-rf-obstriluv-ala-odesu-z-korabeln-oi-artilerii-recnik-ova/	Russians used naval artillery in the direction of Odessa. As a result, several buildings were damaged, no victims are known.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Sumy region	Ukrinform. (2022, March 21). As a result of the accident at Sumykhimprom PJSC, which occurred on March 21, a significant amount of ammonia was released into the air. Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3435973-avaria-na-sumihimpromi-mindo-vkilla-zaavlae-pro-znacnu-killist-amiakuv-povitri.html	Russians struck "Sumykhimprom", chemical enterprise. As a result, ammonia leaked, which is dangerous for humans and environment.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 56; AP I Art. 85(3)(c)	Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 239; Art. 241; Art. 438	

03/21/2022	Trostianets, Sumy region	Zhyvytskyi Dmytro. (2022, March 21). <i>Sumyshchyna. Results of the day of 21 March</i> . [Video Attached]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/Zhyvytsky/videos/4884763801641823/	Russian stole the last one ambulance in the city.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. (8)(2)(b)(iii)	GC IV Art. 18; GC IV Art. 19; GC IV Art. 33; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 432; Art. 438; Art. 444	
03/21/2022	Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia region	Hlushchenko O. (2022, March 21). The occupiers stole 5 ships with grain from the Berdyansk port - the head of the Zaporizhzhia OVA. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333207/	Russians stole 5 ships with grain.	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b); Art. (8)(2)(b)(xvi); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	GC IV Art. 33; GC IV Art. 33; GC IV Art. 59; GC IV Art. 60; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 70; AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 432; Art. 433; Art. 438; Art. 442	The exact date when this happened is unknown.
03/21/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	Suspilne. (2022, March 21). Russian soldiers fired at a car with civilians in a village in Zaporozhye. There are wounded including children. <i>Suspilne Novyny</i> . https://suspilne.media/219761-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-dendvadcat-sostij-onlajn/?anchor=live_1647883110&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps	Russian struck evacuation cars with civilians and children. 6 people were wounded, including 2 children.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region	Ukrainska Pravda (2022, March 21). Vereshchuk: Russians kidnapped three Israeli citizens in Melitopol. <i>Ukrainska Pravda</i> . https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/21/7333411/	Russians kidnapped three citizens of Israel.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(viii)	GC IV, Art. 34; AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146-1; Art. 438	
03/21/2022	Zhytomyr region	UP.Strichka. (2022, March 21). Zhytomyr Oblast was shelled for the first time from "Hradiv", 4 people died - the head of OVA Vitaliy Bunechko. Telegram. https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/11338	Zhytomyr region was shelled from Grad, because of this 4 people died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 53; GC IV Art. 32; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/22/2022	Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	<p>УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли з "Градів" населені пункти поблизу Кривого Рогу"</p> <p>https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969088-okupanti-obstrilyali-z-gradiv-naseleni-punkti-poblizu-krivogo-rogu</p> <p>https://www.unian.net/war/na-dnepropetrovshchine-okkupanty-obstrelyali-dva-naselenykh-punkta-na-granice-s-hersonshchino-y-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11754274.html</p> <p>https://www.unian.net/war/na-dnepropetrovshchine-iz-za-obstrela-povrezhdeny-bolше-20-domov-novosti-dnepra-11755063.html</p>	Russian troops shelled the villages of Mala Kostromka and Zelenodolsk with "Grads", residential buildings were destroyed, no deaths.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/22/2022	Pavlograd, Dnipropetrovsk	<p>УНН, "Росіяни завдали ракетного удару по Дніпропетровщині: загинула одна людина, знищено залізничну станцію"</p> <p>https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969183-rosiyani-zavdali-raketnogo-udaru-po-dnipropetrovshchini-zaginula-odna-lyudina-znischeno-zaliznichnu-stantsiyu</p> <p>https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/vijskovi-rf-z-avdali-raketnikh-udaru-po-pavlohradu-na-dnipropetrovshchini.html</p> <p>https://www.unian.net/war/rossiyskie-terroristy-razrushili-zheleznyuyu-dorogu-na-dnepropetrovshchine-nanesya-raketnye-udary-novosti-dnepra-11755189.html</p>	Russian occupants launched a missile attack on Pavlograd in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. 1 person was killed and the Pavlograd-2 railway station was destroyed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 263	

03/22/2022	Druzhkivka, Donetsk Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти завдали ракетного удару по Дружківці, є постраждалі" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969121-okupanti-zavdali-rocketnogo-udaru-po-druzhkivtsi-ye-postrazhdali	Russian occupants launched a rocket attack on Druzhkivka in Donetsk Oblast. There were casualties. The Russians shelled civilians with aviation, rocket launchers and heavy artillery. At least 43 civilian objects were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 27; GC IV Art. 32; GC IV Art. 53; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 85(2); AP I Art. 85(3)(a); AP I Art. 85(3)(b)	Art. 110; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 438	
03/22/2022	Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast	Кyiv Post, "Ukraine official: Russia using banned white phosphorus vs. civilians" https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-official-russia-using-banned-white-phosphorus-vs-civilians.html УНН, "У Краматорську російські окупанти застосували фосфорні боєприпаси" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969059-u-kramatorsku-rosiy-ski-okupanti-zastosovali-fosfori-bojepri-pasi	Russian Forces attacked Kramatorsk with prohibited phosphorus artillery shells.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art.8(2)(b)(xvii)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 439; Art. 440	
03/22/2022	Mangush, Novoselivka (Donetsk Oblast)	УНН, "За добу в Донецькій області окупанти вбили трьох цивільних" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969225-za-dobu-v-donetskiy-oblasti-okupanti-vbili-trokh-tsivilnikh https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/na-donechch-ini-vid-rosijskoji-zbroji-zahinulo-troje-tsvilnikh.html	Russian occupants killed 2 civilians in Mangush, one in Novoselivka. 6 civilians were wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122	
03/22/2022	Mariupol, Avdiivka, Ocheretin, Marjinka, Krasnogorivka (Donetsk Oblast)	УНН, "Маріуполь в облозі: окупанти обстрілюють місто з авіації, кораблів та реактивної артилерії" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969096-mariupol-v-oblozi-okupanti-obstrilyuyut-yogo-z-aviatsiyi-korabliv-ta-reaktivnoyi-artileriyi	Russian troops shelled Donetsk Oblast. Heavy shelling of Mariupol. Avdiivka - 5 dead, 20 wounded, residential buildings destroyed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	

03/22/2022	Balakleya, Kharkiv Oblast	УНН, "Харківщина: окупанти розстріляли сім'ю з дитиною, які намагалися вийхати з Балакліє" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969197-kharkivschina-okupanti-rozstrilyali-simyu-z-ditinoyu-yaki-namagalisyia-viyikhatiz-balakleyi https://www.unian.net/war/voyna-v-ukrainie-na-harkovshchine-rossiyskiy-tank-rasstrilyal-mashinu-s-detmi-novosti-harkova-11754385.html	Russian occupants shot a family with a child as they tried to leave Balakleya town, Kharkiv Oblast.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 77(5); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 6(4)	Art. 115	
03/22/2022	Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast	УНН, "Харківщина: ворог обстріляв місто Лозова, 8 людей поранено" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969182-kharkivschina-vorog-obstrilyav-misto-lozova-8-lyudey-porane-no https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/rosijani-obstriljali-misto-lozova-na-kharkivshchini-odna-ljudina-zahinula-devjat-poraneni.html https://www.unian.net/war/okkupanty-v-lozovoy-na-harkovshchine-razrushili-20-zhilyh-domov-novosti-harkova-11755150.html	Russian occupants shelled Lozova in Kharkiv Oblast. 1 person died, 9 people were wounded and around 20 houses were destroyed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/22/2022	Brovary, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли Бровари і поцілили в завод: розпочато розслідування" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969152-okupanti-obstrilyali-brovary-i-potsilili-v-zavod-rozpochato-rozsliduvannya https://www.unian.net/war/okkupanty-obstrilyali-zavod-v-brovarah-prokuratura-nachala-rassledovanie-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11755099.html	Russian occupants shelled Brovary in Kiev Oblast. A shell hit the territory of one of the factories, damaging seven buses and household facilities.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 438	

03/22/2022	Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "У Гостомелі окупанти знищили стайню разом з кінями, більшість згоріли живцем" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969108-u-gostomeli-okupanti-znischili-staynyu-r-azom-z-kinmi-bilshis-t-zgorili-zhivtsem	Russian occupiers burned Alexandria's stables along with the horses. 32 horses were burned.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/22/2022	Kyiv	УНН, "Удар по столичній Оболоні: загинула людина, ще троє поранено" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969187-udar-po-stolichniy-oboloni-zaginula-lyudina-sche-troye-porano	Russian occupants have shelled the Obolon district of Kiev. 1 person died and 3 were wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/22/2022	Sievierodonsk, Luhansk Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли чергу людей за продуктами в магазині у Севродонецьку, є жертви - Гайдай" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969107-okupanti-obstrilyali-chergu-lyudey-za-produktami-v-magazini-u-syevyeronetsku-ye-zhertvi-gayday	Russian troops shelled a shop in Sievierodonsk with people in it. There were dead and wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/22/2022	Sievierodonsk, Luhansk Oblast	УНН, "Рашисти відкрили вогонь по дитячій лікарні у Севродонецьку: 7 дітей евакуювали" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969173-rashisti-vidkrili-vogon-po-dityachiy-likarni-u-syevyeronetsku-7-ditey-evakuyovali	Russian occupants opened fire on children's hospital in Sievierodonsk. 7 children and doctors were evacuated.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 15(5); AP I Art. 16; AP I Art. 12; AP II Art. 9; AP II Art. 10; AP II Art. 11; AP II Art. 13	Art. 439; Art. 440	
03/22/2022	Mykolaiv	УНН, "Російські окупанти обстріляли порт Миколаєва" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969098-rosiyski-okupanti-obstrilyali-port-mikolayeva https://www.unian.net/war/v-nikolaeve-rosiyskie-voyska-obstrilyali-morskoy-port-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-11754715.html	Russian troops shelled seaport in Mykolaiv, no deaths.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263	

03/22/2022	Mykolaiv Oblast	УНН, "На Миколаївщині окупанти обстріляли АЗС: є загиблі" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969087-na-mikolayivschini-okupanti-obstrilyali-azs-ye-zagibli	Russian troops shelled a petrol station in Mykolaiv region, 3 people were killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a);	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/22/2022	Sumy Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти на Сумщині розстріляли подружжя пенсіонерів, які їхали на велосипедах у лікарню" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969115-okupanti-na-sumschini-rozstrilyali-podruzhyazhzhya-pensioneriv-yaki-yikhali-na-velosipedakh-u-likarnyu	Russian occupants shot a retired couple as they rode to a pharmacy on their bicycles. The 59-year-old woman died and her husband was wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a);	Art. 115; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/23/2022	Chernigiv	УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли харчове підприємство у Чернігові. Мешканців попередили про можливий витік аміаку" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969381-okupanti-obstrilyali-kharchove-pidpriyemstvo-u-chernigovi-meshkantsiv-poperedili-pro-mozhliviy-vitik-amiaku https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/u-chemihovi-vnaslidok-obstriliv-vijskovikh-rf-poshko-dzheno-amiakoprovid.html	Russian occupants shelled a food processing plant in Chernihiv.	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 54; AP II Art. 14	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 438	
03/23/2022	Stariy Saltiv, Kharkiv Oblast	УНН, "Харківщина: під час обстрілу окупантів у Старому Салтові загинула секретар селищної ради" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969370-kharkivschina-pid-chas-obstrilu-okupanti-v-u-staromu-saltovi-zaginula-sekretar-selishchnoyi-radi	Shelling of Stary Saltiv, Kharkiv Oblast. Village council secretary Galina Kursachova was killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/23/2022	Brovary, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти знищили овочесховище та ковбасний цех під Києвом" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969230-okupanti-znischili-ovocho-skhovische-ta-kovbasniy-tsekh-pid-kiyevom	Russian occupants destroyed a vegetable warehouse and a sausage factory in Brovary district, Kyiv Oblast.	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 54; AP II Art. 14	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 438	

03/23/2022	Hostomel, Irpin, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Над околицею Києва окупанти застосували заборонені фосфорні боєприпаси" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969289-nad-okolitseyu-kiyeva-okupanti-zastosuv-ali-zaboroneni-fosfor-ni-boeprisasi https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/rf-vdarila-po-peredmistju-kijeva-zaboroneni-fosfor-ni-boeprisasi-mi-boeprisasi-mi-irpenja.html https://www.unian.net/war/okkupanty-pod-kievom-ispolzovali-fosfornye-boeprisasi-novosti-kieva-11756158.html	Russian occupants used phosphorus weapon in Kyiv Oblast. The approximate target area were Hostomel and Irpin.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art.8(2)(b)(xvii)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 439; Art. 440	
03/23/2022	Kyiv	УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли парковку столичного ТЦ: одна людина загинула, двох - госпіталізували" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969352-okupanti-obstrilyali-parkovku-stolichnogo-tts-odna-lyudina-zaginula-dvokh-gospitalizovali	Russian occupants shelled a car park near a shopping centre in Kiev's Podilsky district. 1 person was killed and 2 were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/23/2022	Kyiv	УНН, "У Києві окупанти здійснили мінометний обстріл по житловому кварталі, є постраждалі" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969364-u-kiyevi-okupanti-z-diysnili-minometniy-obstril-po-zhitlovomu-kvartalu-ye-postrazhdali	Russian occupants have launched a mortar attack on Kiev's Podilsky district. There were casualties.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282	

03/23/2022	Kyiv	УНН, "Ворог зранку знову обстріляв Київ: загорілися житлові будинки, 4 людей травмовані" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969254-vorog-zranku-znovu-obstrilyav-kiyiv-zagorilisya-zhitlovi-budinki-4-lyudey-travmovani	Russian occupants shelled 2 residential areas in Kyiv. 4 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/23/2022	Yasnogorodka, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти з "Градів" обстріляли село Ясногородка під Києвом" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969266-okupanti-z-gradiv-obstrilyali-selo-yasnogorodka-pid-kiyevom	Russian occupants fired "Grad" missiles at Yasnogorodka village, Kyiv Oblast.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282	
03/23/2022	Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast	УНН, "У Лисичанську російські окупанти обстріляли нафтопереробний завод" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969246-u-lisichansku-rosiyski-okupanti-obstrilyali-naftopererobnyi-zavod	Russian occupants shelled an oil refinery in Lysychansk, Luhansk Oblast, from an aircraft.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 292	
03/23/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast	УНН, "У Рубіжному ворожий снаряд влучив в багатоповерхівку, троє загинили, двоє з них діти" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969248-u-rubizhnomu-vorozhiy-snaryad-vluchiv-v-bagatopoverkhivku-troye-zagiblikh-dvoje-z-nikh-diti https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/u-rubizhnomu-rosijskij-snarjad-vluchiv-u-bahatopoverkhivku-zahinuli-troje-ljudej-dvoje-z-nikh-diti.html	On 22 March, Russian occupants hit a multi-storey building in Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, with shells. 2 children and 1 adult were killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 115; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	

03/23/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти знищили спортивний комплекс у Рубіжному" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969262-okupanti-znischili-sportivniy-kompleks-u-rubizhnomu	Russian occupants destroyed a sports complex in Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(2)(d); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/23/2022	Mariupol	УНН, "Окупанти знищили будівлю музею у Маріуполі" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969318-okupanti-znischili-budivlyu-muzeyu-u-mariupoli-tam-zberigal-isya-originali-kartin-ayvazovskogo-ta-yablonskoyi https://zn.ua/ukr/CULTURE/rosijski-okupanti-znischili-khudozhniy-muzej-kujindzhi-v-mariupoli.html	Russian occupants have destroyed the Arkhip Kuindzhi Art Museum in Mariupol.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 53(a)	Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/23/2022	Mariupol	УНН, "У Маріуполі через влучання ворожого снаряду в будинок загинула 11-річна гімнастка" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969387-u-mariupoli-cherez-vluchannya-vorozhogo-snaryadu-v-budynok-zaginula-11-richna-gimnastka https://zn.ua/ukr/SPORT/u-mariupoli-vnashidok-obstrilu-rosijskikh-okupantiv-zahinula-juna-himnastka.html	As a result of shelling in Mariupol, 11-year-old gymnast Kateryna Diachenko was killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i);	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 77(1); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/23/2022	Mykolaiv	УНН, "Окупанти вночі обстріляли житлові квартали Миколаєва: є загиблі" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969271-okupanti-vnochi-obstrilyali-zhitlovi-kvartali-mikolayeva-ye-zagibli	Russian occupants shelled a residential area in Mykolaiv. 2 civilians killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2). AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a)	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 263	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/24/2022	Kharkiv Oblast	ZN.UA, "У Харківській області російські військові викрали двох дітей" https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/na-kharkivshchiny-rosijski-vijskov-i-vikrali-dvokh-ditej.html	Russian occupants have kidnapped two children of a local resident from Kharkiv Oblast.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(viii); Art. 8(2)(c)(iii)	AP I Art. 75(2)(c); AP I Art. 3(1)(b); AP II Art. 4(2)(c)	Art. 147	
03/24/2022	Kharkiv	УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли пункт гуманітарної допомоги у Харкові: 6 осіб загинуло, 15 поранено" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969481-okupanti-obstrilyali-punkt-gumodopomogi-u-kharkovi-6-osib-zaginulo-15-poraneno https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/okupanti-obstrilyali-punkt-novoji-poshti-u-kharkovi-za-hinulo-shestero-osib.html	Russian occupants fired long-range weapons at a humanitarian aid station in Kharkiv. 6 killed, 15 wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/24/2022	Irpin, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Київщина: окупанти обстріляли Ірпін з "Градів" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969487-kiyivschina-okupanti-obstrilyali-irpin-z-gradiv	Russian occupants fired "Grad" rockets at Irpin in Kiev Oblast.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 282	
03/24/2022	Kyiv	УНН, "У Києві на Оболоні ворожий снаряд влучив у приватний будинок" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969483-u-kiyevi-na-oboloni-vorozhij-snaryad-vluchiv-u-privatniy-budinok	A shell hit a residential building in the Obolonskiy district of Kiev and caught fire.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/24/2022	Vasilkiv, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти обстріляли евакуаційний поїзд Київ – Івано-Франківськ" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969543-okupanti-obstrilyali-evakuatsiyiy-poyizd-kiyiv-ivano-frankivsk	Russian occupants shelled the Kiev - Ivano-Frankivsk evacuation train. There were no casualties.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	

03/24/2022	Vyshhorod, Kyiv Oblast	УНН, "Київщина: російські військові з артилерії обстріляли околиці Вишгорода, пошкоджено багатоповерхівку" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969544-kiyivschina-rosiyski-viyskovi-z-artileriyi-obstrilyali-okolitsi-vishgoroda-poshkodzheno-bagatopoverkhivku	Russian occupants shelled the outskirts of Vyshgorod (Kyiv Oblast) with heavy artillery. A multi-storey building was damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/24/2022	Sevierodone tsk, Lysychansk, Rubizhne, Kreminna, Novodruzhye, Voivodivka (Luhansk Oblast)	УНН, "По Луганщині окупанти вночі завдали ударів ракетами та фосфорними бомбами, четверо загинули" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969422-po-luganschini-vnochi-zavdali-udariv-raketami-ta-fosfornimi-bombami-chetvero-zagiblich https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/na-rubizhne-luhanskoji-oblasti-skinuli-fosfori-bombi-holova-ova.html	Russian occupants shelled Luhansk Oblast. 4 civilians were killed (2 of them children) and 6 were wounded. 31 civilian buildings were destroyed, 23 of which were residential buildings. Russians also used phosphorous weapon.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	
03/24/2022	Mariupol	УНН, "Окупанти примусово депортували до фільтраційних таборів близько 6 тис. мариупольців - МЗС" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969476-okupanti-primusovo-deportovali-do-filtratsiynikh-taboriv-blizko-6-tis-mariupoltsiv-mzs	During the war, the Russian occupiers forcibly deported 6,000 Mariupol residents to filtration camps in the Russian Federation.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 146	
03/24/2022	Mariupol	УНН, "У Мариуполі окупанти захопили храм і відкривають звідти вогонь" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969497-u-mariupoli-okupanti-zakhopili-khram-po-krova-bozhoyi-materi	Russian occupants seized the Church of the Protection of the Mother of God in Mariupol and were firing from there.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 52(3); AP I Art. 53(a); AP I Art. 53(b)	Art. 341	

03/24/2022	Mariupol, Yasna Polyana, Novoselivka, New-York, Novopokrovsk, Bakhmut	УНН, "Росіяни вбили ще двох дітей на Донеччині: у Маріуполі загинула 11-річна дівчинка, а в Ясній Полянці – 14-річний хлопець" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969549-rosiyani-vbili-schedvokh-ditey-na-donechchini-u-mariupoli-zaginula-11-richna-divchinka-a-v-yasniy-polyani-14-richniy-khlopets	Russians killed two more children in Donbas: an 11-year-old girl was killed in Mariupol and a 14-year-old boy was killed in Yasna Polyana. In addition, 1 more person was reported killed and 5 wounded in Mariupol. On 24 March, Russian shelling killed 3 people in New York, Novoselivka and Novopokrovsk. 6 people were wounded. Additionally, 1 person injured in Luhansk Oblast received medical help in Bakhmut.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122	
03/24/2022	Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast	УНН, "Окупанти завдали авіаудар по найбільш густонаселеному мікрорайону Охтирки: є жертва" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969452-okupanti-zavdali-aviadar-po-naybilsh-gustonaselenomu-mikrorayonu-okhtirki-ye-zhertva https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/okupanti-rf-obstriljali-raketami-najbilsh-hustonaselenij-rajon-okhtirki-je-zahibli.html	Russian occupants fired air-to-ground missiles at a residential neighbourhood in Okhtyrka (Sumy Oblast). 1 killed person.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 263	
03/24/2022	Zhytomyr Oblast	УНН, "На Житомирщині окупанти завдали ракетного удару по промислового об'єкту" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1969435-na-zhitomirschini-okupanti-zavdali-raketnogo-udaru-po-promislovomu-obyektu	A rocket hit an industrial facility in the Novograd-Volynsky district of Zhytomyr Oblast.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 263	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/25/2022	Maximiliani vka, Avdiivka, Mariinka. Donetsk region.	Donetsk Region Administration _ https://dn.gov.ua/news/rosiyani-zhorstoko-obstrilyuyut-mirne-nasele-nnya-na-donech-chini-za-dobu-odna-l-yudina-zaginula-ta-s-hist-zaznali-poranen	«Росія вбиває цивільних! Весь день росіяни жорстоко обстрілюють мирне населення на Авдіївському та Мар'їнському напрямках. У Максимільянівці загинула 1 дитина, 3 людей дістали поранення. Є також двоє поранених в Авдіївці (серед них – одна дитина) та один поранений у Мар'їнці», - написав він. *начальник Донецької обласної військової адміністрації Павло Кириленко)	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	1 child killed; 6 injured (1 of them - child)
03/25/2022	Kharkiv city.	Head of Kharkiv region administration. _ https://t.me/synegubov/2733	Сьогодні зранку в Основ'янському районі Харкова обстріляли із артилерії та «Градів» міську поліклініку, де видавали гуманітарну допомогу. Постраждали 7 осіб, з яких 4 - померли. Очевидно, що ворог хоче посіяти паніку та перешкоджає отриманню гуманітарної допомоги. Вчора вдень російські війська так само обстріляли пункт видачі «Нової пошти», 6 осіб загинули, 17 - постраждалих.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv);	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	Artillery fire against hospital where humanitarian help was provided for civils. 4 killed, 7 injured

		<p>a/214452-vijna-rosii-proti-ukraini-so-vidbuvaetsa-u-kiivskij-oblasti/ Oleksiy Kuleba, Head of Kyiv region military administration https://t.me/OleksiyKuleba/512</p>	<p>Бучанська, Ірпінська, Дмирівська громади залишаються під постійним обстрілом ворога. Багато сіл в окупації, що приближує гуманітарну катастрофу. Постійно ведуться бої на Житомирській трасі. Ворог проводить повітряну розвідку</p> <p>Немишайівська територіальна громада – ворог окопався, інфраструктура зруйнована, зв'язку практично немає.</p> <p>Бучанська територіальна громада – ворог окопався, інфраструктура зруйнована. Постійні обстріли.</p> <p>Гостомельська територіальна громада – переміщення технікою ворога, йшов бій. Інфраструктура зруйнована.</p> <p>Ірпінська територіальна громада – Ірпінь бій. ЗСУ покращило свої позиції та контролює 85% міста. Інфраструктура зруйнована. Постійно обстріли./// Залишаються знеструмленими в результаті обстрілів електромереж 499 населених пунктів, 156742 споживачів. Протягом минулої доби включено електропостачання 62 населених пунктів. Відновлено електропостачання 12 414 споживачам. ... За минулу добу на спецлінію «102» та чергову частину Головного управління надійшло 70 заяв та повідомлень громадян про підпад, вибух, замінування, пов'язаних безпосередньо з російською агресією.</p> <p>— Точна кількість загиблих та поранених в Київській області наразі невідома. Влада області повідомляє, що багато людей лишаються в підвалах, війська РФ беруть заручників, вбивають як дорослих, так і дітей.</p> <p>—</p>	<p>? Art. (8)(2)(a)(viii);</p> <p>— ? Art 7 (1)(h)</p>	<p>75(2)(c)</p>	<p>used to describe atrocity which happened here. Avia attacks and land fights hapenning in these communit es. #s of killed and injuries stayed unknown. Infrustructure is destroyed. "humanitarian corridors" for civils evacuation were declined by russia. Cases when russian troops take hostages and kill people are reported</p>
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повернутися додому – їм на заміну вирушили 46 добровольців.

...

Але після обіду сталося таке: колона танків приїхала до ЧАЕС з боку Прип'яті, підійшла до одного з корпусів станції і направила дула на будівлю. Росіяни погрожували «перетворити усіх на м'ясо». І це при тому, що на території атомного об'єкту не можна вести бойові дії.

...

Спального місця в мене не було. Де працювали, там і спали, на підлозі на тілогрійках.

Із засобів комунікації у нас залишилося радіо, ми постійно слухали, що відбувається в Україні. Мобільного зв'язку та інтернету не було.

...

У нас же на станції є їдальня, яка годує персонал. Запасів їжі на складах мало вистачити приблизно на місяць.

Крім того, у нас був медпункт і два фельдшери. Ліків було небагато, але медики допомагали персоналу, як могли.

...

Годувати потрібно було близько трьох сотень людей, а на станції була лише одна кухарка. І в якийсь момент вона була настільки виснажена, що довелося ставити їй крапельницю.

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Коли окупанти вирішили знімати фейковий сюжет про те, як вони роздають персоналу гуманітарну допомогу, керівництво нас одразу попередило, щоб ми не брали в цьому участь.

Тоді окупанти роздобули на санпропускниках спецодяг Novarka – підприємства, яке будувало накриття над четвертим енергоблоком і вже давно у нас не працює. Росіяни одяглися і стали побити витяг л

guarded it became hostages for 24 days since Feb 24th (lately, 100 personnel were rotated with 46 new ones). There were no medical personnel after rotation.

03/25/2022	Rubizhne, Schedryshcheve, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Zolote. Luhansk region	Luhansk Region Administration. (1) http://loga.gov.ua/odapress/news/sergiy_gayday_pozhezhnimi_vryatovano_simoh_lyudey_troie_zhiteliv_luganshchiny , (2) http://loga.gov.ua/odapress/news/protyagom_nochi_rosiyani_ruynuvali_budinki_v_rubizhnomu_ie_dvoie_zagiblih_sergiy , (3) http://loga.gov.ua/odapress/news/rosiyani_obstrilyali_gradami_zolote_zranku_sergiy_gayday	<p>«Протягом доби в області тривають запеклі бої – Збройні сили України намагаються витіснити росіян з Попасної та Рубіжного, де ворог закріпився на околицях населених пунктів. У той же час продовжується обстріл житлового сектору. Сьогодні зранку «руський мир» вкотре відчули жителі Золотого – по місту армія рф відкрила вогонь градами. Кількість жертв і руйнувань уточнюємо», – заявив очільник Луганщини Сергій Гайдай. _____ «Загиблі – жителі Рубіжного та Щедрищевого, які армія рф обстрілювала з самого ранку. За наявною інформацією, жертв більше, однак через постійні обстріли до деяких районів рятувальники не можуть дістатися. Упродовж дня вони поборолі полум'я у 10 житлових будинках, куди сталися влучання снарядів ворога. Це 4 багатоповерхівки та 6 приватних. 3-під завалів евакуйовані 7 осіб», – підбив підсумки 25 березня начальник обласної військової адміністрації Сергій Гайдай.</p> <p>Сьогодні росіяни обстріляли Северодонецьк, Рубіжне, Лисичанськ, Золоте, Щедрищеве.</p> <p>Унаслідок російського вторгнення без електроенергії перебувають ще 95 312 споживачів Луганщини. Знеструмлені 32 населених пункти області – 12 частково та 20 повністю.</p> <p>Крім того, без газопостачання залишаються 27 населених пунктів – 22 повністю та 5 частково.</p>	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(viii)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	Night and day long bombing of civil houses. 3 person killed in Rubizhne and Schedryshcheve; unknown #s are killed and injured as rescuers can't get to some towns because of unstoppable attacks.
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03/25/2022	Regions of Kyiv, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernigiv.	Ministry of culture of Ukraine _ (1) https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/u-seredno-mu-dvi-na-den-vijna-rosiyi-proti-ukrayini-zavdala-rujnuvan-shc-honajmenshe-59-sporudam-duhovnogo-znachennya-v-shchonajmenshe-8-oblastya-h-ukrayini , (2) https://mkip.gov.ua/news/6996.html	У середньому дві на день: війна росії проти України завдала руйнувань щонайменше 59 спорудам духовного значення в щонайменше 8 областях України З 24 лютого постраждали вже щонайменше 59 споруд духовного значення (не враховуючи прилеглих будівель) у щонайменше восьми областях України: Київській, Донецькій, Житомирській, Запорізькій, Луганській, Сумській, Харківській та Чернігівській. Переважна більшість із них – православні храми. Руйнувань зазнали також мечеті, синагоги, протестантські церкви, релігійні освітні заклади та важливі адміністративні будівлі релігійних організацій. Інтерактивна мапа дає змогу побачити всі постраждалі об'єкти та вибрати візуалізацію за релігійною спільнотою.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 53(a)	Art. 438	"2 per day in average" (c). 59 religious buildings are harmed in 8 regions of Ukraine since 24th of Feb. "Mosques, synagogues, protestant churches, religious educational institutions and important administrative buildings of religious organizations were also destroyed."
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03/25/2022	Regions of Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Chernigiv, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, Kherson, Sumy.	General Prosecutor Office _ Juvenile prosecutor department _ https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/yuvenalni-prokurori-vnaslidok-zbroinoyi-agresiyi-rtf-v-ukrayini-zaginulo-135-ditei	135 дітей станом на ранок 25 березня 2022 року загинуло в Україні через збройну агресію Російської Федерації. 184 дитини отримали поранення. Найбільше постраждало дітей у Київській - 64, Харківській - 44, Донецькій - 46, Чернігівській - 34, Миколаївській - 25, Запорізькій - 26, столиці - 16, Житомирській - 15, Херсонській - 15 та Сумській - 14 областях. __ Внаслідок запеклих боїв серед міста у Рубіжному Луганської області загинули двоє дітей. /... Через щоденні бомбардування та обстріли пошкоджено 566 закладів освіти, 73 з яких зруйновано повністю.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	"135 children killed, 184 children injured. 566 educational settings are harmed (73 totally destroyed)."
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/26/2022	Chernigiv city.	SlovoDilo - press conference with Major of Chernigiv city _ https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/03/26/novyna/bezpeka/chernihovi-zalyshylosya-menshe-polovyny-zhyteliv-mista-majzhe-nemaye-mer-atroshenko	Станом на поточну добу, 26 березня, у Чернігові залишилося менше половини мешканців, місто вщент зруйноване – легше порухувати цілі будинки, ніж зруйновані. Про це міський голова Чернігова Владислав Атрошенко повідомив на пресконференції у Ukraine Media Centre Київ та в ефірі каналу «Рада». _ «Місто рознесене вщент. Простіше порухувати ті будинки, які ще вцілили. Вбито більше 200 мирних людей. Зараз приблизно у Чернігові перебуває 120-130 тисяч містян. Міська влада на місці, всі працюють, підтримують наше військо. Ніхто місто здавати не збирається», - повідомив мер.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I. Art 51(4)(a) Art 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	Less than 50% of population stays in the city, city is badly destroyed. "It is easier to count non-harmed buildings, then destroyed ones. Over 200 civils are killed" (c)
03/26/2022	Donetsk region.	Donetsk Region Adm	На Донеччині через обстріли російських військових одна людина загинула, ще шестеро дістали поранення	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I. Art 51(4)(a) Art 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	1 killed, 6 injured
03/26/2022	Mariupol. Donetsk region	NYT _ https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/26/world/ukraine-russia-war	Video story about escaping Mariupol . _ The child hurted because of mine; attack on maternity home; destroyed houses of civils; __ note: "Ukrainian families are taking enormous risks to try to flee Mariupol, traveling through Russian checkpoints — and in some cases land mines — to try to get to safety.CreditCredit...Benjamin Foley for The New York Times"	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	Children without parents taken by russian troops from Mariupol to Donetsk reported. Additional note states that other civils from Mariupol were departed as well, and if they don't have relatives in Donetsk, they are additionally departed to taganrog (russia)

03/26/2022	Mariupol-Donetsk region.	Ukrinform. https://www.	У лікарні ім. Вишневецького в окупованому Донецьку нині перебувають діти без батьків, вивезені російськими загарбниками з Маріуполя. ... у двох школах №№25 та 31 Ленінського району, а також у гімназії №70 у Київському районі перебувають біженці, яких російські військові вивезли зі зруйнованого Маріуполя. Наприклад, у школі №31 зараз перебувають близько 250 мариупольчан. Але ці люди не постійно тут живуть, вони ночують. Потім, якщо у біженців не знаходяться родичі в Донецьку, які можуть їх забрати, людей вивозять до таганрога, до росії.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(d); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(b)(viii)	GC IV Art. 49; AP I Art. 78.	Art. 438	Children without parents taken by russian troops from Mariupol to Donetsk reported. Additional note states that other civils from Mariupol were departed as well, and if they don't have relatives in Donetsk, they are additionall y departed to taganrog (russia)
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03/26/2022	Boyarka, Kyiv region.	Kyiv region prosecutor office _ https://t.me/press_kobl/771	Внаслідок обстрілу Боярки на Київщині поранено 4 мирних мешканців, у тому числі дитину — розпочато досудове розслідування Фастівська окружна прокуратура розпочала кримінальні провадження за фактом обстрілу окупаційними військами міста Боярка. Дії військових РФ кваліфіковано як порушення законів та звичаїв війни – ст. 438 КК України. За даними слідства, 26 березня військовослужбовці збройних сил РФ відкрили вогонь по місту Боярка. Внаслідок застосування зброї за попередньою інформацією поранення отримали 4 особи, серед яких неповнолітня дитина. Серед пошкодженої окупантами інфраструктури - багатоповерховий і приватні житлові будинки, гаражі та інші об'єкти нерухомості. Такі дії російських військ становлять пряму загрозу життю й здоров'ю мирного населення та суперечать нормам міжнародного гуманітарного права.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	4 injured (1 child), civil houses are harmed as a result of russian troops fire against the town
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03/26/2022	Communities of Bucha, Brovary, Vyshgorod. Kyiv region	Kyiv region administration _ https://koda.gov.ua/operatyvna-informaciya-stanom-na-1000-27-03-2022-shhodo-sytuaciyi-na-kyiyvshhyni/ & https://t.me/kyivoda/2722 _ Andriy Nebytov (Head of Police in Kyiv region) https://www.facebook.com/100039590617894/posts/663222585007423/	<p>ОПЕРАТИВНА ІНФОРМАЦІЯ СТАНОМ НА 10:00 27.03.2022 ЩОДО СИТУАЦІЇ НА КИЇВЩИНІ _</p> <p>Протягом 26 березня зафіксовано більше 30 обстрілів російськими військами житлових масивів та соціальної інфраструктури.</p> <p>Найбільш руйнувань внаслідок обстрілів у Бучанському (Ірпінська, Бучанська, Макарівська, Бородянська, Дмитрівська громади), Броварському (Великодимерська громада), Вишгородському районах (Димерська, Іванківська громади) _</p> <p>За минулу добу на спецлінію «102» та чергову частину Головного управління надійшло 58 заяв та повідомлень громадян про підпад, вибух, замінування, пов'язаних безпосередньо з російською агресією.</p> <p>_</p> <p>Точна кількість загиблих та поранених в Київській області наразі невідома. Влада області повідомляє, що багато людей лишаються в підвалах, війська РФ беруть заручників, вбивають як дорослих, так і дітей.</p> <p>Зруйновано щонайменше 5 будинків, є постраждалі серед цивільного населення, в тому числі одна дитина.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p> <p>_</p> <p>? Art. (8)(2)(a)(viii)</p> <p>_</p> <p>? Art. 7 (1)(h)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)</p>	Art. 438	<p>"Over 30 attacks on civils buildings and infrustructure. #s of killed and injurries stayed unknown. Cases when russian troops take hostages and kill people are reported</p> <p>At least 5 living houses are destroyed, civils are injured (incl. 1 child)"</p> <p>Note from Mr. Nebitov: "Investigators documted over 250 facts of war crimes in Kyiv region for International Crime Court" (c, 26th of March)</p>
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03/26/2022	Kyiv city.	Kyiv city administrati	Столичні швидкі від початку повномасштабного російського вторгнення прийняли понад 400 викликів до поранених внаслідок ворожих дій окупанта. За цей час, рятуючи життя містян, один лікар та три водії «швидких» Києва також отримали поранення. Про це повідомив перший заступник голови КМДА Микола Поворозник	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 62	Art. 438	Medical emergency got over 400 cases of help to injured by war people in Kyiv. 1 doctor and 3 drivers were injured in workplace
03/26/2022	Makariv, Kyiv region	Ukrainian Witness project _ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hytpLySKzo & https://lb.ua/society/2022/03/26/511142_zhittyia_mayzhe_zruynovanomu_makarovi.html	Селище міського типу Макарів, що знаходиться у Київській області, продовжує страждати від щоденного бомбардування росією. Люди не можуть пересуватися вулицями, тому що в будь-який момент просто біля них може впасти і вибухнути ракета. “Я не можу ходити, тому що такі йдуть бомбежки по Макарову... От виходиш зранку, за 200 метрів горить хата, повертаєшся туди, там горить хата”, – говорить житель селища. Більшість житлових будинків та магазинів вже зруйновано, а у будівлі хлібозаводу дуже сильно пошкоджена електропроводка. На дорогах та городах величезні ями від вибухів, а навколо зруйнованих будинків розкидані уламки скла та меблів.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	Makariv is avia attacked daily. People can't leave their shelters as russian airstrike can kill them any moment. Major of houses and stored are totally destroyed
03/26/2022	Slavutych, Kyiv region	Kyiv region administr	РОСІЙСЬКІ ОКУПАНТИ ВТОРГЛИСЯ В МІСТО СЛАВУТИЧ ТА ЗАХОПИЛИ МІСЬКУ ЛІКАРНЮ.	Russia	Art. 8(a)(viii); Art. 8(b)(v)	GC IV Art. 57; AP I Art. 75(2)(c); AP I Art. 12	Art. 438	Russians troops occupied hospital. The major pf the town was taken as hostage

03/26/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk region	Luhansk Region Adm	Сергій Гайдай: росіяни прицільно б'ють по продуктових складах в Северодонецьку – знають, де вони розташовані, та необізнані, наповнені вони чи ні ..	Russia	Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 54(2)	Art. 438	Russians bombing food warehouses in Severodonetsk
03/26/2022	Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, Luhansk region	Luhansk Region Adm	26 березня, у день, коли необхідно було дотримуватися «режиму тиші», росіяни відкрили вогонь по Лисичанську і Северодонецьку. «Рятівники ледве встигають гасити полум'я. Через обстріли сталося загоряння будинку в Лисичанську, знеструмлено шахту, де під землею знаходяться працівники. Зараз їх намагаються підняти на поверхню. Росія вдарила по місту ракетою «Точка-У» та градами. Складна ситуація і в Северодонецьку. Тут палає ще один продуктовий склад, два житлових та декілька дачних будинків, пошкоджені гаражі станції швидкої допомоги, в цьому ж районі травмовано жінку», - повідомив очільник Луганщини Сергій Гайдай.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	"humanitarian corridors" were agreed to let civilians evacuation. Russians keep firing towns. Many civil property (houses, garages) and common property (foodstuffs, station for medical emergency cars) were destroyed. At least one woman killed.

03/26/2022	Lviv city.	Lviv region administration _ https://old.loda.gov.ua/news?id=66696	<p>At about 16:10, an air alarm was initiated in Lviv and the region. Within a few minutes, several powerful blows were heard.</p> <p>The Head of the Lviv Regional Military Administration Maksym Kozytskyi reported about what happened.</p> <p>"What I can tell you as of this hour. There were two missile strikes within Lviv. Information that there was an impact on a residential building or other infrastructure facilities has not been confirmed. According to preliminary data, five people were injured. The threat of a missile strike is still there. Stay in the shelters! Don't stay outside Everything that can be reported for security reasons, I will report later, "- stated the Head of the Lviv Regional Military Administration.</p>	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	5 injured caused by missile strike.
03/26/2022	Vasylivka village, Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia region administration _ https://www.zoda.gov.ua/news/60178/pob-lizu-vasilivki-okupanti-stvorili-bagatokilometroviy-zator.html	<p>Перешкоджання евакуації _ У ньому - автівки біженців із Маріуполя та евакуаційні автобуси, які вивозять людей із Бердянська до Запоріжжя. У черзі стоять і карети швидких із пораненими дітьми на борту. Окупанти роблять поглиблений огляд тих, хто перетинає їхній блокпост, і створюють перешкоди для швидкого руху колони. Українська сторона веде непрості переговори з представниками рф стосовно необхідності якнайшвидше нормалізувати пропуск наших громадян у бік Запоріжжя.</p>	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	"Humanitarian corridors" were agreed, but russian troops slowing access to evacuation by detailed monitoring of every civil quitting. Medical emergency cars with injured people stuck in the traffic giant.

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/27/2022	Mariupol. Donetsk region	Donetsk Region Administration _ https://dn.gov.ua/news/dostemenno-vidom-o-pro-128-zagiblih-v-naslidok-rosijskih-obstriliv-na-donechchini	Вдалося встановити інформацію про ще двох поранених внаслідок російських обстрілів у Маріуполі. Про це начальник Донецької обласної військової адміністрації Павло Кириленко повідомив у Facebook.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	2 injured.
03/27/2022	Kharkiv city.	NYT_ https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/27/world/ukraine-russia-war	"Seven people, including two children, died in artillery fire in Kharkiv, in northeast Ukraine, as Russian forces tried to subdue the city near the border, the Ukrainian news media reported. And missiles hit a fuel depot in western Ukraine as Russia continued to use airstrikes to disrupt supply lines to Ukrainian forces." - the day of event stays unknown	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	7 killed (incl. 2 children) by russian artillery fire

03/27/2022	Beryslav district at Kherson region	<p>Kherson region administration _ https://khoda.gov.ua/operativna-%D1%96nformac%D1%96ja-po-hersonshin%D1%96-za-danimi-v%D1%96d-rda-ta-otg-27-03-2022r--na-15%3A00?_cf_chl_tk=b_.RhugFizrctJb5hn9qFKDfn5v2qQPYP87fTAQ8IE-1658914120-0-gaNycGzNCT0</p>	<p>Бериславський район:</p> <p>— Станом на 27 березня населені пункти Високопільської, Милівської, Тягинської, Борозенської, Калинівської та Кочубеївської територіальних громад окупована агресорами РФ.</p> <p>Там ведуться бойові дії. По всіх територіальних громадах району зв'язок з операторами Vodafone UA, KYIVSTAR працює з перебоями, мережа Інтернет іноді зникає.</p> <p>Проблемне питання забезпечення населення по всіх територіальних громадах ліками: серцево-судинні захворювання, інсулінозалежних хворих, онкохворих, захворювання ендокринної системи, безглютенним дитячим харчуванням та ін.</p> <p>— Борозенська та Калинівська територіальні громади – відсутній зв'язок. Але за словами місцевих жителів у соцмережах є інформація про бойові дії. У деяких селах декілька днів немає світла, критична ситуація з ліками. Внаслідок вибухів є постраждала інфраструктура. Телефонний зв'язок практично відсутній.</p>	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 63	Art. 438	6 villages are occupied. Problem of access to medical drugs is reported, especially for people with cardiovascular diseases, insulin-dependent patients, cancer patients, diseases of the endocrine system, gluten-free baby food, etc.
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03/27/2022	Kyiv region.	Kyiv region administration _ https://koda.gov.ua/operatyvna-informacziya-stanom-na-1900-27-03-2022/	Ворог на тимчасово зайнятих територіях продовжує порушувати вимоги Міжнародного гуманітарного права вдається до викрадення та залякування місцевих мешканців, утримує цивільних громадян України у заручниках. __ Відзначається продовження мілітаризації російськими окупаційними військами зони відчуження Чорнобильської АЕС. Це серйозно підвищує ризик пошкодження ізоляційних споруд, що побудовані над четвертим енергоблоком станції після її вибуху в 1986 році. Таке пошкодження неминуче призведе до потрапляння в атмосферу значної кількості радіоактивного пилу та зараження ним не лише України, але й інших країн Європи. Окупаційні війська РФ ігнорують загрози та застереження та продовжують транспортувати і зберігати значну кількість боєприпасів в безпосередній близькості від атомної станції. __	Russia	Art. 7(1)(h); Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(a)(viii); Art. 8(b)(i); Art. 8(b)(v); Art. 8(b)(iv); -- for Chornobyl station occupation???	AP I Art. 55; AP I Art. 56; AP I Art. 75(2)(a); AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 438 ? Art. 441	
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03/27/2022	Borivske, Rubizhne, Lysychansk, Severodonetsk, Voevodivka. Luhansk region.	<u>Luhansk Region Administration</u> , http://loga.gov.ua/oda/press/news/naslidki-rosiyskikh-obstriliv-27-bereznia-u-borivskomu-zaginula-ditina-shche-dvoie	<p>Наслідки російських обстрілів 27 березня: у Борівському загинула дитина, ще двоє травмованих – одна дитина</p> <p>Про це повідомив начальник обласної військової адміністрації Сергій Гайдай увечері 27 березня.</p> <p>Ворог прицільно обстрілював Северодонецьк, Рубіжне, Лисичанськ, Борівське, Воєводівку.</p> <p>«Ми маємо 12 зруйнованих росіянам будівель – 4 багатоповерхівки, 5 приватних будинків та інші споруди. Постраждав ще один оптовий склад в Северодонецьку. Однак, головне – втрачаємо людей, мирне населення. Унаслідок обстрілів Борівського знайдено загиблу дитину, ще двоє осіб поранено, з них одна дитина. Упродовж дня сталося три пожежі у житловому фонді області – з-під завалів врятовано шістьох мешканців», – сказав Сергій Гайдай.</p> <p>Також збільшується кількість знеструмлень. Через бойові дії на Луганщині вимкнено 600 трансформаторних підстанцій, 14 населених пунктів без світла частково, 21 повністю – загалом 101 526 споживачів.</p>	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b); AP I Art. 54(2)	Art. 438	<p>1 child killed; 2 injured (1 of them - child)</p> <p>12 civil houses are destroyed, food warehouse was harmed</p>
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03/27/2022	Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk. Luhansk region	Luhansk Region Administration. http://loga.gov.ua/od-a/press/news/sergiy_gayday_rosiyani_poshkodili_11_budinkiv_a_v_popasniy_z_mionometu_rozstrilyali	<p>Ще 3 багатопверхівки та 8 приватних будинків пошкоджені вогнем росіян в Северодонецьку, Лисичанську та Рубіжному. Також потрапили під обстріл школа в селі поблизу Лисичанська, інфраструктура станції швидкої допомоги в Северодонецьку та два оптових склади міста.</p> <p>Внаслідок дій агресора постраждало двоє осіб, врятовано з-під завалів – четверо. Загалом упродовж доби сталося 16 займань житлового фонду та на 15 га сухої трави.</p> <p>Ситуація навколо відновлення критичної інфраструктури Луганщини залишається незмінною. Без електроенергії перебувають 95 312 споживачів: знеструмлені 32 населених пункти області – 12 частково та 20 повністю.</p> <p>Крім того, без газопостачання залишаються 27 населених пунктів (близько 41 000 абонентів) – 23 повністю та 5 частково.</p> <p>Відсутнє водопостачання у містах Рубіжне та Попасна, частково обмежено подачу води на Золоте, села Гірської громади, проблеми з подачею води є також в Северодонецьку та Лисичанську.</p>	Russia	Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)(b)	Art. 438	<p>3 apartment houses and 8 private civil houses are destroyed.</p> <p>School setting, medical emergency station, and two food warehouses were harmed.</p>
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/28/2022	Donetsk region	Prosecutor General's Office, "Shelling of Donetsk region continues - 8 criminal proceedings have been initiated", https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/prodovzuyutsya-obstrili-doneccini-rozpocato-8-kriminalnix-provaden	Russian artillery once again hit the cities of Maryinka, Avdiyivka, Zalizne, the city of Toretsk, the village of New York, v. Zaytseve of Bakhmut district - many households, farm buildings, and an electricity substation were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(1)	
03/28/2022	Holoprystan, Kherson region	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Another mayor kidnapped in Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/29/7335545/ Ukrinform, "Russian invaders kidnapped one more person from the Holoprystan community in the Kherson region" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3459681-rosijski-zagarniki-vikrali-u-golopristsanskij-gromadina-hersonsini-se-odnu-ludinu.html	Military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation kidnapped the Head of the Hola Prystan City Council - Oleksandr Babych at gunpoint and are currently holding him hostage.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 146(3); Art. 438(1)	
03/28/2022	Kharkiv and Sumy regions	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Russians use banned mines in Kharkiv and Sumy regions", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/30/7335840/	The Russian occupiers are laying banned mines (POM-3 "Medallion" anti-personnel mines) with seismic sensors in the captured territories of the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Only Russia produces such mines. This mines are banned under the international 1997 Ottawa Convention, to which 169 countries are signatories. Russia has not signed this treaty.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(xvii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1)	
03/28/2022	Lyubotyn, Kharkiv region	LB.ua, "A man died as a result of a missile attack in Kharkiv Region", https://lb.ua/society/2022/03/28/511425_unaslidok_raketnogo_udaru.html Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMSlezRMQ7c	As a result of a missile attack on the city of Lyubotyn, 1 local resident was killed, 7 civilians sustained injuries and residential 7 buildings and 1 car were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1); Art. 438(2)	

03/28/2022	Sofiivska Borshchahivka, Kyiv region	Ukrinform, "In Kyiv region, five civilians killed in Russian shelling", https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3442754-in-kyiv-region-four-civilians-killed-in-russian-shelling.html UNN, "Five more people died near Kyiv due to shelling by the occupiers - Prosecutor General's Office", https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1970142-pid-kiyevom-cherez-obstrili-okupantiv-z-aginuli-sche-pyat-lyudey-ofis-genprokurora	As a result of a missile attack on the village of Sofiivska Borshchahivka, 1 local resident was killed and residential buildings were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1); Art. 438(2)	
03/28/2022	Sviatopetrivs	Prosecutor General's Office, «The occupiers continue to kill civilians and destroy the infrastructure of Kyiv region - an investigation has been launched», https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/okupanti-prodovzuyut-vbivati-mirnix-meskanciv-ta-nishhiti-infrastrukturu-kiyivshhini-rozpocato-rozsliduvannya	4 civilians were killed in enemy shelling, residential buildings were destroyed and damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1); Art. 438(2)	
03/28/2022	Luhansk region	Directspeech.news, "Another shelling of Luhansk region - pre-trial investigations have been started", https://directspeech.news/news/cergovi-obstrili-luganshchini-rozpocato-dosudovi-rozsliduvannya	As a result of a attack on the city of Lysychansk, Popasna, Severodonetsk, Rubizhne and the village Nyzhnye, 2 local residents was killed, 6 civilians sustained injuries and residential buildings and the building of the Popasnya Regional Psychoneurological Boarding School were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1); Art. 438(2)	

03/28/2022	Rivne district	<p>Ukrayinska Pravda, “Russian rocket hits an oil depot in the Rivne region”, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/28/7335332/</p> <p>Ukrinform, “A case of ecocide was opened due to the missile attack on an oil depot in the Rivne region”, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3443503-cerez-raketnij-obstril-naftobazi-na-rivnensini-porusili-spravu-za-faktom-ekocidu.html</p> <p>Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rCgQMikfMw8</p>	As a result of a missile attack on the territory of the oil depot in the Rivne district, fuel tanks of the oil depot were destroyed, a fire broke out, caused damage to the surrounding natural environment.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 35(3); AP I Art. 55(1)	Art. 441; Art. 438(1)	
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03/28/2022	Boromlya, Sumy region	<p>World Today News, “Serhiy Pronevych, the Ukrainian athlete tortured and killed by the Russian army: his body was found with handcuffs on his wrists in a basement”, https://www.world-today-news.com/serhiy-pronevych-the-ukrainian-athlete-tortured-and-killed-by-the-russian-army-his-body-was-found-with-handcuffs-on-his-wrists-in-a-basement/</p> <p>TSN, “Russian occupiers tortured and killed a Ukrainian marathon record holder”, https://tsn.ua/ato/rotskyi-okupanti-zakatu-vali-ta-vbili-marafoncy-a-rekordsmena-ukrayini-2028103.html</p> <p>ZMINA, «The man tortured by Russian occupiers in Trostyanka is athlete Serhiy Pronevych», https://zmina.info/news/zakatovanyj-rosijskymy-okupantamy-u-trostyanczi-cholovik-sportsmen-sergij-pronevych/</p> <p>Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxVdvf3RYdQ</p>	Russian occupiers tortured and killed a marathon runner from the Book of Records of Ukraine Sergei Pronevich. His lifeless body was found with the signs of violence and the handcuffs on his wrists, in a basement of the fire station.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(6)	Art. 438(2)	The exact date of the crime is unknown. 28 March 2022 the man’s body was found in the village of Boromlya after his release by the Ukrainian military.
03/28/2022	Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region	<p>Ukrayinska Pravda, «Russians kidnapped the Head of the Education Department in Melitopol - Ivan Fedorov» https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/28/7335351/</p>	Russian aggressors kidnapped the Head of the Education Department of the Melitopol City Council, Iryna Shcherbak.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 146(3); Art. 438(1)	

03/28/2022	Rozivka, Zaporizhzhia region	Facebook, Sergiy Tomilenko, https://www.facebook.com/sergiy.tomilenko/posts/4972280099523481 Ukrayinska Pravda, "Aggressors detain a journalist in Zaporizhzhia and take her to Donetsk", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/29/7335564/	The Russian military have detained a journalist from Zaporizhzhya. Irina Dubchenko has been taken to the occupied Donetsk in order to "investigate her actions".	Russia	Art. 7(1)(e)	AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 146(3); Art. 438(1)	
03/28/2022	Malinsk, Zhytomyr region	Directspeech.news, "Airstrikes on the houses of civilians in Malyna - an investigation has been launched", https://directspeech.news/news/aviaudari-po-budinkam-mirnix-ziteliv-u-malini-roz-pocato-rozsliduvannya	The armed forces of the Russian Federation carried out an airstrike on the houses of civilians. As a result of the explosion, the house was damaged, and 1 civilian - its owner received a concussion.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1)	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/29/2022	Nizhyn, Chernihiv region	Facebook, Oleksandr Kodola, https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.mihlich/posts/5051727954919990 Ukrayinska Pravda, "1 person killed and 6 injured, including 1 child, in shelling in Nizhyyn", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/30/7335764/	1 person was killed in Russian shelling of Nizhyn on 29 March, 6 more civilians were injured, including 1 child.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(2)	
03/29/2022	Volnovakha, Donetsk region	Facebook, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, https://www.facebook.com/Church.ua/posts/5589090164439809 Lb.ua, «The Russian army shelled the UOC MP monastery in Volnovaha for the second time, Bishop Ambrose was wounded» https://lb.ua/society/2022/03/30/511607_r_osiyska_armiya_vdruge_obstrilyala.html	Shelling on the Uspenskiy Mykola-Vasilyvskyi Monastery of the UOC MP. The abbot - Bishop Amvrosy of Volnovasky was injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(1)	
03/29/2022	Chuguyev, Kharkiv region	Facebook, Sergey Bolvynov, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=4991148324304348&id=100002276907245 RBC-Ukraine, «In the Chuguyiv district, a car hit a mine, there are dead and victims», https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/chuguevskom-rayone-avtomobil-naehal-minu-1648645178.html	2 civilians men died, and 5 more civilians people were injured, including a 6-month-old baby. It happened as a result of a car hitting mines.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(2)	
03/29/2022	David Brid, Kherson region	Kherson region in a day, «Two people died in David Brid, a child was seriously injured», http://ksza.ks.ua/news/society/98310-u-da-vidovomu-brod-zagynulo-dvoje-lyudey-t-yazhko-travmovanaditina.html	As a result of the shelling, 2 civilians were killed, and a minor child was seriously injured. Damage was caused to private houses and commercial premises.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(2)	

03/29/2022	Novovorontsovka, Kherson region	TSN, "In the Kherson region, the Russian military shelled Novovorontsovka", https://tsn.ua/ato/u-hersonskiy-oblasti-viy-skovi-rf-obstrilyali-novovorontsovku-foto-2024329.htm	Civilians residential buildings and farm buildings were damaged as a result of enemy shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 52(1);	Art. 438(1)	
03/29/2022	Brovary district, Kyiv region	Kyiv region Prosecutor's Office, "As a result of airstrikes in Brovary district, warehouses with food products are on fire - an investigation has been started", https://kobl.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=312134	As a result of an air strike on the Brovary district, warehouses where food products, household chemicals and other goods of general use were stored were damaged. The area of the fire was 20 thousand square meters.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 438(1)	
03/29/2022	Preobrazhenie, Luhansk region	I-UA.tv, "Abduction of a resident of Luhansk region", https://i-ua.tv/news/29105-vykradennia-meshkanky-luhanshchyny	Abduction of a civilian woman.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(e)	AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 146(3); Art. 438(1)	
03/29/2022	Luhansk region	Prosecutor General's Office, "Regular shelling of the cities of Luhansk region - pre-trial investigations have been started", https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/sergovi-obstrili-mist-luganshchini-rozpocato-dosudovi-rozsliduvannya	Shelling of Nizhne, Tryochizbenka, Borivske, Lysychansk, Kreminna, Zolote-4. 4 people were injured, 6 died, among them 1 minor child. Apartment buildings and private houses, utility rooms, garages, and shops were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(2)	
03/29/2022	Mariupol	TSN, "Occupiers kidnapped medical stuff and patients from Mariupol Maternity house #2" https://tsn.ua/en/ato/occupiers-kidnapped-medical-stuff-and-patients-from-mariupol-maternity-house-2-2024533.html	Russian occupying forces abducted medical stuff and patients (more than 70 people) from Mariupol maternity house.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(d)	AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 146(3); Art. 438(1)	

<p>administration become known - complete list”, https://www.5.ua/regiony/staly-vidomi-imena-zahyblykh-vid-raketnoho-udaru-po-mykolaivskii-ova-povny-spysok-273584.html</p> <p>Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XcwTbDMj-s</p> <p>Wikipedia, “Shelling of the building Mykolaiv regional administration”, https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9E%D0%B1%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D1%96%D0%BB_%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%96%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%96_%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%B2%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%97_%D0%9E%D0%94%D0%90</p>	<p>company; 4) Tyanulin Andrii Evgeniyovych - employees of the utility company; 5) Maria Yosypivna Bincheva - employees of the administration; 6) Anzhelika Myroslavivna Buchkovska - employees of the administration; 7) Andrii Ivanovich Litvinov - employees of the administration; 8) Svitlana Mykolaivna Popova - employees of the administration; 9) Solonar Artem Olegovich - employees of the administration; 10) Turbina-Khlopina Olena Mykhailivna - employees of the administration; 11) Khaitov Stanislav Vyacheslavovich - employees of the administration; 12) Mykola Oleksandrovykh Khomrovy - employees of the administration; 13) Vitaliy Volodymyrovych Shamrayev - employees of the administration; 14) Oksana Viktorivna Havrysh- employees of the administration; 15) Grigorenko Iryna Serhiivna- employees of the administration; 16) Tetyana Anatoliyivna Demennikova- employees of the administration; 17) Olga Hryhorivna Zablotska- employees of the administration; 18) Cabbage Zulfia Mukaddasivna- employees of the administration; 19) Kochetova Iryna Volodymyrivna- employees of the administration; 20) Natalya Volodymyrivna Lavrinenko- employees of the administration; 21) Valery Oleksandrivna Lysyk- employees of the administration; 22) Lyutov Vladyslav Ihorovych – military; 23) Motelchuk Volodymyr Serhiyovych – military; 24) Oiler Dmytro Olegovich – military; 25) Paid Kostyantyn Viktorovych – military; 26) Dmytro Volodymyrovych Ostryanin – military; 27) Pavlyuk Petro Stepanovych – military; 28) Anton Dmytrovych</p>
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03/29/2022	Zaporizhzhya	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Head of local administration: Not a single "green corridor" in Zaporizhzhya today", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/29/7335603/	The Russian Army prevented the function of yet another "green corridor" in Zaporizhzhya. The "green corridor" didn't happen for about 70 buses and vans, which were leaving Zaporizhzhya.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(e)(iii)	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 438(1)	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/30/2022	Donetsk region	Prosecutor General's Office, "Another shelling of the residential areas of Donetsk region by the Russian Armed Forces with fatal consequences - pre-trial investigations have begun", https://gp.gov.ua/posts/sergovi-obstrili-zs-rf-zitlovix-kvartali-v-doneccini-zi-smerelnimi-naslidkami-rozpozato-dosudovi-rozsliduvannya	The armed forces of the Russian Federation shelled the residential quarters of Avdiivka, Maryinka, New York, Toretska. 2 local residents were wounded by shrapnel, 3 died. Residential buildings, warehouses, secondary school buildings and the fire and rescue department were damaged. It was not possible to save a 1.7-year-old child who received a mine-explosive polytrauma in Lysychansk, a closed craniocerebral injury and multiple gunshot penetrating shrapnel wounds of the whole body and was in a coma.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(1); Art. 438(2)	
03/30/2022	Maryinka, Donetsk Regional	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Donetsk Military Administration: Russian troops used phosphorous ammunition in Maryinka", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/30/7335877/	Russian troops used banned phosphorous ammunition in Maryinka in the Donetsk region, causing around 10 fires in the city.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(xvii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)	AP I Art. 51(4)(c);	Art. 438(1); Art. 439	
03/30/2022	Kharkiv	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Russian shell destroys gas pipeline in Kharkiv, repairs not yet possible", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/31/7335996/	An underground medium-pressure gas pipeline in Kharkiv has been destroyed by Russian shelling, with about 34,000 consumers left without gas.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 35(3); AP I Art. 55(1)	Art. 441; Art. 438(1)	

03/30/2022	Guta-Mezhygirsk, Kyiv region	TSN, "On 03/30/2022, a body was found. The exact date of the murder is unknown", https://tsn.ua/en/ato/s-hot-at-home-details-of-the-death-of-the-photojournalist-levin-2027326.html Institute of Mass Information, "Photojournalist Max Levin killed by Russian troops, according to Prosecutor General", https://imi.org.ua/en/news/photojournalist-max-levin-killed-by-russian-troops-according-to-prosecutor-general-i44802	The well-known photojournalist Maks Levin was killed at home by Russian soldiers with two shots from an assault rifle. Maksim Levin was a well-known Ukrainian photo-correspondent and a documentary filmmaker and photographer. He worked with Reuters, BBC, TRT World, Associated Press, Hromadske, LB.ua.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 438(2)	The exact date of the murder is unknown. On 03/30/2022, a body was found.
03/30/2022	Lysychansk region	Ukrinform, "Two children seriously injured in Russia's artillery shelling of Lysychansk", https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3443907-two-children-seriously-injured-in-russias-artillery-shelling-of-lysyhansk.html	Russian invaders have shelled the city of Lysychansk with artillery systems, leaving 4 family members wounded, including 2 children seriously injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(1)	
03/30/2022	Luhansk region	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Evacuation from Luhansk region: bus from Lysychansk comes under fire", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/30/7335799/	A bus came under Russian fire during another evacuation of Lysychansk residents.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(e)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(1)	Art. 438(2)	
03/30/2022	Luhansk region	Prosecutor General's Office, "Shelling of populated areas of Luhansk region - pre-trial investigations have begun", https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/obstrili-naselenix-punktiv-luganskoyi-oblasti-rozpocato-dosudovi-rozsliduvannya	As a result of shelling of populated areas of the Luhansk region, 7 civilians were killed and 8 were injured of various degrees and severity, including 1 child. Apartment buildings and private houses, farm buildings, and industrial facilities were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(1); Art. 438(2)	
03/30/2022	Mariupol	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Invaders deliberately bomb Red Cross building in Mariupol – Azov", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/30/7335738/	The occupiers have deliberately destroyed a building marked with a red cross on a white background with aerial bombardment and artillery fire.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii); Art. 8(2)(e)(ii); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 438(1)	

03/30/2022	Ryzhivka, Sumy region	Magnolia-TV, «In Sumy Region, the prosecutor's office is dealing with the abduction of a person and the shelling of a checkpoint», https://magnolia-tv.com/news/71111-na-sumshchyni-prokuratura-rozbyrayetsya-iz-vykradennyam-lyudyny-ta-obstrilom-kpp Facebook, Sumy Regional Prosecutor's Office, https://ms-my.facebook.com/948846185147719/posts/5284462198252741/	The Russian military illegally detained and forcibly removed from the territory of Ukraine a 42-year-old resident.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(d); Art. 7(1)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 146(3); Art. 438(1)	
03/30/2022	Trostyianet, Sumy region	Prosecutor General's Office, "The bodies of tortured civilians were discovered in the liberated Trostyanka - criminal proceedings have been initiated", https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/u-zvilnenomu-t-rostyanci-viyavleno-t-ila-zakatovanix-mirnix-ziteliv-rozpocato-kriminalni-provadzennya	Servicemen of the armed forces of the Russian Federation kidnapped and abused 2 civilians.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 438(2)	After the liberation of the city from Russian troops on March 30, two bound bodies with gunshot wounds were discovered. The dead turned out to be peaceful local residents, whose relatives had reported their disappearance a few days before.

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
03/31/2022	Chernihiv Region	zaxid.net, https://zaxid.net/rosi-yani-obstrilyali-kolodnu-volonteriv-pid-cherhigovim-ye-zhertvi_n1539940	Russian soldiers shot a convoy of volunteers near Chernihiv.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	
03/31/2022	Kharkiv Region	liveuamap.com,	Russian troops blew up the dam of the Oskil reservoir in the village of Oskil, Izyum district	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 56(1)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
03/31/2022	Luhansk Region	pravda.com.ua,	Two people died as a result of daytime shelling in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	
03/31/2022	Luhansk Region	pravda.com.ua,	Russians shell Donetsk region with phosphorus shells, leaving casualties.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xvii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xix); Art. 8(2)(b)(xx); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 439; Art. 440	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/1/2022	Kherson Region	Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2337706699705449&set=gm.504840064310348	The Russian military captured man	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 146; Art. 147	
04/1/2022	Kyiv Region	liveuamap.com, https://liveuamap.com/uk/2022/1-april-russian-troops-planted-explosives-at-cookie-s-plant	Russian troops planted explosives at a biscuit factory in the city of Bucha, and also poisoned all the products in the warehouses	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 11; AP I Art. 54; AP II Art. 5(1)(b); AP II Art. 14	Art. 442; Art. 438	
04/1/2022	Kyiv Region	hromadske.ua, https://hromadske.ua/posts/zaginuv-fotozhurnalist-i-dokumentalist-maks-levin	Photojournalist and documentarian Max Levin died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	
04/1/2022	Luhansk Region	https://liveuamap.com/uk/2022/1-april-woman-wounded-as-result-of-russian-army-shelling . https://t.me/operativnoZSU/16682	A woman was wounded	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 121; Art. 122	
04/1/2022	Sumy Region	https://t.me/Zhyvytsky/1488?fbclid=IwAR1AsDluAffNxfZ5iPj5iMRDnXifPsyNK433n6lFokh0EEXwvn6yTT2Mewk	The Russian military captured man	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 52(2); AP II Art. 13	Art. 146; Art. 147	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/2/2022	Kyiv Region	Twitter, https://twitter.com/AFP/status/15103113481518612488	Buried 280 people in mass graves	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vi); Art. 8(2)(b)(vi); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(2)(d); AP I Art. 75(4); AP I Art. 77(5); AP I Art. 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 3(1)(d); AP II Art. 4(2)(b); AP II Art. 6(2); AP II Art. 6(4); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434	
04/2/2022	Kyiv Region	AFP News Agency, https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1510281903856705536?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwtterm%5E1510281903856705536%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F	The bodies of at least 20 men were found in Bucha	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	
04/2/2022	Kyiv Region	Mikhail Palinchak, https://www.facebook.com/mpalinchak/posts/49912673909206500	Dead civilians are seen on the sidelines of highway 20km from Kyiv	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	
04/2/2022	Kyiv Region	The village head of the city of Makariv Vadim Tokar, https://t.me/vadimtokar/5629	The head of the village of Motyzhin Olga Sukhenko and her husband Ihor Sukhenko, were captured and killed	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I 75(1); AP I 51(2); AP I 52(2); Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/3/2022	Balakliia, Kharkiv region	Ukrinform, "In Balakliia, the invaders fired at the evacuation convoy, the driver was killed" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3447718-u-balaklii-zagarbniki-obstrilali-evakuacijnu-kolonu-zaginuv-vodij.html	On 03 April 2022 in Balakliia Kharkiv region the evacuation column was fired upon by Russian army. 1 person killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/3/2022	Kharkiv	The Kyiv Independent, "At least 7 killed, 34 injured by April 3 shelling in Kharkiv" https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/at-least-7-killed-34-injured-by-april-3-shelling-in-kharkiv Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7-T-2KpWRo&ab_channel=D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%A5%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BA%D1%96%D0%B2	7 dead, 34 wounded: the consequences of shelling in the Slobid district of Kharkiv	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/3/2022	Mala Rohan, Kharkiv Region	Ukrinform, "Russian occupiers use white phosphorus munitions and thermobaric weapons near Kharkiv" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3449217-russian-occupiers-use-white-phosphorus-munitions-and-thermobaric-weapons-near-kharkiv.html Facebook https://www.facebook.com/ngu.east/posts/271738865127876	Russian occupiers used white phosphorus munitions and thermobaric weapons during battles for Mala Rohan, Kharkiv Region	Russia		AP I Art. 51(4)(c)	Art. 438	*
04/3/2022	Rubizhne, Lugansk region	Telegram (Governor of Luhansk Oblast), "One person died, three were injured, Russians shelled a hospital in Rubizhny" https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1170 Facebook https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidai.loga/posts/141868591685866	On 03 April 2022 shelling of the Russian army destroyed hospital in Rubizhne Lugansk region. 1 person died, 3 were injured	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51(4)(c); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)(i)	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	

04/3/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>Ukraine Live Map, "In the wake of the shelling of Mykolayev, one perished, 14 took off the wounded. So sacrifices in Ochakov" https://liveuamap.com/uk/2022/3-april-one-killed-14-wounded-as-result-of-shelling-of-mykolaiv</p> <p>Ukrinform, "8 people killed, 34 injured in shelling of Mykolayiv and Ochakov" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3448291-8-people-killed-34-injured-in-shelling-of-mykolayiv-and-ochakov.html</p>	On 03 April 2022 in Mykolaiv 1 person killed and at least 14 persons took off the wounded because of the shelling by Russian army.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2).</p>	<p>Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438</p>	
04/3/2022	Ochakov, Mykolaiv region	<p>Mykolaiv region prosecutor's office, "Shelling by the occupiers of the cities of Ochakov and Mykolaiv - an investigation has been launched" https://myk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=312307&fp=110</p> <p>Ukrinform, "8 people killed, 34 injured in shelling of Mykolayiv and Ochakov" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3448291-8-people-killed-34-injured-in-shelling-of-mykolayiv-and-ochakov.html</p>	On 03 April 2022 in Ochakov Mykolaiv region 7 person killed and at least 20 persons took off the wounded because of the shelling by Russian army.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438</p>	*

04/3/2022	Konstantynivka, Mykolaiv region	<p>Proagro.com.ua, "Rashist troops struck a grain elevator in Mykolaiv region" https://proagro.com.ua/eng/storage/rashist-troops-struck-a-grain-elevator-in-mykolaiv-region.html</p> <p>Facebook https://www.facebook.com/paekua/posts/pfbid0TGF42PVeQQZypeqSDc6ZjgmnvU85SgvWDKDQUUnUPoZun7QdtRWiou1B79njv7spgl</p> <p>Foto https://t.me/truexane wsua/38913</p>	On 03 April 2022 missile strike of the Russian army was carried out on the facility of LLC "Balovnyansk production base" which is located in the village of Konstantynivka, Mykolaiv region.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a)	Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/3/2022	Odesa	<p>The Kyiv Independent, "April 3 missile strikes destroy oil refinery, storage facilities in Odesa" https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/april-3-missile-strikes-destroy-oil-refinery-storage-facilities-in-odesa</p>	On 03 April 2022 missile strikes of the Russian army destroyed an oil refinery in Odesa. 1 person was wounded	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51(4)(a); AP I Art. 51(5)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/4/2022	Avdiivka, Donetsk region	Ukraine Live Map, "Avdiivka, Donetsk region: after shelling by Russian troops, 2 dead, 4 wounded" https://liveuamap.com/uk/2022/4-april-2-killed-4-wounded-as-result-of-russian-shelling	After shelling by Russian troops, 2 dead, 4 wounded	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/4/2022	Barvinkove, Kharkiv region	Ukraine Live Map, "Russian troops fired on Barvinkove in Kharkiv region, civilians were destroyed" https://liveuamap.com/uk/2022/4-april-russian-troops-shelled-barvinkove-in-kharkiv-region	On April 4, 2022 in Barvinkove Kharkiv region shelling by Russian army destroyed living quarters, passenger cars and agricultural equipment.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 4; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/4/2022	Chuhuiv, Kharkiv region	Ukrinform, "Two civilians killed in Russian shelling of Chuhuiv" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3448652-two-civilians-killed-in-russian-shelling-of-chuhuiv.html	As a result of enemy artillery shelling, a 38-year-old man and a 63-year-old woman were killed today, April 4, in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv region.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(2)(a)(i); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/4/2022	Kharkiv, Kharkiv region	The Kyiv Independent, "Russian shellings on April 4 kill 6 people, injure 8 in Kharkiv Oblast" https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/russian-shellings-on-april-4-kill-6-people-injure-8-in-kharkiv-oblast	Russian shellings kill 6 people, injure 8	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(2)(a)(i); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/4/2022	Kharkiv region	Uacrisis.org, "The Kharkiv Ecopark is almost destroyed by the shelling of the Russian army" https://uacrisis.org/en/the-kharkiv-ecopark-is-almost-destroyed-by-the-shelling-of-the-russian-army Twitter https://twitter.com/kyivindependent/status/1519318225011593217	On April 4 in Kharkiv region almost destroyed Kharkiv Ecopark	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/4/2022	Gogoliv, Kyiv region	Ukraine Live Map, "A 32-year-old man from the village of Gogoliv, Kyiv region, died as a result of the detonation of an explosive device left by the Russian military in his car" https://liveuamap.com Foto https://t.me/kyivopera Facebook https://www.facebook.com	A 32-year-old man from the village of Gogoliv, Kyiv region, died as a result of the detonation of an explosive device left by the Russian military in his car	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 75(2)(a)(i); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 438	

04/4/2022	Mariupol	<p>Reuters, "Foreign ship sinks in Mariupol after missile attacks, says flag registry" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/foreign-merchant-ship-hit-by-missile-mariupol-ukrainian-official-2022-04-05/</p> <p>Maritime-executive.com, "Cargo Ship Sunk by Russian Shelling at Port of Mariupol" https://maritime-executive.com/article/cargo-ship-on-fire-and-sinking-after-being-hit-in-mariupol</p>	On April 4, around 2240 LT (local time) the vessel was heavily fired upon by Russian armed forces after intentionally shelling the vessel twice a day earlier.	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/4/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>Ukrinform, "Ten adults and one child killed in Russian shelling of Mykolaiv" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3448811-ten-adults-and-one-child-killed-in-russian-shelling-of-mykolaiv.html</p> <p>Video: https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/977</p> <p>Telegram https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/3540</p>	On April 4, 2022, Russian troops shelled Mykolaiv downtown, having killed 10 adults and one child (12 killed 41 wounded).	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 77(1); AP I Art. 75(2)(a)(i); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	Art. 115; Art. 119; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/5/2022	Toretsk, Donetsk region	<p>Pravda.com.ua, "Aggressors shell chemical plant in Donetsk region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/5/7337213/</p> <p>Telegraf, "The Russians bombed a chemical plant in Donbas: 7 hits were recorded" https://telegraf.com.ua/ukr/ukraina/2022-04-05/5701512-rosiya-ni-bombili-fenolnij-zavod-na-donbasi-za-fiksovano-7-vluchen</p> <p>Ukrinform, "Russians shelled a chemical plant in the JFO zone" https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-ato/3448858-rossiane-obstreli-himiceskij-zavod-v-zone-oos.html</p>	On April 5, 2022, russian bombed a chemical plant in Toretsk, Donetsk region	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 56(1)	Art. 194; Art. 438	
04/5/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk region	<p>Ukrinform, "Russian troops have hit a nitric acid tank in the city of Rubizhne, Luhansk Region" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3449182-russian-troops-hit-nitric-acid-tank-in-rubizhne.html</p>	On April 5, 2022, russian troops have hit a nitric acid tank in the city of Rubizhne, Luhansk Region	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 56(1)	Art. 194; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/9/2022	Krasnohorivka, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrinform, "In Donetsk region, as a result of enemy shelling, five people were killed and another five were wounded", https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3453481-na-doneccini-vn-aslidok-vorozih-obstriliv-zaginuli-pat-ludej-se-pat-poraneni.html	Russian shelling injured one person in Krasnohorivka.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/9/2022	Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrinform, "In Donetsk region, as a result of enemy shelling, five people were killed and another five were wounded", https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3453481-na-doneccini-vn-aslidok-vorozih-obstriliv-zaginuli-pat-ludej-se-pat-poraneni.html	Russian shelling killed one person in Novomykhailivka.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/9/2022	Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrinform, "In Donetsk region, as a result of enemy shelling, five people were killed and another five were wounded", https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3453481-na-doneccini-vn-aslidok-vorozih-obstriliv-zaginuli-pat-ludej-se-pat-poraneni.html	Russian shelling killed four civilians and wounded one in Vuhledar.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440;	
04/9/2022	Berdyansk, Tokmak and Energodar	Ukrainska Pravda, "The Russians did not release evacuation buses from the three cities", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/9/7338494/	Buses for the evacuation of people from Berdyansk, Tokmak and Energodar had to be returned to Zaporizhzhia, as the occupying forces refused to let them pass along the agreed route.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 78(1)	Art. 340	
04/9/2022	Kharkiv Region, Ukraine	Telegram channel, https://t.me/synegubov/2849	The occupiers shelled the civilian infrastructure of Balaklia, Pischyna, there was heavy shelling in Zolochiv, Dergachy. It is known about 11 victims, 10 people died, among them - 1 child.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	

04/9/2022	Kharkiv, Ukraine	Telegram channel Suspilne Kharkiv, "A Russian projectile on a parachute during the shelling of Kharkiv, April 9, 2022", https://t.me/suspilnekharkiv/10981	The mayor of Kharkiv, Igor Terekhov, said that the Russian occupiers were dropping bombs on the city with parachutes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(4)(b); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/9/2022	Kherson, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Ex-head of the Kherson Regional State Administration was abducted - sources", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/9/7338362/	On the morning of April 9, Andrii Putilov, the former head of the Kherson Regional State Administration, was kidnapped from Kherson.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 51(6)	Art. 146; Art. 146-1	
04/9/2022	Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Express, "Russia shoot themselves in foot as attack on nitric acid tanker backfires on own position", https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1594046/Russia-news-missile-strike-nitric-acid-tanker-Rubizhne-Luhansk-gas-mask-ven	Russian forces hit a storage tank holding nitric acid, according to Serhii Haidai.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 35(3); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2); AP I Art. 55(1)	Art. 441	
04/9/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, Shelling in Severodonetsk: a house caught fire, the number of victims is specified, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/9/7338318/	Shelling in Severodonetsk cause a fire.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/9/2022	Myrhorod, Poltava Oblast, Ukraine	NV "Russian missile attack on infrastructure in Myrhorod in central Ukraine leaves 2 injured" https://english.nv.ua/nation/russian-missile-attack-on-infrastructure-in-myrhorod-in-central-ukraine-leaves-2-injured-50232477.html	Russian troops launched a missile attack on the infrastructure in Myrhorod. Two people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/10/2022	Dnipro, Ukraine	Voice of America, "Russia Launches New Attacks in Eastern Ukraine", https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-launches-new-attacks-in-eastern-ukraine-6523002.html	According to Governor Valentyn Reznichenko, the Russian attack destroyed an unnamed infrastructure site in Dnipro, leaving one person injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7(2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Dnipro, Ukraine	Aljazeera, "Russian rockets destroy airport in Ukrainian city of Dnipro", https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/10/russian-rockets-destroy-airport-in-ukrainian-city-of-dnipro	As a result of Russian missile attacks on the city of Dnipro, the international airport was completely destroyed, 6 rescuers of the State Emergency Service were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7(2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Hourly air raid sirens in Dnipropetrovsk region: Russian air strikes", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/10/7338538/	A farm building burned down in the Dnipro district.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Pavlograd, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Hourly air raid sirens in Dnipropetrovsk region: Russian air strikes", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/10/7338538/	Russian missile hit an industrial facility in Pavlograd.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Izium, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "The occupiers kidnapped the writer Volodymyr Vakulenko in Izium", https://life.pravda.com.ua/society/2022/04/10/248186/	The occupiers kidnapped the writer Volodymyr Vakulenko and his son in Izium	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 51(6)	Art. 146; Art. 146-1	According to his daughter, Volodymyr Vakulenko was kidnapped week earlier
04/10/2022	Kharkiv Region, Ukraine	Telegram channel, https://t.me/syngubov/2849	During the day, the Russian troops made about 66 strikes from artillery, mortars, and small arms fire. Saltivka, Pyatikhatki, Kholodna Gora, PISOCHYN, ZOLOCHIV, BALAKLIYA, DERGACHI were affected. As a result of the shelling of the Russians, civilians suffered - 11 dead, among them - a 7-year-old child, 14 wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7(2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	The number of victims include ones in Zolochiv below

04/10/2022	Kharkiv Region, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Russian army continues their "fight" against the civilian population of the Kharkiv region: two killed", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/10/7338581/	The Dergachi and Kharkiv districts were attacked again today – 2 people were killed and others are injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7 (2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art.122; Art.162; Art.194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art.433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	Censor.net, "Russian army fired on Zolochiv in Kharkiv region, four people were wounded. PHOTOS", https://censor.net/en/photo_news/3333079/russian_army_fired_on_zolochiv_in_kharkiv_region_four_people_were_wounded_photos	Russian servicemen fired artillery at the village of Zolochiv. Four people were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7 (2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art.122; Art. 263; Art.433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Kherson, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Russian forces disperse rally in Kherson and Russian "rally" fails in Nova Kakhovka", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/10/7338600/	Residents gathered for a peaceful rally in Kherson on the square outside the Yuvileinyi cinema and concert hall, but it was dispersed by Russian forces.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8 (2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2)	Art. 122;	
04/10/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Severodonetsk: the Russian army opened fire throughout the city on Sunday", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/10/7338628/	According to Gaidai, the Russians hit two houses and a private clinic in Severodonetsk, the city's infrastructure was almost destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art.162; Art.194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art.433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/10/2022	Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Russian troops shell school and 2 apartment buildings in Sievierodonetsk", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/10/7338528/	Two high-rise apartment buildings in Sievierodonetsk in the Luhansk region, as well as a secondary school building, came under intense fire from the Russian army.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art.162; Art.194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art.433; Art. 439; Art. 440	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/11/2022	Azov Sea	Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians abduct sailors from cargo ship in Mariupol – Denisova", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/04/11/7338847/	Russian forces have abducted crew members of the cargo ship SMARTA and taken them to an unknown destination, ombudsman Liudmyla Denisova has said. Eighteen Ukrainian nationals and one Egyptian national have been abducted.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 51 (2); AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146; Art. 146-1	
04/11/2022	Mykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "In Donetsk region, the Russians shelled a village: 30 houses were damaged", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/11/7338908/	As a result of the shelling of the village 30 houses were damaged in Mykhailivka, Pokrovsky district. There are injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7 (2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/11/2022	Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Kharkiv Oblast: 8 people, including 1 child, died as a result of shelling by the Russians", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/11/7338928/	The shelling of Kharkiv continued in the area of Kholodnaya Hora, Saltivka. As a result of attacks in the city and region, 8 people died, including a 13-year-old child. 19 were injured, among them two children aged 4 and 9.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 7 (2)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 433; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/11/2022	Kharkiv, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "Kharkiv Oblast: 8 people, including 1 child, died as a result of shelling by the Russians", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/11/7338928/	Head of the Kharkiv administration Oleg Sinegubov said that at 1:30 a.m. the Russian occupiers scattered time-delayed mines from artillery on Kharkiv.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 48; AP I Art. 51(4)(b); AP I Art. 52(1); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/11/2022	Kherson, Ukraine	Ukrainska Pravda, "The Russians crushed the "Glory to Ukraine" memorial in Kherson", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/11/7338807/	The Russians crushed the "Glory to Ukraine" memorial in Kherson	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 53(a)	Art. 194	
04/11/2022	Mariupol, Ukraine	CNN, "Nine volunteer drivers on rescue mission to Mariupol detained by Russian forces, aid group says", https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/11/europe/ukraine-russia-hostage-bus-drivers-help-people-intl-hnk/index.html	Nine drivers working for "Help People," a Ukrainian volunteer group that provides food and medicine for those in need and assists in evacuations, were detained by the Russian military and remain missing.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 51 (2); AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146; Art. 146-1	Drivers were sent on different dates - March 26, 27 and 31. Communication with them broke off the next day after departure.

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statue	Geneva Conventions	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/15/2022	Kharkiv	Kharkiv oblast military administration: https://t.me/synegubov/2883 . Suspilne: "Russia shelled the KhTZ region: there are wounded and dead" https://suspilne.media/229115-rosia-obstrilala-rajon-htz-zagинуli-dvoe-ludej-14-porani/	Russia shelled one of the residential areas of the city of Kharkiv. The number of victims is 50 people, eight of them died	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/15/2022	Starobilsk, Luhansk oblast	Ex-Ombudsman of Ukraine https://www.facebook.com/denisovaombudsman/posts/521938009287476	Russian troops fired at buses that were trying to take people out of the hostilities. There are wounded and dead	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/15/2022	Mykolaiv	Head of Mykolaiv city https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1066 . Operational Command "South" https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2033523360152240 Ukrainska Pravda: "In Mykolaiv, it was reported that a residential area had been shelled, and there were	Russia fired cluster munitions at a residential area of Mykolaiv. 15 persons are wounded, 5 are dead.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 35; AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/15/2022	Vasylivka, Zaporizka oblast	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/6530	Russian armed forces shelled the town of Vasylivka with artillery. As a result of the shelling, 1 person died, 5 were injured. Residential buildings were also damaged, a grocery store was destroyed, and a depot at the railway station was damaged	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statue	Geneva Conventions	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/16/2022	Kharkiv	Head of Kharkiv oblast military administration: https://www.facebook.com/synegubov.oleg/posts/pfbid0LT8Epiu9oKCmt7d1AZ97RZfzZeXrS9PB5GVFywj1jwCMK7Xhpkpg9JnH49Ys2h!/?_cft__[0]=AZX0XiBxvLDiaUoIRSeMwpAO-6jpJUbT8GEL1Ramj2Wzg6ARym3RnpZwpviG-ZXIyePALjN0IvtkcbMdszMisW3cG5DT8UUVOnKVDSIX6G9x-1OQqhuNOxIZ_PtL80T50OrVGEZppxOOZT0kHteceY6tg&_tn_=%2CO%2CP-R	The Russian occupying forces launched 23 artillery, mortar, and anti-aircraft fire and 1 rocket fire	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/16/2022	Kyiv	Head of Kyiv https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/1363 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/1361	On the morning of April 16, the Russian troops shelled Kyiv. Darnytskyi district of the city came under attack. One person died, several people were hospitalized.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/16/2022	Lysychansk, Luhansk oblast	Head of Luhansk oblast administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1647	The Russian military shelled the Lysychan oil refinery. As a result there was a fire in 5,000 sq.m	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 35(3)	Art. 22; Art. 113; Art. 189; Art. 194; Art. 292	
04/16/2022	Lysychansk, Luhansk oblast	Head of Luhansk oblast administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1651	The Russian army disrupted the evacuation of the civilian population by opening fire on the center of Lysychansk	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statue	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/17/2022	Zalenodolsk , Dnipropetrovsk oblast	Head of Zelenodolsk village https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0GATJBFNKuK6YG7Bn1LmygrtvLHpDrvJ15ftsyzqaK7N6a18Mc1stnnuAG4CpTARPl&id=100013474629316&__cft__[0]=AZXacX_ER09L4HkHPFZOOnhbroA0Dz9jB-YyjMlgGtAOyxJ-z9mK2_Zffr5Fjj_jtLDF9wmVWCceH_FzpUZNGNDp2ewyP712KSP2f3xot1b4XjXbFR58eoluL4YsBRwJFEMUy34HfVH-XyJtgoNmIM5&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R	On April 17, a village was shelled, as a result, a civilian died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/17/2022	Kreminna, Luhansk oblast	Head of Luhansk oblast administration: https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1662	On the morning of April 17, the Russian army struck Kreminnaya with artillery. One person was wounded	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 448	
04/17/2022	Sievierodoneck, Luhansk oblast	Head of Luhansk oblast administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1685	The Russians shelled the church in Severodonetsk.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 298; Art. 438	
04/17/2022	Zolote, Luhansk oblast	Head of Luhansk oblast administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1684	The Russians opened fire in the center of the city of Zolote: two were killed and four were wounded	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 438	
04/17/2022	Kharkiv	BBC News "Russia shelled the residential quarters of Kharkiv. There are dead and many wounded" https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-61134205	During the day, the Russian army shelled the residential quarters of Kharkiv. At least 5 people died and 13 were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 448	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/18/2022	Synelnykove district, Pavlohrad district Dnipropetrovsk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-2-wounded-as-result-of-missile-strike-in-synelnykove Telegram Suspilnednipro https://t.me/suspilnednipro/3687 Війська РФ завдали ракетного удару по Дніпропетровщині: двоє травмованих, зруйнована інфраструктура https://suspilne.media/229776-vijska-rf-zavdali-raketnogo-udara-po-dnipropetrovsi-ni-dvoe-travmovanih-zrujnovana-infrastruktura/	2 wounded as result of missile strike in Synelnykove district, railway infrastructure damaged in Pavlohrad district, no casualties	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 51(4); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75.	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/18/2022	Kramatorsk, Donetsk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-at-least-8-residential-buildings-educational-and Telegram Tsaplienko https://t.me/Tsaplienko/6350	8 residential buildings, educational and infrastructural objects were destroyed as result of missiles strikes	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/18/2022	Kharkiv	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-russian-troops-shelled-and-damaged-a-church-at-saltovka Telegram Kharkivlife Russian troops shelled and damaged a church at Saltovka district in Kharkiv last night https://t.me/kharkivlife/35743	Church at Saltovka district in Kharkiv has been shelled and damaged	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 53	Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 282; Art. 298; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/18/2022	Kharkiv	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-humanitarian-aid-distribution-point-was-shelled Telegram babel https://t.me/babel/15631 Interfax-Ukraine Due to enemy shelling of humanitarian aid distribution point in Kharkiv, one person killed, six injured https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/825052.html	Humanitarian aid distribution point was shelled at Novi Budynty district in Kharkiv. 1 person killed, 6 wounded	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438; Art. 442	

04/18/2022	Kreminna, Luhansk region	<p>https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-4-killed-1-wounded-when-russian-troops-attacked Sergij Gaidaj https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidaj.loga/posts/145539067985485 Swissinfo Four civilians shot dead while fleeing town in Ukraine's Luhansk region – governor https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/four-civilians-shot-dead-while-fleeing-town-in-ukraine-s-luhansk-region---governor/47524146 CNN April 18, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-new-04-18-22/h_afd7619788eef9a4a65ba9dbb704efca USNEWS Four civilians shot dead while fleeing town in Ukraine's Luhansk region – governor https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-04-18/four-civilians-shot-dead-while-fleeing-town-in-ukraines-luhansk-region-governor</p>	4 killed, 1 wounded - attacked civilian car	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438</p>	
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04/18/2022	Lviv	<p>https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-6-killed-8-wounded-including-a-child-as-result-of-Hromadske_ua https://t.me/hromadske_ua/20360 There are dead and wounded as result of missile strike in Lviv, - MP Mykola Knyazhytsky https://t.me/lvov_lives/8950 Telegram Sadovyi https://t.me/andriysadovyi/720 Washingtonpost Lviv sees first wartime deaths amid strikes, Ukrainian officials say https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/18/lviv-missile-strikes-ukraine-russia-war/ The Guardian Four rockets kill seven people in western city of Lviv, whose mayor accuses Moscow of genocide https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/18/lviv-mayor-accuses-russia-genocide-missiles-strike-city-ukraine</p>	6 killed, 11 wounded, including a child, 40 cars damaged or destroyed, hotel damaged as result of missile strike	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438</p>	
04/18/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-explosions-in-mykolaiv-as-result-of-heavy-shelling Espreso.tv У Миколаєві пролунали вибухи https://espreso.tv/uk-mikolaevi-buli-vibukhi Ukrinform. Ukrainian multimedia platform for broadcasting Several explosions were heard in Mykolaiv tonight https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3461119-several-explosions-heard-in-mykolaiv-mayor.html</p>	Explosions in Mykolaiv as result of heavy shelling	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438</p>	

04/18/2022	Ochakiv, Mykolaiv region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-ochakiv-in-mykolaiv-region-was-shelled-with-mlrs Fakty Directly in residential areas: the occupiers struck with cluster munitions on Ochakov https://fakty.com.ua/en/ukraine/20220418-pryamo-v-zhytlovi-kvartaly-okupanty-zavdaly-udaru-kasetny-my-boyeprypasamy-po-ochakovu/ Telegram Operativny UAF https://t.me/operativnoZSU/19847	Town was shelled with MLRS Uragan with cluster ammunition	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xx); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 52	Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 437; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 439; Art. 440	
04/18/2022	Huliaipole Zaporizhiye region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-huliaipole-in-zaporizhiye-region-was-shelled-with-telegram-gromadske https://t.me/hromadske_ua/20408	Huliaipole was shelled with incendiary ammunition	Russia	Art. 8(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 35(2); AP I Art. 52	Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 437; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 439; Art. 440	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/19/2022	Avdiyivka Donetsk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-ukrainian-military-foiled-2-russian-advance-attempts Telegram Suspilnenovyny https://t.me/suspilnews/9879	As result of artillery shelling 1 civilian killed, gas pipe and several houses damaged	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/19/2022	Kramatorsk, Avdiyivka and Blahodatne of Donetsk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-3-killed-today-as-result-of-russian-shelling-today Telegram LigaNet https://t.me/liganet/16102 Telegram Pavlo Kyrylenko – Donetsk (RMA) https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3081	3 killed as result of shelling. 5 more wounded, including 1 child	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/19/2022	Kharkiv	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-destruction-in-kharkiv-as-result-of-overnight-shelling Telegram Kharkivlife https://t.me/kharkivlife/35864 https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-produce-store-destroyed-as-result-of-russian-shelling Telegram Kharkivlife https://t.me/kharkivlife/35880 https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-3-residents-of-kharkiv-were-killed-and-21-injured Twitter SUSPILNE NEWS https://twitter.com/suspilne_news/status/1516400710040137740	Destruction in Kharkiv as result of overnight shelling. Produce store destroyed. 3 residents were killed and 21 injured. Derhachiv and Chuhuiv districts were also shelled. Emergency crews work in an enhanced mode.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	

04/19/2022	Kharkiv	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-russian-army-shelled-kharkiv-with-mlrs-uragan-4 Censor.net https://censor.net/ua/photo_news/3335314/rosiyany_obstrilyaly_z_uraganu_moskovskyyi_rayion_harkova_4_lyudyny_zagynuly_14_poraneni_prokuratura Interfax-Ukraine Russians fire Moskovsky district of Kharkiv by Uragan MLRS: Four killed, 14 wounded https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/825477.html	Russian army shelled Kharkiv with MLRS Uragan. 4 people killed, 14 wounded	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/19/2022	Stoyanka Kyiv region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-truck-driver-killed-in-stoyanka-near-irpin-as-result Telegram https://t.me/kyiv_politycnyi/11709 Irpinskiy Visnyk A Truck Exploded on a Mine in Stoyanka, Killing the Driver on the Spot https://visnyk-irpin.com.ua/en/u-stoyanczi-na-mini-pidirvalasya-vantazhivka-vodijzagynuv-na-misczi/ Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whofD0a5bgo	Truck driver killed in Stoyanka near Irpin as result of landmine explosion	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	

04/19/2022	Mariupol	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-russian-plane-dropped-powerful-aerial-bomb-on-the-Telegram-Novoeizdanie https://t.me/Novoeizdanie/10920 Front News In Mariupol, occupants dropped a bomb on a hospital near Azovstal – MP https://frontnews.eu/en/news/details/27782 Italian Post Mariupol, “bomb on hospital near Azovstal: 300 under the rubble” https://www.italianpost.news/mariupol-bomb-on-hospital-near-azovstal-300-under-the-rubble/	Russian plane dropped powerful aerial bomb on the hospital near Azovstal	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(ii)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/19/2022	Bashtanka, Mykolaiv region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-russian-troops-shelled-hospital-in-bashtanka-mykolaiv-Telegram-Espresotb https://t.me/espresotb/25965 Video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y28Y8c4kYVU UHC Numbers of healthcare facilities under attack in Mykolaiv region https://uhc.org.ua/en/2022/04/25/numbers-of-healthcare-facilities-under-attack-in-mykolaiv-region/	Russian troops shelled hospital	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(ii)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	

04/19/2022	Mykolaiv	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-widespread-damaged-in-mykolaiv-after-shelling-overnight Twitter HromadskeRadio https://twitter.com/HromadskeRadio/status/1516310736393412611 Ukraine Media Centre Destroyed houses and two persons injured: consequences of night shelling of Mykolaiv https://mediacenter.org.ua/destroyed-houses-and-two-persons-injured-consequences-of-night-shelling-of-mykolaiv/ https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-parts-of-russian-missiles-have-fallen-on-the-zoo Twitter Hochu domoy v UA https://twitter.com/hochu_dodomu/status/1516347764812169216	Widespread damaged, destroyed houses and 2 persons injured as consequences after shelling overnight. Parts of Russian missiles have fallen on the zoo in Mykolaiv	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 51(4); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/19/2022	Orikhiv, Preobrazhenka of Polohy district, Stepne and Malokaterynivka villages of Zaporizhzhia region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-april-6-killed-8-wounded-including-a-child-as-result-of https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-april-russian-troops-shelled-orikhiv-preobrazhenka-of Telegram Zaporizhzhya https://t.me/info_zp/6390	Russian troops shelled villages with MLRS Grad. 14 years old girl wounded.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 51(4); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75; AP I Art. 77	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/20/2022	Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-russian-troops-shelled-zelenodolsk-in-dnipropetrovsk Ukrinform Russian troops have shelled the city of Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk Region, causing damage to the utility systems https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3463056-russian-troops-shell-zelenodolsk-leaving-local-residents-without-water-and-electricity.html	Russian troops shelled Zelenodolsk in Dnipropetrovsk region	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438	
04/20/2022	Donetsk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-in-the-donetsk-region-five-civilians-were-wounded Twitter Ukrinform https://twitter.com/ukrinform/status/1516886045941510146	In the Donetsk region, 5 civilians were wounded in the past 24 hours as a result of Russian army shelling	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 51(4); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75	Art. 121; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/20/2022	Barvinkove, Kharkiv region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-damage-in-barvinkove-of-kharkiv-region-as-result Telegram Kharkivlife https://t.me/kharkivlife/36044	Damage in Barvinkove as result of shelling	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438	
04/20/2022	Kharkiv, Derhachi and Lozova, Kharkiv region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-violent-explosions-in-kharkiv-derhachi-and-lozova Telegram https://t.me/truexanewsua/42652	Violent explosions in Kharkiv, Derhachi and Lozova.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438	
04/20/2022	Kharkiv	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-russian-troops-shelled-area-of-cemetery-of-victims Photo https://t.me/hueviykharkov/55987	Russian troops shelled area of cemetery of victims of totalitarianism in Kharkiv. 4302 Polish officers and civilians, 2000 Ukrainians and Jews, executed by NKVD, buried at the site	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 53	Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 282; Art. 298; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	

04/20/2022	Kyiv region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-1-man-killed-another-wounded-as-result-of-explosion Telegram Kyiv politycnyi https://t.me/kyiv_politycnyi/11748	1 man killed, another wounded as result of explosion of landmine in the forest in Kyiv region	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 437; Art. 438	
04/20/2022	Novodruzhesk and Hirske towns in Luhansk region	https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/20-april-russian-army-shelled-novodruzhesk-and-hirske-towns Telegram Babel https://t.me/babel/15782	Russian army shelled Novodruzhesk and Hirske towns in Luhansk region	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 414; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible	Rome Statute	Geneva Conven	Ukrainian P	Notes
04/21/2022	Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	TCH.ua, "The occupiers launched three rocket attacks on Dnipropetrovsk region - the head of the Regional Military Administration" https://tsn.ua/ato/okupanti-zavdali-troh-rocketnih-udariv-po-dnipropetrovschini-golova-ova-2042977.html https://t.me/TCH_channel/28973 Valentyn Reznichenko "Dnipropetrovsk region April 21", Telegram, 21 Apr. 2022, https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/699 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/700	Three rockets were fired at the railway infrastructure. The railway track and contact network were destroyed. 5 people were injured - 2 men and 3 women. All of them are in the hospital.	Russia	Art. 8 (2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 277	
04/21/2022	Donetsk oblast	TCH.ua, "The head of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration reported on the dead and wounded in the region" https://tsn.ua/ato/golova-doneckoyi-ovapovidomiv-pro-zagiblih-ta-poranenih-v-oblasti-2043025.html Pavlo Kyrylenko "Russia kills civilians!" https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/530382891977603	On April 21st russians injured 5 more people in Donetsk oblast. It's still impossible to count victims of russians in Mariupol and Volnovakha.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2); AP I Art. 51(1)(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122	

04/21/2022	Kharkiv Oblast	<p>TCH.ua, "They shoot volunteers and isolate settlements: the occupiers commit atrocities in Kharkiv region" https://tsn.ua/ato/rozs-trilyuyut-volonteriv-t-a-izolyuyut-naseleni-punkti-okupanti-chinyat-zvirstva-na-harki-vschini-2042509.htm 1 Defence Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, "The occupiers isolate captured settlements and shoot volunteers", Telegram, 21 Apr. 2022, https://t.me/DIUkraine/382</p>	<p>The Russians completely isolate the occupied settlements from Ukraine, prohibit evacuation and do not allow volunteers. Evacuation is possible only to the territory of the Russian Federation. There is an absolute ban on the delivery of humanitarian goods from the territory controlled by Ukraine. Local residents were warned that volunteers trying to deliver humanitarian aid would be shot. As of April 20, there is no mobile connection. Many settlements remained without electricity. There is no medical assistance and supply of medicines. The roads are mined.</p>	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b)(xxv)	<p>AP II Art. 7(2); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 10(2); AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 279; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 115.</p>	
04/21/2021	Mykolaiv	<p>TCH.ua, "There was an explosion in Mykolaiv" https://tsn.ua/ato/u-mikolayevi-progrimiv-vibuh-2043112.html TCH.ua, "At night, the Russians shelled Zelenodolsk and Mykolaiv, and 15 shellings were recorded in Kharkiv during the day" https://tsn.ua/video/video-novini/vnochi-rosiyani-obstrilyali-ze-lenodolsk-ta-mikolayiv-a-u-harkovi-za-dobu-zafiksuvali-15-obstriliv.html Oleksandr Senkevych, the mayor of Mykolaiv, "Briefly about the state of affairs in the city", Telegram, 21 Apr. 2022 https://t.me/senkevichonline/893</p>	<p>Mykolaiv continues to be attacked with cluster bombs. 3 people were injured last night, one of them died in hospital. The occupiers aimed at the middle of the city, where there is no military infrastructure.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 282</p>	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible	Rome Statute	Geneva Conven	Ukrainian P	Notes
04/22/2022	Donetsk oblast	Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Operational information on the Russian invasion as of 15:00 on April 22", Facebook, 22 Apr. 2022, <a 2022,="" 22="" <a="" apr.="" at="" fired="" hospital="" href="https://t.me/c/1741315966/14" in="" lyman",="" occupiers="" regional="" russian="" telegram,="" the="" trauma="">https://t.me/c/1741315966/14	The Russians continue to purposefully destroy the civilian infrastructure of Donetsk region. High-rise buildings, private houses, a school, a shop, bus stops and a trauma hospital were damaged. In total, today the occupiers shelled 20 settlements, where 34 civilian objects were destroyed or damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282	
04/22/2022	Donetsk oblast	Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians!", Facebook, 22 Apr. 2022, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=531030008579558&set=a.464541731895053	On April 22, as a result of Russian shelling, 3 more civilians were killed in Donetsk region. In addition, 7 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4 (2)(a); AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122	
04/22/2022	Irpin	TCH.ua, "In Irpin, three occupiers raped her mother and 15-year-old sister in front of the girl, and then killed them", https://kyiv.tsn.ua/ukrayina/v-irpeni-troye-okupantiv-na-ochahu-divchini-zgvaltuvani-yiyi-mamu-i-15-richnu-sestru-a-potim-vbili-2043484.html Liudmyla Denisova, "Every day there are new testimonies of terrible sexual crimes by Rashists from the liberated territories", Facebook, 22 Apr. 2022, https://www.facebook.com/denisovaambudsman/posts/526195135528430	In Irpin, three occupiers raped her mother and younger 15-year-old sister in front of a 17-year-old girl. Russians beat and raped the woman and her minor daughter with particular cruelty. They are both dead. The girl in a state of psychological shock lived with corpses in the house for 4 days. She said that while her relatives were being killed, she was held and not touched, "because I am a monster." After the liberation of the city, she was able to reach her grandmother.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(g); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4 (2)(a); AP II Art. 4(2)(e); AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 75(2)(b); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 153	

04/22/2022	Kharkiv	TCH.ua, "In the Kharkiv region, the occupiers destroyed the ice complex for training hockey players and skaters (photo)", https://tsn.ua/prosport/na-harkivschini-okupanti-zruynuvali-lodoviy-kompleks-dlyatrenuvan-hokeyistiv-i-kovzanyariv-foto-2043610.html Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine, "The occupiers destroyed the ice complex in Kharkiv", https://mms.gov.ua/news/okupanti-zruynuvali-lodovij-kompleks-u-harkovi	The ice rink "Saltivskiy Lid" was destroyed by the shelling of the Russian occupiers. A projectile hit the upper part of the building.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194	
04/22/2022	Kakhovka, Kherson oblast	TCH.ua, "The hostages are beaten and subjected to electric shock torture: the occupiers have set up a torture chamber in Kakhovka", https://tsn.ua/ato/zaruchnikiv-b-yut-i-pidayut-torturam-elektrichnim-strumom-u-kahovci-okupanti-oblasthuvali-kativnyu-2043637.html	Men, including civilians, are tortured with electric shockers, beaten. The Russian military is most cruel to those who are related to the security forces — territorial defense fighters and former soldiers	Russia	Art. (8)(2)(a)(viii); Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxi)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(b); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2)	Art. 126; Art. 127	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible	Rome Statute	Geneva Conven	Ukrainian P	Notes
04/23/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	TCH.ua, "The Russian occupiers disrupted the evacuation from Mariupol, dispersing people with threats", https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyski-okupanti-zirvali-evakuaciyu-z-mariupolya-z-pogrozami-rozignavshi-lyudey-2044501.html Petro Andryushchenko, "An evacuation that was disrupted", Telegram, 23 Apr. 2022, https://t.me/andriyshTime/444	About 200 residents of Mariupol gathered in the city on April 23 to evacuate to Zaporizhzhia, but the evacuation was disrupted by the Russian occupiers. The invaders forced people to disperse, threatening to shoot them, and said that they could only evacuate to the territory of the Donetsk People's Republic.	Russia	Art. 7 (1)(d); Art. 7(2)(d)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 129; Art. 189	
04/23/2022	Zolote, Luhansk region	TCH.ua, "The russian army fired with artillery the centre of Zolote in Luhansk region: two people died", https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyska-armiya-z-artileriyi-obstrilyala-centr-zolotogo-na-lugansc-hini-dvoye-lyudey-zaginuli-2044456.html Serhiy Haidai, "Artillery attack on Zolote - two dead, two more wounded", Telegram, 23 Apr. 2022, https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/1918	Artillery shells hit residential buildings. 2 people died on the spot, 2 more were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 282	
04/23/2022	Odesa	Slovoidilo.ua, "A rocket strike hit Odesa: the number of victims has increased", https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/04/23/novyna/bezpeka/raketnyj-udar-rashystiv-po-odesi-zroslo-kilkist-zhertv TCH.ua, "The Russians hit a 16-story residential building", Telegram, 23 Apr 2022, https://t.me/c/1741315966/35	The Russians hit a 16-story residential building, the apartments on the 4th and 5th floors caught fire. 8 people died, including a 3-month-old baby. 18 people were injured. 2 people were rescued from the rubble, 86 residents of the building were evacuated	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 282	

04/23/2022	Sumy oblast	<p>TCH.ua, "Russian troops fired artillery at a psychiatric boarding school and houses in the Sumy region", https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyski-viyska-vdarili-z-artileriyi-po-psihonevrologichnomu-inter-natu-ta-budinkah-u-sumskiy-oblasti-foto-2044777.html</p> <p>Dmytro Zhyvytskyy, "Today, as a result of artillery shelling from the Russian side", Telegram, 23 April 2022, https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/1761</p>	<p>The Russian occupiers shelled the territory of the Sumy region with artillery. The invaders hit the psycho-neurological boarding school in the village of Atynskoe and the territory of private houses. There are no casualties among civilians.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	Art. 194	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/24/2022	Chuhuiv	TSN, "Russia fired at Chuhuiv", https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyski-okupanti-na-velikden-obstrilyali-chuguyiv-ye-poraneni-2045188.html	As a result of the shelling, three people were injured, including a mother and a 12-year-old child	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121	
04/24/2022	Ocheretyne, Donetsk Oblast	TSN, "Russian invaders killed two children", https://tsn.ua/ato/u-doneckiy-oblasti-na-velikden-rosiyski-okupanti-vbili-dvoh-ditey-2045041.html	The house on Myru Street, where lived family, was destroyed, girls aged 14 and 5 died	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13** AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 194	
04/24/2022	Kremenchug	TSN, "Russia fired at Kremenchug", https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyan-rozstrilyuyut-kremenchuk-za-vechir-po-mistu-prileteli-9-raket-golova-ova-2045383.html	Russia hit infrastructure facilities in Kremenchug with missiles	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 282; Art. 292	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/25/2022	Bezruky	TSN, "Three people died as a result of the shelling.", https://tsn.ua/ukrayin-a/obstril-harkivschini-okupanti-vbili-troh-zhiveliv-dergachivsk-oyi-gromadi-2045929.html	As a result of the Russian shelling of the village of Bezruky in the Dergachy community, three civilians were killed: one woman and two men. This was reported by the head of the Dergachy community, Vyacheslav Zadorenko	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 110; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122	
04/25/2022	Central, western Ukraine	TSN, "Railway stations in Ukraine came under fire from the occupiers", https://tsn.ua/ato/pid-obstril-okupantiv-potrapila-nizka-zaliznic-hnih-stanciy-v-ukrayini-mayzhe-20-potyagiv-zatrimuyutsya-2045572.html	Railway stations in Ukraine came under fire from the occupiers	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 292	
04/25/2022	Zhmerynka, Koziatyn	TSN, "Russia fired rockets at infrastructure facilities in the Vinnytsia region.", https://tsn.ua/ato/raketniy-obstril-vinnichchini-rosiyski-okupanti-vbili-5-lyudey-18-osib-poraneno-2045875.html	The occupiers launched rockets at transport infrastructure facilities near Zhmerinka and Koziatyn in Vinnytsia. As a result of enemy shelling, 5 people were previously killed and 18 wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 110; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122	
04/25/2022		СБУ, «Російські окупанти грубо порушують норми міжнародного права», https://tsn.ua/ato/strilyayut-ta-vibivayut-in-formaciyu-rosiyski-okupanti-hvalyatsya-yak-katuyut-poloneni-ukrayinciv-2046550.html	Вони катують та знущаються з українських військовополонених. А спецслужби РФ ще і це заохочують. Про це повідомляє СБУ з посиланням на перехоплену розмову російського вбивці.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxi)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(b); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 5(2)(e); AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 11(1)	Art. 126; Art. 127	
04/25/2022	Velyka Kostromka, Maryanske	ТСН, «Російські військові 25 квітня обстріляли забороненими касетними боеприпасами село Велика Костромка та населений пункт Мар'янське Криворізького району Дніпропетровської області.», https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyski-viyska-obstrilyali-krivorizkiy-rayon-zaboroneni-kasetnimi-boyeripasami-vidkrito-spravu-2046838.html	За даними слідства, 25 квітня російські війська здійснили артилерійський обстріл забороненими касетними боеприпасами села Велика Костромка. Внаслідок обстрілу пошкоджень зазнали приватні будівлі мирних жителів та господарські приміщення	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 439; Art. 440	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/27/2022	Avdiivka Donetsk region	Ukrainian truth The Russians shelled Avdiivka with phosphorus shells - the head of the OVA https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/04/27/7342394/	As a result of shelling with phosphorus shells, several fires broke out in residential buildings in the city. The high-rise building was damaged as a result of the airstrike. One person is injured	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75(1); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/27/2022	Chuhiv Kharkiv region	RBC, Occupiers shelled Chuhiv near Kharkiv: houses damaged, two wounded, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/okkupanty-obstrelyali-chuguev-harkovom-povrezhdeny-1651062762.html Objectiv, During the shelling of Chuguev, the invaders wounded a child, https://www.objectiv.tv/objectively/2022/04/27/vo-vremya-obstrellov-chugueva-okkupanty-ranili-r	Houses and infrastructure were damaged, a person was killed, 3 civilians were injured, including a 14-year-old child	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/27/2022	Gorsk Lugansk region	Tribun, The Russians fired on Gorskaya bulk: there is a dead https://tribun.com.ua/91302	As a result of an airstrike in Gorskoye, an electrical substation burned down, one person was killed	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 75(2); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/27/2022	Severodonetsk Luhansk region	Hromadske, The occupiers shelled a hospital in Severodonetsk. There is a deceased - OVA https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/okkupanty-obstrelyali-bolnicu-v-severodonecke-est-pogibshaya-ova Obozrevatel, https://war.obozrevatel.com/hoteli-dobit-ranenyih-okkupantyi-obstrelyali-bolnitsu-v-severodone	The hospital building was severely damaged. One woman died	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 75(2); AP I Art. 51(1)(2); AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	

04/27/2022	Popasna , Lisichansk Lugansk region	Fakty, On April 27, the Russian army inflicted 29 strikes on the homes of civilians from aviation, multiple launch rocket systems, cannon artillery, and mortar weapons. https://fakty.com.ua/ru/ukraine/20220428-29-obstriliv-luganshhy-ny-za-dobu-shho-vi-domo-pro-zhert-ta-postrazhdalyh/	10 times the enemy shelled Popasnaya and Lisichansk, after enemy shelling in Popasna, 10 houses were destroyed	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/27/2022	Zaporozhye	The page, "Russian invaders mined a unique monument of archeology of world importance - Stone Grave" https://thepage.ua/news/rossijskie-zahvatc-hiki-zaminirovali-ka-mennuyu-mogilu	a monument of geology and archeology of world importance was mined	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 53	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/28/2022	New York Donetsk region	Pravda, The Russians hit the residential areas of New York in the Donetsk region, three people died, https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/04/28/7342676/ https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/v-rezultate-aviaudara-po	9 residential buildings, an industrial enterprise were damaged, 3 people were killed, 3 were injured	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)(a)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/28/2022	Pokotilovka Kharkiv region	Objectiv, Shelling of Pokotilovka: two dead, 7 wounded, 30 houses damaged, https://www.objectiv.tv/objectively/2022/04/28/obstrel-pokotilovki-dvoe-pogibshih-7-ranenyh-povrezhdenny-30-domov/	2 men were killed, 7 injured, 30 houses and a school were damaged	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)(a)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/28/2022	Kyiv	The page, Rocket attack on the central district of Kyiv on April 28: photo, video, https://thepage.ua/news/raketnyj-udar-pokievu-28-aprelya-foto-video	Fire in a 25-storey residential building with partial destruction of the 1st and 2nd floors. 10 civilians injured	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/29/2022	Vremyevka and Shandrigolovo, Donetsk region	Censor, Two civilians were killed in the Donetsk region as a result of shelling by the invaders, four were https://censor.net/ru/news/3337810/dvoe_grajdanskih_pogibli_v_donetskoyi_oblasti_v_rezultate_obstrelovo_povrezhdeniya	2 civilians killed, 4 wounded	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/29/2022	Uda village, Bogodukhovsky district, Kharkiv region	Objectiv, Shelling of Kharkiv region: a man was wounded in the region, cars were damaged in the city, https://www.objectiv.tv/objectively/2022/04/29/obstrely-harkovshhiny-v-oblasti-ranem-muzhchina-v-gorode-povrezhdeny-avtomobili/	Man injured, his car damaged	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	
04/29/2022	Orekhov Zaporozhye region	Ukrinform, Houses on fire in Zaporizhia at night due to shelling, https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-regions/3470442-izza-obstrelovo-na-zaporoze-nocuzagorelis-doma.html	4 houses damaged	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(xx); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 438; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 444	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
04/30/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Facebook page of The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Dnipropetrovsk region https://www.facebook.com/MNSDNE/posts/309472034698539	A Russian missile hit a grain warehouse in the Sinelnyk district of the Dnipropetrovsk region	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
04/30/2022	Dobropillia	Ombudsman: Rashists are causing more and more destruction and killing civilians every day https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rashisti-shchodnya-zavdayut-vse-bilshih-rujnuvan-i-vbivayut-civilnih	On April 30, 2022, in the city of Dobropillia in Donetsk region, as a result of the use of high-explosive penetrating cruise missiles by the occupiers, 8 more people were hospitalized. In addition, debris damaged private houses, residential buildings of the local prophylactic office, and a bakery factory.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 194	
04/30/2022	Mariupol, Lyman, Avdiivka, Dobropillia, Ocheretyne, Drobysheve, Novosilka, Dibrove, Pisky (Donetsk region)	Official website of the National Police, "In Donetsk region, the police documented 14 Russian shellings in 24 hours: 4 children were injured" https://dn.npu.gov.ua/obstril-na-donechchini-za-dobu-policziya-zadokumentovala-14-rosijskix-obstriliv-sered-postrazhdalix-4-ditej/ The Reuters, "Ukraine says Russian air forces continuing to strike city of Mariupol" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russian-air-forces-continuing-strike-city-mariupol-2022-04-30/	The troops of the Russian Federation bombarded the civilian population with aircraft, Grad rocket launchers, tanks, and heavy artillery. The occupiers killed four civilians. Another 10 people were injured, among them children aged 5, 6, 7 and 14. The Russians shelled nine settlements. As a result of the strikes, at least 24 civilian objects were destroyed - residential buildings, a kindergarten, a cultural center, and a feed mill.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194	
04/30/2022	Kalynove, Kharkiv region	Suspilne media, "The occupiers fired at a kindergarten, a shop and residential buildings of the Zolochiv community in Kharkiv region" https://suspilne.media/234385-okupanti-obstrilali-ditsadok-magazin-ta-zitlovi-budynki-zolocivskoi-gromadi-na-harkivsini/	Destruction of residential buildings. The Russian military attacked residential buildings of the village of Kalynove, with a direct hit destroying the house of the honored worker of education Oleksiy Salamakha and neighboring buildings.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 194	

04/30/2022	Kharkiv	Serhiy Bolvinov, head of the investigation of the Kharkiv region, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/100002276907245/posts/5073018652783981/?app=fbl	As a result of the shelling by Russian troops one child died	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
04/30/2022	Kharkiv	Suspilne media, "The Russian army shelled a hospital in Kharkiv's Nemyshlyan district" https://suspilne.media/234348-rosijska-armia-obstrilala-likarnu-u-nemislanskomu-rajoni-harkova/	As a result of the shelling, the hospital building in the Nemyshlyan district was damaged, and two apartments in the area were also destroyed	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 194	
04/30/2022	Kharkiv	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2trqo9VbwI	The auto chemical enterprise burned down after the shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
04/30/2022	Kharkiv	UNN, "During the day, the occupiers shelled Kharkiv three times with artillery and MLRS: one person was injured" https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1974868-minuloyi-dobi-okupanti-trichi-obstrilyali-kharkiv-z-artileriyi-ta-rszo-ye-postrazhdaliy	Synergubov - Head of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration, -noted that on April 30, the occupiers shelled Saltivka, Pyatikhatki and the airport area. During the day, one person was injured in the Balaklia district.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
04/30/2022	Popasna, Luhansk region	Zmina info, "In the Luhansk region, the Russian military is shooting evacuation buses and cars of volunteers" https://zmina.info/news/na-lugansshyni-vijskovi-rf-rozstrilyaly-evakuacijni-avtobusy/ Hromadske, "The Russians shot two evacuation buses in Popasna — the drivers do not communicate" https://hromadske.ua/posts/rosiyani-rozstrilyali-dva-evakuacijni-avtobusi-u-popasnij-vodiyi-ne-vihodyat-na-zvyazok	Evacuation buses were fired upon by Russian troops. Buses were shot. There is no contact with the people who were in the vehicle and organized the evacuation	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
04/30/2022	Hirske, Orikhove, Rubizhne, Novodruzhesk - Luhansk region	Facebook page of The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Luhansk region https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/357833176377759	Destruction of residential buildings due to shelling.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 194	

04/30/2022	Komyshuvakha, Luhansk region	Serhii Haidai, head of the Luhansk regional administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2148	As a result of shelling, the school building was damaged and the village council building was destroyed	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 194	
04/30/2022	Odesa	Ombudsman: Rashists are causing more and more destruction and killing civilians every day https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rashisti-shchodnya-zavdayut-vse-bilshih-rujnuvan-i-vbivayut-civilnih The Reuters, "Russia strikes U.S. weapons at airfield near Odesa, defence ministry says" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-strikes-us-weapons-airfield-near-odesa-defence-ministry-says-2022-05-01/	As a result of a missile attack on Odesa region, the runway of Odesa airport was damaged. Its further use is impossible.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 194	
04/30/2022	Mali Shcherbaky, Zaporizhzhia region	Telegram channel "Zaporizhzhia.info" https://t.me/info_zp/7043	In the village Mali Shcherbaki of the Vasyliv district, as a result of Russian artillery shelling, a local man, born in 1959, was wounded in several areas of the lower and upper limbs	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
04/30/2022	Chervone, Zaporizhzhia region	Telegram channel "Zaporizhzhia.info" https://t.me/info_zp/7043	In the village Chervone, Pologiv district, a woman born in 1938 was killed by shrapnel during enemy artillery fire near a kindergarten.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/01/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Telegram chanel, Ukrinform media https://t.me/ukrinform_news/67984	A woman was injured in the Sinelnyk district of the Dnipropetrovsk region as a result of shelling by the Russian army	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/01/2022	Bogodukhiv	Telegram chanel, Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office https://t.me/prokurat_ura_kharkiv/3630	One person was killed and two were injured as a result of Russian artillery shelling of the Bogoduhiv community, which occurred around 11:30 a.m. on May 1	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/01/2022	Udy, Kharkiv region	Suspilne media, "The occupiers targeted a school that survived two world wars" https://suspilne.media/234600-na-harkivsi-ni-okupanti-pocilili-v-skolu-so-perezila-dv-i-svitovi-vijni/	Two residential buildings and a school were damaged	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Baranivka, Kharkiv region	Suspilne media, "The occupiers targeted a school that survived two world wars" https://suspilne.media/234600-na-harkivsi-ni-okupanti-pocilili-v-skolu-so-perezila-dv-i-svitovi-vijni/	Farm premises destroyed as a result of the shelling.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438 ; Art. 188; Art. 194;	
05/01/2022	Odnorobivka, Kharkiv region	Suspilne media, "The occupiers targeted a school that survived two world wars" https://suspilne.media/234600-na-harkivsi-ni-okupanti-pocilili-v-skolu-so-perezila-dv-i-svitovi-vijni/	In Odnorobivka, the gas station of an agricultural enterprise caught fire due to shelling. A 30-year-old man received a shrapnel wound.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Zlochiv, Kharkiv region	Telegram chanel, Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office https://t.me/prokurat_ura_kharkiv/3633	A man died as a result of the shelling. Twelve residential buildings and a number of commercial premises were damaged.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Kharkiv region	Serhiy Bolvinov, head of the investigation of the Kharkiv region, Facebook https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=5075654179187095&id=100002276907245	5 civilians died as a result of shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Hirske, Luhansk region	The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Luhansk region https://www.facebook.com/lugdSNS/posts/359083646252712	4 residential buildings were destroyed	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 188; Art. 194;	

05/01/2022	Orikhove, Luhansk region	The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Luhansk region https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/359083646252712	12 residential buildings were destroyed	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 188; Art. 194;	
05/01/2022	Popasna, Luhansk region	Serhii Haidai, head of the Luhansk regional administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2183	One person died as a result of shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Sievierodonetsk	The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Luhansk region https://www.facebook.com/lugdsns/posts/359083646252712	The police of the Luhansk region recorded 18 shellings of residential areas. In Severodonetsk, five apartment buildings burned at once. As a result of shelling, there are dead and wounded, among them a child, 6 high-rise buildings were destroyed	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 188; Art. 194;	
05/01/2022	Zolote, Luhansk region	Serhii Haidai, head of the Luhansk regional administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2183	The boy, born in 2010, was wounded during heavy shelling by the Russians in the city of Zolote at approximately 20:00 on May 1. A local resident was also among the victims. One woman died in Zoloti.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Lysychansk	Serhii Haidai, head of the Luhansk regional administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2183	In Lysychansk, the ancient building of the multidisciplinary gymnasium, which is part of the Belgian heritage of the city, burned down, and several buildings were also damaged.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Lysychansk	Serhii Haidai, head of the Luhansk regional administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2183	As a result of the shelling, one man received shrapnel wounds	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Lysychansk	Serhii Haidai, head of the Luhansk regional administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2183	One person died as a result of shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 7(1)(a)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Mykolaiv region	Operational Command "South" on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2045672962270613	The Russian military shelled the outskirts of Mykolaiv with cluster munitions from the Uragan MLRS. Private houses and yards, gas pipeline line were damaged.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	

05/01/2022	Mykolaiv region	The official page of the head of the Mykolaiv Regional Council, Hanna Zamazeeva https://t.me/mykolaivskaoblrada/1670	12 people were injured as a result of shelling in the Mykolaiv region	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/01/2022	Orikhiv, Zaporizhzhia region	Official website of the National Police, "In the Zaporizhzhya region, the police documented the fact of enemy shelling with fatal consequences" https://zp.npu.gov.ua/news/novini/u-zaporizkij-oblasti-policzejski-zadokumentuvali-fakt-vorozhogo-obstrilu-z-letalnimi-naslidkami/?fbclid=IwAR3mhKO-bjXweAGhmzqDx5BwQufoFNDMRvknHpVIJRIOc2PfQ3_X-xPMuT8	In the course of the armed aggression, the occupiers hit multi-story buildings in Orikhov, Pologiv district. As a result of the shelling, four civilians received shrapnel wounds. Two more men, born in 1980 and 1939, died from their injuries.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/01/2022	Pology, Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia regional state administration https://www.facebook.com/zoda.gov.ua/posts/303315248645000	In the city of Pology, as a result of artillery shelling, two commercial buildings with an area of 80 sq.m. and 32 sq.m., as well as the office premises of the "PrivatBank" branch on an area of 25 sq.m., burned.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/01/2022	Zaliznychne, Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia regional state administration https://www.facebook.com/zoda.gov.ua/posts/303315248645000	In the village of Zaliznychne, near Gulyaipol, due to Russian artillery attacks on civilians, the roof of a house and farm buildings with a total area of 150 sq.m.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)		Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/02/2022	Pokrov, Dnipro region	Facebook, "Arrival" of an enemy rocket to the Pokrovsk community in the Synelnyk district", <iframe src="https://www.facebook.com/plugins/post.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fbnbnkr%2Fposts%2Ffbid027hzgKRzRQ6aoLQBop7MaGXyR7jLNvTfmCP72tPWmeqR2MpNthKKqkHLt9V8BhyZV1&show_text=true&width=500" width="500" height="473" style="border:none;overflow:hidden" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; picture-in-picture; web-share"></iframe> Telegram, Two more "arrivals" in the Synelniky district, https://t.me/dnipeprotrovskaODA/829	Russian rockets hit the elevator on one of the agricultural companies and a pork complex	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54	Art. 194; Art.239; Art. 258; Art. 270	
05/02/2022	Dibrova, Donetsk region	Facebook <i>Russia is killing civilians</i> , https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/495591338790092 .	Russian forces attacked Dibrova, one civilian man was killed and eight civilians were injured	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v) 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51; 52; 75	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art. 280	
05/02/2022	Donetsk region	Ombudsman:Russian terrorist forces destroy peaceful Ukrainians and Ukrainian towns and villages every hour https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rosijski-terroristichni-vijska-shchogodiniznishchuyut-mirnih-ukrayinciv-ta-ukrayinski-mista-i-sela	One civilian resident of Donetsk region was killed by Russian troops - 8 people were injured in Dibrov, in the Liman Region.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51;AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	

05/02/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Telegram Polk "Azov" https://t.me/polkazov/4454	The Russian troops continued to shell the territory of the plant with all types of weapons: air strikes, firing, using ship artillery and tanks after the partial evacuation of civilians from the territory of "Azovstal"	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 Art.277; Art. 280	
05/02/2022	Barvinkove, Kharkiv region	Telegram chanel, Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office https://t.me/prokurat_ura_kharkiv/3646	As a result of the shelling, two men were wounded. Residential buildings and two administrative buildings were also damaged	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/02/2022	Barvinkove, Kharkiv region	Telegram <i>Russian occupiers once again opened fire on Zolochiv</i> https://t.me/prokurat_ura_kharkiv/3635	Russian troops fired artillery shells to Barvinkove village, Kharkiv region. Two men were wounded, two administrative buildings and houses also were damaged	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v) 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1)	
05/02/2022	Fesky village, Kharkiv region	Suspilne.Media <i>Russia once again shelled Zolochiv in Kharkiv region: a kindergarten and a school were damaged</i> , https://suspilne.media/234965-rosia-vcergove-obstrilala-zolochiv-na-harkivsini-poskodzeni-ditsadok-ta-skola/	Russian aircraft bombed a kindergarten, a school and the House of Culture. Also, 15 private houses were destroyed, doors and windows in 35 settlements of apartment buildings were damaged. The windows and doors also were destroyed in the ambulatory.	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v) 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1)	
05/02/2022	Kharkiv	Telegram chanel, Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office https://t.me/prokurat_ura_kharkiv/3644	Russian military shelled the Shevchenkiv district of Kharkiv. As a result of shelling, 9 residential buildings and cars were damaged.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/02/2022	Kharkiv region	Telegram chanel, Ukrinform https://t.me/ukrinform_news/68148	In Kharkiv region, three people were killed and eight were injured as a result of Russian shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/02/2022	Rusko Lozovaia, Kharkiv region	Suspilne.Media <i>The occupants shelled vehicles that was evacuating people from Ruskoia Lozovaia near Kharkiv</i> , https://suspilne.media/235110-okupanti-obstrilali-kolonu-masin-aka-evakuuvala-ludej-z-ruskoi-lozovoid-harkovom//	Volunteer vehicles came under mortar fire when they were evacuating people from the village of Ruska Lozova in the eastern outskirts of Kharkiv	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iii) 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art.277; Art. 280	

05/02/2022	Zlochiv, Kharkiv region	Suspilne media, "Russia once again shelled Zolochiv in Kharkiv Oblast: a kindergarten and a school were damaged" https://suspilne.media/234965-rosia-vcergove-obstrilala-zoloci-v-na-harkivsini-poskodzeni-ditsadok-ta-skola/	Six residential buildings and two educational institutions were damaged as a result of the shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/02/2022	Zolochiv, Kharkiv region	Telegram <i>Russian occupiers once again opened fire on Zolochiv</i> https://t.me/prokurat_ura_kharkiv/3635	Russian soldiers shelled Zolochiv: six houses and two schools	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v) 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1)	
05/02/2022	Popasna, Luhansk region	Telegram chanel, Novoe Izdanye https://t.me/Novoeizdanie/11956	Destruction of a residential building as a result of shelling	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438	
05/02/2022	Mykolaiv region	The official page of the head of the Mykolaiv Regional Council, Hanna Zamazeeva https://t.me/mykolaivskaoblrada/1699	Five civilians were injured	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/02/2022	Kyslyivka, Mykolaiv region	Yaroslav Gizhitskiy https://www.facebook.com/jaroslav.gizycki/posts/10226662895829398	As a result of shelling by the Russian military, in the village of A 19th century church was destroyed in Kyslyivka, Bashtan district, as well as private residential buildings	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 188; Art. 194;	
05/02/2022	Mykolaiv region	28 separate mechanized brigade named after the Knights of the Winter Campaign, Facebook https://www.facebook.com/28brigade/posts/362748489214274	Destruction of an Orthodox church in the Mykolaiv region as a result of Russian military shelling	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 178	
05/02/2022	Mykolayiv	Facebook <i>Press Service of the Head Department of the State Security Service of Ukraine</i> , https://www.facebook.com/DSNSMYKOL/posts/30067791241040	Three metal cars in the Korabelnoe district of Mykolayiv were set on fire as a result of Russian attacked	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art.277; Art. 280	

05/02/2022	Odesa	Hromadske, "The occupiers hit Odesa with rockets: there are dead and wounded" https://hromadske.ua/posts/okupanti-vdarii-raketami-po-odesi-vluchili-v-obyekti-infrastrukturi-mista-po-shkodili-religijnu-sporudu Telegram chanel, Suspilne media https://t.me/suspilnews/10412	Russia launched a missile attack on Odesa in the evening of May 2. City infrastructure facilities were damaged, including one religious building. There are dead and injured people. As a result of an attack on a residential building, a 15-year-old boy died, another minor girl was injured, reported the head of the press center of the security and defense forces of the South Humenyuk.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 438; Art. 121; Art. 122	
05/02/2022	Odesa	The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Odesa region https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/368324035334418?_cft=%2525255B0%2525255D=AZVnn_4nxb1Qiz8ZWMIFthBAFcYAlmna-Ju3HTtyI5-nf3V_GOZPlwMOxvt-NHLqxlxTdvLitvMSQ0P3hvFF9EeTT15Od-3HoDqDBDV5rX0JdqEGwRfOicfnvdfFcJruPkgbhqa9ScJ5syf_9xKkM6VD&_tn_=%252525252CO%2525252CP-R	As a result of rockets hitting a 2-story residential building, it was destroyed and caught fire. A boy, born in 2008, died as a result of the shelling. and the injured girl, born in 2004, who was hospitalized in a serious condition.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	
05/02/2022	Odesa	Ukrainian pravda <i>Rocket attack on Odessa: child killed, another one wounded,</i> https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/05/2/7343588/	Russian rockets bombed a 15-year-old child died, one was injured. In addition, a religious organization of a religious organization, the building was damaged	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art. 280	
05/02/2022	Andriivka, Zaporizhzhia region	Suspilne media, "In Melitopol, the occupiers kidnapped a major of the civil defense service" https://suspilne.media/235324-u-melitopoli-okupanti-vikrali-majora-sluzbi-civilnogo-zahistu/	Two local residents, born in 1998 and 1999, who previously served under contract in the Armed Forces, were kidnapped in Andriivka village of Berdyansk district.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii); Art. 8(2)(c)(iii)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75; Art. 3(1)(b)	Art. 147	

05/02/2022	Novofedorivka, Zaporizhzhia region	Suspilne media, "In Melitopol, the occupiers kidnapped a major of the civil defense service" https://suspilne.media/235324-u-melitopoli-okupanti-vikrali-majora-sluzbi-civilnogo-zahistu/	According to Ruslan Tkachuk, spokesman for the Defense Forces of the Zaporizhzhia Region, during the day, May 2, it became known that the military of the Russian Armed Forces kidnapped a man born in 2003 in the village of Novofedorivka, Pologiv District.	Russia	Art.8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. (8)(2)(a)(viii); Art. 8(2)(c)(iii)	AP I Art. 77; AP I Art. 44; AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75; Art. 3(1)(b)	Art. 147	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/03/2022	Avdiivka, Donetsk region	Telegram Civilians killed and injured in Avdeevka as a result of a Russian attack, https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3255	Three civilians had been killed during an aerial bombardment of the town of Avdiivka. Three more were killed by shelling of the city of Vuhledar and three were killed in shelling of the town of Lyman. A bus with workers of the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant was shelled. As a result of a direct hit on the passenger transport 10 employees of the plant were killed, about 20 - were seriously wounded.	Russia	8(2)(a)(i) 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art.277; Art. 280	
05/03/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Telegram Mariupol. Filtration camps, https://t.me/andriyshTime/625	A large number of men from Mariupol had been staying in inhumane conditions in the village of Besimyane for days	Russia	8(2)(a)(ii)	AP I Art. 75(1)	Art.129; Art.146	
05/03/2022	Kharkiv	Telegram Occupiers shelled the center of Kharkiv: there are wounded, https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/3673	The Russian soldiers attacked the center of Kharkiv. The park area and "Dynamo Stadium" were damaged by the shelling. A 46-year-old man and a 43-year-old woman were wounded.	Russia	8(2)(a)(i) 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art. 280	
05/03/2022	Kochubeyivka, Kherson region	Facebook Information about shelling, https://www.facebook.com/105637922119004/posts/120504210632375/	Russians troops were shelling Kochubeyivka community, Kherson region: six men being wounded, two people sustained head injuries, and four people sustained lighter wounds to their ends. A woman was killed.	Russia	8(2)(a)(i) 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art. 280	

05/03/2022	Lviv	Telegram The Lviv region was hit by missiles, https://t.me/kozytsky_y_maksym_official/2395 , The Lviv region was hit by missiles, https://t.me/andriysadovyi/744 The Kyiv Independent 2 electrical substations damaged by missile attack in Lviv, according to Mayor Andriy Sadovy, https://kyivindependent.com/news-archiv e/page/73	Lviv was attacked by the Russian rockets. The missile stroke struck three electrical power plants in the city. Two people were injured.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii) 8(2)(b)(ii) 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art.277; Art. 280	
05/03/2022	Zaliznichne, Zaporizhia region	Telegram Russian army continues to damaged civilian houses in villages and towns in Zaporizhia region, https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7279	The Russian troops carried out an artillery attack on the village Zaliznichne, Zaporizhia region. Twelve buildings and the local school were damaged. Two people were killed as a result of shrapnel wounds	Russia	8(2)(a)(i) 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iii) 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270 (1); Art.277; Art. 280	
05/03/2022	Volovtsy, Zakarpattia region	Telegram A rocket hit a railroad station in Volovtsy, https://t.me/zakarpatskaODA/811	The Russian missile hit one of the train stations near the train station in Volovtsy	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii) 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270; Art.277; Art. 280	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/04/2022	Dnipro	Telegram The Russians shelled the center of Dnipro, https://t.me/dniptrope trovskODA/848	The Russians launched a missile attack on the railroad infrastructure in Dnipro.	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii) 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270; Art. 280	
05/04/2022	Makiyivka, Donetsk region	Ukrainian pravda Oil depot burns in occupied Makiyivtsi, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/05/4/7343905/	Four tanks of 5,000 tons each at the Makiyivtsi oil depot had caught fire due to shelling. One person was killed and two were injured as a result of the shelling of the Makiyivtsi oil depot	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii) 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270; Art. 280	
05/04/2022	Izium, Kharkiv Oblast	The Kyiv Independent Ukrainian journalist Oleksandr Makhov killed by Russian shelling, https://kyivindependent.com/news-archiv e/page/72	Ukrainian journalist Oleksandr Makhov killed by Russian shelling	Russia	8(2)(a)(i)	AP I Art. 79; 51(1)	Art. 115	
05/04/2022	Kirovograd region	Telegram Russian missile hits infrastructure in Kirovograd Oblast, https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/1012	The Russian missile hit infrastructure in Kirovograd region	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270; Art. 280	
05/04/2022	Trebukhi, Kyiv region	Facebook Ukrainian air defense shoots down Russian missile in Kyiv Oblast, https://www.facebook.com/i.sapozhko/posts/3152919908313007	The remnants of the missile fell in a field near the village of Trebukhi	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 258; Art. 270; Art. 280	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/08/2022	Sinelnikove, Dnipropetrovsk region	Nurnberg2022, "12-year-old boy killed by russian cluster munition explosion" https://www.numberg2022.org/en/post/12-year-old-boy-killed-by-russian-cluster-munition-explosion	12-year-old boy was killed by the detonation of unexploded Russian cluster munition.	Russia	8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438; Art. 439; Art. 440	
05/08/2022	Sviatohirsk, Dnipropetrovsk region	Yurii Kochevenko (military officer), "Russia bombed St. George's Skete of Sviatohirsk Cave Monastery" https://www.facebook.com/100001481224164/videos/674712210493353/	Russia has destroyed ancient church in Sviatohirsk Cave Monastery.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 53; 15(5) AP II Art. 9; AP II Art. 16	Art. 178; Art. 194; Art. 438	
05/08/2022	Lysychansk, Bahmut, Donetsk Region	Serhiy Hayday, "Evacuation from Luhansk region has been stopped. The "road of life" is under fire" https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/6378	The evacuation bus came under enemy fire, despite the agreement on a humanitarian corridor. 1 person injured.	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 51; 52; 12 AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 11	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 442; Art. 438;	
05/08/2022	Lugansk region	Ukrinform, "Lysychansk, Sievierodonetsk left without electricity after Russia's air strike" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3478055-lynychansk-sievierodonetsk-left-without-electricity-after-russias-air-strike.html Serhiy Hayday, "1 million people left without water and electricity" https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/6373	As result of shelling the city and about 1 million people left without of water, heat, electricity, and food.	Russia	7(1)(h); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(e)(i); 8(2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 51; 52; 55; 54; 75 AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP II Art. 14	Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 438	
05/08/2022	Shipilove, Luhansk region	Serhiy Hayday, "11 civilians trapped under the rubble" https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/636 WestObserver, "The Russian occupiers fired on a village in the Luhansk region: 11 people were trapped in the house" https://westobserver.com/news/europe/the-russian-occupiers-fired-on-a-village-in-the-luhansk-region-11-people-were-trapped-in-the-house/	Russian military shelled the village of Shipilove. As a result, a two-story civilian building was destroyed, and 11 people were trapped under the rubble. Rescuing was impossible due to constant fire.	Russia	7(1)(k); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	

05/08/2022	Mykolaiv Region	<p>Ukrinform, "One person killed and 27 injured in Russia's missile strikes on Mykolaiv Region" https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3477991-one-person-killed-and-27-injured-in-russias-missile-strikes-on-mykolaiv-region.html</p> <p>TSN, "Russian Shell Killed a Senior Russian Language Teacher in Mykolaiv Region" https://tsn.ua/en/ato/russian-shell-killed-a-senior-russian-language-teacher-in-mykolaiv-region-2056873.html</p>	Russian missiles hit residential areas of Mykolaiv, Voznesensk, Ochakiv. 27 civilians were seriously injured and 1 person was killed.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 55; 75; 52 AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art.115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 438	
05/08/2022	Odesa	<p>Suspilne, "The Russian military shelled the Odesa coast from planes" https://suspilne.media/237196-rosijski-vijskovi-obstrilali-z-litakiv-uzberezza-odesi-foto/</p> <p>Odesa administration, "Video of the damages after shelling" https://t.me/odesacityofficial/7457</p>	3 missiles flew towards the city from the Black Sea. About 300 square meters were under the rubble. There were any military facilities the area.	Russia	Article 8 (2)(b)(ii); Article 8(2)(a)(iv); Article 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 438	
05/08/2022	Hlukhiv, Sumy region	Holos Ukrainy, "Russian occupiers are fighting in Ukraine with Jewish, Orthodox and Muslim cemeteries" http://www.golos.com.ua/article/359848	Jewish cemetery, that is historical monument, in Glukhov was damaged by Russian rockets.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 53; AP II Art. 16	Art. 178; Art. 194; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/09/2022	Ganivka, Dnipropetrovsk region	Valentyn Resnichenko, "Orcs shelled the Shirokiv community from the "Hrads" https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/877	As result of indiscriminate shelling, 1 house was destroyed, several were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 51;	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438; Art. 439;	
05/09/2022	Mykolaiv	Suspilne, "Destroyed infrastructure, fires and casualties: the consequences of the night shelling of Mykolaiv" https://suspilne.media/237190-znisena-infrastruktura-pozezi-ta-zagibli-naslidki-nicni-obstriliv-mikolaeva/	Russian troops shelled Mykolaiv, 2 civilian yachts burned down, and there are casualties in the residential quarter.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 442; Art. 438	
05/09/2022	Shevchenko ve, Mykolaiv region	DSNS (Ukrainian rescue service), "One person deceased as a result of shoting" https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6693	As a result of shelling in the Shevchenkive village, Mykolaiv region, a garage with a car and an outbuilding on the territory of a private household caught fire, 1 man killed during the attack.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 438	
05/09/2022	Odesa	The Guardian, "Buildings burn after seven Russian missiles hit Ukrainian port city" https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2022/may/10/buildings-burn-after-seven-russian-missiles-hit-ukrainian-port-city-video	1 person was killed and at least 6 injured when seven missiles hit a shopping centre and a depot.	Russia	Article 8 (2)(b)(ii); Article 8(2)(a)(iv); Article 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 438	
05/09/2022	Odesa region	Channel 24, "During the evening shelling of Odesa region, two people were injured" https://t.me/chanel24/39210 National police "Guards of civilian infrastructure are trapped under the rubble" t.me/UA_National_Police/3793	Dagger-type missiles were fired from the Tu-22 strategic aircraft. 5 civilian buildings were destroyed, 2 people injured, at least 1 killed.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13;	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 438	
05/09/2022	Slovyansk	TSN, "On the 9th of May, the Russian invaders fired on the center of Slovyansk" https://tsn.ua/en/ato/the-russian-invaders-fired-on-the-center-of-slovyansk-the-mayor-2057479.html	City center shelled by Russian forces. At least 85 civilian facilities were destroyed, including schools and homes.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i)	AP I Art. 51; 52; 75 AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 438	

05/09/2022	Bilohirya, Zaporizhzhia region	Interfax Ukraine, "Occupants fire on car with civilians near Zaporizhia, one killed" https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/831130.html	Russians fired a civilian car. 1 person died on the spot and 1 was wounded.	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; 52; 75 AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 438	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/10/2022	Donetsk region	Babel, "The occupiers killed three civilians in the Donetsk region" https://babel.ua/en/texts/78518-the-war-biden-signed-a-lend-lease-the-enemy-fired-rockets-at-odesa-oblast-but-was-unable-to-hold-parades-in-the-occupied-cities-day-76-live-coverage?post_id=13698	The occupiers killed 2 civilians in the Donetsk region as result if indiscriminate shelling, 3 more people were injured.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75; 52.	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 282;	
05/10/2022	Donetsk	Interfax, "Russian invaders force kindergarten teachers from Donetsk to go to Mariupol" https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/831120.html Main Department of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine "Russian invaders force kindergarten teachers from Donetsk to go to Mariupol" t.me/DIUKraine/468	The heads of pre-school education institutions in occupied Donetsk received an order to select personnel to be sent to occupied Mariupol and nearby settlements	Russia	7(1)(d); 8 (2)(a)(vii); 8 (2) (b) (viii)	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 16; AP I Art. 75; 53		
05/10/2022	Siversk, Donetsk region	DSND, "Russian troops fired on Siversk" t.me/dsns_telegram/6725	Russian troops fired on Siversk, civil infrastructure damaged, along with fire department.	Russia	8 (2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 14; AP I Art. 54	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 292 Art. 438	
05/10/2022	Izium	BBC, "Bodies of 44 civilians found as battle for Izium rages" https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61396800	The bodies of 44 civilians had been found in occupied Izium under the rubble of a high-rise civilian building destroyed by the Russians in early March.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii)	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75; 52.	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 438	! The shelling and the death happened earlier - in March, but was found only on May 10
05/10/2022	Kharkiv region	Babel, "The occupiers increased the intensity of shelling in the Kharkiv district" https://babel.ua/en/texts/78518-the-war-biden-signed-a-lend-lease-the-enemy-fired-rockets-at-odesa-oblast-but-was-unable-to-hold-parades-in-the-occupied-cities-day-76-live-coverage?post_id=13706	6 people were injured and 1 killed. Unfortunately, one person died in Kupyansk district. Two people were hospitalized with injuries in Kharkiv. 2 people were hospitalized with injuries in Kharkiv.	Russia	8 (2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v);	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75; 52.	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 438	

05/10/2022	Mykolaiv	Ok-Pyvden, "The outskirts of Mykolaiv were fired from the Uragan multiple-launch rocket systems" https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid0LuDnf6xymKGTjsmHFhv1r7pWfE1feYq5ZdeKDyi7WQa161N12bR9zP9KHkwPAhz51	Russian military forces used non-selective cluster munitions destroying civilian areas.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75; 52.	Art.115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 414; Art. 433; Art. 438; Art. 439;	
05/10/2022	Komyshuvakha, Zaporizhzhia region	Suspilne, "The Russians fired rockets at the village of Komyshuvakha in Zaporizhzhia. There are dead and injured" https://suspilne.media/238364-rosiani-obs-trilali-raketami-selise-komisuvaha-na-zaporizzi/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps	A total of 18 rockets were fired at the village. About 60 houses were damaged. One person died, 3 were injured.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75; 52.	Art.115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 438	
05/10/2022	Orihiv, Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration, "Day 76" https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7609	Russian soldiers carried out massive shellings. 1 person was killed, and 8 were injured and hospitalized. The authorities suspended the work of the humanitarian aid post in order to save people's lives.	Russia	8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 4; AP II Art. 13; AP I Art. 75; 52.	Art.115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 414; Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439; Art. 440; Art. 444;	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/14/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region, Shyroke community	Head of Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration https://t.me/dnioproetrovskaODA/919	Residential buildings shelled with Uragan rocket systems. Cluster ammunition was found in some yards.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/14/2022	Donetsk region	Donetsk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3392	Russians killed 3 civilians in Donetsk region: 2 in Bogorodychne and 1 in Keramik. 4 more people were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122	
05/14/2022	Donetsk region	Ministry of Internal Affairs https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12817	11 settlements were shelled: Mariupol, Avdiivka, Toretsk, Lyman, Ocheretyno, Drobyshevo, Pivnichne, Keramik, Berestove, Borodychne, Novokalynove. Russians shelled civilians with small arms, aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery, mortars and Grad rocket systems. As a result, 36 civilian objects were shelled, including residential and industrial buildings, traction power station, medical facility.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/14/2022	Donetsk region, Mariupol	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-mariupolyu-zagrozhuyut-masshtabna-epidemiya-vnaslidok-yakoyi-ye-rizik-zagibeli-tisyach-zhiveliv-mista	Lack of clean drinking water, critical situation with sewerage and gutters, large-scale epidemic due to decomposition of bodies.	Russia		AP I Art. 54(1)		No precise date of the reasons of this situation
05/14/2022	Donetsk region, Mariupol	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rosiyani-dopituyut-ditej-z-metoyu-perevirki-dostovirnosti-pokazanih-batkiv	Interrogation of children.	Russia		AP I Art. 77(1)		Art. 27, 31, 37 of the UN Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
05/14/2022	Kharkiv region	Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration https://t.me/synegubov/3183	Russians shell civilian vehicles when civilians try to leave the region or come back there.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 52		
05/14/2022	Kharkiv region, Chuhuiv district	Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration https://t.me/synegubov/3183	As a result of shelling, 2 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52;	Art. 121 Art. 122	

05/14/2022	Kharkiv region, Pervomaisk	Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration https://t.me/syngubov/3183	As a result of shelling, 2 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52;	Art. 121 Art. 122	
05/14/2022	Kherson region	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-na-hersonshchini-okupanti-planuyut-provesti-perepis-naseleennya-ce-superechit-zhenevskim-konvenciya	The occupiers plan to conduct a "census" of the population in the Kherson region	Russia	Art. 7(1)(d) Art. 8(b)(viii)	???		
05/14/2022	Kherson region	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-na-pivdni-ukrayini-rosijski-vijskovi-znishchuyut-unikalnu-zapovidnu-kinburnsku-kosu	Occupants don't allow the firefighters to extinguish the fire in forests and Kinburn Spit	Russia		AP I Art. 55		
05/14/2022	Luhansk region	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2601v	52 infrastructure objects were shelled during the day.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/14/2022	Luhansk region	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2618	Severodonetsk: 11 high-rise buildings are ruined, several apartments in them caught fire. The Russians hit the building of the technical school.					
05/14/2022	Luhansk region	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2620	The production workshop of the Azot plant caught fire after being hit by a shell. The local hospital was also fired.					
05/14/2022	Luhansk region	Ministry of Internal Affairs https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12826	9 civilians were injured					
05/14/2022	Luhansk region	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2601v	3 residential houses destroyed in Lysychansk as a result of Russian airstrike. 2 residential houses destroyed in Rubizhne.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52	Art. 194	
05/14/2022	Luhansk region	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2601v	3 civilians were injured in Vrubivka, 1 civilian was injured in Novodruzhesk.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52	Art. 121 Art. 122	

05/14/2022	Luhansk region, Popasna	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2591	Russian militants examine the ruins in search of civilians and, under the muzzles of machine guns, take them to the territories occupied back in 2014 – to Pervomaisk and Stakhanov. People are being held against their will. Relatives cannot contact them. It is not known what happens to the citizens of Popasna after their deportation.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(d) Art. 8(b)(viii)	AP I Art. 52; 75(2)(c)	Art. 438	
05/14/2022	Luhansk region, Popasna and Hirskas communities	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2601v	4 houses destroyed in Toshkivka, 5 - in Zolote, 2 -in Troitske.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52	Art. 194	
05/14/2022	Luhansk region, Komyshuvakha	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2601v	9 houses destroyed in Komyshuvakha. Also the building of the village council and village palace of culture have been hit.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52	Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/14/2022	Mykolaiv region	Head of Mykolaiv Regional Council https://t.me/mykolaivskaoblrada/1934	10 people injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 121 Art. 122	No indication whether the injured were civilians
05/14/2022	Poltava region, Kremenchuk	State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6809	The remains of the unexploded rocket that hit the residential area were neutralized.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	???		Unclear when the rocket hit the residential area
05/14/2022	Symu region, Shpylivka	Sumu Regional State Administration https://t.me/Zhyvytsky/2132	On the night of May 14, Russia launched a missile attack on the outskirts of Shpylivka village, Sumy district. Several households were ruined.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52	Art. 194	
05/14/2022	Sumy region, Velyka Pysarivka community	Sumu Regional State Administration https://t.me/Zhyvytsky/2130	On the evening of May 14, the Velyka Pysarivka community of the Sumy region was shelled from the territory of the Russian Federation. About 6 mortar rounds. There were no human victims	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52	Art. 282	
05/14/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7754	271 cases of kidnapping of civilians were reported and more than a hundred civilians are held hostage.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146 Art. 147	Overall data not linked to the particular date

05/14/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7754	Local farmers are forced to collaborate with Russians. They are allowed to work only based on special permits but given the lack of understanding who will own the crops grown by them, the farmers do not want to grow it. Russian occupiers report that vegetables from the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are already being sold on Crimean markets.	Russia		AP I Art. 55		
05/14/2022	Zaporizhzhia region, Huliaipole	Ministry of Internal Affairs https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12837	Destruction of civil buildings	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 54	Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/14/2022		Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7813						
05/14/2022	Zaporizhzhia region, Kamyanets-Dniprovsk	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7784	Russians prohibited fishing in the reservoir. In other waters of the community fishing is allowed only based on the special permits.	Russia		AP I Art. 55		

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/15/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region, Shyroke community	Head of Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration https://t.me/dnioproetrovskaODA/932	Residential buildings shelled with Uragan rocket systems	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 438	
05/15/2022	Donetsk region	Donetsk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3396	Russians killed 3 civilians in Donetsk region: 2 in Drobyshevo and 1 in Toretsk. 13 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122	On this date, it was reported that it became possible to clarify information about 3 civilians who died earlier: 2 in Siviersk and 1 in Vilne Pole.
05/15/2022	Donetsk region	Ministry of Internal Affairs https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12848	During the day, Russians shelled 10 settlements – Mariupol, Avdiivka, Toretsk, Lyman, Soledar, Zalizne, Bakhmut, New York, Dibrova, Bakhmutsk – with aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery, rocket salvo systems "Grad" and "Smerch", as well as rockets. There are wounded and dead. 36 civilian objects were destroyed - residential buildings, a mosque, a factory, a cafe, critical infrastructure objects.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54; AP I Art. 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 178 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/15/2022	Donetsk region, Mariupol	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rosijski-okupanti-za-stosuvali-proti-ukrayinskih-zahisnikiv-na-azovstali-fosforni-bombi	Russians attack Azovstal with phosphorus bombs.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)		
05/15/2022		Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol https://t.me/andriyshTime/891						
05/15/2022	Kherson region, Kherson	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-u-hersoni-rosijski-bojoviki-katuyut-vzyatih-u-zaruchniki-mirnih-meshkanciv	Russians kidnap and torture civilians	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 7(1)(f) Art. 7(1)(k) Art. 8(2)(a)(ii) Art. 8(2)(a)(viii) Art. 8(2)(b)(xxi)	AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 126 Art. 127 Art. 146 Art. 147	No particular date of the crime

05/15/2022	Luhansk region, Lysychansk	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2623	1 civilian (15-year-old) hospitalized after Lysychansk shelling	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52;	Art. 121 Art. 122	
05/15/2022	Luhansk region, Severodonetsk	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2619	10 civilians were attacked during evacuation, no injured or dead	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52;		
05/15/2022	Luhansk region, Severodonetsk	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2623	2 civilians dead, 1 civilian injured after the residential building shelling	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 196	
05/15/2022		Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2629	7 residential buildings were damaged					
05/15/2022	Mykolaiv region	Head of Mykolaiv Regional Council https://t.me/mykolaivskaoblrada/1938	15 people injured. Most of them – civilians	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 121 Art. 122	
05/15/2022	Mykolaiv region	Ministry of Internal Affairs https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12858	Residential buildings, vehicles and other objects of civil infrastructure were damaged. Some civilians were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 438	Data for 14-15 May 2022
05/15/2022	Mykolaiv region, Pervomaisk	State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6838	A residential building caught fire as a result of enemy shelling	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)		
05/15/2022		Novosti Nikolaeva https://t.me/novostiniko/17662 Photos of consequences of shelling						
05/15/2022	Mykolaiv region, Bashtan district, Berezhuvate	State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6838	A residential building caught fire as a result of enemy shelling	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)		
05/15/2022	Mykolaiv region, Bashtan district, Pryshyb village and Vesele village	Novosti Nikolaeva https://t.me/novostiniko/17637	2 civilians dead in Pryshyb village. 2 civilians injured in Vesele village.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 178 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/15/2022	Sumy region, Shostka district	Sumy Regional State Administration https://t.me/Zhyvvytsky/2132	Around 2 a.m., a missile strike from a Russian aircraft destroyed infrastructure facilities in Shostka district.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 54	Art. 194	
05/15/2022	Sumy region, Sumy district, Sad village community	State border service of Ukraine https://t.me/DPSUkr/4166	Late in the evening, Russian troops launched a missile strike from the territory of the Russian Federation on the outskirts of the Sad community in the Sumy district.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194	

05/15/2022	Sumy region, Shostka district, Hlukhiv community	State border service of Ukraine https://t.me/DPSUkr/4166	As a result of a missile strike from a Russian aircraft, the infrastructure of the Hlukhiv community in Shostka district was destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194	
05/15/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7824	In Mala Tokmachka village, as a result of artillery shelling by the Russians, a farm building on the territory of the Orikhiv correctional institution was damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 54;	Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/15/2022		Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7843	The Russian					
05/15/2022	Zaporizhzhia region, Orikhiv	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7824	The Russian soldiers damaged three departments of the local hospital and the temple of the religious community with artillery strikes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 52; 53	Art. 194 Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/16/2022	Donetsk region	Donetsk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3400	Russians killed 9 civilians in Donetsk region: 3 in Lyman, 2 in Avdiivka, 1 in Mariinka, 1 in Klynove, 1 in Drobysheve and 1 in Katerynivka. 6 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122	On this date, it was reported that it became possible to clarify information about 1 injured person in Stara Mykolaivka.
05/16/2022	Donetsk region	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rashisti-svoyimi-diyami-prodovzhuyut-sprichinyati-tehnogennita-ekologichni-katastrofi-v-ukrayini	Severe damage to environment.	Russia		AP I Art. 35(3), 55(1)	Art. 441	No exact date of violation
05/16/2022	Donetsk region	Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12886	Russians attacked the following 19 settlements with aerial bombs, air-to-ground missiles, Uragan rocket systems, heavy artillery and Iskander missile systems – Mariupol, Druzhkivka,	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 54;	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/16/2022		Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/12896						
05/16/2022	Lyman, Donetsk region	https://twitter.com/krasnyliman/status/1526244918267678720	Destruction of garage.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52;	Art. 194	
05/16/2022	Druzhkivka, Donetsk region	Donetsk Regional Military Administration https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUFtgfOcrKo	A school in Druzhkivka, kindergarten No.6, ice arena Altair and residential buildings were shelled on 16 May in the morning.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52; 52(3)	Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/16/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-rf-porushuye-prava-ukrayinskih-poranenih-vijskovosluzhbovciv-na-dostup-do-medichnoyi-dopomogi	Violation of Ukrainian soldiers' right for life and medical treatment.	Russia		AP I Art. 11(4)	Art. 438	
05/16/2022	Donetsk region and Zaporizhzhia region	General Staff of Ukraine https://www.facebook.com/100069092624537/posts/318398300473255/?d=n	Russian troops caused fire damage to civil infrastructure in the areas of Vremivka, Novosilka, Mala Tokmachka and Novoandriivka settlements. They carried out an airstrike on the settlement of Malynivka.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 54	Art. 194	
05/16/2022	Kharkiv region	Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration https://t.me/synegubov/3188	As a result of shelling, the warehouse with mineral fertilizers exploded.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52;	Art. 194 Art. 438	

05/16/2022	Kharkiv region	Ukraine NOW https://t.me/UkraineNow/11798	Russians fired artillery at civilian infrastructure in the areas of Dovhenke, Ruski Tyshky, Ternova and Petrivka settlements	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52		
05/16/2022	Kharkiv region, Chuhuiv district	Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration https://t.me/synegov/3188	As a result of shelling, 2 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52;	Art. 121 Art. 122	
05/16/2022	Kharkiv region, Pechenihiy	Ukraine NOW https://t.me/UkraineNow/11835	1 person dead, 1 person injured as a result of shelling	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 178 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/16/2022	Kherson region	Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-na-okupovaniy-rf-hersonshchini-narostaye-gumanitarna-kriza	Russians distribute 5-year-old products and expired medicines as humanitarian aid. At the same time, in exchange for them, they require passport data, lists of pensioners, social workers and just people living in a particular community.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(b)	AP I Art. 69		
05/16/2022		Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-na-hersonshchini-okupanti-planuyut-provesti-perepis-naselennya-c						
05/16/2022	Kherson region	General Staff of Ukraine https://www.facebook.com/100069092624537/posts/318398300473255/?d=n	Shelling of civilian infrastructure from barrel artillery and mortars in the areas of Oleksandrivka, Shevchenkove and Novovorontsovka settlements	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52		
05/16/2022		Ukraine NOW https://t.me/UkraineNow/11837						
05/16/2022	Luhansk region	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2646	Mass destruction of the residential sector of Hirsk community, no communications.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 196	
05/16/2022		State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6866	20 houses were damaged in Komyshuvakha, Katerynivka,					
05/16/2022	Luhansk region, Severodonetsk	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2652	As a result of shelling, a warehouse of the local scientific and industrial association caught fire. 10 civilians are dead.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52; 75(2)(a)	Art. 115 Art. 194 Art. 196 Art. 438	
05/16/2022	Luhansk region, Lysychansk	Luhansk Regional Military Administration https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2652	As a result of shelling, residential buildings caught fire.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(2); 52;	Art. 194	
05/16/2022	Mykolaiv region	Head of Mykolaiv Regional Council https://t.me/mykolaivskaoblrada/1958	13 people injured. Most of them – civilians	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)	AP I Art. 51(4); 75(2)	Art. 121 Art. 122	

05/16/2022	Mykolaiv region, Mykolaiv	State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6838	After enemy shelling a fire broke out in the roof of a shop and in a car	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52;		
05/16/2022	Mykolaiv region, Mykolaiv	State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6857	Central and Inhulsk districts of the Mykolaiv city were shelled with MLRS. 1 person is injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(4); 75(2)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/16/2022		Novosti Nikolaeva https://t.me/novostiniko/17658						
05/16/2022		Novosti Nikolaeva https://t.me/novostiniko/17643						
05/16/2022		Suspilne https://suspilne.media/239793-mikolaiv-obstrilali-vijskovi-rf-v-darili-po-zitlovih-kvartalah-z-rszv/ Video of destruction after the morning shelling						
05/16/2022		LB.UA https://lb.ua/society/2022/05/16/516947_svitanku_mikolaievi_prolunali.html						
05/16/2022	Mykolaiv region, Shevchenko ve village and Luch village	Novosti Nikolaeva https://t.me/novostiniko/17669	Repeated shelling of the village of Shevchenkove and the village of Luch	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52; 51(2)		
05/16/2022	Odesa region	State emergency service https://t.me/dsns_telegram/6853	As a result of the missile attack by strategic aviation planes, the tourist infrastructure and a residential building were destroyed. 4 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52; 51(2)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 438	
05/16/2022		Maksym Marchenko: Odesa Regional State Administration https://t.me/odeskaODA/568						
05/16/2022		Ombudsman Office https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/upovnovazhenij-unaslidok-raketnogo-udaru-po-odeshchini-postrazhdalo-troye-lyudej-sered-yakih-ditina						
05/16/2022	Zaporizhzhia region, Enerhodar	Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/7853	Russian military were reported to taking away men, tying their hands and taking them to an unknown destination. Currently, 6 people are reported to have been abducted. During the above actions, the Russians were threatening everyone who lived in the apartments with these men with guns.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 8(a)(viii)	AP I Art. 52; 51(2); 75(2)(c)	Art. 146 Art. 147	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/17/2022	Bakhmut, Donetsk region	The Kyiv Independent, "Death Toll in Russia's Airstrike on Bakhmut Grows to 5 People," https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/death-toll-in-russia-s-airstrike-on-bakhmut-grows-to-5-people Ukrainska Pravda, "Bakhmut in Donetsk Region Hit by Rocket: Homes Destroyed, One Dead, Child Injured," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/17/7346769/	The Russian military dropped a bomb on a 5-story apartment building. At least 5 people died, including a 2-year-old child. 4 other civilians, including 3 children aged 9, 12 and 17, were seriously injured. The structure of the residential building was destroyed from the 4th to the ground floor.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the people's injuries).
05/17/2022	Soledar, Donetsk region	Perlid, "Knauf factory on fire in Donbas due to shelling," https://www.perild.com/2022/05/17/knauf-factory-on-fire-in-donbas-due-to-shelling/ Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians attack Knauf Ukraine in the Donetsk region," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/17/7346816/	Russian troops launched an airstrike at the Knauf Ukraine building materials plant. As a result of the bombing, a large-scale fire broke out, the company's premises were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194	
05/17/2022	Sieverodone tsk, Luhansk region	Perlid, "Shelling in the Luhansk region: ten dead in a day," https://www.perild.com/2022/05/17/shelling-in-the-luhansk-region-ten-dead-in-a-day/ Hardwo, "The Russians attacked the Lugansk region: the hospital was damaged, many dead and wounded (photo)," https://www.hardwo.com/2022/05/17/the-russians-attacked-the-lugansk-region-the-hospital-was-damaged-many-dead-and-wounded-photo/	Russian troops shelled 2 buildings of the hospital and the building of the research and production association "Impulse". A building materials store and a four high-rise buildings were also destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP II Art. 11; 13 AP I Art. 12; 52(2)	Art. 194	Can't find any accurate data about dead or injured in this incident

05/17/2022	Zatoka, Odesa Region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians launch new missile strike on Dniester Estuary bridge in south west Ukraine" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/17/7346766/</p> <p>Ukrainian News, https://ukranews.com/en/news/857473-missiles-hit-bridge-over-dniester-estuary-again-bridge-destroyed</p>	A new Russian missile strike on the railway bridge over the mouth of the Dniester Estuary. As a result, the bridge is significantly damaged and its operation is currently impossible.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 194 Art. 277	Art. 277 is absent in UKTF Crime Key, but I suppose it may be used in this case.
05/17/2022	Ohtyrka, Sumy region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Sumy Region: 5 missile strikes on Okhtyrka, at least 5 injured," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/17/7346687/</p> <p>Bukvy, "At least 5 injured in Russian missile attack on Sumy, – local governor," https://bykvu.com/eng/bukvy/at-least-5-injured-in-russian-missile-attack-on-sumy-local-governor/</p> <p>Interfax Ukraine, "Enemy launches rocket attack on Okhtyrka, at least five wounded," https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/832758.html</p>	Russian troops launched a missile strike on the residential area. At least 5 were injured. Many private houses, a church, and a kindergarten were damaged. Warehouses were set on fire. The shockwave damaged the front door to the entrance of a 2-story building, trapping people inside.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 16 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2); 53	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 178; Art. 194	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the people's injuries).

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/18/2022	Dnipro	<p>Bukvy, "One injured in a missile attack on Dnipro region, – local governor", https://bykvu.com/en/g/bukvy/one-injured-in-a-missile-attack-on-dnipro-region-local-governor/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russia launches 2 missiles on Dnipro: 1 shot down by Ukrainian air defence, fragments injure a woman", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/18/7346880/</p>	As a result of the Russian missile attack, 1 woman sustained injuries. 2 houses were damaged and a transport infrastructure object was destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the woman's injury).
05/18/2022	Bakhmut, Donetsk region	<p>Liveuamap, "10 civilians were killed as result of Russian shelling in Donetsk region today. 7 killed in Lyman, 3 in Bakhmut, including 1 child. 7 more people wounded", https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-may-10-civilians-were-killed-as-result-of-russian-shelling</p> <p>Ukrainian News, "Russian Shelling Kills 10 Civilians In Donetsk Region Wednesday", https://press.ukranews.com/en/news/857794-russian-shelling-kills-10-civilians-in-donetsk-region-wednesday</p>	3 civilians were killed as a result of Russian shelling. 1 child is among the killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 115	Can't find any accurate data about the quantity of wounded.

05/18/2022	Lyman, Donetsk region	<p>Liveuamap, "10 civilians were killed as result of Russian shelling in Donetsk region today. 7 killed in Lyman, 3 in Bakhmut, including 1 child. 7 more people wounded", https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/18-may-10-civilians-were-killed-as-result-of-russian-shelling</p> <p>Ukrainian News, "Russian Shelling Kills 10 Civilians In Donetsk Region Wednesday", https://press.ukranews.com/en/news/857794-russian-shelling-kills-10-civilians-in-donetsk-region-wednesday</p>	7 civilians were killed as a result of Russian shelling. 1 child is among the killed.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)</p>	Art. 115	Can't find any accurate data about the quantity of wounded.
05/18/2022	Sieverodonsk, Donetsk region	<p>Liveuamap, "4 killed as result of Russian army shelling in Sieverodonsk yesterday", https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/19-may-4-killed-as-result-of-russian-army-shelling-in-sieverodonsk</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians shell Sievierodonsk: four people killed", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347123/</p>	4 people were killed and 3 others injured as a result of Russian shelling. At least 8 residential buildings were damaged, some of them were on fire.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)</p>	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the people's injuries).

05/18/2022	Lysychansk, Luhansk region	<p>Babel, "Luhansk oblast was left without electricity — the occupiers destroyed the last substation", https://babel.ua/en/news/78831-luhansk-oblast-was-left-without-electricity-the-occupiers-destroyed-the-last-substation</p> <p>NV, "Day 84 of Putin's War. Army repulses 12 enemy attacks in the east, Russia launches missile strike on Dnipro", https://english.nv.ua/nation/day-84-of-putin-s-war-army-repulses-12-enemy-attacks-russia-launches-missile-strike-on-dnipro-50243064.html</p>	Complete blackout in the region after Russian shelling, the last powerful power substation was damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52; 51(2)	Art. 194-1	<p>Art. 194-1 is absent in UKTF Crime Key, but I suppose it may be used in this case.</p> <p>+ Not sure whether the power substation is a "civil object" (if not, it is better to delete Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) and Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)).</p>
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/19/2022	Velyka Kostromka village, Dnipropetrovsk region	TSN, "Russian invaders shelled Ukrainian Dnipropetrovsk region: gas pipeline and electricity supply were damaged, more than 10 houses destroyed", https://tsn.ua/en/ato/russian-invaders-shelled-ukrainian-dnipropetrovsk-region-gas-pipeline-and-electricity-supply-were-damaged-more-than-10-houses-destroyed-2066539.html SUSPILNE NEWS, "During the night, #Russian forces opened artillery fire at the Zelenodolsk community in the #Dnipropetrovsk region five times", https://twitter.com/suspilne_news/status/1527181575225544705	As a result of Russian shelling, the gas pipeline, electricity supply were damaged, and more than 10 houses were destroyed. Some parts of the village were left without electricity and gas.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 51(4); 52; 51(2)	Art. 194	
05/19/2022	Avdiivka, Donetsk region	Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077 Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/	1 civilian was killed in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 115	

05/19/2022	Bakhmut, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	2 civilians were killed and 1 was injured in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122</p>	Don't know if is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).
05/19/2022	Khrestyshche, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	1 civilian was killed in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 115</p>	

05/19/2022	Kostiantynivka village, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	1 civilian was injured in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).
05/19/2022	Krasnohorivka, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	1 civilian was killed in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 115	

05/19/2022	Lyman, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	1 civilian was injured in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).
05/19/2022	Marinka, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	2 civilians were injured in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).

05/19/2022	Sydorove, Donetsk region	<p>Pavlo Kyrylenko, "Russia kills civilians! On March 19th russians killed 5 civilians in Donetsk oblast: 2 in Bakhmut, 1 in Krasnohorivka, 1 in Avdiivka and 1 in Khrestyshche. 6 more people got injured", https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/549658150050077</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed 5 and injured 6 civilians over the past 24 hours", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347296/</p>	1 civilian was injured in the course of Russian operational activity.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).
05/19/2022	Balakliia amalgamated territorial community, Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians firing artillery at Kharkiv city and Oblast again: 1 person killed" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347298/</p> <p>Oleh Syniehubov, "Шановні жителі Харківщини!", https://t.me/syniehubov/3216.</p>	1 woman suffered blast injuries as a result of Russian shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).
05/19/2022	Chuhuiv district, Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians firing artillery at Kharkiv city and Oblast again: 1 person killed" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347298/</p>	A 17-year-old man was injured as a result of Russian shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122	Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).

05/19/2022	Kharkiv	<p>TSN, The invaders fired on the Institute of Endocrine Pathology in Kharkiv, https://tsn.ua/en/ato/the-invaders-fired-on-the-institute-of-endocrine-pathology-in-kharkiv-2065723.html</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians firing artillery at Kharkiv city and Oblast again: 1 person killed" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347298/</p>	<p>Early in the morning the Russian invaders attacked the Kyiv district, where the boiler room of the Institute of Endocrine Pathology was hit. Then, the occupying forces also attacked the Shevchenkivskiy district, Saltivka and Northern Saltivka. 1 person was injured in the shelling in Saltivka.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 11; 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 12; 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194</p>	<p>Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).</p>
05/19/2022	Tsyrkun village, Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians firing artillery at Kharkiv city and Oblast again: 1 person killed" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347298/</p> <p>Oleh Syniehubov, "Шановні жителі Харківщини!", https://t.me/syniehubov/3216.</p>	<p>A 64-year-old man was killed during Russian shelling.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 115</p>	
05/19/2022	Velyki Khutory village, Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians firing artillery at Kharkiv city and Oblast again: 1 person killed" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347298/</p> <p>Oleh Syniehubov, "Шановні жителі Харківщини!", https://t.me/syniehubov/3216.</p>	<p>As a result of Russian shelling, a 13-year-old child and a woman sustained shrapnel wounds</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v).</p>	<p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13. AP I Art. 75(1); 51(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122</p>	<p>Don't know is it better to use Art. 121 or 122 of UA Penal Code (depends on the severity of the injuries).</p>

05/19/2022	Vasylivka, Zaporizhzhia region	<p>The Kyiv Independent, "Russians block civilians from leaving occupied areas in southern Ukraine", https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/russians-block-civilians-from-leaving-occupied-areas-in-southern-ukraine</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "In the Zaporizhzhia region occupying forces not letting people pass through checkpoint: more than a thousand cars are queueing", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/19/7347231/</p>	<p>Russians have held over 1,000 cars with people at their checkpoint, not allowing them to either enter Ukrainian-controlled territories or return to the occupied ones.</p>	Russia	Art. (8)(2)(a)(viii)	AP II Art. 4(2) AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 147	Not sure in the qualification of the crime.
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/27/2022	Crimean Peninsula	Twitter https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1530267044112961537	Bulk carrier Matros Koshka transited Bosphorus towards Med en route from occupied Sevastopol allegedly carrying 27200 tons wheat stolen in Ukraine.	Russia	Art. (8)(2)(e)(v)	AP II Art. 4(2)(g) AP I Art. 52(1)	Art. 432; Art. 433; Art. 438	
05/27/2022	Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Region	Ukrayinska Pravda, "The Russians hit the National Guard Barracks in dnipropetrovsk region: 10 dead and 35 wounded." https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/27/7348873/	3 missile strikes and significant damage caused. 10 people died and about 35 were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 52(1); 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/27/2022	Donetsk Region (Novobakhmutivka, Kamiyanka, Avdiyivka, Pisky and Maryinka)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12359	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Donetsk Region (Studenky, Sviyatohirsk, Bohorodychne, Karnaukhivka and Virnopillia, Dovhenke)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Donetsk Region, Novomykhailivka	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	Village was under heavy shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Donetsk, Kurakhove direction (Maryinka, Myslyvske and Pavlivka)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Donetsk, Sloviansk direction (Sloviansk, Dovhenke, Sviatohirsk, Bohorodychne, Virnopillya and others)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12359	The territories were shelled. Airstrikes were conducted.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Kharkiv Region (Derhachi, Zolochiv and Saltivka)	Twitter https://twitter.com/Cyberpuzo/status/1530270451724845056	Districts were shelled with artillery.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/27/2022	Kharkiv Region (Ternova, Prudyanka, Ruski Tyshky, Kutuzivka, Varvarivka, Petrivka, Mykhailivka, Korobochkino and others)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Khersonskyi Region (Henichesk)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/dogrujol/posts/pfbid0vKtho3ipHpWFGJ7BUKH2V5WE7nj8GpwrEVWXMGAxcFPgVU3xBMqzb8aG69GstddUlUkrayinskaPravda, "In Novooleksiivka, the occupiers kidnapped a Crimean Tatar and his wife, they may torture them," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/27/7348905/	2 Crimean Tatars were detained by the occupiers in their own home and sent to an unknown direction.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(e); Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(vii); Art. 8(a)(viii)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 146; Art. 147; Art. 371	
05/27/2022	Khersonskyi Region (Lyman, Ozerne and Dibrova)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	Shelling with MLRS and mortars, airstrikes are conducted.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Luhansk Region (Sievierodoneck)	Twitter, https://twitter.com/olchbatkovych/status/1530092448931880961 Ukrayinska Pravda, "Russians attempt to break through in Luhansk region: 5 killed, extensive damage" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/27/7348820/	5 people were killed as a result of the shelling.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP II, Article 4 (2)(a); 4(2)(d); 13; AP I Art. 51(1)(2); 51(2); 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/27/2022	Mykolaiv Region (Osokorivka, Novovorontsovka, Blahodatne, Zorya and Tavriyske)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	Occupiers shelled civilian infrastructure.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/27/2022	Sumy Region	Twitter, https://twitter.com/DPSU_ua/status/1530099968123580417 Ukrayinska Pravda, "Sumy region shelled with mortars again," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/27/7348988/	Shelling with mortars in the border areas.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Zaporizhzhia direction (Kurakhove, Novopavlivsk)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12360	On these direction mortars, reactive artillery and howitzers were used. Su-25 planes conducted airstrikes near Mala Tokmachka and Orikhiv.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/27/2022	Zaporizhzhia direction (Vremivka, Poltavka, Chervone, Huliaipole, Orikhiv, Kamianske and Olhivske)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/28/2022	Donetsk Region (Novomykhailivka)	Twitter https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1530505082617348096	The territory was under heavy shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Donetsk Region (Studenky, Sviyatohirsk, Bohorodchne, Karnaukhivka, Virnopolia, Dovhenke)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12367	The territories were shelled with artillery plus airstrikes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Donetsk, Avdiyivka direction (Vesele and Kamianka)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707	Artillery strikes along all contact line in this direction.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Donetsk, Kurakhove direction (Maryinka, Myslyvske and Pavlivka)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12367	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Donetsk, Lyman direction (Dibrova)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707	Combat aviation conducted 3 airstrikes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Kharkiv Region (Nova Dmytrovka, Velyka Komysheva, Dovhenke, and Dibrova)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707	The helicopters conducted airstrike, the territory was shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Kharkiv Region (Ternova, Prudyanka, Ruski Tyshky, Kutuzivka, Varvarivka, Petrivka, Mykhailivka, Korobochkino)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12367	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/28/2022	Kharkiv Region (Zolochiv, Balakliia, Izium, Savyntsi, Korobochkyne)	Espresso TV https://espresso.tv/snaryad-zaletiv-na-kukhnyu-vnashidok-obstrilu-zolochyva-na-khar-kivshchini-poranenodvokh-lyudey The Kyiv Independent, Twitter https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1530690269410099201	6 people wounded as result of shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 52(1); 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/28/2022	Kherson Region (Huliaipole, Vremivka, Poltavka, Chervone, Huliaipole, Orikhiv, Kamianske and Olhivske)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12367	Forces shelled these territories.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Kherson Region (Lyman, Ozerne and Dibrova)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12367	The territories were shelled with MLRS and mortars, as well as airstrikes were conducted.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Kherson Region (Prybuzke, Posad-Pokrovske, Blahodatne, Osokorivka, Novovorontsovka, Novooleksandrivka and others)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707	Shelling of civilian infrastructure.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Kryvyi Rih	Telegram https://t.me/vilkul/1323	Explosions in the city (missile strike).	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Mykolaiv	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Mykolaiv residential neighbourhood shelled: 1 civilian killed, 6 wounded" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/28/7349139/ Facebook https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/380746284087191	1 killed, 6 wounded as result of shelling.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 52(1); 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/28/2022	Mykolaiv (Osokorivka, Novovorontsovka, Blahodatne, Zorya and Tavriyske)	Telegram https://t.me/UkraineNow/12368	Civilian infrastructure was shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/28/2022	Sumy	NV, "Russia shells Sumy region overnight," https://english.nv.ua/nation/russia-shells-sumy-region-overnight-50245902.html Telegram https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/2308?single https://t.me/liganet/17535	The territory was shelled. Missile strike damaged agricultural enterprise in Konotop district.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/28/2022	Sumy Region	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Sumy Oblast missile strike: woman wounded, church and kindergarten damaged," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/28/7349163/	1 civilian wounded as result of airstrike in Sumy Region, church and kindergarten are damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ix); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13; 16 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2); 53	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 298; Art. 414; Art. 438;	
05/28/2022	Sumy Region (Seredyna Buda, Stari Vyrky and Znob-Trubchevska)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327247112921707	Shelling of border guards objects with mortars.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/29/2022	Donetsk, Bakhmut direction (Komyshuvakha, Dolomytne, New York, Berestove, Pokrovske, Verhnekamianske, Vrubivka, and Soledar)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316	Shelling with mortars, howitzers and MLRS. The aviation conducted airstrike and 4 missile strikes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Kharkiv Region	The Economic Times, "Several explosions heard in Ukraine's Kharkiv after Zelenskiy visit," https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/several-explosions-heard-in-ukraines-kharkiv-after-zelenskiy-visit/articleshow/91873453.cms	Explosion near the Kharkiv city.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Kharkiv Region (Husarivka, Velyka Komyshuvakha, Bohorodychne, Sviatohirsk, Dovhenke)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038	Shelling of the territories with artillery. The aviation conducted airstrike.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Kharkiv Region (Velyka Komyshuvakha, Dovhenke and Virnopolia)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316	The airstrike against the village was conducted. Howitzers and rocket systems were used. Shelling with artillery and mortars.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Kharkiv, Kharkiv direction (Cherkaski Tyshky, Ruski Tyshky, Petrivka and Ternova)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038	The civilian infrastructure was shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Kherson Region	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038	Russian troops shelled Lymany, Stepova Dolyna, Luch, Partyzany, Chernovniy Yar, Trudolyubivka and other.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/29/2022	Kryvyi Rih direction (Trudolyubivka, Mala Shesternya, Dobryanka, Knyazivka, Tokareve, Shyroke, Pervomaisk e, Kotlyarevo, Novohryhorivka, Tavriyske and Posad-Pokrovsk e)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316	Forces shelled the territory with mortars, MLRS and howitzers.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Luhansk Region (Severodonetsk)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/327663802880038	The aviation conducted strikes near Ustynivka	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Lyhansk Region, Severodonetsk	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316	The aviation conducted airstrike.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Mykolaiv	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Shelling of Mykolaiv: one killed two injured, explosions in the city," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/29/7349286/	Explosions in the city. 2 civilians killed, 5 wounded as result of shelling.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/29/2022	Mykolaiv, Mykolaiv'ska oblast	Twitter https://twitter.com/rubryka/status/1530825075536044032	Shelling of residential areas.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/29/2022	Sumy Region (Senkivka, Hirsk, Hrinivka, Hasychivka of Chernihiv region, Bachivsk, Seredyna Buda, Boyaro-Lezhachi and Manukhivka)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328041022842316	Shelling of the territories with artillery.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/30/2022	Donetsk Region (Iadosove, Dacha, Mykolaivka Druha, Odradivka, Oprosnе)	Ukrayinska Pravda, "In the Bakhmut district, an ammonia pipeline was damaged, a leak occurred — Oblast Military Administration "https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/30/7349501/	Ammonia pipeline Tolyatti-Odesa was damaged as result of shelling, cloud of ammonia from Travneve could impact villages towards Bakhmut.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv)	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 113; Art. 194; Art. 292; Art. 441	
05/30/2022	Kharkiv direction (Kharkin city, Ruski Tyshky, Cherkasky Tyshky, Ruska Lozova, Pytomnyk, Borschova and Peremoha areas)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/32835537614214 Ukrayinska Pravda, "Kharkiv is shelled again: a teenager and two other people have been wounded," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/30/7349525/	Shelling of the territory. 3 civilians have been wounded.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/30/2022	Kharkiv Region	Liveuamap https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/30-may-shelling-in-kharkiv-region-again	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/30/2022	Kharkiv Region (Odnorobivka, Udy, Ruski Tyshky and Cherkaski Tyshky)	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Three civilians killed in Kharkiv region in 24 hours, child killed in the morning", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/31/7349627/	The territories were shelled. 3 civilians were killed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/30/2022	Kherson, Pivdennobuzki direction (Posad-Pokrovskе, Osokorivka, Novovorontsovka, Blahodatne, Partyzanske and other at Pivdenny Buh direction)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BP2eVZ2ToWxpJBjFa2xb1XmwaCTbd1E9TtmGwoxinyDWQiuuhwBy8ZUHV4iaMFuBl	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/30/2022	Luhansk Region (Lysychansk)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BP2eVZ2ToWxpJBjFa2xb1XmwaCTbd1E9TtmGwoxinyDWQiuuhwBy8ZUHV4iaMFuBl	Aviation conducted airstrikes near Novoselivka and Lysychansk, conducted missile strikes near Soledar and Siversk	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/30/2022	Lyhansk Region	The Washington Post, "French journalist killed in strike on humanitarian convoy, officials say", https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/30/french-journalist-killed-ukraine-russia/	Shelling of evacuation convoy from Luhansk Region. French journalist killed. 1 person was slightly wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/30/2022	Mykolaiv Region	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Mykolaiv: as a result of morning shelling one person wounded, 21 residential buildings are damaged", https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/30/7349447/	21 private houses were damaged in one of areas of the city, 1 person was wounded.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/30/2022	Odesa Region (Zatoka)	Telegram https://t.me/suspilneodesa/14193	2 missile strikes overnight at railway bridge. Several private houses nearby were damaged by the shock wave.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/30/2022	Sumy, Siverskiy direction (Boyaro-Lezhachi, Manukhivka - Sumy Region and Yanzhulivka, Kamenska Sloboda - Chernihiv Region)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02BP2eVZ2ToWxpJBjFa2xb1XmwaCTbd1E9TtmGwoxinyDWQiuuhwBy8ZUHV4iaMFuBl	The territories were shelled.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/30/2022	Sumy Region (Zapsillia, Myropillia, Kindrativka)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214	The aviation conducted airstrikes, as well as artillery shelling,	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
05/31/2022	Donetsk Region, Sloviansk	Ukrayinska Pravda, "Russians launch missile attack on Sloviansk, leaving some dead and others injured," https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/31/7349584/	3 killed, 6 wounded as result of missile strike in Sloviansk.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/31/2022	Donetsk, Sloviansk direction (Dovhenke, Virnopolia, Grushuvakha and Velyka Komyshuvakha)	Twitter https://twitter.com/nakipeloua/status/1531546198636650496	Territories were under shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/31/2022	Kharkiv direction (Terny, Lozova, Protopopivka, Rudneve and Sokolivka and Kharkiv city)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030	Shelling of the territories. 5 civilians were wounded.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
05/31/2022	Kherson direction (Oleksandriivka, Prybuzke, Posad-Pokrovske, Novohryhorivka, Osokorivka, Knyazivka and Trudolyubivka).	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030	The artillery shelled on these territories.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/31/2022	Kherson Region (Davydiv Brid)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329511842695234	The aviation conducted airstrikes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	
05/31/2022	Mykolaiv Region, Mykolaiv	Telegram https://t.me/suspilnemykolaiv/10646	Explosions in Mykolaiv. 1 child was injured, 14 people were injured during the day, most of them civilians.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 113; Art. 178; Art. 282; Art. 292	

05/31/2022	Zaporizhzhia Region (Mala Tokmachka, Novoandriivka)	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030	The aviation conducted airstrikes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 4(2)(a); 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2);	Art. 113; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 414;	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/06/2022	Donetsk	<p>NV, "This has not happened in eight years." Social networks once again reported on the shelling of Donetsk - video" https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/u-socmerezhah-z-yavilisyia-povidomlennya-pro-obstiril-donecka-6-chervnya-video-novini-ukrajini-50247917.html</p> <p>Telegram channel, "All-seeing EYE" https://t.me/c/1307866449/16971 (for members only)</p> <p>Telegram channel, "All-seeing EYE" https://t.me/c/1307866449/16983 (for members only)</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Shpalta" https://t.me/SHPALTA/11318 (for members only)</p>	According to local residents, russians repeatedly shelled Donetsk.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 282, Art. 438	Russia blamed Ukraine for this shellings. There is little information as to the damage caused.

06/06/2022	Donetsk region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "During the day, the Russians killed 4 civilians of the Donetsk region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350949/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Pavlo Kyrylenko/Donetsk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3625?fbclid=IwAR3G6xKYy2eXWZQUnygiim9uTOgOHYdy8Srj2_rhKv28OVqAnKMDnmzog</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the Russians shelled Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, fights in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350784/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Ukraine receives the bodies of those killed in "Azovstal" and maintains the defense in Severodonetsk. 104 day of the war" https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/06/7/7350962/</p>	<p>4 civilians died (two in New York, one in Chasiv Yar and 1 in Pisky), 7 injured due to russia's military actions in Donetsk region. The post also mentions that "information was clarified as to 1 dead and 2 injured in Lyman community ("hromada)". Furthermore 4 civilians who were injured in Luhansk region were registered in Kostiantynivka.</p> <p>Twenty objects were damaged, including residential houses and industrial facilities.</p> <p>According to the residents, Chasiv Yar was shelled, inter alia, using cluster bombs.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>
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06/06/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Telegram channel, "A	In the temporarily occupied Mariupol, the queue for food products from the Russian invaders in the former shopping center "Metro" reaches from 1.5 to 2 thousand people every day. "Up to 400 sets are issued per day. In the heat under the sun, people stand in line for 6 hours in vain. There is no drinking water, there is nowhere to get it on the territory of the "humanitarian headquarters". There is no shadow to take shelter. Every hour in recent days, up to 10 people who faint are taken to the hospital. The stench from the morgue, located 200 meters away, intensifies every day."	Russia	Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv); Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. (8)(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 51, 54 Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c)	Art. 442; Art. 438	
06/06/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Ukraine received the first bodies of fighters who died at "Azovstal" - AP" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/06/7350917/ AP, "AP Exclusive: Ukraine recovers bodies from steel-plant siege" https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-kyiv-travel-government-and-politics-fd34c02c14247c39589bd93cd85ff818?fbclid=IwAR0H4MjVueZVAaPbLX66CTWuT0rU8NYbiJ587-Zm5RWsPpThBz7E-Wh7Y	Ukraine announced the first officially confirmed swap of its military dead since the war began. It said the two sides exchanged 320 bodies in all, each getting back 160 sets of remains. The swap took place Thursday on the front line in the Zaporizhzhia region. The press secretary of the "Azov" regiment, Hanna Golovko, said that all 160 Ukrainian bodies handed over by Russia were from the ruins of "Azovstal". She said that at least 52 of these bodies are believed to be the remains of soldiers from the Azov Regiment.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(e)(x) Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP I Art. 51 Art. 3(1)(a)	Art. 115 Art. 438	Both soldiers and civilians were hiding at Azovstal, waiting for humanitarian corridor.

06/06/2022	Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the Russians shelled Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, fights in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350784/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/</p>	<p>In the evening and at night residential areas on the outskirts of Kharkiv, in particular Saltivka, were shelled. Blyznyuky, Pervomayskyi and the village of Slobozhanske were shelled at night. Izyumskyi, Chuhuyivskyi and Kharkivskyi districts were shelled in the region during the day. In total, 10 wounded, 3 dead in the region for the last 24 hours. By 9.20 a.m. on June 7, four people were injured and two died due to shelling in Derhachi and Chornohlazivka.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438</p>	<p>Report as of 9.25 am, 6 June. Might cover 5 June as well</p>
06/06/2022	Lozova, Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The occupiers fired rockets at a city in the Kharkiv region, causing a lot of destruction", https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350845/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Sergiy Selensky" https://www.facebook.com/SergiySelensky/</p>	<p>On the night of 6 June, russians shelled the city with missiles, damaged 5 educational institutions, critical infrastructure and residential buildings (in particular, two schools, three kindergartens and dormitories, where internally displaced people lived). No victims among civilians.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/06/2022	Kherson region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "SBU: The occupiers were allowed to shoot civilians at checkpoints in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350899/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Security Service of Ukraine" https://www.facebook.com/SecurSerUkraine/videos/953469238654210/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the Russians shelled Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, fights in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350784/</p>	<p>The Security Service of Ukraine received information that at the internal checkpoints of the temporarily occupied Kherson region, the invaders are allowed to shoot civilians who seem suspicious to them.</p> <p>As a result of mines on the sea shore, particularly in Lazurne, three local residents were blown up by a Russian mine. All died.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(e)(x) Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51</p>	<p>Art. 438 Art. 115</p>	

06/06/2022	Tyotkino, Kursk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The head of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation announced the shelling of the border village" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350769/ Telegram channel, "Roman Starovoyt" https://t.me/gubernator_46/728	The governor of Kursk region said that the village of Tyotkino was shelled (bridge and local enterprises), which is located not far from the border with Ukraine.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 282 Art. 438	russia blamed Ukraine for this shellings. There is little information as to the damage caused.
06/06/2022	Luhansk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the Russians shelled Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, fights in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350784/ Ukrainska Pravda, "Gaidai told about the situation in Luhansk Region and Zelensky's visit" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350772/	In Lysychansk, russians shelled a bakery that was baking bread for people until the last day. In addition to the bakery, several buildings of state institutions and two multi-storey buildings were damaged. More serious destruction occurred in Hirska community: namely, 16 houses in Zolote, three in Hirske. Also, six houses were destroyed in Vrubivka. 1 person died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 9.25 am, 6 June. Might cover 5 June as well
06/06/2022	Mykolayiv	Ukrainska Pravda, "Morning shelling of Mykolayiv: one person died, there are injured" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350846/ Telegram channel, "Hanna Zamazyeyeva//Mykolayiv regional council" https://t.me/mykolaivskaobrada/2354 Ukrainska Pravda, "Explosions rang out in Mykolaiv - the mayor" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/6/7350791/ Facebook page, "Mykolayiv regional state administration" https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0cbgiDTVDHUGh1SVAKxjDHNeBvTgXH1SowmYhsZGPbP8SK5pUSnajyxJdqQFXLHj9l	During morning shelling of Mykolayiv, civilians were injured, one person died. Residential infrastructure with no military objects nearby was chaotically shelled. Six private houses, a school, electrical networks were damaged. During the day, russians also shelled Shyroktivska community: one residential building was ruined, an ambulatory was damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/07/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region (near the border with Kherson region)	Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/	Unnamed community was shelled with Uragan. One person was injured, buildings damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 7 am, 7 June. Might cover 6 June as well
06/07/2022	Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/ Telegram channel, "Holos Ukrainy" https://t.me/c/1492790217/5367 (for members only)	Russians attacked Kurakhovo and Avdiyivka with rockets, and Mykolayivka with cluster munitions. Bakhmut, Krasnohorivka, Avdiyivka, Chasiv Yar, vil. New York, vil. Bohoyavlenka, vil. Pervomaiske and vil. Netaylove were also under the fire. Overall, 26 objects (17 private houses and 5 multi-storey buildings, industrial and social objects) were damaged. During the day, three people were killed (one of them a child), six were injured (including two children).	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51, 77 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 7 am, 7 June. Covers 6 June as well
06/07/2022	Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians wounded 5 civilians" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7351131/ Telegram channel, "Pavlo Kyrylenko/Donetsk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3631	5 civilians were injured due to russian actions (2 in Ocheretyne, 2 in Lastochkyno and 1 in Mykolayivka). One person who was injured in Luhansk region was registered in Kostyantynivka, Donetsk region.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	
06/07/2022	Kharkiv	Ukrainska Pravda, "Shelling in Kharkiv: one person died, four were injured" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7351093/ Telegram channel, "General Prosecutor's Office" https://t.me/pgov_gov_ua/4382	Due to shelling of Shevchenkivskyi district of Kharkiv, 56-year old man died. Another three civilians were injured. Over 10 residential buildings and 2 administrative buildings were damaged. Also there was a shelling of Kyiv region of Kharkiv. Residential buildings and car were damaged, 56-year old man injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	

06/07/2022	Kharkiv region	Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/	Kyiv district of Kharkiv was shelled, one building caught fire, one person was rescued from under the rubble. In total during the day in the Kharkiv region, 4 people were injured. There were shellings in Derhachi, Izyum district. Two people died during the day as a result of shelling: in Derhachi and Chornoglazivka.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 7 am, 7 June. Covers 6 June as well
06/07/2022	Kharkiv region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Kharkiv region: at least 3 dead and 6 wounded as a result of shelling" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7351121/ Telegram channel, "Oleh Synehubov, head of Kharkiv RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://t.me/synehubov/3397	Due to shelling of Kharkiv region (Kharkiv and vil. Cherkaska Lozova, Slatyne and Korobochkine) at least 3 people died, at least 6 were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	
06/07/2022	Kherson	Ukrainska Pravda, "Rus[sian] media reported on the explosion in Kherson near the administration" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7351034/ Telegram channel, "RIA News" https://t.me/rian_ru/166314	There was an explosion in a cafe near the administration; one civilian injured.	Unknown	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Might be attributed to Ukrainian partisans
06/07/2022	Kherson region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The occupiers keep 600 people in the torture chambers in the Kherson region: torture and inhumane conditions" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7351069/ Ukrinform, "In the Kherson region, the Russians are holding about 600 hostages in torture chambers - Tasheva" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3501651-na-hersonsini-rosiani-utrimuut-u-kativnah-blizko-600-zarucnikiv-taseva.html	In the occupied Kherson region, russians are holding about 600 people in captivity, and are also transporting kidnapped residents to annexed Crimea. Kidnapped residents of the region are held by the occupiers in inhumane conditions and tortured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii) Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) Art. 7(1)(e)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(b); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 75(2)(a)(ii)(iv)(c)	Art. 146; Art. 146-1 Art. 147 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 371 Art. 438	

06/07/2022	Kyiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Residents of Kyiv region were blown up by a mine in the forest, where they went to get firewood"</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Oleksii Kuleba/Kyiv regional military administration" https://t.me/OleksiyKuleba/1679</p>	Local residents came across the mine in Poliska community and were injured	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	
06/07/2022	Luhansk region	<p><u>Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties"</u> https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Shpalta" https://t.me/SHPALTA/11298 (for members only)</p>	Russians shelled a market, a college and a school in Lysychansk, injuring two people. Russians also shelled Zolote (13 buildings were ruined) and Hirske (11 buildings were damaged).	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 7 am, 7 June. Might cover 6 June as well
06/07/2022	Luhansk and Donetsk regions	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "In Donbas, the Armed Forces of Ukraine repelled 11 attacks, battles are ongoing in two locations" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7351138/</p> <p>Telegram channel "Joint Forces Task Force" https://www.facebook.com/easternbridgehead/posts/pfbid09t1y9Xynu1ez15QjGK-mzt4imqLsjxNayMXDbx4UxNrutK6nie2y5D29LEnwZ1sz21</p>	On Tuesday, the occupiers shelled more than 20 settlements in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, destroyed and damaged 39 civilian objects, including: 36 residential buildings, a school, a kindergarten, and a power line. As a result of these shellings, one civilian was killed, 6 were wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	

06/07/2022	Mykolayiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The occupiers attacked Bashtanka in the Mykolaiv region: 2 people died" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350994/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Mykolayiv regional state administration" https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0cbgiDTVdHUGH1SVAKxjDHNeBvTgXH1SowmYhsZGPbP8SK5pUSnAjyxJdqQFXLHj9l</p>	At night, Bashtanska community came under the shelling, as a result of which two people died and one person was injured. Certain administrative premises, stadium and sports school were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	
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06/07/2022	Mykolayiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "On Tuesday, the Russians shelled the Mykolaiv region: there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351239/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Hanna Zamazyeyeva//Mykolayiv regional council" https://t.me/mykolaivskaobrada/2386</p> <p>Website, "National Police of Mykolayiv Region" https://mk.npu.gov.ua/news/stoprussia/uprodovzh-minuloji-dobi-obstriliv-zaznali-pyat-naselenix-punkti-v-oblasti-pravooxorneczi-dokumentuyut-naslidki-chergovix-vo-rozhix-atak/?fbclid=IwAR1-817acwEro9pDLCC7bgPhTrrW3D0n8g2uPivwn4aLFUeWvmPQWnCl3w</p> <p>Facebook page, "Mykolayiv regional state administration", https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid02w623wTyDMS99AF9XEYu7a5GZVCKWwi1NPqBjzQUN11rQDnf5ZcTovgC6ZQbMrUBPl&id=100064554675894</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Shpalta" https://t.me/SHPALTA/11340 (for members only)</p>	The town of Bashtanka and the villages of Kaluha, Zelenyi Hai, Zasillya and Murakhivka were under fire. One apartment building and six private houses, a stadium and other civilian infrastructure facilities were damaged. There were fatalities and casualties (13 people were injured). Two people died in Zasillya.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/07/2022	Seredyna-Buda, Sumy region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "A day in the regions: the occupiers shelled the east and south of Ukraine, battles in the Luhansk region, there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/7/7350991/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Shpalta" https://t.me/SHPALTA/11294 (for members only)</p>	Due to night mortar and artillery shellings, at least 6 buildings, utility building and garage were damaged, as well as power line. No losses among civilians.	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	

06/07/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "In Zaporizhzhia, the occupiers injured three people and kidnapped three" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/08/7351176/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Zaporizhzhia regional military administration" https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8805</p>	<p>Due to shelling in Zaporizhzhia region (villages Tavriyske and Komyshevukha), a minor boy, a man and a woman were wounded by shrapnel. Russians also kidnapped three men from Melitopol, Tokmak and vil. Kopan. Civilian infrastructure was shelled in Orikhiv, Hulyaypole, Komyshevukha, Tavriyske, Novodanylivka, Novoandriyivka, Kamyanske: 20 buildings, car, store damaged. The occupants in the temporarily occupied territories continue to engage in looting: six cars and three trucks were stolen in Novokamyanka, Kinski Rozdory, Kamyanka, Solodkovodne, vil. Bilmak and Dniprovka.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii) Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii) Art. (8)(2)(e)(v) Art. 7(1)(e)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51, 77 AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 75(2)(c)</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 146; Art. 146-1 Art. 147 Art. 432; Art. 433; Art. 438; Art. 371</p>	<p>Report as of 7.43 am, 8 June. Might cover 8 June as well</p>
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/08/2022	Donetsk	Telegram channel, Holos Ukrainy https://t.me/c/1492790217/5410 Gazeta.ua, "A powerful explosion rang out in the center of Donetsk: details" https://gazeta.ua/articles/donbas/_u-centri-donecka-prolunav-potuzhnij-vibuh-podrobiti/1093305	Another explosion near the building of former regional administration; a woman injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	
06/08/2022	Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "In Donetsk region, Russians killed 4 civilians" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351342/ Youtube, "Donetsk regional state administration" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8KyDj873Y8	During the day on June 8, russians killed four civilians in Donetsk region. In particular, in Bakhmut, a school was ruined, 5 people injured, 4 died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	
06/08/2022	Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians shelled Donetsk region: 7 wounded" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351272/ Facebook page, "Donetsk regional prosecutor's office" https://www.facebook.com/don_gp.gov.ua/posts/388480423318643	According to the investigation data, during 6-7 June 2022, as a result of the attacks, 7 civilians received shrapnel wounds. Another civilian was taken to hospital in serious condition after shelling of Lysychansk, Luhansk region. Apartment buildings and private households, commercial premises, a dormitory of an educational institution, and other objects and facilities with no relation to military infrastructure were hit by shells.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	This data contradicts to the reports of other institutions regarding civilian losses in Donetsk region for 6-7 June. It could be explained by the fact that investigators did not yet commence proceedings on other cases.
06/08/2022	Donetsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Mykolaiv and Kharkiv were shelled again, Donetsk region was hit from "Hrad" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351188/	As a result of shelling of Avdiyivka, Kurakhove, vil. Ocheretyno, Lastochkino, New York 35 objects were damaged (24 private houses, 3 multi-storey buildings, kindergarten, school, administrative and industrial premises). 5 civilians injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 8.55 am, 8 June. Might cover 7 June as well

06/08/2022	Kharkiv	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The evening shelling of Kharkiv caused large-scale fires, two people died" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/9/7351401/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The situation in the regions: missile attack on Zhytomyr region, numerous shellings in Donbas" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/9/7351405/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Kharkiv region" https://www.facebook.com/MNSKHARKIV/posts/pfbid02H4JWsREAuw9EzUdX6TLZZxhjfs4z4CWt5fKrgqkyKYvejqqWmYRBh3sVFoUUyiZ81</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Oleh Synehubov, head of Kharkiv RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://t.me/synehubov/3399</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Shpalta" https://t.me/SHPALTA/11369</p>	<p>Due to shelling of Novobavarskyi district of Kharkiv, cafe, shop and school library were damaged. Two people died, six injured. Fires caused by shelling occurred in the Novobavarskyi (2) district of Kharkiv, as well as in the Chuhuyevskyi (8), Izyumskyi (2), Bohodukhivskyi (2) and Kharkivskyi (2) districts of Kharkiv. These fires damaged residential buildings, storage buildings, garages and cars, a cafe building, a store, a school library, a supermarket, as well as coniferous forests. On 8 June, in the morning russians shelled Saltivka district in Kharkiv.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/08/2022	Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians killed 5 residents of Kharkiv region, wounded 12 more, and hit a supermarket" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351246/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Oleh Synehubov, head of Kharkiv RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://t.me/synehubov/3399</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Obyektyv News Kharkiv" https://t.me/objective tv/27039</p>	<p>Over the past 24 hours, five people were killed and 12 civilians were injured in Kharkiv region: in Cherkaska Lozova 2 people died, 3 injured; in Korobochkyne 1 died, 1 injured; in Pechenihiy 1 died, 2 injured; on Kharkiv - see above. Private houses were damaged in villages Tsyrukuny, Slatyne and Cherkaska Lozova. A fire started in the private households in Lebyazhe and Korobochkyne due to the shelling.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	<p>Report as of 12.45 pm, 8 June. Might cover 7 June as well</p>

06/08/2022	Kharkiv region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Mykolaiv and Kharkiv were shelled again, Donetsk region was hit from "Hrad"" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351188/	Overall, for a day (last 24 hours), 11 injured, 4 dead. Non-residential buildings, supermarket, garage cooperatives damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 8.55 am, 8 June. Might cover 7 June as well
06/08/2022	Kherson region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Mykolaiv and Kharkiv were shelled again, Donetsk region was hit from "Hrad"" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351188/	Situation in the region is critical. Many houses and infrastructure objects are damaged. There are injured and dead among civilians.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 8.55 am, 8 June. Might cover 7 June as well
06/08/2022	vil. Tverdomedove, Kherson region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Kherson region: Russians shelled the village, there are wounded" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/9/7351373/ Telegram channel, "Oleksandr Vilkul" https://t.me/vilkul/1360	Due to artillery shelling of Tverdomedove, two civilians were injured (52-year old man and 46-year old woman).	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	
06/08/2022	Luhansk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The enemy continues to attack Severodonetsk and Lysychansk: 4 dead civilians" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/9/7351396/ Telegram channel, "Serhiy Gaidai/Luhansk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3294	At least four residents of the region died. One of them was a man from Severodonetsk, who was wounded by russians back on June 6. Three Lysychansk residents also died: a man and two women. One person was wounded. Overall, during the last two days 6 Lysychansk residents were wounded. Due to missiles shelling 10 buildings were damaged in Hirske, 8 in Orikhove and 4 in Lysychansk.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 8.33 am, 9 June. Might cover 9 June as well
06/08/2022	Luhansk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Mykolaiv and Kharkiv were shelled again, Donetsk region was hit from "Hrad"" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351188/	Overall, for a day (last 24 hours), russians shelled Zolote-4 and Vrubivka: 25 residential buildings ruined, two died, two injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	Report as of 8.55 am, 8 June. Might cover 7 June as well

06/08/2022	Luhansk and Donetsk regions	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "In Donbas, the Armed Forces of Ukraine repelled 7 enemy attacks and destroyed 9 units of enemy equipment" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351360/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Joint Forces Task Force" https://www.facebook.com/easternbridgehead/posts/pfbid022Ho3wi97by8EEH74KsKs5bEf4Z7Lw94egkw1Cvix816LdLtpSoL18TxWwecp6ijv1</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The situation in the regions: a missile attack on Zhytomyr region, numerous shelling in Donbas" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/9/7351405/</p>	<p>During the day, the invaders shelled 20 settlements in Donbas, destroying 28 civilian objects, including 21 residential buildings, 2 schools, and a railway station transformer. In total, 4 civilians died, 6 were injured.</p> <p>Report as of 9 June, 9.16 am, further provides that: in Luhansk region - 4 dead, 5 injured, and in Donetsk region - 4 dead, 11 injured for a day (last 24 hours).</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/08/2022	Sumy region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "In Sumy region, Russians carried out four attacks on border villages" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351347/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Dmytro Zhyvytskyi/Sumy RMA [Regional Military Administration]" https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/2485</p>	<p>russians shelled Esmanska, Khotinska, Yunakivska, Seredyno-Budska and Krasnopilska communities: destroyed an outbuilding, a car and injured one person.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/08/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians shelled Zaporizhzhia region: there is a wounded person, a lot of destruction" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351263/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Zaporizhzhia regional military administration" https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8838</p>	<p>In Orikhovo and the village of Preobrazhenka, Orikhovo community, power supply equipment was damaged, as a result of which most houses of local residents were de-energized for a long time. In Preobrazhenka, russians hit several houses, which were completely destroyed. A 42-year old man was injured in Orikhovo, veterinary hospital was damaged, as well as auto and motor vehicles.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	

06/08/2022	Zaporizhzhia region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Russian occupiers kidnapped 11 workers of the Zaporizhzhya NPP in one week" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/8/7351248/ Telegram channel, "Energoatom" https://t.me/energoatom_ua/6974	russians continue to kidnap people in the temporarily occupied Enerhodar. In the last week alone, they detained and took about 20 citizens of Enerhodar to an unknown destination, 11 of them are employees of Zaporizhzhya NPP.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii) Art. 7(1)(e)	Art. 3(1)(b); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146; Art.146-1 Art. 147 Art. 371 Art. 438	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/09/2022	Hotmyzhsk, Belhorod region	Telegram channel, "All-seeing EYE" https://t.me/c/1307866449/17120 Maidan, "Kharkiv. Chronicles of the attack on the city, day 106" https://maidan.org.ua/2022/06/kharkiv-khroniky-ataky-na-misto-den-106-y-09-06-2022/	Hotmyzhsk was shelled; damage caused to 3 households.	Unknown	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	
06/09/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The Russians shelled Dnipropetrovsk without casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/9/7351398/ Telegram channel, "Valentyn Reznichenko / Dnipropetrovsk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1099	In Velyka Kostromka, Dnipropetrovsk region, buildings were ruined.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	
06/09/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the occupiers shelled Kharkiv, fighting continues in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351637/ Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians launched a missile attack on Dnipropetrovsk region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351624/ Telegram channel, "Valentyn Reznichenko / Dnipropetrovsk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1112	Three communities which border with Kherson region were shelled. One person, a 41-year-old woman, was injured in Zelenodolska community. Buildings damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438	

06/09/2022	Donetsk region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Terrorists "sentenced" to the death penalty 3 foreigners who defended Ukraine" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/09/7351507/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, ""War crime" - UN on death sentence to 3 foreigners in "DPR"" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351851/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Death penalty for foreigners: Ukraine reacted to the void sentence of the occupiers" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/09/7351540/</p> <p>RIA News, "The DPR court sentenced the mercenaries Aslin, Pinner, and Brahim to the death penalty" https://ria.ru/20220609/naemniki-1794334925.html</p> <p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Commentary by MFA representative Maria Zakharova on the Supreme Court of the Donetsk People's Republic's sentencing of British mercenaries" https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1817234/</p> <p>AIF.ru, "Lavrov on the death sentence for mercenaries: do not interfere with the judicial system of the DPR" https://aif.ru/politics/world/lavrov_o_smer_tnom_prigovore_nay_omnikam_ne_stoit_meshat_sudebnoy_sisteme_dnr</p>	So called "supreme court of Donetsk People Republic" sentenced to death three foreign soldiers (soldiers of Ukrainian army and prisoners of war), defending Ukraine (Moroccan citizen Brahim Saadoun and English citizens Aiden Aslin and Shaun Pinner).	Russia	Art. 7(1)(e) Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(iv)	Art. 3(1)(d); Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 75(2)(e)	Art. 371 Art. 115 Art. 438	
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06/09/2022	Donetsk regi	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The occupiers shelled the Donetsk region: there are casualties" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351657/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "National police of Ukraine" https://t.me/UA_National_Police/4600</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Pavlo Kyrylenko/Donetsk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3642</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk region: Russians killed three civilians during a day" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351612/</p>	<p>Russian troops shelled the Donetsk region 10 times, as a result of which at least three people were killed (two in Avdiyivka and one in Novoukrayinka) and 22 civilian objects were destroyed (10 private and apartment buildings, school, farm, enterprise, agricultural machinery, railway and critical infrastructure). In particular, russians shelled Bakhmut, Kostiantynivka, New York, Kalynove, Pervomayske, Khromove and Mykilske. Some civilians were injured.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/09/2022	Mariupol, Donetsk region	<p>Telegram channel, "Security Service of Ukraine" https://t.me/SBUkr/4420</p> <p>Suspilne News, "The occupiers want to release captured Ukrainians to the minefields near Mariupol — SBU [Security Service of Ukraine]" https://suspilne.media/248341-okupanti-hocut-vipustiti-polone-nih-ukrainciv-na-minni-pola-poblizu-mariupola-sbu/</p>	<p>Security Service of Ukraine published a recording showing russians' intention to "clear the mines" of Mariupol by releasing captured Ukrainians to the minefields.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 75(2)(e)</p>	<p>Art. 115 Art. 438</p>	

06/09/2022	Kharkiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Two people died as a result of shelling in the Kharkiv region: houses were destroyed, forests were on fire" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351706/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Oleh Synehubov, head of Kharkiv RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://t.me/synehubov/3406</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the occupiers shelled Kharkiv, fighting continues in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351637/</p>	<p>During the day, 2 civilians died, 15 were injured. 6 people were hospitalized in the village of Pechenihiy, 1 person died. In the village of Mala Danylivka - 2. In Zolochiv, 5 were hospitalized, 1 died. In Vyshneve, 1 was hospitalized. In the village of Hrushuvaha 12-year-old boy was hospitalized. As a result of shelling, houses, warehouses, infrastructure objects were damaged, coniferous forests were burned.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51, 77 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
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06/09/2022	Luhansk region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians burned the Severodonetsk Ice Palace" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/09/7351591/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Serhiy Gaidai/Luhansk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3309?fbclid=IwAR0TAGIPNDviJK-OeZsB5rvHwUS8Nn1psIssMA6kfSFEJEOhqI4h_kHsEOQ</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: the occupiers shelled Kharkiv, fighting continues in the Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351637/</p> <p>Priamyi, "Russian occupiers destroyed 38 houses in the Luhansk region" https://prm.ua/rosiyski-okupanty-zruynuvaly-na-luhashchyni-38-budynkiv/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Serhiy Gaidai/Luhansk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3321</p>	<p>Russians destroyed Ice Palace in Severodonetsk; destroyed 15 buildings in Orikhove, 6 in Vrubivka, 4 in Lysychansk and another 4 in Hirske. Village of Synetskyi was significantly ruined. In Nyrkove and Mykolayivka - 9.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	AP I Art. 52	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/09/2022	Mykolayiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The situation in the regions: missile attack on Zhytomyr region, numerous shellings in Donbas" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/09/7351405/</p>	<p>Shellings in Bereznehuvatska community: one person died; residential houses damaged. Power line damaged due to shelling of Kutsurubaska community in vil. Prybuzke.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	

06/09/2022	Sumy region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Russians are dropping grenades from drones on the border villages of Sumy region"</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Dmytro Zhyvytskyi/Sumy RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/2505</p>	<p>Around 10 a.m., russians launched three kamikaze drones with ammunition over the villages of Krasnopillya. At 4:00 p.m., russians carried a fragmentation grenade shot from a quadcopter on the Krasnopillya community. No one was injured, but one building was damaged.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	AP I Art. 52	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/09/2022	Novohrad-Volynskyi, Zhytomyr region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The situation in the regions: a missile attack on Zhytomyr region, numerous shelling in Donbas" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/09/7351405/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Zhytomyr RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://www.facebook.com/odazt/posts/pfbid03g3BN5UHVXxx63S29A4aZvLjXVRLpBS8sHnjwTjgpVcQyL71X4VBtmyicmvUFkRXI</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "A missile was launched over Zhytomyr region from the side of Belarus - RMA [Regional Military Administration]" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/09/7351502/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Vitalii Bunechko - head of Zhytomyr RMA [Regional Military Administration]"</p>	<p>Around one o'clock in the morning on June 9, a multi-story building in Novohrad-Volynskyi was damaged by a Russian missile. No one injured.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	AP I Art. 52	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/10/2022	Kryvyi Rih district, Dnipropetrovsk region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The occupiers shelled Kryvyi Rih district: two wounded, the village without electricity and gas" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351858/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Oleksandr Vilkul" https://t.me/vilkul/1368</p> <p>Telegram channel, "Valentyn Reznichenko/Dnipropetrovsk RSA [Regional State Administration] (RMA [Regional Military Administration])" https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1123</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Russians are shelling Donetsk region and Luhansk region, civilians injured due to fighting in Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351866/</p>	In Stepanove, a few buildings ruined, one man (civilian, 32-years old) injured. In Velyka Kostromka, house of culture, private houses, gas pipeline, administrative building ruined, one person injured (71-years old).	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(c)(i);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(e)(i);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(ii);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(iv);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a);</p> <p>AP I Art. 51</p> <p>AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113;</p> <p>Art. 115;</p> <p>Art. 121;</p> <p>Art. 122;</p> <p>Art. 125</p> <p>Art. 194;</p> <p>Art. 263;</p> <p>Art. 292;</p> <p>Art. 195;</p> <p>Art. 196</p> <p>Art. 438</p>	Occurred on the night of June 10 to 11.

06/10/2022	Donetsk	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Explosions rang out near Pushylin's "administration" in the center of Donetsk" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351744/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "RIA News" https://t.me/rian_ru/166793?fbclid=IwAR2ZdhOCusrzDD4tQn6rVNpwUZRp2hkuq-lfo9MVOBkttkNz0TzGAvR_lfg</p> <p>Telegram channel "Andryuschenko Time" https://t.me/andriyshTime/1375?fbclid=IwAR14C_8skzta2JQtclKzK0R-7HUKSnrC32lzC3mkNQ0YSj3m5VnFHKc6eI</p> <p>Telegram channel, "All-seeing EYE" https://t.me/c/1307866449/17245</p>	<p>There were two explosions in the centre of occupied Donetsk near the administration of Donetsk People's Republic's leader, Mr Denys Pushylin. The explosions happened after Pushylin decided to dismiss the so-called government of DPR, likely in assassination attempt.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)</p>	AP I Art. 51	<p>Art. 282 Art. 438</p>	
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06/10/2022	Donetsk regi	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "The head of the RMA [Regional Military Administration] reported the number of dead civilians in Donetsk region over the past day" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351838/</p> <p>Facebook page, "Pavlo Kyrylenko" https://www.facebook.com/100050176913214/posts/pfbid0kmFNmkEe7364qma6TdpBrUZG31vRMTTzbCeaMK2tEW7KvrsRSkR4YuJfoFmj2MPKl/?d=n&mibextid=CbyEMU</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Russians are shelling Donetsk region and Luhansk region, civilians injured due to fighting in Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351866/</p> <p>National Police, Donetska Oblast "During the day, the Russians struck Donetsk 16 times: the crimes were documented" https://dn.npu.gov.ua/news/obstril/za-dobu-rosiyani-nanesli-podonechchini-16-udariv-zlochini-zadokumentovano/?fbclid=IwAR2Tgqo_rV4OW5wIAs_ZXMqxBENIXF7zPIFEivRMey2OF-yDWLnWxh7PCPc</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Donetsk Region: the occupiers have carried out 16 strikes, there are fatalities" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351894/</p>	<p>russians killed 2 civilians in Kostyantynivka and Hirnik. 7 more people were injured.</p> <p>In addition, in Bakhmut, medical assistance was provided to one person injured in Luhansk region.</p> <p>Russians shelled Avdiyivka, Zalizne, Mykolayivka, villages of Novomykolayivka, Vysokoivanivka, Cherkaske, Pershotravneve, Sukha Balka, Ptyche, Karpivka, Hornyak, Netaylovo, Novobakhmutivka: 30 civilian objects ruined: 14 residential buildings, power lines, transformer substations, woodland and garages; at least 5 civilians injured. There is no gas supply in the region. Water and electricity are partially missing (334 settlements are de-energized).</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
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06/10/2022	Kharkiv region	Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Russians are shelling Donetsk region and Luhansk region, civilians injured due to fighting in Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351866/	Communities of Chuhuyivskyi and Kharkiv districts shelled; 5 people injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	
06/10/2022	Pochepyn, Kyiv region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The car blew up on a Russian mine in the Kyiv region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351742/ Facebook page, "State Emergency Service of Ukraine" https://www.facebook.com/MNS.GOV.UA/posts/pfbid0vAHmNgTZYbhdjmmgAWFqo8G2PZem53r21RcfWBtGx3v9SdGgd7Mh3QpyaPbb137HI	A truck exploded on a mine. Driver injured, but not significantly.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 438	

06/10/2022	Luhansk regi	<p>The National, "Russians accused of using more deadly weapons in fight for eastern Ukraine" https://www.thenational.wales/news/2020-3543-russians-accused-using-deadly-weapons-fight-eastern-ukraine/</p> <p>Free Radio, "In the Luhansk region, Russians targeted 6 infrastructure facilities and hit Vrubivka with Solntsepyok, — Haidai" https://freeradio.com.ua/na-luhanshchyni-r OSIANY-potsilyly-u-6-infrastrukturykh-ob-iektyv-ta-vhatyly-po-vrubivtsi-z-solntsepoka-haidai/</p> <p>Telegram channel, "UNIAN - Ukraine's news" https://t.me/uniannet/59561?single</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Regions: Russians are shelling Donetsk region and Luhansk region, civilians injured due to fighting in Kherson region" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351866/</p>	<p>russians used a flamethrower rocket system in Vrubivka, Luhansk region, – many houses burnt down. A journalist claimed use of phosphorus bombs, but this information was not officially confirmed. In Lysychansk, russians shelled the territory of a glass factory, damaged a school and a cooking school. Three people died and eight were injured. Russians also shelled Ustynivka, Toshkivka, Zolote, Nyrkove, Hirske and Komyshuvakha resulting in damage to many residential buildings.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(e)(xii)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 125 Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 292; Art. 195; Art. 196 Art. 438</p>	
06/10/2022	Starobilsk, Luhansk region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Ru RIA News, "The LPR</p>	<p>The russian-backed separatists from Luhansk People's Republic sent 650 tons of stolen Ukrainian grain to russia, allegedly because there was more grain than required.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 54</p>	<p>Art. 442; Art. 438</p>	
06/10/2022	Mykolayiv region	<p>Ukrainska Pravda, "Ru</p>	<p>russians shelled village Lymany (Halytsynivska community, Mykolayiv district). One person died.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51</p>	<p>Art. 113; Art. 115 Art. 438</p>	

06/10/2022	Shevchenki vska amalgamate d territorial community, Mykolayiv region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The head of the ATC [amalgamated territorial community] in Mykolaiv region and 4 other Ukrainians were released from the occupiers' captivity" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/10/7351757/ Telegram channel, "Vitaliy Kim/Mykolayiv RSA [Regional State Administration]" https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1465	Mr Oleh Pylypenko, a head of Shevchenki vska amalgamated territorial community, was released from russian captivity. According to his wife, Tetyana, on March 10, he went to deliver bread and did not return.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(vii); Art. 8(2)(a)(viii) Art. 7(1)(f); Art. 7(1)(k); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) Art. 7(1)(e)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(b); AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146; Art.146-1 Art. 147 Art. 126; Art. 127 Art. 371 Art. 438	
06/10/2022	Krasnopilsk a community, Sumy region	Ukrainska Pravda, "The enemy was attacking Sumy Oblast from the territory of Russia, one person was killed - RMA [Regional Military Administration]" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/11/7351847/ Telegram channel, "Dmytro Zhyvytskyi/Sumy RMA [Regional Military Administration]" https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/2528	Krasnopilsk community was shelled. One person died.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 51	Art. 113; Art. 115 Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/16/2022	Donetsk region	Офіційний Телеграм-канал Міністерства внутрішніх справ України. «14 ворожих ударів по Донеччині: поліція задокументувала кожний воєнний злочин росіян», 17 червня 2022, https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/14059	42 civilian facilities were destroyed by shelling, two people were injured in the settlements of Toretsk and Kurdyumovka (one in each settlement). Russian missiles damaged the settlements of Pokrovsk and Grishino, where 14 private houses, a weather station and a farm were damaged. Two civilians were wounded. More than 30 animals also died as a result of the shelling.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 258 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/16/2022	Kharkov region	Телеграм-канал Офісу Генерального прокурора. “Окупанти обстріляли харчове підприємство у Харкові – розпочато провадження”. 16 червня 2022, https://t.me/pgov_gov_ua/4491 Сергій Болвінов. “Нічний обстріл Індустріального району Харкова”. Фейсбук, 16 червня 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0bHu8e6f2kLUBwAxAUeLq3yttDNUtwWsYKysJJjDnwNTqAMwFrjn3d1H1tWKPvPXzl&id=100002276907245	On the night of June 16, the armed forces of the Russian Federation shelled the Industrial District of Kharkov. Rocket X-59 destroyed the meat processing plant.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art 8 (2) (b) (xx) Art 8 (2) (b) (xxv)	AP I Art. 54	Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439 Art. 442	

06/16/2022	Pesochin, Kharkov region	Укринформ. “Захватчики дважды ударили ракетами по поселку Песочин под Харьковом - полиция”. 17.06.2022, https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-regions/3509098-zahvatciki-dvazdy-udarili-raketa-mi-po-poselku-pesocin-pod-harkovom-policia.html Офіційний телеграм канал Харківської прокуратури. “Ракетний обстріл смт Песочин: пошкоджено приватне підприємство”, 17 червня 2022, https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/4542	The city of Pesochin was fired at by rockets around 23.00. Several multi-storey buildings, cars, a warehouse, a roof, production facilities of a repair enterprise were partially destroyed. In addition, as a result of the explosion, an old, no longer working water tower fell onto the roof of the auto repair shop. Another explosion formed a funnel about 5 meters deep.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/16/2022	Lisichansk	Ukrinform, “Russians inflicted an airstrike on Lisichansk, there are dead and wounded”, 16.06.2022, https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-ato/3508235-rossiane-nanesli-aviaudar-po-lisicansku-est-pogibsie-i-raneny.html	As a result of two air strikes on Lisichansk, an outpatient clinic and the building of the Palace of Culture "Diamant" were destroyed. 4 people were killed. Seven people are injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 178 Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/16/2022	Mykolaiv	Suspilne news, “The armed forces of the Russian Federation shelled a residential quarter in Mykolaiv at night”, 16 June, https://suspilne.media/250872-zbrojni-sil-rf-vnoci-obstrilali-zitloviy-kvartal-u-mikolaevi/ Alexander Senkevic, “The armed forces of the Russian Federation shelled a residential quarter in Mykolaiv at night”, 16 June, https://t.me/senkevic_honline/1360	residential areas of the city were shelled with cluster munitions in Mykolaiv. 5 residential buildings and one three-storey house were destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art.439	

06/16/2022	Severodonetsk	Jakub Hadzic, "Voice of Islam.ru", "Russian World" destroyed the mosque in Severodonetsk", June 28, https://golosislama.com/news.php?id=40816 Timur Beridze, Facebook, 5 July, https://www.facebook.com/beridzetemur/posts/pfbid0XbK5JjbQVRuUJpWKFmSSWyxaBZ35GrvhJ1b4S7oUAYffedTiR8r3zR9xJkm7FpHpl	As a result of shelling by Russian troops, a mosque in Severodonetsk, which was located in the Islamic Cultural Center, was destroyed. Sources say that at least 17 charred corpses were found under the rubble of the mosque, which cannot be identified. It is impossible to establish the exact number of those killed and wounded, since the control of the city is carried out by the Russian military. There were civilians inside the mosque who hid there because of the opportunity to get access to drinking water.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 Art. 53 (a) AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 178 Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/16/2022	Glukhovskaya community, Sumy Region	Dmitry Zhivitsky, «Сумщина. Ситуація станом на 21:30 16 червня 2022», 16 June., https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/2624?single	About 30 shells from multiple rocket launchers from the territory of the Russian Federation were fired at Glukhovskaya community. The shelling damaged the farm and wounded the cows. Later, an air strike was carried out in the immediate vicinity of the town of Glukhov.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art 8 (2) (b) (xxv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 54 (2) AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/16/2022	Krasnopol'skaya community, Sumy Region	Дмитро Живицький / Сумська ОВА. "Сумщина. Ситуація станом на 8:00 16 червня 2022", https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/2609	Rocket strikes were inflicted on the Krasnopol'skaya community. Immediately after that, mortar fire was opened from the territory of the Russian Federation.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/16/2022	Sadovskaya community, Sumy Region	Дмитро Живицький / Сумська ОВА. "Сумщина. Ситуація станом на 8:00 16 червня 2022", https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/2609	Four people were killed and six people were injured as a result of a rocket attack on the Sadovskaya community.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	

06/16/2022	Zaporozhye region.	Dnipro operational "In the Zaporozhye region, a child died at the hands of the invaders", 18.06.2022, https://dnepr.express/post/v-zaporozhskoy-oblasti-ot-ruk-okkupantov-pogib-rebenok Zaporozhye Regional State Administration, "The enemy systematically destroys civilian objects in the demarcation zone", 16 June 2022, https://www.zoda.gov.ua/news/61550/vorog-sistemno-nishit-tsivilni-objekti-u-zoni-rozmezhuвання.html	As a result of shelling of Pologovsky district , houses and yards were destroyed, windows and doors were broken. A 15-year-old resident of the village of Engineering died of his wounds the next day. Also, the artillery of the Russian Federation fired of an agricultural enterprise in the village of Lukyanovskoye, Vasilyevsky district. Farming and agricultural equipment was destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art.439	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/17/2022	Pervomaisk y, Kharkov region	Поліція Харківської області, “Поліція Харківщини продовжує фіксувати злочини російських окупантів проти мешканців області”, 17 June 2022, https://www.facebook.com/police.kharkov/posts/5170759579688631	In the morning, at about 10:00, a Russian missile hit the industrial zone of the city of Pervomaisky, Lozovsky district, Kharkiv region. The blow was inflicted on the enterprise of critical infrastructure. 3 employees of the enterprise were injured	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/17/2022	Zolochev, Kharkov Region	Pravda, “Russian forces fired at Kharkiv region, Zolochiv was shelled with cluster munitions – Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration”, 17 June 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/17/7352997/	The village of Zolochev in the Kharkiv region was shelled by cluster munitions in the middle of the night. The shooters damaged 7 residential buildings and wounded a woman who was 82 years old.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/17/2022	Mykolaiv region	Головне управління ДСНС України у Миколаївській області, «Оперативна інформація стосовно ракетного удару м. Миколаєва з боку окупантів станом на 10:00», 17 June 2022, https://www.facebook.com/DSNSMYKOL/posts/pfbid025xkmHP9qbsRMrgGAGBne4VETBMS5ZXDb5KesTheKZVMvq6aviiP6rDQuL98YZReXI Віталій Кім / Миколаївська ОДА, 16 червня 2022, https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1515	On the morning of June 17, cruise missiles fired at the residential area of Mykolaiv. The main department of the State Service of Ukraine for Emergency Situations in the Mykolaiv region reported the destruction of 5 residential multi-storey buildings. It is also known that one of the missiles hit the building of the sports complex. As a result of the incident, 20 people were injured, 2 people died.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	

Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
18/6/2022	Kryvyi Rih, Dnepropetrovsk region	Головне управління ДСНС України у Дніпропетровській області, 18 червня 2022, https://www.facebook.com/MNSDNE/posts/343110881334654 Pravda, "The Russians fired missiles at Kryvyi Rih: there are casualties", 18 June 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/18/7353245 The missiles were fired from the territory of the Belgorod region from the Iskander operational-tactical anti-aircraft missile systems./	Around noon on June 18, a missile attack was launched on the Ingulets district of Kryvyi Rih. The State Emergency Service reported that 2 residential buildings and a garage were destroyed by two rockets. Two people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 438 Art. 439	
18/6/2022	Donetsk region	Павло Кириленко / Донецька ОДА, Телеграм, "Росія вбиває цивільних!", 18 червня 2022, https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3719	On June 18, was killed 1 person in the Donetsk region - in Raygorodok. Another 11 people were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 8(2)(a)(i) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 258 Art. 438 Art. 439	
18/6/2022	Zhelannoye, Pokrovsky district, Donetsk Region	Офіс Генерального прокурора, Фейсбук, «Обстріли Донеччини із загиблими і пораненими мирними мешканцями - розпочато розслідування», 18 червня 2022, https://www.facebook.com/100064585280174/posts/pfbid02j3qvKsGLCXTvzHpxZ8SYHco3bqkXPYJkGVVApZntZkNyENPqxqAZAhESPTitW9g65l/?d=n	According to the Donetsk regional prosecutor's office, Russian servicemen using Smerch multiple launch rocket systems carried out remote mining with cluster munitions in the village of Zhelannoye, Pokrovsky district. As a result, several private houses belonging to civilians were damaged.	Russia	Art/ 8 (2) (b) (xx)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 439	
18/6/2022	Andreevka, Kharkov Region	«РБК-Україна», «Окупанти обстріляли газоперерабатывающий завод в Харьковской области», 18 июня 2022, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/okkupanty-obstrelyali-gazopererabatyvayushchiy-1655567331.html	Several rockets were fired at the Shebelinsky gas processing plant, which is located in the village of Andreevka, 15 kilometers from Balakleya (Iziumsky district of the Kharkov region).	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 35 AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 55 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 194 Art. 241 Art. 258 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439 Art. 441	

18/6/2022	Kremenchug, Poltava Region	Дмитро Лунін / Полтавська ОДА (ОВА), 18 июня 2022, https://t.me/DMYTR OLUNIN/2495 Gazeta.ua, “Россияне ударили ракетами по Кременчугу: рассказали о последствиях”, 18 июня 2022, https://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/regions/_rossi yane-udarili-raketami-po-kremenchugu-rasskazali-o-posledstviyah/1095318	An oil refinery and a thermal power plant in Kremenchug, Poltava region, fell under the missile attack of the Russian army. The infrastructure of the Kremenchug Oil Refinery has been destroyed. There were no injuries or deaths among the people.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	AP I Art. 35 AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 55 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
18/6/2022	Melitopol, Zaporozhye region	Центр журналістських розслідувань, «Російські окупанти в Мелітополі викрали двох волонтерів», 18.06.2022, https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news-2/244027/	On the same night in Melitopol, Russian servicemen arrested another volunteer, Yaroslav Zhuk.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 7 (1) (e)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 146-1	
18/6/2022	Vasilevka, Zaporozhye region	Штаб оборони Запорізького краю, «Запорізький напрямок: головне з інформаційно-бойового зведення сил оборони (з 23.00 17.06. по 23.00 18.06.2022)», 19.06.2022, https://www.facebook.com/107585091917625/posts/136375202371947	On June 18, the occupying authorities abducted and took away in an unknown direction the head of the Christian-Baptist church in the city of Vasilevka, Nikolai Zholovan.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 7 (1) (e)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 146-1	

Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/19/2022	Gubinikham , Dnepropetrovsk region	Минфин, «Нефтяная инфраструктура под ударом. Окупанты обстреляли четыре НПЗ», 18 июня 2022, https://minfin.com.ua/2022/06/20/87452567/ Корреспондент.net , «На нефтебазе возле Днепра взорвался резервуар, есть жертвы», 19 июня 2022, https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/4487236-na-neftebaze-vozle-dnepra-vzorvalsia-rezervuar-est-zhertvy Головне управління ДСНС України у Дніпропетровській області, “Тяжка новина для всієї нашої пожежно-рятувальної родини”, 19 червня 2022,	Russian military tried to use three cruise missiles to blow up an oil depot in the village of Gubinikha, Novomoskovsky district. Because of the explosion, a fire broke out, which was extinguished only after 108 hours. On that day, it became known about two dead, the body of the third dead was found only on June 20 after the fire was extinguished. Eleven people received burns and bodily injuries. One of them died in the hospital the next day. The next morning, June 19, while the fire was being extinguished, one of the fuel tanks exploded. Because of this, the rescuer junior sergeant of the civil protection service Yaroslav Miroshnik died and two people were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 35 AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 55 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 241 Art. 258 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439 Art. 441	
06/19/2022	Donetsk region	Украинские национальные новости, «В Донецкой области в результате российских обстрелов погибли два человека», 19 июня 2022, https://www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/1982071-na-donechchini-vna-slidok-rosiyskikh-obstriliv-zaginuli-dvi-0-sobi	due to the fault of the Russian forces 2 civilians of Donbass were killed in the settlements of Maksimilyanovka and Zaitsevo (one person in each).	Russia	Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/19/2022	Grodovka, Donetsk Region	Офіційний Телеграм-канал Міністерства внутрішніх справ України, “Ворог не припиняє знищувати не лише житлові будинки, а й заклади культури”, 19 червня 2022, https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/14188	on the night of June 18, a fire broke out in the House of Folk Traditions, which is located in the village of Grodovka, after a rocket attack. At the same time, 2 residential buildings were damaged, windows were broken in a preschool educational institution, and the roof of the cathedral was destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ix) Art. 8(2)(e)(iv)	AP I Art. 52 Art. 53 (a) AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 178 Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	

06/19/2022	Donetsk region Toretskaya community	Lb.ua, "На Донеччині трое українців отримали поранення від обстрілу росіян", 19 червня 2022, https://lb.ua/society/2022/06/19/520561_donechchini_troie_u_kraintsiv_otrimali.html Торецька міська військово-цивільна адміністрація, Фейсбук, «Звернення начальника Торецької міської військової адміністрації Василя Чинчика до жителів Торецької громади щодо ситуації, що склалася наразі на території громади», 19 червня 2022, https://www.facebook.com/toretskVA/videos/767856054221966/	Residents of the city of Zheleznoye came under fire from the armed forces of the Russian Federation when they stood in line for delivered water. As a result of the attack, three people were injured, two houses were damaged	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/19/2022	Kharkiv region Cherkassky Tishki	Оперативне командування "Північ". Фейсбук. «Окупанти під ранок гадили з мінометів по цивільних будинках на Сумщині», 19 червня 2022, https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/pfbid02Mx4N7UFJE8XCwdJtF5vNopDns2d7M9WEutv1V4mSJHbUZgXz2pvp2X1v6GxP1bshl?_tn_=-R	The Russian military carried out remote mining of the area in the area of the settlement of Cherkassky Tishki.	Russia	Art. 8 (2) (b) (xx)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 438 Art. 439	

06/19/2022	Kherson region Skadovsk	Gazeta.ua, “В захваченном Скадовске россияне похитили и убили спасателя”, 19 июня 2022, https://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/np/_v-zahvachennom-skadovske-rossiyane-pohitili-i-ubili-spatatelya/1095535	On June 18, a report was received about the abduction of an employee of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine Serhii Boychenko in the temporarily occupied Skadovsk, Kherson region. Serhii Boychenko examined place of explosions in the port of Skadovsk, which had taken place two days earlier. That same evening, he was kidnapped from his home by armed men. Later he was found dead. The circumstances of death are unknown.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a) Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 7(2)(i) Art. 8(a)(i)	AP I Art. 75 (2)(a)(1)	Art. 146-1 Art. 115	
06/19/2022	Mykolaiv	Факты, «Обстрел Николаева: ракеты попали в завод, дом и колбасный цех», Июнь, 19 в 7:06, https://fakty.com.ua/ru/ukraine/20220619-obstril-mykolayeva-rakety-poczilyly-v-zavod-budynok-i-kovbasnyj-czeh/	Mykolaiv was twice subjected to rocket fire. In the middle of the day, X-55 missiles hit the industrial infrastructure. Two rockets destroyed a plastic window factory, one rocket hit a sausage production shop, and one rocket hit a residential building. In the evening, from the side of Kherson, a second strike was made on the city by five Kalibr missiles	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art 8 (2)(b)(xx) Art 8 (2)(b)(xxv)	AP I Art. 54	Art. 194 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439 Art. 442	
06/19/2022	Mykolaiv region Ochakov	Офіційний канал новин Суспільного, 19 червня 2022, https://t.me/suspilnews/12114	Russian rockets fired at the port of Ochakov hit a residential area of the city, damaging several buildings. One person died and two were injured. All victims were civilians.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 433 Art. 438 Art. 439	

06/19/2022	Sumy region Shostka district Seredina-Buda	Офіційний Телеграм-канал Міністерства внутрішніх справ України, «На Сумщині поліцейські документують наслідки нічних обстрілів», 19 червня 2022, https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/14181 Телеграм-канал Офісу Генерального прокурора. «Мінометні обстріли російськими військовими Сумщини – проводиться досудове розслідування», 19 червня 2022, https://t.me/pgov_gov_ua/4521 Оперативне командування "Північ". Фейсбук. «Окупанти під ранок гатили з мінометів по цивільних будинках на Сумщині», 19 червня 2022, https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/pfbid02Mx4N7UFJE8XCwdJtF5vNopDns2d7M9WEutv1V4mSJHbUZgXz2pvp2X1v6GxP1bshl?_tn=-R	The military personnel of the Russian Federation, using means of war prohibited by international law, fired at the territory of the settlement of Seredina-Buda, Shostka district, from the territory of the Russian Federation. As a result of the shelling, a fire broke out, which destroyed a residential building and damaged 9 more building. Also, as a result of the shelling, an electric pole was damaged and wires were cut off. A 48-year-old civilian woman was injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8 (2) (b) (iv)	Art. 3(1)(a) AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)	Art. 121 Art. 122 Art. 194 Art. 194-1 Art. 438 Art. 439	
06/19/2022	Melitopol, Zaporozhye region	Центр журналістських розслідувань, «У Мелітополі озброєні окупанти викрали священника під час молитви», 19.06.2022, https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news-2/244047/	The armed men also kidnapped the pastor of the Protestant church "Source of Life" Valentin Zhuravlev. The priest was arrested in the city center during a joint prayer of believers of different churches on Victory Square in Melitopol. His further fate is not reported.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i) Art. 7 (1) (e)	AP I Art. 51	Art. 146-1	

Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/20/2022	Lyubotin	<p>Pravda, “Invaders destroyed a vocational college near Kharkiv with two missiles”, 20 June 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/06/20/7353615/</p> <p>Суспільне новини, «Ракетний обстріл навчального закладу в Люботині під Харковом — фото наслідків», 20 червня 2022, https://suspilne.media/252020-obstril-navchalnogo-zakladu-pid-harkovom-u-budivli-perebuvala-zinka-foto-naslidkiv/</p>	<p>The Russian army fired two cruise missiles at the two-story building of the Lyubotinsky Professional Lyceum of Railway Transport, where there was a point for issuing humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons.</p> <p>As a result of the missile strike, one of the buildings of the lyceum and several private houses were destroyed.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv) Art. 8(2)(b)(iii) Art. 8(2)(b)(v) Art. 8(2)(b)(ix)</p>	<p>AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 85 (3)(b)</p>	<p>Art. 113 Art. 194 Art. 258 Art. 438 Art. 439</p>	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/26/2022	Cherkasy region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254263-kerivnik-ce-rkaskoi-ova-nazvav-termini-vidnovlennaposkodzenoi-infrastrukturi-unaslidok-raketnih-udariv/ Telegram channel of Cherkasy Regional State Administration: https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/1706	As a result of a rocket attack on June 26, an infrastructure facilities was damaged near Cherkasy. One person died, five more were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/26/2022	Kharkiv, Chuguiv region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254102-rosijski-vijska-masovano-obstriliali-harkiv-u-nic-proti-26-cervna-zajnalasa-pozeza/ Volunteer Natalya Popova in Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/popova.natali/posts/pfbid02e56aYN9DzJRgizfVsy8bgDD5aAZcsQYuffq5Ywmj29skurVP4QAATQfVRDLvvWacl	The Russian army shelled residential areas of Kharkiv. As a result of the rocket hitting, a fire broke out, two civilians were injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/26/2022	Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254281-dnipropetrovsina-cerez-obstrilienzelenodolskoi-gromadi-troe-ludej-otrimali-poranenna/	Russian troops shelled Zelenodolsk from "Hrads". Three people received shrapnel wounds. A fire broke out on the territory of one of the residential areas. Several high-rise buildings, the building of the sport school, the post office, and the cultural center were damaged. In the park zone of the city, debris from the "Hrads" were found.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/26/2022	Donetsk region (Toretsk, Avdiyivka, Hrodivka)	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254272-pid-obstrilipotrapila-skola-v-torecku-25-cervna-zrujnovana-skola-u-maakah-kirilenko/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/posts/pfbid0zxTUx3qkaDWbvPVbPDzEArTR7WWxAQsG98B867j8ozVXmsmCgPRD39CfHiKuJyRkl	A school in Toretsk came under shelling - the windows were broken, the roof was damaged. The Avdiyiv coke plant and the city of Avdiyivka itself were shelled. The Russians used cluster munitions in the Hrodivka community — one person was injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

06/26/2022	Kluchino-Bashkyrivka, Kharkiv region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254287-armia-rf-v-darila-po-selu-pid-cu-guevom-na-harkivsin-i-zaginuli-dvi-zinki-p-oranenij-colovik/ Telegram: https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/2452	As a result of Russian shelling, two women were killed and a man was wounded from the shelling. The shelling caused a fire.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122;	
06/26/2022	Novovorontsovka, Kherson region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254526-vijskov-i-rf-obstrilali-raketami-novovorontsovku-prokuratura-rozpocala-dosudove-rozsliduvannya/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/groups/973482346115208/permalink/2650334835096609/	The Russian military fired a rocket at the village of Novovorontsovka, Kherson region. There were no military facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the village. Private houses were damaged by the explosion.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/26/2022	Kyiv, Shevchenko district	BBC NEWS Ukraine: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-61939904 Ukrinform: https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3515395-kiiv-obstrilali-raketami-z-litakiv-tu95-i-tu160-povitranisil-i-zsu.html Facebook (SESU account): https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1211414246297308 NV: https://nv.ua/ukr/kyiv/raketniy-obstril-kiyeva-istoriya-sim-ji-ya-ka-vizhila-26-cherwnya-50257595.html UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/26/7354730/	One of the Russian rockets launched over Kyiv hit the roof of a residential building and demolished several upper floors. One person died. 6 residents of the house were injured, including a 7-year-old child. Another rocket hit a kindergarten next to the house.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/26/2022	Krasnopillia and Shalyginsk communities of the Sumy region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254296-u-krasnopilskij-gromadi-na-sumini-cerez-obstril-zaginula-ludina/	The Russian invaders released more than 150 shells and mines in four communities of Sumy Region. As a result of shelling, a civilian was killed and another was wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/27/2022	Donetsk region	Telegram: https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3810	Two civilians died. Another 13 were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Kharkiv	UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/27/7355009/ Suspilne: Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254644-rosijska-armia-27-cervna-obstrilala-nemislanskij-rajon-harkova-e-zagibli/ https://suspilne.media/254696-vdarili-vsli-pu-navmanna-naslidki-rosijskogo-obstrilu-harkova-27-cervna-foto/ https://suspilne.media/254386-naslidki-rosijskogo-raketnogo-udaru-po-skoli-u-harkovi-v-nic-na-27-cervna-foto/ https://suspilne.media/254555-rosijski-okupanti-27-cervna-obstrilali-kiivskij-rajon-harkova-gorili-garazi/	The Russians shelled Nemyshlyanskyi, Saltivskyi, Osnovyanskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Kharkiv today. 5 people died, 31 were injured, 5 of them children. Russian troops also shelled the school and the garage cooperative.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Kramatorsk region	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254642-rosijski-okupanti-obstrilali-okolicu-kramatorska-e-rujnuvanna/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid02wBGjdJq1k9LPGV6NfkJfvGHCyWfcLn5uWxBJpeMZYzJg95cde2MKHKHutK29iPn5l	As a result of the shelling, a private house and a garage were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

06/27/2022	Kremenchuk	<p>BBC: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/61967480</p> <p>ASPI News: https://aspi.com.ua/news/politika/lavrova-spiymali-na-brekhni-pro-raketniy-udar-po-trc-amstor-u-kremenchuci-foto-video#gsc.tab=0</p> <p>Bigus.Info: https://youtu.be/LhjfX8Hza9Q</p> <p>Videos: BBC News Ukraine https://youtu.be/ARuWm4OZ9qQ SSU: https://youtu.be/MFVN2XpNQaw</p> <p>Interviews: Radio Svoboda https://youtu.be/Uk4oipQmbXY Suspilne https://youtu.be/uZbH7elGq0 https://youtu.be/iZVURs2PyDU</p>	The Russian army launched a missile attack on the Amstor shopping center in Kremenchuk, when visitors were there. Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, which took off from the airfield in Shaykivka near Kaluga, hit the mall with Kh-22 missiles from the Kursk region. 21 people died, 1 is considered missing.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Kremenchuk	<p>Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254909-rujnuvanna-na-zavodi-stalo-vidomokudi-vlucila-druga-raketa-u-kremenchuci/</p> <p>Twitter: https://twitter.com/ua_poltava/status/1541755926822141952?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1541755926822141952%7Ctwgr%5E20213554463a4b28d3ad04fc46a14e38d3daa3c7%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ffromadske.ua%2Fposts%2Fpid-chas-obstrilu-u-kremenchuci-okupanti-vluchili-she-j-u-zavod-kredmash</p>	One of the two missiles fired by Russia at Kremenchuk hit the Kredmash road machinery plant. According to the head of the plant, military vehicles have not been produced there since 1989, only cars for civilians.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Lysychansk	<p>UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/27/7355043/</p> <p>Telegram: https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/7297</p>	Russian troops fired from "Uragans" on a crowd of people who came to collect technical water, as a result of which at least 8 people died and 21 were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

06/27/2022	Mariupol	Telegram: https://t.me/andriyshTime/1603	In the Lioberezhny district, in the building hit by an aerial bomb at the intersection of Peremogy Ave. and Blvd. Meotyda more than 100 bodies of those killed in the bombing were found. The bodies are still under the rubble.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Mykolaiv	UNN: https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1983208-rosiyski-okupanti-obstrilyali-mikolayiv-kasetnimi-snaryadami Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254708-mikolayiv-obstrilali-kasetnimi-boepripasami/	Russians bombarded Mykolaiv with Uragan cluster shells. Private houses and a car were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Mykolaiv region	UNN: https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1983075-okupanti-vrantsi-znovu-obstrilyali-mikolayivschinu-zruynovano-budinki-ta-dityachiy-sadok	Russian occupiers shelled the town of Berezneguvate and the Shirokiv community of the Mykolaiv region - a kindergarten and residential buildings were destroyed.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4)	Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Odesa region	UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/27/7354925/ Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254426-vnaslidok-rocketnogo-udaru-na-odesini-bilse-60-budinkiv-ne-privdatni-dla-porozivanna/?fbclid=IwAR1I3ZFPmJ7cISoEMOU1p0AOgGewL_leJ6vyTIp3UR2pxMdzz9R7Tn7fryU	The armed forces of the Russian Federation launched a rocket attack with an X-22 cruise missile on a residential area of one of the border villages of the Odesa region. As a result 65 houses were damaged. Eight civilians received multiple injuries	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/27/2022	Krasnopillia community, Sumy region	Telegram: https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/2842	Around 4:00 p.m., the Russians shelled the Krasnopillia community (more than 40 shells) with barrel artillery. One person is injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/28/2022	Dnipro	Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/255094-u-nas-rozbiti-vikna-strasno-bulo-duze-raketni-udari-po-dnipru-28-cervna-s-o-rozkazuut-ocevidci/ The Page: https://thepage.ua/ua/news/raketnij-obstril-dnipra-28062022-vid-eo	The Russian Federation hit industrial and transport enterprises with Kalibr cruise missiles, two people were killed. 21 cars and 13 trucks were damaged, buildings, boxes and a hangar were destroyed. The bodies of two people were found under the rubble. The railway infrastructure was also destroyed, several buildings were damaged.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/28/2022	Kharkiv, Industrial, Shevchenkivski and Slobidski districts	UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/28/7355161/ Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/255175-rosijski-vijska-28-cervna-obstril-ali-prompidpriemstvo-v-harkovi-foto-naslidkiv/	During the day, the Russian occupiers shelled the Industrial, Shevchenkivski, and Slobidski districts of Kharkiv. They fired an Iskander missile complex at the Mashhidroprivid plant in the Slobidski district of Kharkiv. At about 11 p.m., the Russian military attacked the Shevchenkiv district (Pavlové Pole). As a result of the explosion, windows in the building were broken, 2 people were injured. Russian troops also shelled the Industrial district of Kharkiv. As a result of the shelling, a fire broke out at one of the industrial enterprises. 6 civilians were injured. Private houses, commercial buildings and warehouse areas were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/28/2022	Kryvyi Rih	UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/28/7355257/ LB: https://lb.ua/society/2022/06/28/521517_rosijski_okupatsiyini_viyska.html	The Russians struck the Kryvorizka TPP. One person was injured.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

06/28/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/28/7355099/</p> <p>Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254723-vranci-28-cervna-vijska-rf-obstrilali-raketami-mikolaiv/</p>	<p>As a result of a rocket attack on Mykolaiv, the central city stadium and social infrastructure were damaged.</p> <p>One rocket fell on the newly renovated city stadium, creating a crater 5 meters deep and 15 meters in diameter.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51(4)</p>	<p>Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341</p>	
06/28/2022	Ochakiv	<p>Zaxid.net: https://zaxid.net/rosiyani_vbili_ditinu_pid_chas_masovanogo_artobstrilu_ochakov_a_n1545291</p> <p>Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/254748-vijska-rf-obstrilali-misto-ocakiv-so-na-mikolaivsini-zaginula-ditina/</p> <p>UNIAN: https://www.unian.ua/war/z-yavilisya-foto-naslidkiv-udaru-okupantiv-po-ochakovunovini-vtorgnennya-rusiji-v-ukrajinu-11882529.html</p>	<p>The occupiers fired at Ochakiv in the Mykolaiv Oblast. As a result of the shelling, three people died, six more were injured.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341</p>	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/29/2022	Dnipro	Ukrinform: https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3517675-vid-prilotu-u-dni-pri-semero-postrazdah-sered-akih-6ricnij-hlopcik.html	As a result of a rocket attack in Dnipro, 7 people were injured, including a child.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/29/2022	Mykolaiv	UP: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/29/7355291/ Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/255386-ak-vidbuvaetsya-posukovo-ratuvalni-roboti-na-zavalah-budinku-v-mikolaevi/	A Russian rocket hit a residential building in Mykolaiv. As a result of the rocket attack, five people were injured and five died	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
06/29/2022	Bilopolska, Krasnopilsk a and Velikopysar ovska communities, Sumy region	Kourier: https://kourier.in.ua/6914-sumschina-situacya-za-den-29-cherვნya-2022-stanom-na-2200.html Suspilne: https://suspilne.media/255454-dvi-ludinizaginuli-visim-otrimali-poranenna-vnasli dok-obstriliv-sumsini/	There was a shootout with Russians on the border — one person was injured. In the Krasnopillia community, the Russians fired mortars. One person died, three were injured. The Russians opened mortar fire. The house of local residents and a civil utility building were damaged. One person died, four were injured.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a) AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

Date	Location	Source	Description of the incident	Responsible Party	Roma Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
06/30/2022	Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	<p>TG channel of Valentyn Reznichenko, Governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (30 June). https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1232</p> <p>FB account of Mykola Lukashuk, Head of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council (30 June). https://www.facebook.com/nbankr/posts/pfbid0UTh6naiJ4DG8yDTjBt9BfhFcLDCFMYkQL1rVmMfcwU6mZQJLa5vDgaV216AbkJbT1</p>	<p>Early in the morning, Russian army shelled Zelenodol community and Velyka Kostromka village resulting in property damage and destruction of an agricultural enterprise, including a warehouse with 40 tons of grain. More than 15 units of agricultural machines and one non-residential building of the village council were destroyed, and around three buildings damaged.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(2)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv);</p>	<p>AP II Art. 5(1)(b)**; 14 AP I Art. 11; 54</p>	<p>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 442; Art. 438</p>	
06/30/2022	Donetsk Oblast, Sloviansk	<p>Liveuamap.com (30 June). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/30-june-6-wounded-as-result-of-russian-shelling-in-sloviansk</p> <p>TG channel of Vadym Lyakh, Head of Sloviansk City Military Administration (30 June). https://t.me/slv_vca/2408</p> <p>Balachuk, I. "Окупанти обстріляли Слов'янськ: 6 поранених" (30 June). https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/30/7355616/</p> <p>TG Channel of Meduza (30 June). https://t.me/meduzalive/63424</p>	<p>As a result of cluster munition shelling, 6 persons were wounded in Sloviansk. Explosions were reported in Batiuka and Vilna streets. According to the city Mayor, outskirts of the city were targeted by cluster munition (no further evidence of cluster munition are available though).</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)†; Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii)††; Art. 8(2)(b)(xix)†††; Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)**; Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)***; Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 439; Art. 440</p>	

06/30/2022	Zaporizhzhya Oblast, Berdiansk	<p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-reuters-ukraine-requests-turkey-detain-russian-flagged</p> <p>Reuters: World (2 July). "Exclusive: Ukraine requests Turkey detain Russian-flagged ship it says carrying Ukrainian grain" https://t.me/ReutersWorldChannel/150080</p> <p>Gordiichuk, D. (30 June). "Окупанти кажуть, що вивезли перше судно з краденим зерном з Бердянську". https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2022/06/30/688716/</p> <p>Reuters (4 July). "Turkey halts Russian ship, investigates Ukrainian claims -senior official" https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turkey-halts-russian-ship-investigates-ukrainian-claims-senior-official-2022-07-04/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda (1 July). "Корабель з зерном з окупованого Бердянська прибув до Туреччини, посол України вимагає вжити заходів" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/1/7355864/</p> <p>TG channel of Meduza (30 June). https://t.me/meduzalive/63378</p>	<p>Russian-flagged cargo ship Zhibek Zholy left the port in Berdiansk with some 4,500 tons of grain, stolen from Ukrainian warehouses. Thus, the ship became the first cargo carrying the grain stolen from the occupied territories of Ukraine to the 3rd countries. At a request of Ukraine, the ship has been detained by Turkey and later released.</p>	Russia	Art. (8)(2)(e)(v)	AP II Art. 4(2)(g) AP I Art. 54(2)	Art. 432; 433; 438	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of the incident	Responsible Party	Roma Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
07/01/2022	Donetsk Oblast, Bakhmut	<p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-russian-shelling-targeted-civilian-infrastructure</p> <p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-5-people-including-a-child-wounded-as-result-of-russian</p> <p>FB account of Pavlo Kyrylenko, Governor of Donetsk Oblast (1 July). https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=361666516108943&ref=sharing</p>	In the morning, Russian shelling targeted residential areas, and in the afternoon launched an air strike. 5 people wounded, including a 11y.o. child, residential buildings damaged	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	It is unclear whether all wounded are civilians
07/01/2022	Donetsk Oblast, Sloviansk	<p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/2-july-russian-troops-shelled-sloviansk-with-cluster-ammunition</p> <p>FB page of Vadym Liakh, Mayor of Sloviansk (1 July). https://fb.watch/eaDLArmmj/</p> <p>Andreikovets, K. (1 July 2022). "4 people became victims of the shelling of Slovyansk. Russian troops opened fire with cluster shells" https://babel.ua/en/news/80875-4-people-became-victims-of-the-shelling-of-slovyansk-russian-troops-opened-fire-with-cluster-shells</p> <p>TG channel of Pavlo Kyrylenko, Governor of Donetsk Oblast (1 July). https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3854</p>	In the evening of July, 1, Russian troops shelled Sloviansk with cluster ammunition by multiple rocket launchers: 4 people killed, 12 wounded.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115	Lymany microdistrict of Slovyansk came under fire — specifically, Barvinkivka, Pidhirna and Danylevskoho streets

07/01/2022	Mykolaiv Oblast	<p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-russian-missile-hit-industrial-enterprise-in-mykolaiv</p> <p>UNIAN (1 July). "У Миколаєві прогрімала серія вибухів: що відомо (фото, відео)". https://www.unian.ua/war/vibuhi-v-mikolayevi-1-lipnya-mikolajivciv-rozbudila-seriya-vibuhiv-shcho-vidomo-foto-i-video-novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11886144.html?_gl=1*9jhw57*_ga*MzcxNTk4MjQwLjE2NTYzNjk0MzI.*_ga_JLSK4Y8K67*MTY1NjY1NTkyNS44LjAuMTY1NjY1NTkyNS42MA.*_ga_DENC12J6P3*MTY1NjY1NTkyNS44LjAuMTY1NjY1NTkyNS42MA</p> <p>Petrenko, R. (1 July). "Росіяни у п'ятницю запустили 12 ракет по Миколаєву" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/1/7355823/</p> <p>TG channel of Meduza (1 July). https://t.me/meduzalive/63463</p>	<p>The city of Mykolaiv was targeted by at least 12 missiles, most of which were intercepted by anti air defence. However, the remaining missiles hit industrial enterprise causing property damage. At least ten explosions were heard in the city.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p>	<p>AP I Art. 51(5); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341</p>	
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07/01/2022	Odesa Oblast, Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky Region, Serhiivka	<p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-russian-army-launched-3-kh22-missiles-at-bilhoroddnistrovsky</p> <p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-the-ukrainian-president-volodymyr-zelensky-has-again</p> <p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-death-toll-of-missile-strikes-in-bilhoroddnistrovsky</p> <p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-search-and-rescue-operation-continues-at-the-site</p> <p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-death-toll-of-missile-strikes-in-bilhoroddnistrovsky</p> <p>TG channel of the State Service of Emergency Situations (1 July). https://t.me/dsns_telegram/8037; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/8042; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/8061</p> <p>British Defence Intelligence Update (2 July). https://www.kyivpost.com/Ukraine-politics/british-defense-intelligence-update-july-2-2022.html</p> <p>Kyiv Post (2 July). "Russia's war against Ukraine: Day 129, July 2 – Update 1" https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/russias-war-against-ukraine-day-129-july-2-update-1.html</p>	<p>Russian Army launched at least 3 Kh-22 KITCHEN missiles into residential neighbourhoods of Serhiivka. As a result, a 9-storied residential building has been partially damaged (images show most of windows blasted out and lower storeys badly burned or in rubble) and an adjacent store caught on fire. As the result of the accident, 16 people killed, 38 wounded (including 6 children). One of the rockets hit and damaged one 3-storied and one 4-storied building of a health resort in Serhiivka, leading to 5 dead (including 1 child). In total - 21 civilians dead, 38 injured.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341</p>	<p>According to Ukraine Joint Command South (JCS), weapons were launched by Russian Tu-22 bombers flying over the Black Sea between 1 and 2 in the morning. Social media report that between 150 and 160 people lived in the building and were at home at night. Most military analysts consider Kh-22 missile to be highly inaccurate by modern standards, and unlikely to hit closer than 500 meters of its intended target.</p>
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07/01/2022	Odesa Oblast	<p>Korshak S. (1 July 2022). "Kremlin fires more ship killer missiles at land targets: 19 dead, apartments, resort hit" https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/kremlin-fires-more-ship-killer-missiles-at-land-targets-19-dead-apartments-resort-hit.html</p> <p>Klitina, A. (1 July 2022). "Deadly overnight Odesa attacks are Russia's revenge for Zmiyny Island" https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/deadly-overnight-odesa-attacks-are-russias-revenge-for-zmiyny-island.html</p> <p>Twitter account of the World News (2 July). https://twitter.com/news_type_c/status/1543021574722404355?s=20&t=5HrXDjzXC27BSTLJBz9JQ</p> <p>Novoe Vremia (1 July). "Зеленський про обстріл курорту на Одещині: Це не випадковий удар, а терор проти наших людей". https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/obstril-selishcha-sergijivka-ce-ne-vipadkoviy-udar-za-yaviv-zelenskiy-50253737.html</p>		Russia		AP I Art. 51(2); AP I Art. 52; AP I Art. 75(2)		
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07/01/2022	Odesa Oblast	<p>Petrenko, R., Tyshchenko, K. (1 July) "Удар по Сергіївці: уже 21 загиблий, серед них дитина" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/1/7355806/</p> <p>Tyshchenko, K. (1 July) "Зеленський: Серед загиблих у Сергіївці – 4 людей з однієї родини" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/1/7355900/</p> <p>Tyshchenko, K. (1 July) "Зеленський про Сергіївку: Не випадковість, а цілеспрямований удар" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/1/7355880/</p> <p>FB account of Anna Nemerenco, Minister of Healthcare of Moldova (1 July) https://www.facebook.com/ala.nemerenco/posts/3138271039758473</p>		Russia				
07/01/2022	Sumy Oblast	<p>Liveuamap.com (1 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/1-july-russian-army-launched-over-270-mortar-mines-and-other</p> <p>TG channel of Dmytro Zhyvytskyi, Governor of Sumy Oblast (1 July). https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/2898</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda (1 July) "Росія тероризує Одещину, Україна збирає Армію дронів. Головні події 128 дня війни. ОНЛАЙН" https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/07/1/7355722/</p>	Russian army launched over 270 mortar mines and other projectiles into Sumy Oblast today. Seven communities in the region were attacked: Bilopillia, Shalyhine, Krasnopillia, Novoslobidske, Esman, Hlukhiv, and Velykopysarivska District. A 64-year-old woman in Shalyhine was reportedly injured due to Russian shelling while working in her garden. Material damage: houses of civilians, farms, power grids and a water tower.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

07/01/2022	Zmiinyi Ostriv (Snake Island)	<p>FB page of Valery Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces. https://fb.watch/esVAv1fdqv/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda (1 July). "Росія тероризує Одещину, Україна збирає Армію дронів. Головні події 128 дня війни. ОНЛАЙН" https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/07/1/7355722/</p>	Russian forces carried out two airstrikes by phosphorous bombs on Snake Island. There is no information on casualties	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(xvii)† Art. 8(2)(b)(xviii)†† ; Art. 8(2)(b)(xix)†††; Art. 8(2)(b)(xx)**; Art. 8(2)(c)(i)***;</p>	<p>AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 439; Art. 440</p>	Russian troops were forced to withdraw from the island on June 30.
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Date	Location	Source	Description of the incident	Responsible Party	Roma Statute	Geneva Conven	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
07/02/2022	Donetsk Oblast	<p>Liveuamap.com (2 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/3-july-the-russians-shelled-the-town-of-dobropillia-in-donetsk</p> <p>FB account of Pavlo Kyrylenko, Governor of Donetsk Oblast (2 July). "Щонайменше 2 загиблих і 3 поранених – наслідки російського удару по Добропілля" https://fb.watch/eaAdily64u/</p>	The Russians shelled the town of Dobropillia in Donetsk region. As a result of the strike, two civilians were killed and three more were injured. Among the wounded are two children, 4 and 7 years old. One residential building destroyed, 6 more damaged.	Russia	<p>Art. 7(1)(a);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(ii);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(c)(i);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(c)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a);</p> <p>Art. 3(1)(c);</p> <p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13**</p> <p>AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 112;</p> <p>Art. 113;</p> <p>Art. 115;</p> <p>Art. 121;</p> <p>Art. 122;</p> <p>Art. 188;</p> <p>Art. 194;</p> <p>Art. 263;</p> <p>Art. 341</p>	
07/02/2022	Kharkiv Oblast	<p>Liveuamap.com (2 July). https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/2-july-1-wounded-as-result-of-russian-shelling-in-derhachi</p> <p>TG channel of Oleg Syniegubov, Head of Kharkiv Oblast Administration (2 July). https://t.me/synegubov/3539</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda (2 July). "У Білорусі продовжують військові навчання. 129-й день війни. ОНЛАЙН" https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/07/2/7355920/</p>	Shelling by rocket and artillery systems in Kharkiv Oblast. As a result, 5 civilians wounded (1 in Derhachi, 2 in Izium, 1 in Kharkiv, 1 in Loziv), private houses and farm buildings damaged, forest strips caught on fire, and a kindergarten destroyed (in Zolochiv).	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(ii);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(b)(v);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(c)(i);</p> <p>Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a);</p> <p>Art. 3(1)(c);</p> <p>AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13**</p> <p>AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 121;</p> <p>Art. 122;</p> <p>Art. 188;</p> <p>Art. 194;</p> <p>Art. 263;</p> <p>Art. 341</p>	

07/02/2022	Mykolaiv Oblast	<p>Gabedava T. (2 July 2022). <i>Рано вранці в суботу, 2 липня, війська РФ завдали ракетних ударів по Миколаєву.</i> https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/viyna-v-ukrajini-po-mikolayevu-vipustili-10-raket-tipu-oniks-novini-ukrajini-50253871.html</p> <p>TG Channel of Ganna Zamazeeva from Mykolaiv Oblast Council (2 July). https://t.me/mykolaivskaoblrada/2879</p> <p>Novoe Vremia (2 July). <i>"Вранці окупанти випустили по Миколаєву десять ракет типу Онікс — ОК Південь"</i>. https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/viyna-v-ukrajini-po-mikolayevu-vipustili-10-raket-tipu-oniks-novini-ukrajini-50253871.html</p> <p>Тушченко, К. (2 July). <i>"Ранковий обстріл Миколаєва: РФ випустила 12 ракет, є руйнування"</i>. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/2/7356026/</p>	<p>Russian troops fired ten Onyx missiles at Mykolaiv port and other industrial infrastructure, and later targeted Bashtansk and Mykolaiv Regions. As a result, 14 persons were injured and property damaged, including agricultural land and infrastructure.</p>	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341</p>	<p>At least first rockets were launched from the Russian-occupied territories in Kherson Oblast.</p>
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Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code
07/19/22	Kharkiv	South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/video/world/3185817/tram-service-back-track-kharkiv-despite-damage-during-russias-invasion-ukraine	Heavy shelling by Russian forces left northeastern Ukrainian city without public transport, as shelling damaged the electrical station used to power the city's Soviet-era trams. Out of 160 trams, 60 were destroyed in the fighting and 60 were damaged, leaving only 40 operational.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii)	API Art. 52;	Art. 277 Art. 438;
07/19/22	Kharkiv	Kharkiv Today, https://2day.kh.ua/ua/kharkow/za-dobu-nakharkivshchyni-cher ez-obstrily-zahynulyudyna-shche-pyate-ro-otrymaly	Russian shelled Kharkiv, Bogodukhiv, Chuguyiv and Izyum districts. 1 person was killed in the shelling in Kharkiv Oblast, and five others were injured	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	API Art. 51; API Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a);	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122; Art. 194 Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438 Art. 444
07/19/22	Kramatorsk	NY Post "Russia pounds Ukraine as Putin holds talks in Tehran" https://nypost.com/2022/07/19/russia-pounds-ukraine-as-putin-holds-talks-in-tehran/ CNN, " July 19,2022 At least 1 civilian killed in missile attack on Ukrainian city of Kramatorsk https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-19-22/index.html Telegram of Emergency Service of Ukraine https://t.me/s/dsns_telegram?before=8484	Russian missiles struck Kramatorsk, a city in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk province that is considered a likely occupation target of Russian forces. 1 person was killed in an airstrike that hit a five-story residential building. Ukraine's Emergency Service said on Telegram that 10 people were wounded, 5 of them hospitalized.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	API Art. 51; API Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a);	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122; Art. 194 Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438 Art. 444
07/19/22	Nikopol	Kiev Independent https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/governor-russian-forces-shell-nikopol-up-to-40-times-overnight-on-july-19 Ukrainska pravda https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/07/19/7358871/	Russian forces shell Nikopol up to 40 times overnight. Russian forces used Grad multiple-launch rocket systems to fire on the city of Nikopol, targeting residential houses and the Nikopol river port, and causing fires to break out at two industrial facilities.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	API Art. 52;	Art. 194 Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438

07/19/22	Odesa	CNN, " July 19,2022 Russian missiles hit Odesa overnight https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-19-22/index.html Forbes "Tuesday, July 19 Russia's War on Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/07/19/tuesday-july-19-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=4f3c4eca70f2	6 people were injured, including a child, after Russian missiles struck the city of Odesa. City was targeted by seven "Kalibr" cruise missiles fired from the Black Sea. Three homes and at least 2 other buildings were destroyed in the attack.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52;	Art. 121 Art. 122; Art. 194 Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438 Art. 444
07/19/22	Sloviansk	Forbes "Tuesday, July 19. Russia's War On Ukraine," https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/07/19/tuesday-july-19-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=4f3c4eca70f2 .	Russian shelling in Donetsk region, has resulted in the deaths of at least 2 people who were found under the ruins of a private residential building.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a);	Art. 115 Art. 194 Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438 Art. 444
07/19/22	Sumy	Facebook https://www.facebook.com/Zhyvytskyy	Russia carried out 9 shellings of the border territories and settlements of the Sumy region with various types of weapons - about 78 parishes.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52;	Art. 438

Date	Location	Source	Description of incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code
07/20/22	Kharkiv	<p>CNN, "July 20, 2022 Three killed in Kharkiv shelling, including 13-year-old boy https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-20-22/index.html</p> <p>Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (MVS) https://mvs.gov.ua/news/xarkiv-rosiyani-z-diisnili-cergovii-obst-ril-zitlovogo-masivu-saltivka</p> <p>NY Post "Shattered Ukrainian dad holds hand of son killed in Russian airstrike" https://nypost.com/2022/07/20/ukrainian-dad-holds-hand-of-son-killed-in-russian-airstrike/</p>	Attack on residential areas of Saltivka in the city of Kharkiv from multiple Hurricane salvo rocket launchers, as a result of which 3 people were killed, including a 13-year-old boy. 2 more people received shrapnel wounds: the 15-year-old sister of the deceased, as well as a 72-year-old woman.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a);	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438 Art. 444
07/20/22	Nikopol	<p>Ukrainian Truth https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/07/20/7359088/</p> <p>Kiev Independence https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1549616709698461698?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw</p> <p>https://t.me/dnipropeetrovskaODA/1349</p> <p>Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyaoldak/2022/07/20/wednesday-july-20-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=2c624e8150c6</p> <p>Telegram Dsns Ukraine https://t.me/s/dsns_telegram?before=8479</p> <p>CNN, "July 20, 2022 Russian shelling kills 2 in southern city of Nikopol" https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-20-22/index.html</p>	The Russians attacked Nikopol again: 30 shellson the residential area of the city. 2 people died and nine others were injured following Russian shelling of a residential area. 4 of the injured are children, the shelling destroyed 3 houses, damaged 12 other homes and 4 outbuildings.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a);	Art. 115 Art. 121 Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 282; Art. 438 Art. 444

07/20/22	Zaporizhzhia	Ukrinform Russian forces kidnap around 400 people in Zaporizhzhia Oblast" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-other_news/3532846-zagarbniki-vikrali-blizko-400-ziteliv-zaporizkoi-oblasti.html	Russian forces kidnap around 400 people in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Civilians of the Zaporizhzhia region, ZNPP workers and representatives of local authorities are in captivity.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(i); Art. 7(2)(i); Art. 8(a)(viii)	Art. 3(1)(b); AP I Art. 75(2)(c)	Art. 146; Art. 147 Art. 349
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
7/23/2022	Kharkiv	Ukrainska Pravda, "Several strikes on central Kharkiv; a civilian injured" https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/07/23/7359731/ Telegram, Ihor Terekhov, "Another result of the morning "arrival"" https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/358	There were several strong hits in the center. One person was injured. The O.M.Beketov National University of Urban Economy and the nearest buildings were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 53	Art.121; Art.122; Art. 194	
7/23/2022	Kharkiv Oblast	TSN, "The Russians continue shelling the Sumy region. In the regions bordering the Russian Federation, the enemy constantly carries out reconnaissance from drones" https://tsn.ua/ato/rosiyani-prodovzhuyut-obstrilyuvati-mirni-mista-harkivschi-ni-yaka-situaciya-u-prikordonnih-oblastyah-2117560.html	The RF used artillery toward the settlements in Kharkiv oblast. Also, RF made an airstrike near Verkhniy Saltiv.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/23/2022	Kropyvnytskyi	Forbes, "Saturday, July 23. Russia's War On Ukraine: News And Information From Ukraine" https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/07/23/saturday-july-23-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=2eb509474b18 TSN, "Russia's massive missile attack on Kropyvnytskyi: the number of victims has increased" https://tsn.ua/ato/masovana-raketna-atak-rosiyi-po-kropivnickomu-zroslo-kilkist-postrazhdalih-2117611.html Telegram, Andrii Raikovych/Kirovohrad military-civil regional administration https://t.me/kirovogradskaODA/1844	The military airfield "Kanatove" and one of the facilities of "Ukrzaliznytsia" were targeted. Three people were killed, and at least 19 injured, among them a military.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art.112; Art.113; Art.115; Art.121; Art.122; Art.194; Art.276	

7/23/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>Forbes, “Saturday, July 23. Russia’s War On Ukraine: News And Information From Ukraine”, https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/07/23/saturday-july-23-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=2eb509474b18</p> <p>TSN, “Shelling of residential areas of Mykolaiv: it is known about two wounded, among them a teenager”, https://tsn.ua/ato/obstril-zhitlovih-kvartaliv-mikolayeva-vidomopro-dvoh-poranenih-sered-nih-pidlitok-2117641.html</p> <p>Telegram, Sienkevych Online, https://t.me/senkevichonline/1757</p>	The destruction of the residential neighbourhood caused a trap of many people under the rubble. Two people were injured, one of them a teenager. Also, high-rise buildings, private houses and cars were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art.121; Art.122; Art. 194	
7/23/2022	Luhansk Obl	<p>Ukrinform, “In the Luhansk region, the enemy launched four missile strikes and one airstrike during the day”, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3535660-na-lugansini-zadobu-vorog-zavdav-cotiri-raketni-ta-odinaviaudar.html,</p>	Russia continues its missile and artillery terror against the civilian population.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	

7/23/2022	Odesa	<p>Facebook, Operational Command “South”, “Official notification of OC “South”, https://www.facebook.com/528312067340051/posts/2109987842505791/</p> <p>Ukrainska Pravda, “The Russians damaged the Odesa Fine Arts Museum building”, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/07/23/7359832/</p> <p>Suspilne, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, day 150. Text online” https://suspilne.media/263566-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-150-tekstovij-onlajn/</p>	The infrastructure of Odesa seaport and the Fine Arts Museum building was damaged. The local authority announced about injured but didn't concretize the number of them.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52 AP I Art. 53	Art.121; Art.122; Art. 194	
7/23/2022	Sumy Oblast	Telegram, Dmytro Zhyvytskyi/Sumy military-civil regional administration, https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/3394?single	Several communities of this region became under shelling. As a result, a man was mortally wounded, civilian and farm buildings, 2 farm tractors and community agriculture were destroyed.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51 AP I Art. 52	Art.112; Art.113; Art.115; Art.194	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
7/24/2022	Bahmut direction	Facebook, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "Operational information as of 6a.m. on July 24 regarding the Russian invasion", https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04CkYbuHtuB7JgankJrRHquDuZsHsfWU8BxucbZueLPRRCQXnAvczf6LF9w2bAp92l	Russia used an assault and army aviation toward military and civilian infrastructure.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/24/2022	Donetsk Oblast	Telegram, Pavlo Kyrylenko/ Donetsk military-civil regional administration, "Operational situation as of 10a.m. on July 24", https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/4266?single&fbclid=IwAR1eJvxNob25-nqj7r9U-CKrc7oxoXJuQiY6Igp6Qf6MPb7zqhxD7duCoQ Ukrinform, "The Russians attacked Donetsk region – two schools were destroyed, houses were damaged", https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3535725-rosiani-vdarili-po-doneccini-zrujnovani-dvi-skoli-poskodzeni-budinki.html	Schools, a kindergarten, private houses and commercial facilities became under shelling in local communities.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/24/2022	Kharkiv direction	Facebook, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "Operational information as of 6a.m. on July 24 regarding the Russian invasion", https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04CkYbuHtuB7JgankJrRHquDuZsHsfWU8BxucbZueLPRRCQXnAvczf6LF9w2bAp92l	Conventional and rocket artillery of Russian forces caused destruction in number of settlements of Kharkiv region.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	

7/24/2022	Kramatorsk direction	Facebook, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "Operational information as of 6a.m. on July 24 regarding the Russian invasion", https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04CkYbuHtuB7JgankJrRHquDuZsHsfWU8BxucbZueLPRRCQXnAvczf6LF9w2bAp92l	Shelling was recorded in different communities. No information about human losses or damages.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/24/2022	Mykolaiv	Forbes, "Sunday, July 24. Russia's War On Ukraine: News And Information From Ukraine", https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyasoldak/2022/07/24/sunday-july-24-russias-war-on-ukraine-news-and-information-from-ukraine/?sh=4aa13b8a2950 Ukrinform, "In Mykolaiv Oblast, two people were killed and five were injured during the day due to shelling", https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3535710-na-mikolaivsini-za-dobu-cerez-obstrili-zaginuli-dvi-ludini-se-patero-porajeni.html	Two people died and five injured. The strikes on the city rendered civilian infrastructure, factories, storage facilities and residential buildings unusable.	Russia	Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52	Art.112; Art.113; Art.115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194	
7/24/2022	Siversk direction	Facebook, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "Operational information as of 6a.m. on July 24 regarding the Russian invasion", https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04CkYbuHtuB7JgankJrRHquDuZsHsfWU8BxucbZueLPRRCQXnAvczf6LF9w2bAp92l	Some settlements of Chernihiv and Sumy region were under shelling.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	

7/24/2022	Sloviansk direction	Facebook, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "Operational information as of 6a.m. on July 24 regarding the Russian invasion", https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04CkYbuHtuB7JgankJrRHquDuZsHsfWU8BxucbZueLPRRCQXnAvczf6LF9w2bAp92l	Three regions in Slovyansk direction suffered from Russian artillery.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/24/2022	Sumy Oblast	Telegram, Dmytro Zhyvytskyi/Sumy military-civil regional administration, https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/3394?single	Thirty three times, Sumy region was under conventional artillery and mortars during the day.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 52	Art. 194; Art. 282; Art. 292	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
7/25/2022	Chernihiv and Sumy region	DPSU Telegram, "The Russian Federation shelled the border of Ukraine more than fifty times". https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/ https://t.me/DPSUkr/5367	Russians fired at the border more than 50 times with 120 mm mortars. July 25, 5 communities in Sumy Oblast and 4 communities in Chernihiv Oblast were shelled.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv)*; 8(2)(b)(v)†; 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/25/2022	Chuhuiv	https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/?anchor=live_1658847727&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps t.me/synegov/3777	School and house of culture destroyed by explosion. People had to make their way out of the ruins. Two civilians were killed. Suspil'ne Kharkiv, "In Chuhuiv, as a result of night shelling, a school and a cultural center where civilians were staying were destroyed".	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(ix); 8(2)(c)(i); 8(2)(e)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 10; 13 AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 16; 52(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115 Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444	
7/25/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	HD Dnepr, "Russian army shelled Myrivska and Marganets communities in Nikopol district with MLRS. Russian aircraft launched Kh-59 missile at Lyubymivka village of Dnipro district. Also Russian army shelled Zelenodolsk community in Kryvyi Rih district". Photo: https://t.me/info_zp/11983 https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/07/25/7359988/ https://t.me/dnepr_operativ/20551	Multiple Launch Rocket System strike on residential area, agricultural enterprise.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341	

7/25/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	<p>The main department of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in the Dnipropetrovsk region, "The Russians shelled the village of Velyka Kostromka of the Zelenodol community in the Dnipropetrovsk region for the second time in the evening - there is destruction. They fired from artillery.</p> <p>A power line, a residential building and outbuildings were damaged. People were not injured."</p> <p>https://www.facebook.com/MNSDNE/posts/pfbid0cYSGaRnRAVTFrZQUG2u3VnjCMHEBjPEhes3DkVFZh6CSZRb8MhEopqEqg8kqy5171 https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/07/25/7359987/</p>	A power line, a residential building and outbuildings were damaged. People were not injured.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341	
7/25/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>5 Channel, "7 years old child wounded as result of Russian shelling in Mykolaiv".https://twitter.com/5channel/status/1551476614721990656 https://www.5.ua/regiony/vnochi-voroh-z-novu-byv-po-mykolaievu-ta-oblasti-postrazhdala-7-richna-dytna-kim-283257.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm</p>	As a result of enemy shelling, grain fields were set on fire, 7 years old child wounded.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(c)(i); 8(2)(e)(i);	Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

7/25/2022	Mykolaiv region	Vitalii Kim Telegram, t.me/mykolaivskaOD A/1894.	<p>Multiple Launch Rocket System strike on residential area, agricultural area. Private house was destroyed.</p> <p>On July 25, approximately at 18:00, the village was shelled. Shiroke of Shirokivska hromada. The hits were outside the settlement, there were no casualties. Also, approximately at 11:00 p.m., the village was shelled. Shiroke et al. Red Valley, hitting outside the villages. On the morning of July 26, at 4:30 a.m., the village was shelled. Red Valley. Hitting outside the village. There are no casualties.</p> <p>Villages located on the demarcation line in the Berezneguvat community remain under constant shelling. Yesterday, July 25, at approximately 9:50 p.m., the village of Maliivka came under fire. One residential building was destroyed. There is no information about the victims. Information about the destruction of residential buildings is being clarified."</p>	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(b)(v)	API Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 341	
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7/25/2022	Sumy region	<p>Dmytro Zhyvytskyi Telergam Channel, "Esmansk community: around half past nine there were 4 parishes from "Grady". https://t.me/Zhyvytskyi/3421 https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/07/25/7359987/</p>	<p>Multiple rocket and artillery attacks on civilian areas without specific reports of injury, death or property destruction. At eleven o'clock in the morning - 3 guns from the barrel artillery.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Khotyn community: at half past one there was mortar fire from the Russian side, 4 come. ▪ Bilopolsk community: almost at two o'clock in the afternoon, there were 3 mortar shots in the community. ▪ Znob-Novgorod community: at fifteen o'clock there was artillery fire, 10 parishes. ▪ Seredino-Budsk community: at half past nine in the evening, the Russians opened fire with mortars, 6 approaches. <p>There are no losses and destructions today.</p>	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v)†; 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/25/2022	Volyn' region	<p>https://www.facebook.com/PvkZahid/posts/pfbid02gVLe2mAmksAT1RaPk9gfi1ktVbQmxH8B3Hseayr7d32Q1Qq5tCpz26Bjqu2Kp4P6l https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/25/7360089/ https://t.me/volyn_main/208 https://t.me/volynskaODA/1672</p>	<p>In the Volyn region, two unmanned aerial vehicles were shot down by means of anti-aircraft defense, but the wreckage resulted in the death of one person and the injury of two others.</p> <p>Air Command "West" of the Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "The "West" command of the Air Force stated that on Monday in the north-western direction, two enemy UAVs were detected, which crossed the airspace of Ukraine from the side of Belarus and carried out aerial reconnaissance of objects in the Volyn region.</p>	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(e)(i); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(c)(i);	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115 Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341.	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
7/26/2022	Chernihiv region	Suspil'ne media, https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/	Rocket attacks on civilian areas and objects. In the morning, a massive missile attack was carried out, including with the use of aircraft, from the direction of the Black Sea. Several air-launched missiles were launched.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v)†; Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/26/2022	Chernihiv region	https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jwCJuLWhnLZ3opMf6nf3ZUX2KzYUaZyHy4AjMo4xp76Vyzquq5W2UsLYo5CbpKajl	Rocket attacks on civilian areas and objects. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "In the Siversky direction, the enemy shelled civilian and military infrastructure in the areas of Znob-Novgorodske, Khrinivka, Senkivka and a number of other settlements."	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v)†; Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/26/2022	Chuhuiv	t.me/synegubov/3774 https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/ https://suspilne.media/264504-rf-poskodila-gazoprovod-na-harkivsini-bez-gazu-zalisilosa-selo/	There are hits on critical infrastructure. Throughout the region, during the day, the occupiers attacked the Tsirkunivska community, a residential building was damaged. In the Balaklia community, a civilian infrastructure object was also damaged as a result of Russian shelling. Oleh Syniebobov Telegram, "The Russians struck Chuguiev again. There are hits on critical infrastructure. Rescuers continue to analyze the consequences of yesterday's destruction of the cultural center, where people still remained in the basement.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

7/26/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Mykola Lukashchuk Telegram, "Russian troops shelled two districts of Dnipropetrovsk region with barrel artillery and anti-aircraft guns". t.me/mykola_lukashchuk/810 https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/	At night, the Russians struck the outskirts of the village of Koshov, in the Kryvorizka district. There are no casualties or damage. The power supply line is damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
7/26/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Suspil'ne media, "A harvester in the Dnipropetrovsk region was blown up by a shell from the "Hurricane". https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/ t.me/dnepr_operativ/20592	During the wheat harvest in the Zelenodol community, an agrarian was blown up by a Russian anti-transport mine, the carrier of which is the Uragan. The combine was not injured, the combine itself was damaged	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
7/26/2022	Dnipropetrovsk region	Suspil'ne media, "The Russians shelled a community in the Dnipropetrovsk region from "Hurricanes". https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/ t.me/miskiygolovaAndriyOsa/654	Power lines were damaged and a fire broke out in a 2-hectare field	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	
7/26/2022	Kharkiv	Suspil'ne media, "As a result of the shelling of Kharkiv, the roof of the car showroom caught fire". https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/?anchor=live_1658811404&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps https://t.me/synegov/3774	As a result of the shelling, the roof of the car showroom was on fire. A few more shells hit open areas.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v);	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

7/26/2022	Kharkiv region	https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0jwCJuLWhnLZ3opMf6nf3ZUX2KzYUaZyHy4AjMo4xp76Vyzquq5W2UsLYo5CbpKajl	General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "In the direction of Bakhmut, the enemy shelled military and civilian infrastructure in the districts of Berestovo, Soledar, Pokrovsky, Veselaya Dolyna, Vershyn, Kodema, Mayorsk and Toretsk. Tsinichno carried out airstrikes directly on the settlements of Pokrovske and Novoluhanske."	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)*; Art. 8(2)(b)(v)†; Art. 8(2)(e)(i)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 292	
7/26/2022	Mykolaiv	Vitalii Kim Telegram, "In the morning, Russian troops launched a massive missile attack on Mykolaiv: what is known". t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1894 https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/?anchor=live_1658833139&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps	As a result of the fall of ammunition and their debris, a critical infrastructure facility and a motor vehicle enterprise were damaged.	Russia	Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341	

7/26/2022	Odesa region	<p>Suspil'ne media, "In the morning, a massive missile attack was carried out, including with the use of aircraft, from the direction of the Black Sea. Several air-launched missiles were launched."</p> <p>https://suspilne.media/264429-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-153-tekstovij-onlajn-2/</p> <p>https://www.instagram.com/p/Cgd3TuIFdMm/?utm_source=ig_embed&ig_rid=e47e257f-47e4-4c76-8a81-09b13e78c690</p> <p>https://suspilne.media/264620-rosijska-armia-atakuvala-odesinu-z-10-bombarduvalnikiv-podrobici-obstrilu/</p> <p>https://suspilne.media/264458-vnaslidok-riaketnogo-udaru-po-odesini-poranena-ludina-odeska-rajderzadministracia/</p>	There are hits in private buildings of coastal villages followed by ignition. Rescuers are working on the ground. Two people were injured.	Russia	<p>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(c)(i); Art. 8(2)(e)(i)</p>	<p>Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 3(1)(c); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; 13** AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)</p>	<p>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341</p>	
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Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
7/27/2022	Bakhmut, Donetsk region	<p>CNN, "1 killed, another trapped as town of Bakhmut in Donetsk comes under heavy fire" https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-27-22/h_5a3064a8090aba531409c70ea3085cb2</p> <p>RBC.UA, "Occupants hit a residential building in Bakhmut: there are victims" https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/okkupanty-udarili-zhilomu-domu-bahmute-zhertvy-1658909042.html/amp</p> <p>Ukrinform, "In Bakhmut, Donetsk region, the Russian military hit a hotel" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3537678-rosiani-obstrilali-bahmut-pocilili-u-gotel-e-zagibli-ta-porajeni.html</p>	<p>In Bakhmut, the Russians targeted a hotel — there are dead and wounded.</p> <p>Russian occupation forces launched a rocket attack on a 5-story residential building in Bakhmut, Donetsk region. 2 persons died as a result of the shelling.</p>	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 194 Art. 438	
7/27/2022	Kharkiv region, Dergachyv district	<p>Kharkiv Today, "In Kharkiv region, a father and son were wounded by shelling" https://2day.kh.ua/ua/kharkow/na-kharkivs-hchini-vid-obstriliv-poranen-distaly-batko-z-synom</p>	<p>A boy and his father were wounded in Dergachyv district. Both wounded were taken to medical facilities in Kharkiv</p>	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	

7/27/2022	Kharkiv	<p>CNN, "Russian shelling hits industrial district of Kharkiv" https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-27-22/h_c480360e91813c63bd1ad650f8198128</p> <p>Hromadske.ua, "Russian troops shelled Kharkiv with C-300 missiles" https://hromadske.ua/posts/vijska-rf-obstrilyali-harkiv-na-misciprilotiv-pracyuyut-ryatuvalniki</p> <p>gp.gov.ua, "The Russian military launched a missile attack on the Kharkiv region" https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/viiskovi-rf-nanesli-raketnii-udar-po-xarkivshhini-roz-pocato-provadžennya</p>	Russian troops attacked an industrial area of the city with S-300 long-range missile systems.	Russia	8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 438	
7/27/2022	Marganets, Nikopol district, Dnipropetrovsk region	<p>Ukrinform, "Russian troops shelled Dnipropetrovsk region at night" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3537554-rosijski-vijska-unico-obstrilali-dnipropetrovsinu-poranenazinka.html</p>	In the Nikopol district, the enemy struck twice with "Grad". Fired up to 40 shells. A 54-year-old woman was injured in Marganets. She was taken to the hospital.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	
7/27/2022	Mykolaiv	<p>Ukrinform, "Invaders shelled an industrial zone and an enterprise in Mykolaiv" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3537568-zagarbniki-zranku-obstrilali-promzonu-ta-pidpriemstvo-umikolaevi.html</p>	An industrial zone and a repair enterprise were damaged.	Russia	8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 438	

Date	Location	Source	Description of Incident	Responsible Party	Rome Statute	Geneva Convention	Ukrainian Penal Code	Notes
7/28/2022	Honcharivske, Chernihiv region	Ukrinform, "More than 10 shellings were recorded in Chernihiv region" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3538359-na-cernigivsini-zafiksuvani-ponad-10-prilotiv.html Pryamiy, "Chernihiv region were hit by rockets from the territory of Belarus" https://prn.ua/viyska-rf-z-terytorii-bilorusi-vdaryly-raketamy-po-chernihivshchyni/	9 rockets hit the territory of Chernihiv region and fell into the forest.	Belarus/Russia	8(2)(b)(iv)	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 282; Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Kryvorizky district, Dnipropetrovsk region	Ukrinform, "Russia again shelled the Kryvorizky district" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3538513-rosia-znovu-obstrilala-krivorizkij-rajon-e-zagiblij-ta-poraneni.html	Russia hit the agricultural enterprise, 1 person died, 2 were injured.	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Bakhmut, Donetsk region	Hromadske, "The Russians shelled Bakhmut." https://hromadske.ua/posts/rosiyani-obstrilyali-bahmut-shonajmenshe-troye-lyudej-zaginuli-i-she-troye-poraneni	At least 3 people were killed and 3 more injured.	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Toretsk, Donetsk region	CNN, "2 killed in missile strike in Donetsk town of Toretsk" https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-28-22/h_0b9ba4145e7ff94d1633d484cbcb675a	At least 2 people were killed as a five-story building in the Donetsk town of Toretsk in eastern Ukraine collapsed following a Russian strike	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 194 Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Chuhuiv, Kharkiv region	Channel 24, "In Chuhuiv showed a high-rise building that was fired upon by the occupiers" https://24tv.ua/vorog-obstrilyav-chuguyevshho-harkivshhini-fo-to-poshkodzhenoyi_n2107640 Pravda, "The Russians shelled Chuhuiv, hitting residential buildings" https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/28/7360581/	The enemy continues to shell residential buildings of the civilian population, there are casualties.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(c)(i); 8(2)(b)(v)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	

7/28/2022	Kharkiv	Ukrinform, "At midnight, the Russian invaders fired missiles at Kharkiv twice" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3538324-zagarbniki-za-nic-dvici-obstrilali-harkiv-raketami-s300-te-rehov.html	Two small fires broke out as a result of the shelling.	Russia	8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Kharkiv region	Ukrinform, "In Kharkiv region, a policeman was killed as a result of firing at a thermal power plant" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3538577-na-harkivsini-vn-aslidok-obstrilu-tec-zaginu-policejskij.html	As a result of shelling, a policeman was killed and 2 civilians were wounded. The buildings of the residential area and the thermal power plant were damaged.	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Kropyvnytskyi	Hromadske, "Explosions rang out in Kropyvnytskyi. There are dead and wounded" https://hromadske.ua/posts/u-kropivnicko-mu-prolunali-vibuhi Ukrinform, "Rocket attack in Kropyvnytskyi" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3538776-raketnij-obstril-kropivnickogo-5-zagiblih-i-25-poranenih.html	5 people died, another 25 were injured as a result of rocket attack by the Russians.	Russia	7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ii); 8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 194; Art. 438	
7/28/2022	Vyshgorod, Kyiv region	BBC, "Infrastructure facility of Vyshgorod" https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-62330422 CNN, "At least 15 injured in Kyiv region missile strikes" https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-28-22/h_f535d301f5dae8fa1e5d25e7623b7158	At least 15 injured in Kyiv region missile strikes.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iii); 8(2)(c)(i)	Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); 4(2)(a); 13; AP I Art. 75(1); 51(1)(2); 52(2)	Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 438	

7/28/2022	Mykolaiv	RBC, "Loud explosions are heard in Mykolaiv" https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/nikolaeve-zvuchat-gromkie-vzryvy-vremya-vozdushnoy-1658972889.html Ukrinform, "Explosions rang out in Mykolaiv" https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3538377-u-mikolaevi-vid-raketnih-udariv-postrazdali-zakladi-osviti-ta-dvi-bagatopoverhivki.html	As a result of rocket fire from the Russian troops, the premises of the Shipbuilding University, two high-rise residential buildings and school were damaged.	Russia	8(2)(b)(v)	AP I Art. 51(4); 52(2)	Art. 194; Art. 438;	
7/28/2022	Sumy region (Krasnopil, Shalygin and Buryn communities)	RBC, "The Russians fired mortars and self-propelled guns at three communities in the Sumy region" https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/rossiyane-minometov-sau-obstreljali-tri-obshchiny-1659037688.html	The Russian Federation fired self-propelled guns and mortars along the border. Three communities came under the fire of the occupier.	Russia	8(2)(a)(iv);	AP II Art. 13 AP I Art. 52(2)	Art. 438	



THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK

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Most Responsible Party Dossier

Russia (Russian Federation)

Updated as of: 25 NOV 2022

Prepared by Ukraine Task Force – Intelligence Division

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Introduction and Scope

The purpose of this report is to provide in depth analysis of the role, capabilities, and organization of Russian Military and Senior Leadership. This report also provides an overview of key leaders associated with Russian Military and Senior Leadership as well as their roles, responsibilities, and organizational membership. The report also provides a brief overview of the most egregious incidents associated with the Russian Military activities in Ukraine.

Key Areas

Key Political Areas

Russia's political power is distributed among its *oblasti* (regions), *kraya* (territories), *okruga* (autonomous district), and two Federal Cities.¹

The Federal Cities are Moscow (Capital, located in Western Russia), and Saint Petersburg (often called the "Northern Capital").²

Russia is further divided into eight Federal Districts overseen by President-appointed *plenipotentiaries* which monitor the consistency between federal and regional law.³ The districts are: Central, Far East, Northwest, Siberia, Southern, Urals, Volga, and Caucuses.⁴

There are approximately 114 Foreign Embassies and 87 Consulates in Russian territory and approximately 140 Russian Embassies and 38 Consulates around the world.⁵ Russia maintains one Embassy and three consulates in Ukraine, located in Kyiv and Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa, respectively.⁶

Key Military Areas

Russia contains five OSKs (military districts): Western, Southern, Northern Fleet and Arctic Command, Central, and Eastern.⁷

¹ *The Political System of the Russian Federation: President and Government*, THE STATE DUMA (Nov. 9, 2018), <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/28748/>.

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *List of Diplomatic Missions in Russia & Russian Diplomatic Missions Abroad*, EMBASSY WORLDWIDE, <https://www.embassy-worldwide.com/country/russia/> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, *Russian Military Quick Reference Guide*, U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (Jan. 2020), <https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf>.

Each military district command center houses Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy outfits.⁸ Districts fall under the command of the district headquarters, headed by the district commander, and is subordinated to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.⁹

Russia maintains approximately twenty military bases outside its territory, primarily located in post-Soviet states and Syria (Center S, Khmeimim Air Base, and Tartus).¹⁰ Bases are also located in Belarus (including nuclear submarine sites), Egypt, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan (Baikonur Cosmodrome), Kyrgyzstan (Kant Air Base), and Armenia, and Vietnam.¹¹ Russia also maintains a military presence in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.¹²

Russia also operates the Arctic Brigade that includes outposts, air bases, and special forces units.¹³ These agreements and operations are part of a multi-step strategy that involves stationing peacekeepers in frozen conflict zones and integrating aspects of the region's military forces through the CSTO and joint air defense agreements.¹⁴

While China is a traditional Russian ally, throughout the Ukraine conflict several states have shown support and maintain positive military relationships with Russia. These include Belarus, Myanmar, Venezuela, Nicaragua.¹⁵

Relevant Areas of Operations

Russia consistently offers conventional regime support to Syria and more covert support to Central African Republic and Venezuela.¹⁶ It also provides insurgent support to Libya and the rebel Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.¹⁷

⁸ TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, *supra* note 7.

⁹ TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, *supra* note 7.

¹⁰ Anna Maria Dyer, *The Importance of Foreign Military Bases for Russia*, PISM (May 25, 2020), https://pism.pl/publications/The_Importance_of_Foreign_Military_Bases_for_Russia.

¹¹ Jeff Hawn, *Russia's Extraterritorial Military Deployments*, NEWLINES INSTIT. (Mar. 31, 2021) <https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/russias-extraterritorial-military-deployments/>.

¹² Dyer, *supra* note 10.

¹³ Matthew Melino & Heather A. Conley, *The Ice Curtain: Russia's Military Presence in the Arctic*, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, <https://www.csis.org/features/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence> (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).

¹⁴ Dmitry Goreburg, *Russia's Foreign Military Basing Strategy*, PONARS EURASIA (Sept. 20, 2021), <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russias-foreign-military-basing-strategy/>.

¹⁵ *Where Do Russia's Allies Stand as Western powers slam Moscow*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 25, 2022), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/where-do-russias-allies-stand-as-western-powers-slam-moscow>.

¹⁶ Hawn, *supra* note 11.

¹⁷ Hawn, *supra* note 11

Russian troops carry out conventional peacekeeping operations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova.¹⁸

Russia maintains a deployment in the Transdnistria region of Moldova, known as the Operational Group of Russian Forces, for military exercises and trainings.¹⁹ This outpost has become especially active since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

More than 30,000 troops were deployed in Belarus for alleged joint military exercises as of FEB 2022.²⁰

The Russian invasion of Ukraine (official name is the Special Operation in Ukraine, sometimes referred to as an “Operation Z”) includes the use of Chechen special commando units, known as *kadyrovtsy*.²¹

Key Structures and Infrastructure

The Importance of Belarussian Infrastructural Support in the Ukrainian Invasion

In many ways, Belarus functions as an external organ of the Putin regime.²² Headed by an equally despotic and authoritarian ruler, Aleksandr Lukashenko is cut from the same post-Soviet anti-democratic cloth as Putin. Both have histories of cracking down on free speech, democratic processes, and both regimes are teeming with corruption. In recent years, Belarus has attracted negative international attention for the crackdown on the protests that sprung up in the wake of his reelection in 2020.²³ Despite these hiccups, the Putin-Lukashenko partnership continued unabated, and the duo was seen enjoying a boat trip on the Black Sea last MAY.²⁴ By late 2021, Russia was positioning troops in Belarus. Few alarm bells sounded. In mid-FEB 2022, Russia announced joint military exercises in Belarus²⁵—the longest and most extensive exercises in recent memory. By then, American intelligence knew that Russian invasion of Ukraine was imminent.

¹⁸ Hawn, *supra* note 11

¹⁹ Tom Balmforth & Alexander Tanas, *Russian Forces Hold Military Drills in Breakaway Statelet Near Ukraine*, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-hold-military-drills-breakaway-statelet-near-ukraine-2022-02-01/>.

²⁰ *NATO and the Ukraine-Russia crisis: Five key things to know*, ALJAZEERA (Feb. 15, 2022), <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/15/explainer-nato-and-the-ukraine-russia-crisis>.

²¹ Alexey D. Muraviev, *How the Russian Military Remade Itself into a Modern, Efficient and Deadly Fighting Machine*, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 27, 2022, at 10:47 PM), <https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-military-remade-itself-into-a-modern-efficient-and-deadly-fighting-machine-178014>.

²² Erin Cunningham & Maite Fernandez Simon, *What Role has Belarus Played in the Ukraine Crisis*, THE WASHINGTON POST (28 February 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/28/belarus-russia-ukraine-war/>.

²³ *Belarus: Unprecedented Crackdown*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 13, 2021), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/13/belarus-unprecedented-crackdown#>.

²⁴ Vladislav Davidzon, *Putin, Lukashenko Are Reluctant Authoritarian Bros*, FOREIGN POLICY (Jun. 21, 2021), <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/21/putin-lukashenko-belarus-sanctions/>.

²⁵ *Ukraine tensions: Russia stages military drills with Belarus*, BBC (Feb. 10, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60327930>

Several international sources have claimed that Belarus was a “staging ground”²⁶ for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is partly true, but the statement can be broadened: Belarus is Russia’s partner in the Ukraine invasion. In the ensuing weeks since the invasion, the EU and their partners have sanctioned Belarus nearly as heavily as Russia. Without Belarus’ unwavering support of Russia and their ability to use Belarus as an entry point into northern Ukraine, the invasion into Ukraine would have been difficult, if not impossible.

Belarus’ support makes the difference in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the following ways:

- *Proximity to Kyiv.* From the Belorussian town Gropol, it is nearly a straight, unobstructed shot to Kyiv. Newsweek posted a video of Russian tanks coming over the Belorussian border on the early morning of 24 FEB.²⁷ Belarus is essentially an extension of Russia’s border.
- *Additional troops if necessary.* Russia has sustained heavy losses in the conflict. Low estimates that 7,000 soldiers have been killed²⁸, while other sources ballpark closer to 10,000.²⁹ While Minsk has been coy³⁰ about stepping in to help the invasion with more soldiers, it remains an option if Russia continues to hemorrhage personnel.
- *Unobstructed supply chains.* Despite Ukraine’s valiant defense, the north of Ukraine remains firmly within Russia’s control. The Belorussian-Russian border is unobstructed, which can allow materiel and personnel to pass through unmolested.
 - In the weeks before the invasion CSIS published a paper guessing the invasion routes that Russia would take in waging war against Ukraine.³¹ The projected invasion routes and the current ones are nearly a perfect match.³²

Russia’s Access to Chernobyl

²⁶ Becky Sullivan, *Why Belarus is so involved in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine*, NPR (Mar. 11, 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/11/1085548867/belarus-ukraine-russia-invasion-lukashenko-putin>.

²⁷ Brendan Cole, *Belarus Joins Russia in Invading Ukraine as Video Shows Tanks Cross Border*, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 24, 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-belarus-putin-tanks-video-1682125>.

²⁸ Helene Cooper, Julian E. Barnes, & Eric Schmitt, *As Russian Troop Deaths Climb, Morale Becomes an Issue, Officials Say*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 16, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/us/politics/russia-troop-deaths.html>.

²⁹ Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis, & Jeremy Herb, *Mounting Russian casualties in Ukraine lead to more questions about its military readiness*, CNN (Mar. 18, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/17/europe/russian-casualties-ukraine-military-readiness/index.html>.

³⁰ Peter Beaumont, *Belarus may be about to send its troops into Ukraine, US official says*, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/belarus-troops-ukraine-russia-invasion>.

³¹ Seth G. Jones and Philip G. Wasielewski, *Russia’s Possible Invasion of Ukraine*, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Jan. 13, 2022), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-possible-invasion-ukraine>.

³² *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (updated Mar. 29, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html>.

Early in the conflict, Russia quickly surrounded and subsequently gained control of Chernobyl, the city that experienced the infamous nuclear disaster in 1986. While the radiation was too dangerous, the Russian army stationed itself in a city a safe distance away. The purpose of stationing near Chernobyl is ease of access to Kyiv, the seat of the Ukrainian government.³³ It cannot be overstated how important it is to Russia's military endeavors that Russia retains control of the Belorussian border and the northern cities as Russia's army pushes toward Kyiv to bring the capital city to its knees.

Military hardware and conscription situation

Russia has thousands of military conscripts that are rapidly losing morale as the invasion continues.³⁴ The troops are badly trained and have little experience in combat. Despite hefty financial incentives and an ambitious goal of attaining 100,000 conscripts, Russia is far behind in reaching its goal.³⁵

The situation is even worse on the ground than it is on paper. Many videos have appeared on social media of abandoned tanks, and there are unconfirmed reports that conscripts are being told they are going to drill when they are being sent to Ukraine. The now-famous UN speech during which a Russian soldier texts his mother moments before he was killed³⁶ encapsulates the wide gulf between the soldiers' belief and reality: instead of a quick, painless military campaign during which oppressed Russians would be greeted as heroes, young inexperienced soldiers are facing the horrors of war and a determined adversary.

Military hardware and apparatuses used in Ukraine invasion

The military hardware that has been used thus far has been conventional weaponry and materiel typical of a ground invasion.³⁷ These weapons have been confirmed in their use in the Ukraine invasion. This list is not exhaustive.³⁸

- TOS-1 flamethrower system
- T-72 tanks
- BM-21 "Grad" multiple launch rocket system
- Suspected use: Smerch and Urugan rocket launchers

³³ Alex Seitz-Wald, *Why would Russia want to take Chernobyl?*, NBC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2022), <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/russia-want-take-chernobyl-rcna17615>.

³⁴ Cooper, Barnes, & Schmitt, *supra* note 28.

³⁵ Kateryna Stepaneko, Frederick W. Kagan, and Brian Babcock-Lumish, *Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization*, INSTIT. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR (Mar. 5, 2022), <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/explainer-russian-conscription-reserve-and-mobilization>

³⁶ Guardian News, *Ukraine's UN ambassador reads texts from Russian soldier to mother before he was killed*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhQ5P_u4g-M.

³⁷ Peter Beaumont, *Analysis: what weapons is Russia deploying in Ukraine invasion?*, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2022), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/27/analysis-what-weapons-is-russia-deploying-in-ukraine-invasion#:~:text=While%20many%20of%20the%20weapons,particularly%20against%20built%20up%20areas>.

³⁸ *List of aircraft losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War*, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_losses_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).

- BTR3 Tanks
- T80BVM Tanks
- Small-range and medium range ballistic missiles³⁹

Planes

- Su-25 fighter jet
- Su-25SM fighter jet
- Su-34 fighter jet

Helicopters

- Mi-8 helicopter
- Mi-24 helicopter

Key Capabilities

Military Capabilities

On 21 FEB 2022, President Vladimir Putin ordered military units to invade Ukraine, fully equipped to assault the nation by land, air, and sea.⁴⁰ By 25 FEB 2022, between 169,000 and 190,000 Russian personnel had been reported along the border, in Belarus, and in occupied Crimea.⁴¹ The personnel are composed of the Russian National Guard and other internal security units.⁴²

Land Forces

The Russian Ground Forces have been arriving from Russia and travelling as far as 4,000 miles from the Russian Far East. Russia has 900,000 active-duty troops with 2,000,000 reserve troops, 7,571 artilleries, 30,122 armored vehicles, 12,420 tanks including 151 surface to surface missile launchers at their disposal.⁴³

Much of the armor is being brought in by rail, passing through Kursk, approximately 80 miles from the Ukrainian border.⁴⁴ Russian vehicles have also

³⁹ Alex Horton, *The Russian weaponry being used to attack Ukraine*, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2022), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/24/ukraine-russia-weapons/>.

⁴⁰ David Brown, *Ukraine conflict: Where are Russia's troops?*, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60158694>.

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ *Comparison of Ukraine and Russia Military Strengths (2022)*, GLOBAL FIREPOWER, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?country1=ukraine&country2=russia> (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).

⁴⁴ Brown, *supra* note 40.

been arriving by road via Karachev in the Bryansk region.⁴⁵ 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile launchers, replacing the obsolete OTR-21 Tochka systems, are speculated to have been deployed as well.⁴⁶ The Iskander, a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile, has a range of up to 200 miles, using a common transporter-erector launcher and support vehicles. The Iskander system can also fire the 9M728 (R-500, SSC-7) and 9M729 (SSC-8) cruise missiles.⁴⁷ As troops continue to accumulate on the border of Ukraine, they are put on the highest level of readiness to invade.⁴⁸

Air Forces

The Russian Aerospace Forces have been deploying missile strikes, targeting key cities throughout Ukraine.⁴⁹ As a result of failing to capture major cities by land, Aerospace forces have intensified its targeting of civilian areas by the air, striking residential buildings, schools, and hospitals.⁵⁰ The Russian military currently has 544 attack helicopters and 1,511 fighter aircrafts in their position.⁵¹ Russian warplanes are being used to target Ukrainian military bases.⁵²

Russia is doing what it can to hinder Ukraine from being able to locate its missiles. Barrages of ballistic missiles being shot into Ukraine contain decoys that “trick air-defense radars and fool heat-seeking missiles.”⁵³ The devices spanning about a foot in length are shaped like a dart are released by the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Each device contains electronics and produces radio signals to hinder enemy radars from locating the Iskander-M.⁵⁴ These decoys may cause Ukrainian air-defense weapons to have difficulty intercepting Russia’s missiles.⁵⁵ As of 3 MAR 2022, Russia has fired a total of 600 missiles since it began its invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁶

Naval Forces

⁴⁵ Brown, *supra* note 40.

⁴⁶ Brown, *supra* note 40.

⁴⁷ 9K720 Iskander (SS-26), MISSILE THREAT: CSIS MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT (updated Aug. 2, 2021), <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-26-2/>.

⁴⁸ Brown, *supra* note 40.

⁴⁹ *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, *supra* note 32.

⁵⁰ *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, *supra* note 32.

⁵¹ *Comparison of Ukraine and Russia Military Strengths (2022)*, *supra* note 43.

⁵² *Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*, *supra* note 32.

⁵³ John Ismay, *Russia Deploys a Mystery Munition in Ukraine*, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 14, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/14/us/russia-ukraine-weapons-decoy.html>.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ Oren Liebermann, *Russia has fired 600 missiles; 95% of amassed combat power now in Ukraine, senior US defense official says*, CNN NEWS (Mar. 6, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-06-22/h_9a75a46d4bfa8041016b60472351f411.

Throughout FEB, Russia held worldwide naval drills spanning from the Atlantic to the Pacific.⁵⁷ These drills involved about 140 ships and support vessels, 60 aircraft, and 10,000 personnel. The Russian Navy stationed vessels capable of landing main battle tanks, personnel, and armored vehicles in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov including six vessels that passed through the English Channel in JAN.⁵⁸ Thirteen of these vessels are equipped with cruise missiles, nine of which are in the Black Sea, and the remaining four are stationed in the Caspian Sea.⁵⁹

Special Operations Forces

The *Spetsnaz*, or “of special purpose/special designation,” remain the primary elite forces of the Russian military.⁶⁰ As part of the military intelligence, Spetsnaz is a strategic asset lent to territorial commands for operational deployment in times of war, subject to the final authority of the General Staff.⁶¹ Russia has placed the Spetsnaz at the core of Ukraine with a heavy emphasis on Kyiv.⁶² Within the Spetsnaz is the *Zaslon* unit, a unit considered to be the “alpha unit” used for covert missions and specializing in war against terrorism in extreme conditions that can operate far from Russia’s borders.⁶³ The *Zaslon* are regarded as the best fighters within the Russian army, specifically selected by the high command. The *Zaslon* is assimilating into civilian populations within Ukraine with the target of penetrating any weak spots to get at Ukraine’s political and military echelon.⁶⁴ These covert assailants are dressing in civilian clothing, causing alarm, and spiking fear in the community, resulting in neighbor accusing neighbor of being a part of the Spetsnaz. As terror continues, it can be predicted that more chaos will ensue.⁶⁵

Paramilitary Forces

The use of mercenaries is regarded as a key feature of the Kremlin’s military strategy around the world.⁶⁶ Russian mercenaries have previous history of fighting in both Syria and Libya.⁶⁷ These mercenary group, Wagner, covertly snuck into

⁵⁷ Brown, *supra* note 40.

⁵⁸ Brown, *supra* note 40.

⁵⁹ Brown, *supra* note 40.

⁶⁰ Mark Galeotti, *Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role*, GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUR. CTR. FOR SEC. STUD. (Feb. 2020), <https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/1380>.

⁶¹ *Id.*

⁶² Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin’s elite unit’s goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine’s leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165>.

⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ *Id.*

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ Michael Schwartz & Eric Schmitt, *Russian Mercenaries Have Covertly Entered Separatist Enclaves in Ukraine*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 23, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/russian-ukraine-mercenaries.html>.

⁶⁷ *Id.*

territories of Ukraine to lay the groundwork for the invasion.⁶⁸ Wagner's fighters fought in wars in the Middle East and served as security advisers to various governments, including in the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali. While loosely tied to the Russian military, it has allowed the Kremlin to deny the use of mercenaries, and instead refer to them as "volunteers."⁶⁹

As of 23 FEB 2022, there were about 300 in Wagner that arrived in the separatist enclaves of Donetsk and Luhansk.⁷⁰ Like the special forces group Zaslou, Wagner arrived in these territories dressed in civilian clothing to remain discreet.⁷¹ The purpose of mercenaries is debated. One official claimed that mercenaries were placed in rebel territories to engage in the conflict to make it appear as if Ukrainian forces were attacking civilian targets. Another official with the Ukrainian military stated that mercenaries arrived two months prior and were used to fill out the ranks of the separatist forces to make it seem like local fighters were leading the charge.⁷²

Political Capabilities

President Putin warned that those who interfered with his plans to invade Ukraine would face never-before consequences.⁷³ So far, Russia's government is making sure that these words become true. On 3 MAR 2022, the Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption Action approved a draft law that would imprison anyone for spreading false information regarding Russian military operations for up to 15 years.⁷⁴ This is an effort to control the narrative of the war and to promote a Soviet-style national unanimity.⁷⁵

The international community has been taking matters into its own hands. Both the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken steps to urge Russia to cease their operations. The UN had three emergency sessions of the Security Council and a meeting of the 193-member General Assembly, all of which calling for the de-escalation of the conflict.⁷⁶ The General Assembly voted on a resolution that would command Russia to cease its invasion of Ukraine. The resolution had widespread support

⁶⁸ Schwirtz & Schmitt, *supra* note 66.

⁶⁹ Schwirtz & Schmitt, *supra* note 66.

⁷⁰ Schwirtz & Schmitt, *supra* note 66.

⁷¹ Schwirtz & Schmitt, *supra* note 66.

⁷² Schwirtz & Schmitt, *supra* note 66.

⁷³ *Russia attacks Ukraine as Putin warns countries who interfere will face 'consequences you have never seen,'* PBS (Feb. 24, 2022), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-launches-attacks-ukraine-as-putin-warns-countries-who-interfere-consequences-you-have-never-seen>.

⁷⁴ Robert Coalson, *Putin's War At Home: Russian Government Pushes Hard To Enforce Total Unanimity On Ukraine War*, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-ukraine-war-russian-public-opinion/31734536.html>.

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ *Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine*, UN NEWS (Feb. 26, 2022), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802>.

with only five oppositions coming from Russia, Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea.⁷⁷ Following Russia's veto of the resolution, Secretary General, António Guterres, stated to press that "we must never give up" and assured that the UN is scaling up on life-saving support on both sides of the line of contact.⁷⁸

President Putin has already reached out to a few countries asking for additional support including Syria, China, and the Central African Republic.⁷⁹

Additionally, NATO allies have engaged in restrictive measures including sanctions against Russia.⁸⁰ (NATO). NATO urged Russia to stop its invasion and asked to "respect international humanitarian law and to allow for the safe and unhindered humanitarian access and assistance to all persons in need."

NATO held regular consultations with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and has enhanced existing programs and is developing substantial new programs that are targeted at developing practical support to Ukraine.⁸¹ (NATO). This includes NATO's assistance of coordinating the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. Individual member countries are sending weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and other vital military equipment to Ukraine.⁸² (NATO). In addition to sending physical resources, many ally countries are opening their borders to Ukrainian refugees seeking refuge from the turmoil.⁸³ (NATO).

Economic Capabilities

Russia's economy has been impacted from almost the start of the formal invasion at the end of FEB. In the response to severe economic sanctions, the Russian ruble's value has taken a drastic hit.⁸⁴ The Russian Bank initially spiked interest rates from 9.5% to 30% and then slowly decreased to 20%.⁸⁵ With the currency's value diminishing, this could lead to ordinary Russian citizens having their entire savings account wiped out.⁸⁶ President Putin's response to the sanctions and the long lines at banks prohibited Russian citizens from transferring any of their funds to outside of Russia in order to ride out the consequences of the sanctions.⁸⁷ Russia's stock market took a heavy loss and officially closed on 25 FEB

⁷⁷ Peter Granitz & Joe Hernandez, *The U.N. approves a resolution demanding that Russia end the invasion of Ukraine*, NPR (updated Mar. 2, 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1083872077/u-n-set-to-hold-vote-that-would-demand-russia-end-war-in-ukraine>.

⁷⁸ *Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine*, supra note 76.

⁷⁹ Naureen Chowdhury Fink, *Putin is calling in favors from Syria and Africa. It's a dangerous move*, CNN NEWS (updated Mar. 16, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/16/opinions/putin-foreign-fighters-syria-africa-ukraine-fink/index.html>.

⁸⁰ *Relations with Ukraine*, NATO (updated Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm.

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² *Id.*

⁸³ *Id.*

⁸⁴ Russell Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: Russia doubles interest rate after rouble slumps*, BBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60550992>.

⁸⁵ *Id.*

⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁸⁷ *Id.*

2022.⁸⁸ Russia has about \$630bn in reserves built up from soaring oil and gas prices. But due to the money being stored in foreign currencies, the Western ban on dealing with Russia's central bank restricts access to the cash.⁸⁹

Russian citizens are not only lining up at the ATMs to take out their cash, but also lining up at grocery stores, fearful that some items may become scarce due to trade limitations or price increases.⁹⁰ These sanctions are causing a lot more apprehension than previous ones. While citizens are stockpiling supplies, companies started to reduce their working hours or halt production all together because of their inability to access the West.⁹¹

Media/Information Capabilities

Russian authorities have been taking strides to shut down any anti-nationalist sentiments and the spread of “false information” of the invasion in Ukraine.⁹² Ekho Moskvyy radio station liquidated its channel and website after receiving pressure from the government over its coverage of the invasion.⁹³ Roskomnadzor, the state media and communications regulator, issued threats and warnings to put pressure on stations such as Ekho Moskvyy to take down their reports on Ukraine claiming the information that refers to the events as “an attack,” “invasion,” or “declaration of war” instead of a “special operation” are spreading “false information.”⁹⁴ Ekho Moskvyy and similar stations considered to report liberal opinions were taken off the air and blocked from being accessed.⁹⁵

People in Russia have been blocked from accessing Facebook while authorities are looking to restrict the use of Instagram as well. The apps' parent company, Meta, is being accused of being an “extremist organization” by Roskomnadzor and other Russian authorities.⁹⁶ This accusation followed Meta temporarily allowing some calls for violence against Russian soldiers.⁹⁷ Twitter is becoming more difficult to use, and TikTok is not allowing people in Russia to upload new material.⁹⁸ These bans and restrictions are a result of the country passing a law that criminalizes the spread of “false information” regarding the invasion. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other platforms blocked RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik in Europe in compliance with EU sanctions and at the request of other countries supporting Ukraine.⁹⁹ The EU's sanction also extends to traditional broadcast

⁸⁸ *Russia's stock market to remain closed for another week*, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 12, 2022), <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/russias-stock-market-to-remain-closed-for-another-week-11647108749>.

⁸⁹ Hotten, *supra* note 84.

⁹⁰ Hotten, *supra* note 84.

⁹¹ Hotten, *supra* note 84.

⁹² Coalson, *supra* note 74.

⁹³ Coalson, *supra* note 74.

⁹⁴ *Russia: With War, Censorship Reaches New Heights*, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 28, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/28/russia-war-censorship-reaches-new-heights>.

⁹⁵ Coalson, *supra* note 74.

⁹⁶ Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, *Russia is restricting social media. Here's what we know*, NPR (updated Mar. 21, 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban>.

⁹⁷ *Id.*

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ *Id.*

media organizations in Europe.¹⁰⁰ Roskomnadzor stated these restrictions are discriminatory and moved to block these platforms as a response.¹⁰¹ The ban on Twitter falls under a federal law regulating calls for riots, extremism, protests, and the spread of “false information.”¹⁰²

Russia’s Education Ministry also became involved online and held an “online lesson” for schoolchildren and educators on “why the liberation mission in Ukraine was necessary.”¹⁰³ The department, also referred to as the Ministry of Enlightenment, hosted the “All-Russian Open Lesson” that would teach the “danger NATO represents to [Russia]” and “why Russia stood up for the protection of the civilians of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.”¹⁰⁴ The lesson also aims at teaching children how to “distinguish the truth from lies in the huge stream of information, photos, and videos” flooding the internet.¹⁰⁵

Russian citizens are attempting to outwit the authorities by purchasing virtual private networks (VPNs) to access the blocked platforms and other news sites.¹⁰⁶ The demand for VPNs rose 668% on 3 MAR 2022 from the week prior to the invasion.¹⁰⁷

Key Organizations

Political Organizations

United Russia

United Russia is the dominant political party in the Russian Federation. United Russia holds 466 of the 620 in Russia’s Federal Assembly. Specifically, 142 of the 170 seats in the Assembly’s upper house, and 324 of the 450 seats in the Assembly’s lower house. United Russia is described as conservative and nationalist. The party strongly supports the policies of President Putin. The Current Chairman is former president Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev also serves as deputy chairman of the security council under chairman and current president Vladimir Putin.

Military Organizations

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

¹⁰⁰ Bond & Allyn, *supra* note 96.

¹⁰¹ Bond & Allyn, *supra* note 96.

¹⁰² Bond & Allyn, *supra* note 96.

¹⁰³ Coalson, *supra* note 74.

¹⁰⁴ Gerrard Kaonga, *Russia’s Ministry of Enlightenment Gives Lesson to School Children Saying War ‘Necessary,’* NEWSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2022), <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-broadcast-lesson-school-children-ukraine-war-invasion-1684436>.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ Bond & Allyn, *supra* note 96.

¹⁰⁷ Bond & Allyn, *supra* note 96.

The military forces of the Russian Federation. Branches include the Russian Ground Forces, Russian Aerospace Forces, Russian Navy, Russian Airborne Forces, Russian Strategic Missile Forces, and the Russian Special Operations Forces.

Economic Organizations

Bank of Russia

The Bank of Russia is the central bank of the Russian Federation. It serves as the primary regulator of financial markets in Russia and the Russian Ruble. The Bank of Russia has served as a financial source for the Russian Federation during the Invasion. The Bank of Russia has been the target of numerous sanctions by the United States and other countries in efforts to disrupt the funding of the invasion. The Bank of Russia has been responsible for stabilizing the Russian economy during the sanctions targeted at the bank and other Russian financial markets.

Gazprom

Gazprom is a Russian energy corporation and one of the largest natural gas companies in the world. The Russian Federation owns a majority stake in Gazprom. Gazprom is a primary partner in the Nord Stream gas pipeline that runs from Russia through Europe.

Most Responsible Parties Updates
Updates as of 25 NOV 2022

I. Military

A. Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine

1. In April, Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.¹ Dvornikov is known as the “Butcher of Syria.”²
2. In June, Gennady Zhidko was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Aleksandr Dvornikov.³
3. In October, Sergey Surovikin was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Gennady Zhidko.⁴ Surovikin is known as the “General Armageddon.”⁵

B. Deputy Minister of Defense

1. Dmitry Bulgakov, former Deputy Minister of Defense, was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev in September 2022, due to the Russian army’s widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine.⁶
2. Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, now Deputy Minister of Defense, was previously head of the National Defense Control Center of Russia.⁷ Mizintsev led the siege of the Ukrainian Sea of Azov port of Mariupol and is known as the “butcher of Mariupol.”⁸
3. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov (Deputy Minister of Defense) is frequently confused with, especially in photo usage, Nikolay Vasilyevich Pankov (Deputy of the State Duma).⁹

C. Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces

¹ *Russia names air force general to lead its forces in Ukraine*, Reuters (8 Oct. 2022, 10:38 EDT), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-names-air-force-general-lead-its-forces-ukraine-2022-10-08/>.

² Doha Madani et al., *Russia appoints general with cruel history to oversee Ukraine offensive*, NBC News, (10 Apr. 2022, 15:29 EDT), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-appoints-general-cruel-history-oversee-ukraine-offensive-rcna23784>.

³ James Beardsworth, *Russia’s Military ‘Reshuffle’ Hints at Frustration With Slow Ukraine Advance*, The Moscow Times (29 June 2022), <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/06/29/russias-military-reshuffle-hints-at-frustration-with-slow-ukraine-advance-a78143>.

⁴ *See supra* note 1.

⁵ Pjotr Sauer, *Sergei Surovikin: the ‘General Armageddon’ now in charge of Russia’s war*, The Guardian (10 Oct 2022, 12:57 EDT), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/10/sergei-surovikin-the-general-armageddon-now-in-charge-of-russias-war>.

⁶ *Russian Deputy Defense Minister Removed From Office*, RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty (24 Sept. 2022), <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-minister-bulgakov-removed/32049316.html>.

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Compare e.g., Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov*, 2022 War and Sanctions (last visited 24 Nov. 2022), <https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/en/sanction-person/513/> with *Nikolay Vasilyevich Pankov*, 2022 War and Sanctions (last visited 24 Nov. 2022), <https://sanctions.nazk.gov.ua/en/sanction-person/524/> (using Nikolay Vasilyevich Pankov’s picture for Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov’s profile also).

1. The first edition incorrectly included Andrey Yudin in its MRP dossier as a presently serving Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces, but Sergei Dronov was appointed to this role in 2019, replacing Yudin.

D. Eastern Military District

1. There is currently mixed reporting on who is head of the Eastern Military District: both Rustam Muradov and Gennady Zhidko have been independently reportedly as leading the District as of October.¹⁰ What is consistently reported is that Alexandr Chaiko is no longer leading the District after major Russian losses in northeast Ukraine in September and Ukraine's recapture of Lyman, in the Donetsk region.

E. Western Military District

1. In September 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov.¹¹ However, it is alleged that from June to September Andrei Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.¹²

F. Central Military District

1. On 29 October, Alexander Lapin was dismissed as Commander of the Central Military District. On 3 November, Alexander Linkov was reportedly appointed acting commander of Russia's Central Military District.

G. Naval Forces

1. On 17 August, Viktor Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander, replacing Igor Vladimirovich Osipov.¹³ It is alleged that Osipov was suspended following the April sinking of the fleet's flagship, the cruiser Moskva.¹⁴ It is further alleged that Osipov may have

¹⁰ Compare e.g., *Eastern Commander latest Russian general to be sacked as defeats mount - RBC news*, Reuters (7 Oct. 2022, 10:13 EDT),

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eastern-commander-latest-russian-general-be-sacked-defeats-mount-rbc-news-2022-10-07/> with Mary Ilyushina & Natalia Abakumova, *Kremlin, shifting blame for war failures, axes military commanders*, The Washington Post (8 OCT 2022, 9:40 EDT),

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/07/russia-military-commanders-dismissed-war/>.

¹¹ *Russia Sacks Commander of Western Military District - Reports*, U.S. News & World Report (3 Oct. 2022),

<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-10-03/russia-sacks-commander-of-its-western-district-forces-rbc>

¹² @CITeam_en, Twitter (27 June 2022, 15:27 ET),

https://twitter.com/CITeam_en/status/1541503442048393217?s=20&t=8bIhBWM_ZdcVpwiCprTo0g; Brendan Cole, *Top Russian Commander of Invading Army Captured by Ukraine—Report*, Newsweek (9 Sept. 2022, 4:04 EDT),

<https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-sychevoi-capture-commander-1741356>.

¹³ *Naval Academy chief Viktor Sokolov appointed as Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander*, TASS (19 Aug. 2022), <https://tass.com/defense/1495733>.

¹⁴ Matthew Mpoke Bigg, *Russian commanders are relieved of duties over failures in Ukraine, a report says.*, The New York Times (19 May 19 2022, 17:52 ET),

been killed in the Moskva's sinking, as he has "not been seen alive" since. Other sources report he was arrested.

II. Political

A. Deputy Prime Minister

1. In July, Yury Ivanovich Borisov transitioned from Deputy Prime Minister, where he was in charge of weapons industries, to Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos.¹⁵ Denis Valentinovich Manturov, the Minister of Industry and Trade, replaced Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister.¹⁶

B. Council of Ministers

1. On 25 May 2022, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Aleksandr Petrovich Chupriyan, who served as acting Minister of Emergency Situations since September 2021.¹⁷

C. Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District

1. Nikolay Nikolayevich Tsukanov was Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District from 26 JUNE 2018–9 NOV 2020. On 9 NOV 2020, Vladimir Vladimirovich Yakushev replaced Tsukanov and remains in this position.

<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/19/world/russia-ukraine-war?smid=url-share#russian-commanders-are-relieved-of-duties-over-failures-in-ukraine-a-report-says>.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Kluger, *The U.S. and Russia Signal Continued Cooperation—In Space, At Least*, TIME (7 Oct. 2022, 17:35 EDT), <https://time.com/6220640/us-russian-space-station-collaboration/>.

¹⁶ *Putin reshuffles top officials, names new head of state space corporation*, CNBC (15 July 2022, 9:31 EDT), <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/15/putin-reshuffles-top-officials.html>.

¹⁷ *Putin appoints Alexander Kurenkov as Emergency Situations Minister*, TASS (25 May 2022), <https://tass.com/politics/1455683>.

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01. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN

Title(s):

President of the Russian Federation
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Chairman of the Russian Security Council

Role(s):

Commanded Russian armed forces to assemble along the Ukrainian-Russian border and gave the order to launch a war of aggression upon the State of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (“Putin”) was born on 07 OCT 1952 (70 years old), in Leningrad, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union (now Saint Petersburg, Russia). Putin studied law at Leningrad State University and graduated in 1975. In 1975, Putin began his service as a foreign intelligence officer for the Committee for State Security (“KGB”). In total, Putin served as a foreign intelligence officer for the KGB for a period of fifteen years. Putin retired from the KGB in 1990 as a lieutenant colonel.

Following his KGB service, Putin returned to Russia and became the prorector of Leningrad State University. This role required Putin to represent the institution in all external affairs. While at Leningrad State in the role of prorector, Putin reunited with his old tutor, Sobchak, who was, at the time, the first democratically elected mayor of Saint Petersburg. While serving as an advisor to Sobchak, Putin earned the trust and confidence of his boss, earning a reputation for getting things done. Due to this reputation, in 1994, Putin became first deputy mayor.

Two years later, in 1996, Putin moved to Moscow and became a deputy to Pavel Borodin, who was the Kremlin’s chief administrator. Putin was able to make sturdy connections with fellow Leningrad State alumnus, such as Anatoly Chubais, which resulted in Putin being promoted through the administrative ranks. In JUL 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin to the

post of director of the Federal Security Service (“FSB”) (the domestic successor of the KGB). Soon thereafter, Putin became the secretary of the Security Council. At this time, President Yeltsin was looking for someone to assume his duties. Yeltsin had undergone emergency quintuple heart bypass surgery in 1996 followed by the government’s default on its debts which caused the 1998 Russian financial crisis. As a result of Yeltsin’s failures, and Putin’s quick rise, Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister in 1999.

When he was appointed Prime Minister, Putin was virtually unknown amongst Russian society. However, this quickly changed after he launched a military operation against secessionist groups in Chechnya. The Chechnya operation catapulted Putin’s public-approval ratings and ensured his electoral bloc, Unity, a victory in parliamentary elections.

Yeltsin announced his resignation on 31 DEC 1999 and named Putin the acting president. Putin won the MAR 2000 elections with about fifty-three percent of the vote. The MAR 2000 elections marked the first time that the electoral process was utilized to determine who sat in the Kremlin. Following his electoral victory, Putin suggested unity with political foes when he contemplated adding members of opposition political parties to posts in his government. Among his priorities, Putin sought to end corruption and found a regulated market economy.

Upon his election, Putin divided Russia’s eighty-nine regions and republics into seven federal districts, with each district headed by a representative appointed by the president. Contemporaneously, Putin removed the right of regional governors to sit on the Federation Council, which is the upper house of Russian parliament. Putin also closed several media outlets and initiated criminal proceedings against large figures in the media industry, to reduce the power of financiers and media tycoons.

Putin had a rocky relationship with U.S. President George W. Bush. In 2001, he strongly objected to Bush’s decision to discard the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. However, in response to the attacks of 11 SEP 2001, Putin pledged Russia’s assistance to the U.S.-led campaign against terrorist organizations. In this assistance, Russia allowed allied forces to utilize Russian airspace for humanitarian deliveries and aided in search-and-rescue operations. However, Putin opposed the U.S. and U.K. use of force to oust the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.

In 2004, Putin was reelected. However, the Russian constitution, at that time, limited the president to serving two consecutive terms. So, from 2008 to 2012, Putin served as prime minister under Dmitry Medvedev. As prime minister under Medvedev, Putin oversaw large-scale military and police reform, as well as the Russo-Georgian War.

Putin was reelected to the presidency in 2012, and again in 2018. In APR 2021, Putin signed a constitutional amendment into law that allowed him to run for reelection two more times.

Summary of Role(s): The situation in Ukraine is complex and Putin's involvement in such is widespread being at the top of the chain on command.

On 10 OCT 2022, Putin ordered missile strikes across Ukraine in response to the Crimean bridge explosion. Putin claimed that Russia targeted military, energy and communications assets, but instead missiles landed in 15 Ukrainian cities.

On 30 SEP 2022, Putin signed decrees which annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts of Ukraine into the Russian Federation. The annexations are not recognized by the international community, and are illegal under international law.

On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced a partial mobilization and the forthcoming annexation referendums in Russian-occupied Ukraine. On the same day, Putin also threatened to use nuclear weapons if Russia's territorial sovereignty was threatened.

On 24 FEB 2022, Putin announced that Russian armed forces were launching a "special military operation" in eastern Ukraine. In his speech announcing such an operation, Putin claimed that Russia sought the demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine. Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's government was a Nazi government and that it was committing genocide against Russian speaking Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine. Within minutes of Putin's speech, explosions were reported across Ukraine, including in locations such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region.

On 21 FEB 2022, Putin announced that Russia recognized the independence of two-regions, Donetsk and Luhansk.

On 25 JAN 2022, the Russian military conducted exercises that involved 6,000 troops and sixty jets near Ukraine and Crimea. Later, on 10 FEB 2022, Russia and Belarus both began to conduct military maneuvers that lasted for ten-days.

On 10 NOV 2021, the U.S. reported that Russian troops were moving in an unusual fashion near the Ukrainian border. Ukraine reported 92,000 Russian troops had assembled by 28 NOV 2021.

In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine after "little green men," later identified as Russian actors, seized key facilities and checkpoints in Crimea.

Organizational Membership: Putin is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland. While Putin is not the official leader of the United Russia party, he is the de facto leader of it and the party fully supports his policies.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced his plan to annex portions of Ukraine as Russian territory and, on the same day, threatened to use nuclear weapons in defence of Russian territory.

On 18 MAR 2022, Putin attended a concert at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow to commemorate the eighth anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. At that rally, Putin reiterated his false claims that Ukraine was committing genocide against Russian speaking individuals in the Donbas and stated that it was the main reason for the invasion. He also stated that "For a world without Nazism," Russia "will definitely implement all [of its] plans" in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Putin.

On 01 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Putin.

On 28 FEB 2022, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland sanctioned Putin.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S., E.U., and U.K. sanctioned Putin.

On 24 FEB 2022, Putin addressed the world and announced a special military operation against Ukraine. In that speech, Putin stated that NATO expansion into eastern Europe was one catalyst for his invasion of Ukraine.

On 21 FEB 2022, Putin gave a speech in which he recognized the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic, two break away regions of Ukraine, as sovereign and independent states.

On 30 SEP 2015, Putin authorized Russian military intervention in Syria after a formal request from the Syrian regime.

In 2014, under the leadership of Putin, Russia officially annexed Crimea and Sevastopol.

02. VALERY VASILYEVICH GERASIMOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army

Role(s):

Top uniformed member of the Russian military and commands the entirety of Russia's armed forces.



Biographical Summary: Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov (“Gerasimov”) was born on 08 SEP 1955, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, Soviet Union. From 1971 to 1973, Gerasimov attended the Kazan Suvorov Military School. From 1973 to 1977, he attended the Kazan Higher Tank Command School. Following his studies at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, Gerasimov was assigned to the post of commander of a Mechanized Infantry platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. From 1993 to 1995, Gerasimov was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District.

From 1984 to 1987, Gerasimov studied at the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy. Finally, from 1995 to 1997, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. Following his graduation from the General Staff academy, Gerasimov served as the First Deputy Army Commander within the Moscow Military District as well as the commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War.

In 2006, Gerasimov became the commander of the Leningrad Military District before being moved to command the Moscow Military District in 2009. On 23 DEC 2010, Gerasimov became

the deputy Chief of the General Staff. In 2012, he was assigned to command the Central Military District. On 06 NOV 2012, Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.

In FEB 2013, Gerasimov published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” in the Russian trade-paper *Military-Industrial Kurier*. In this article, Gerasimov laid out a new theory of modern warfare. According to *Politico*, this new theory, known as the Gerasimov Doctrine, “took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war, and laid out a new theory of modern warfare—one that looks more like hacking an enemy’s society than attacking it head-on.” Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness . . . [a]ll this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.”

Gerasimov has been awarded the “Hero of the Russian Federation” award, which is given to individuals who provide extraordinary service to the state.

Summary of Role(s): As the Chief of the General Staff, Gerasimov is the highest-ranking officer of the Russian Armed Forces and the senior-most uniformed military officer. This position is comparable to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gerasimov is responsible for the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine, the invasion, and lack of de-escalation of the persistent situation.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 24 OCT 2022, Gerasimov spoke separately by phone with U.S. Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. Mark Milley for the first time since May and Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the British Chief of the Defense Staff, about the situation in Ukraine.

On 21 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 14 MAR 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 01 MAR 2022, the Japan sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 23 DEC 2021, Gerasimov held a meeting with Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the British Chief of the Defense Staff to discuss regional security issues.

On 09 DEC 2021, Gerasimov issued a warning to the government of Ukraine against trying to settle the war in the Donbas through the utilization of force. He said that “information about Russia’s alleged impending invasion of Ukraine is a lie.” Gerasimov went on to say “Kyiv is not fulfilling the Minsk Agreements. The Ukrainian armed forces are touting that they have started to employ US-supplied Javelin anti-tank missile systems in [Donbas] and are also using Turkish reconnaissance/strike drones. As a result, the already tense situation in the east of that country is further deteriorating.”

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 01 OCT 2020, the Australia sanctioned Gerasimov.

On 02 APR 2020, the Switzerland sanctioned Gerasimov.

In MAY 2014, Canada, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland sanctioned Gerasimov for interference in Ukraine and for his responsibility for the deployment of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border.

In SEP 2014, Australia sanctioned Gerasimov “for the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine and lack of de-escalation of the situation.”

In APR 2014, the E.U. sanctioned Gerasimov for “actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”

03. NIKOLAI VASILYEVICH BOGDANOVSKY/BOGDANOVSKIY

Title(s):

First Deputy of the General Staff

Role(s):

One of the top leaders of the Russian military.



Biographical Summary: Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky (“Bogdanovsky”) was born on 17 JAN 1957 in Predgorny, Biysk District, Altai Krai, Russia, Soviet Union. Bogdanovsky attended the Yekaterinburg Suvorov Military School from 1972 to 1974, and then the Moscow Higher Military Command school between 1974 and 1978. From 1984 to 1987, he attended the Frunze Military Academy. From 1994 to 1996, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

In 1978, Bogdanovsky joined the Soviet Army, where he served as a reconnaissance platoon commander, company commander, chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion, commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary from 1978 to 1984. From 1987 to 1994, Bogdanovsky was the chief of staff of fortified areas, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, and chief of staff of a motorized rifle division.

From 1996 to 2006, he was the Chief of the 392nd Pacific Center for Training Junior Specialists of Motorized Rifle Forces. He also served, during this time, as the Chief of Staff and Commander of the 35th Army.

Between JUN 2006 and JAN 2008, Bogdanovsky was the Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District. Following this post, from JAN 2008 to MAR 2009, he was the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

Between 24 MAR 2009 and 09 JAN 2011, Bogdanovsky was the Commander of the Leningrad Military District. On 09 JAN 2011, Putin issued a decree that appointed Bogdanovsky to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training.

On 13 DEC 2012, Bogdanovsky was promoted to the rank of Colonel General. Following this promotion, he became the commander of the Central Military District. Then, on 12 JUN 2014, Putin once again promoted Bogdanovsky by Decree of the President, this time to the position of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. Between 29 SEP and 01 OCT 2015, Bogdanovsky took part in negotiations on coordination of actions with the Israel Defense Forces during Russia's military intervention in Syria.

Summary of Role(s): Disseminates the Commander-in-Chief's policies, transmits his orders, and oversees the execution of such orders in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 01 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Bogdanovsky..

On 18 MAY 2022, Australia sanctioned Bogdanovsky.

On 21 APR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Bogdanovsky.

On 17 SEP 2014, Canada sanctioned Bogdanovsky for or his involvement in Russia's annexation of Crimea.

04. IGOR OLEGOVICH KOSTYUKOV

Title(s):

Director of Russian Military Intelligence

Role(s):

Heads the main intelligence department of the Russian General Staff and provides the military actively engaged in hostilities in Ukraine with intelligence.



Biographical Summary: Igor Olegovich Kostyukov (“Kostyukov”) was born on 21 FEB 1961 in Amur Oblast, RSFSR, USSR. On 22 NOV 2018, he was appointed the acting Director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Department (GBU) following the death of Igor Korobov, who had held the role prior. In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. Kostyukov is the first naval officer to hold the office of the Director of the GBU. While not much information is available on Kostyukov, it has been noted that he is a hardliner. He has been awarded the “Hero of Russian Federation” award.

Summary of Role(s): Senior official of the authority that is directly involved in hostilities against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 20 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Kostyukov for allegedly stealing Angela Merkel’s emails in a 2015 hacking attack on the German parliament.

On 11 MAY 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Kostyukov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 07 APR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Kostyukov for his senior leadership role when the toxic nerve agent “Novichok” was used by officers from the GRU in the U.K. and also for cyberattacks where data was stolen and e-mail accounts of several MPs as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel were affected.

On 06 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Kostyukov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 05 APR 2022, Canada sanctioned Kostyukov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Kostyukov.

In MAR 2022, the E.U. placed Kostyukov on its “blacklist.”

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Kostyukov.

On 21 JAN 2019, the E.U. sanctioned Kostyukov.

On 29 DEC 2016, following the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, the U.S. placed Kostyukov on its “blacklist” for allegedly interfering in the elections.

05. OLEG LEONIDOVICH/LEONYDOVYCH SALYUKOV

Title(s):

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces

Role(s):

Heads and commands the entirety of the Russian ground forces which are engaged in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov (“Salyukov”) was born on 21 MAY 1955 in Saratov, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1977, Salyukov graduated from the Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School with a gold medal. From 1977 to 1982, Salyukov held the positions of (i) platoon officer, (ii) company officer, and (iii) Chief of the staff for the Battalion Commander in the Kiev Military District.

In 1985, he graduated from the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy with high honors. From 1985 to 1994, he held the positions of (i) Deputy Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, (ii) Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, and (iii) Deputy Commander of a Guards tank division in the Moscow Military District.

From 1994 to 1997, he held the positions of (i) Commander of the 81st Guards Motor Rifle Division, (ii) Chief of the staff and Army Commander (35th Army), and (iii) Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District. In 1996, Salyukov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

From 2005 to 2008, he served as the Chief of the Staff-First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District. From 2008 to 2010, he held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District. From 2010 to 2014, he was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From MAY 2014 to the present, Salyukov holds the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. In MAY 2014, Salyukov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army.

Summary of Role(s): Commanded the entirety of Russia's ground forces during the invasion of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 10 May 2022, Salyukov commanded a victory day parade marking the 77th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany where Putin, when discussing Russia's war in Ukraine, said to his military "You are fighting for the motherland, for her future, and so that nobody forgets the lessons of World War II, so that there is no place in the world for executioners, killing squads and Nazis."

On 12 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Salyukov.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Salyukov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Salyukov.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Salyukov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Salyukov.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Salyukov for being "responsible for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine."

On 16 SEP 2014, Canada sanctioned Salyukov.

06. VASILY/VASILII PETROVICH TONKOSHKUROV

Title(s):

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces

Role(s):

Advises and assists Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vasily Petrovich Tonkoshkurov (“Tonkoshkurov”) was born on 27 JAN 1960 in Karaganda, Kazakh SSR, USSR. He joined the Soviet Armed Forces in 1977. In 1981, he graduated from the General VI Lenin Higher Military School in Tashkent. From OCT 1983 to DEC 1985, Tonkoshkurov was in the 371st motorized battalion. He was injured while involved in the Soviet-Afghan War.

In 1990, he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Between FEB 2000 and JUL 2000, he was involved in the Second Chechen War.

In 2004, Tonkoshkurov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff with a gold medal. Beginning in JUL 2004, he commanded the 19th motorized division of the North Caucasus region. In JUN 2008, Tonkoshkurov was assigned to the post of first deputy commander of the 42st army of the Siberian region. On 11 JUN 2009, he was assigned as commander of the 42st Siberian army.

Between OCT 2013 and MAY 2018, Tonkoshkurov was the deputy commander of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In MAY 2018, Tonkoshkurov was appointed to the post of deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 APR 2021, Tonkoshkurov announced that Russia aimed to establish its first experimental army unit equipped with combat UGVs.

In MAR 2019, Tonkoshkurov accompanied and led 100 Russian soldiers in an envoy to Venezuela to discuss equipment maintenance, training, and strategy with the Maduro regime.

On 30 SEP 2014, Tonkoshkurov told reporters that the first Russian military drafts in Crimea and Sevastopol would begin in 2015.

07. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER ANATOLYEVICH MATOVNIKOV

Title(s):

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces

Role(s):

Advises and assists the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Anatolyevich Matovnikov (“Matovnikov”) was born on 19 SEP 1965 in Moscow. In 1982, he began attending the Higher Border Military-Political School of the KGB and graduated in 1986. Upon graduation, he began his service in KGB group “A.”

During his KGB service, Matovnikov was a member of a motorized group operating under the cover of operational units of border troops during the Soviet-Afghan war. Additionally, he held the positions of the head of the 2nd department of the 1st department of Department “A” and the first deputy head of Department “A.” In 1987, he was a member of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s security detail during a state visit to the U.S. In 1988, he was a member of the security detail for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher when she visited areas of Armenia affected by an earthquake.

In 1992, Matovnikov graduated from the Higher School of the Ministry of Security of Russia. Afterwards, he took part in both the First and Second Chechen Wars, including several special operations. Such operations included the storming of a hospital in Budyonnovsk, an anti-terrorist operation in the “Nord-Ost” on Dubrovka, and an investigation into the circumstances of the storming of a school in Beslan.

In 2013, Matovnikov was transferred to the Ministry of Defense and then appointed to the post of Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Main (Intelligence) Directorate of

the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In 2015, he became Commander of the MTR and Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

It has been reported that Matovnikov was a special assignment officer under Putin and led secret military operations abroad. Such operations included coordinating the actions of personnel in Ukraine during Russia's annexation of Crimea. He was also reported to be in command posts during Russia's military intervention in Syria's civil war. In 2017, Matovnikov was awarded the title of "Hero of the Russian Federation" by Putin for his actions in Syria. On 22 FEB 2018, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. On 26 JUN 2018, he was appointed Plenipotentiary Representative in the North Caucasus Federal District. On 03 JUL 2018, he was included in the Russian Security Council.

On 22 JAN 2020, he was transferred to the post of Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces. On 03 FEB 2020, he was removed from the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, and Vasily Tonkoshkurov, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, in military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Matovnikov is a member of the Association of Veterans of the Anti-Terror Unit "Alpha."

Incidents and Events of Note: Unknown.

08. SERGEY/SERGEI VLADIMIROVICH SUROVIKIN

Title(s):

General of the Army
Commander of the Aerospace Forces
Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine

Role(s):

Responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin (“Surovikin”) was born on 11 OCT 1966 in Novosibirsk, RSFSR, USSR. In 1987, Surovikin graduated from Omsk Higher Military Command School. Following his education, he was sent to a Spetsnaz unit and served in the Soviet-Afghan War.

In AUG 1991, during the AUG Coup, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on Garden Ring, which resulted in three demonstrators being killed. After the coup was defeated, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. On 10 DEC 1991, Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders and dropped the charges. Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major shortly afterwards.

He also attended the Frunze Military Academy. In SEP 1995, Surovikin was sentenced to a year of probation by the Moscow garrison’s military court for the illegal sale of weapons. The conviction was later overturned when the investigation concluded that Surovikin gave a fellow student a pistol for a competition, but was unaware of its intended purpose. Surovokin graduated from Frunze in 1995.

Upon graduation from Frunze, Surovikin was sent to Tajikistan to command a motor rifle (tank) battalion. Shortly after, he became the chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division.

In 2002, Surovikin graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Upon graduation, Surovikin was sent to Yekaterinburg, where he became the commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division.

In MAR 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of assaulting him for voting for the wrong candidate. In APR 2004, division deputy commander for armaments Colonel Andrei Shtakal shot himself in the presence of Surovikin after being criticized by Surovikin. Military prosecutors found no evidence of guilt in either instance.

Beginning in JUN 2004, Surovikin led the 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division which was stationed in Chechnya.

In 2005, he became the chief of staff of the 20th Guards Army. In APR 2008, he became the army commander. In NOV 2008, Surovikin became the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. In JAN 2010, he became the chief of staff of the Volga-Urals Military District (which became the Central Military District shortly thereafter).

Beginning in NOV 2011, Surovikin headed a working group that was established to create a Military Police. In OCT 2012, he became the chief of staff of the Eastern Military District. In OCT 2013, he was appointed commander of the Eastern Military District. On 13 DEC 2013, he was promoted to the rank of colonel general.

On 09 JUN 2017, Surovikin was introduced to media representatives as the Commander of the Russian armed forces deployed to Syria. On 22 NOV 2017, Surovikin was appointed to the post of Commander of the Aerospace Forces by presidential decree. On 28 DEC 2017, Surovikin was awarded the Hero of the Russian Federation award for his involvement in Syria.

Surovikin once again commanded the contingent of Russian military forces in Syria from JAN 2019 to APR 2019. In 2021, Surovikin was promoted to General of the Army.

On 08 NOV 2022, Putin appointed Sergey Surovikin the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Gennady Zhidko. Surovikin is known as the “General Armageddon.”

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 NOV 2022, Surovikin appeared on Russian State television with Sergey Shoygu approving of Russia's military withdrawal from Ukraine's Kherson City.

On 08 NOV 2022, Putin appointed Surovikin the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

On 18 OCT 2022, Surovikin told reporters that "The situation in the area of the 'Special Military Operation' can be described as tense."

On 12 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 14 MAR 2022, Ukraine's Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova announced that she filed a criminal case against Surovikin and other Russian officials. The same day, Canada sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. added Surovikin to its sanctions list for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine "for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine."

On 22 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Surovikin for his involvement in Ukraine.

In OCT 2020, a Human Rights Watch report listed Surovikin as one of the commanders "who may bear command responsibility for violations" during the 2019–2020 offensive in Idlib, Syria.

In 2004, it is reported that a colonel serving under Surovikin killed himself after Surovikin addressed him inappropriately.

In AUG 1990, Surovikin, 24 and then a captain, he participated in the failed coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Surovikin led a motorized rifle battalion that drove through barricades set up by protesters outside the Russian White House. Units under Surovikin's

command killed three civilians — Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky and Vladimir Usov. After the failed coup, Surovikin was jailed for several months but then was freed and never convicted of any crime as prosecutors in Moscow ruled that he was simply obeying an order.

09. VIKTOR MUSAVIROVICH AFZALOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces,
Chief of the Main Staff

Role(s):

Advises and assists the commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Photo unavailable.

Biographical Summary: Viktor Musavirovich Afzalov (“Afzalov”) was born 09 JUN 1968. Information regarding the specifics of Afzalov’s background and career are not publicly available.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: Unknown.

10. SERGEY/SERGEI VLADIMIROVICH DRONOV

Title(s):

Commander of the Air Force,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces

Role(s):

Commands the entirety of the Russian Air Force and therefore its operations in Ukraine. Advises and assists the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergei Vladimirovich Dronov (“Dronov”) was born on 11 AUG 1962 in Almazovka, Voroshilovograd region, Ukraine. In 1983, Dronov graduated from the Yeisk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots. Upon graduation, Dronov was referred for further service in the Belarusian Military District, where he served in a fighter-bomber regiment. In 1990, Dronov attended the Yuri Hagarin Air Force Academy. Upon graduation, he was appointed commander of a fighter regiment in the North Caucasus Military District. He then commanded the air force and air defense units in the Far Eastern Military District, though the period of time of such service is unknown to us. In 2013, Dronov was appointed deputy commander of the Russian air force.

In SEP 2015, Dronov was appointed head of the aviation group for the Russian air force base in Syria. During this post, Dronov planned and conducted military operations on the orders of the Supreme Commander. He returned to Russia in 2017. In 2019, Dronov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Air Force of the Russian Federation and the deputy commander of the Aerospace Forces.

Summary of Role(s): Commands the entirety of the Russian Air Force. Advises and assists the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces in aerial military decisions and tactics in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Drovnov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Drovnov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Drovnov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Drovnov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Drovnov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Drovnov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Drovnov “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

11. NIKOLAI/NIKOLAY ANATOLYEVICH YEVMENOV

Title(s):

Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy

Role(s):

Commands the entirety of Russian naval forces. Responsible for any maritime operation of the Russian navy, including in or to Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Nikolai Anatolyevich Yevmenov (“Yevmenov”) was born on 02 APR 1962 in Moscow. He studied at the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation from 1982 to 1987. Upon graduation, he was appointed to the post of commander of the electronic navigation department of the navigation unit (BCh-1) of a nuclear submarine in the Pacific Fleet from 1987 to 1991.

From 1995 to 1997, he studied at the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy. From 1997 to 1999, he commanded ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific Fleet. From 1999 to 2006 he was chief of staff, deputy commander, and then commander of the 25th submarine division of the Pacific Fleet. During this time, from 2001 to 2003, he studied at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

In 2012, Yevmenov was named deputy commander of the Northern Fleet. In 2016, he became commander of the Northern Fleet. In 2017, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. On 03 MAY 2019, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy.

Summary of Role(s): Heads and commands the entirety of Russia’s naval forces, including in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 JUN 2022, Yevmenov told reporters that the Russian Navy will receive 46 warships and support vessels in 2022.

On 12 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U sanctioned Yevmenov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In NOV 2019, Yevmenov made an official visit to Japan to meet with Hiroshi Yamamura, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Self Defense Force. During this visit, Yevmenov took a photo with a portrait of Togo Heihachiro (the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet who defeated the Russian fleet during the Battle of Tsushima), which sparked a controversy in Russia.

12. ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOVICH NOSATOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy
Chief of the Navy Main Staff

Role(s):

Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Mikhailovich Nosatov (“Nosatov”) was born on 27 MAR 1963 in Sevastopol, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. He studied at the P. S. Nakhimov Black Sea Higher Naval School and graduated in 1985. Early in his career, Nosatov was a lieutenant engineer in the laboratory of the coastal base maintenance workshop within the Pacific Fleet. Between 1986 and 1989, he commanded an anti-aircraft missile battery aboard the *Stoykiy*. Nosatov was then the commander of missile and artillery combat aboard the destroyer *Bezboyaznenny*. Beginning in 1991, he was assistant to the flagship missile specialist of the 35th missile ship division.

Beginning in 1993, Nosatov was the commander of the *Bezboyaznenny*’s missile weapons. In 1994, he became the flagship specialist in missile weapons for the 35th division of missile ships. Between 1997 and 1998, Nosatov was the senior officer to the commander of the *Slava*-class cruiser *Varyag*.

In 2000, Nosatov graduated from the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy. Upon graduation, he took over his own command of the Pacific Fleet destroyer *Bystryy*. Between 2002 and 2007, Nosatov was chief of staff and commander of the 36th division of surface ships. In 2006, he was

promoted to rear-admiral by presidential decree. Nosatov undertook further studies at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, leaving in 2009.

In 2009, Nosatov was appointed commander of the naval base at Baltiysk. On 27 JAN 2012, he was appointed deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet. In 2013, he became the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet. On 05 MAY 2014, Nosatov was promoted to vice admiral by presidential decree. Beginning on 17 MAY 2016, he was the head of the Naval Academy, but did not hold the position for long. On 30 JUN 2016, he was appointed acting commander of the Baltic Fleet. On 18 OCT 2016, Nosatov was presented with the ceremonial standard of the fleet. On 12 DEC 2018, he was promoted to Admiral. He has been awarded the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Naval Merit. On 05 OCT 2021 Nosatov was appointed to the post of Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 16 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Nosatov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 12 MAR 2022, the E.U sanctioned Nosatov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

On 01 OCT 2020, Australia sanctioned Nosatov as Former Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral, as responsible for commanding Russian forces that have occupied Ukrainian sovereign territory.

On 31 MAR 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Nosatov for his involvement in Ukraine..

In DEC 2020, Nosatov gave a statement to the Russian army's *Red Star* newspaper that Russia would beef up its forces in the Kaliningrad exclave. He cited the need to respond to a so-called buildup of NATO forces nearby.

On 17 FEB 2015, Canada sanctioned Nosatov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 21 MAR 2014, Nosatov was added to the E.U. sanctions list in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea.

13. VLADIMIR LVOVICH KASATONOV

Title(s):

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy

Role(s):

Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in or to Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Lvovich Kasatonov (“Kasatonov”) was born on 17 JUN 1962 in Moscow, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1977, Kasatonov entered the Nakhimov Naval School in Leningrad. In 1979, he began studying at the P. S. Nakhimov Black Sea Higher Naval School, and graduated in 1984 with a gold medal. Upon graduation, he began his active service with the Northern Fleet in the missile division of the armament section of the heavy nuclear missile cruiser *Kirov*. In SEP 1987, he was appointed commander of the *Kirov*’s missile division. In FEB 1988, he was promoted to the rank of captain-lieutenant. In SEP 1988, he was appointed assistant commander of the *Kirov*.

From 1990 to 1991, Kasatonov served in the Mediterranean Sea with the 5th Operational Squadron. In JUL 1991, he graduated from the Higher Special Officer Classes and was subsequently appointed to the post of senior assistant commander of the *Sovremenny*-class destroyer *Gremyashchy*. Beginning in APR 1994, Kasatonov was the senior assistant to the commander of the destroyer *Rastoropnyy*. In DEC 1994, he became the commander of the *Rastoropnyy*. In SEP 1997, he entered the Naval academy and graduated with honors in JUN 1999. After graduation, he was appointed head of the department of mobilization at the Northern Fleet headquarters.

From MAR 2000 to JUL 2005, Kasatonov served as the captain of the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy. From 2005 to 2006, he served as Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet’s 43rd missile ship

division. Beginning in SEP 2006, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In AUG 2008, Kasatonov was appointed commander of the Northern Fleet's 43rd missile ship division. In OCT 2008, Kasatonov was the leader of a detachment of Northern Fleet warships on a cruise from the Arctic Ocean into the Atlantic. Such detachments made port calls in Venezuela before going through the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.

In APR 2010, Kasatonov was appointed the commander of the Kola Flotilla. In the SUMMER of 2012, Kasatonov was the commander of a detachment of ships from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. On 14 SEP 2012, he was appointed the chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. On 12 JUN 2013, Kasatonov was promoted to vice-admiral. On 03 OCT 2016, he was appointed the head of the Naval Academy.

On 20 DEC 2018, Kasatonov defended his thesis and was awarded a doctorate of military science. In DEC 2019, he was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the navy.

Summary of Role(s): Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies in or to Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U sanctioned Kasatonov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In DEC 2021, Kasatonov said that research by Russian naval vessels indicates that the continental shelf is even larger than most had thought up to now.

In JUN 2021, Kasatonov, a representative of Rosoboronexport, Russia's state-owned defense export firm, and about 20 Russian representatives (mainly Russian navy officers) secretly visited Myanmar.

14. IGOR VLADIMIROVICH OSIPOV

Title(s):

Former Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet
(MAY 2019–AUG 2022)

Role(s):

Commands the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Vladimirovich Osipov (“Osipov”) was born on 06 MAR 1973 in Novoshumnoye, Fyodorov District, Kostanay Region, Kasazkh SSR, USSR. He attended the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation in Saint Petersburg, and graduated in 1995 with a speciality in navigation. In AUG 1995, he began his naval service with the Pacific Fleet as the weapons commander of the *Grisha*-class corvette MPK-221, which was part of the 11th division of anti-submarine ships of the Primorsky Flotilla’s 47th brigade. This brigade was tasked with patrolling an area covering Russky Island and Paris Bay.

Between JUL 1998 and JUL 2000, Osipov commanded the MPK-61, which was part of the 11th division of the 165th brigade of surface ships covering the sea area around Vladivostok and Maly Ulyss Bay. From JUL 2000 to DEC 2001, he served as the chief of staff for the 11th division. Osipov then commanded the 11th division from DEC 2001 to SEP 2002. Following this post, Osipov undertook additional studies at the Naval Academy and graduated in 2004. Between JUN 2004 and JAN 2007, he served as the chief of staff for the 165th brigade. From JAN 2007 to AUG 2011, he served as the commander of the 165th brigade.

In 2012, Osipov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. In JUN 2012, he was appointed chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Baltic

Naval Base, Baltiysk, of the Baltic Fleet. From OCT 2012 to MAY 2015, he served as the base commander for the same base. In MAY 2015, he was appointed to the post of commander of the Caspian Flotilla.

Between SEP 2016 and AUG 2018, he served as the chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. Between AUG 2018 and MAY 2019, Osipov was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. During this post, he was promoted to vice-admiral in 2018. On 08 MAY 2019, Osipov was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet (this appointment was backdated to 03 MAY 2019). On 11 JUN 2021, Osipov was promoted to the rank of admiral.

It is alleged that Osipov may have been killed in the APR 2022 sinking of Russian Black Sea Fleet's flagship, the Moskva's, as he has "not been seen alive" since. Other sources report he was arrested.

Summary of Role(s): Commanded the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine from MAY 2019 to AUG 2022.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In AUG 2022, Viktor Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander, replacing Osipov. It is alleged that Osipov was suspended following the APR sinking of the fleet's flagship, the cruiser Moskva.

On 14 APR 2022, Ukraine sank the Russian Black Sea Fleet's flagship, the cruiser Moskva.

On 15 MAR 2022, satellite imagery showed at least fourteen Russian Navy vessels approaching the Ukrainian coast from the Black Sea. The imagery showed the following groupings of vessels: (i) northern group: line-astern formation led by a tug boat or minesweeper appearing to tow a mine clearing device, followed by two *Ropucha*-class landing ships, another tug boat, and a trailing *Ropucha*; (ii) second group in a square formation made up of smaller warships, including missile corvettes; (iii) a southern group led by the *Slava*-class cruiser *Moskva*, two *Alligator*-class landing ships, the *Ivan Gren*-class landing ship *Pyotr Morgunov*, and a smaller warship, possibly identified as a *Buyan-M*-class missile corvette. The PM-138 vessel was observed in Lake Donuzlav, which has immediate access to the sea and is viewed as a safe harbor to perform emergency battle repairs. Another vessel, the PM-56, was positioned similarly near Feodosia, which is to the east of Crimea. Since its initial placement near Feodosia, the PM-56 has subsequently been moved further east, possibly to support vessels stationed in the Sea of Azov.

On 14 MAR 2022, a Russian convoy landed at Berdyansk within the Sea of Azov.

On 12 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U sanctioned Osipov for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In FEB 2022, six amphibious landing ships, that are normally based in the Arctic and Baltic Seas, were moved to the Black Sea to bolster the Black Sea Fleet. These were further bolstered by amphibious landing ships and combatants from the Arctic, Baltic, Pacific, and Caspian. Further units, including missile corvettes, were moved to the Sea of Azov (a restricted and shallow body of water), placing them adjacent to the city of Mariupol in Donetsk. On 17 FEB 2022, reports showed that Russia appeared to have pre-positioned two repair ships on either side of the Crimean peninsula. The vessels appeared to be Project 304 Amur Class repair and depot ships that are used to perform urgent repairs on the high seas.

15. VIKTOR VASILYEVICH ZOLOTOV

Title(s):

Director of the National Guard of Russia
Non-permanent Member of the Security Council of Russia

Role(s):

Commands the National Guard of Russia which is used within Russia and occupied areas of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov (“Zolotov”) was born on 27 JAN 1954 in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1975, Zolotov began his career with the KGB Border Troops. In 1991, he served as a bodyguard for the President of the Russian SFSR Boris Yeltsin during his famous “Tank Speech” during the 1991 Soviet coup d’etat attempt. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he became part of the newly-created Federal Protective Service, which is the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service.

In the later 1990s, Zolotov was hired as a bodyguard for the Mayor of Saint Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak. During this position, Zolotov became acquainted with then-Vice Mayor, Vladimir Putin. His friendship with Putin blossomed as Zolotov became Putin’s sparring partner in boxing and judo. Additionally, Zolotov walked directly behind Putin anytime Putin appeared in public. Zolotov also served in Roman Tsepov’s private guard Baltik-Eskort, before Tsepov was poisoned by an unknown radioactive substance.

According to Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, in 1992, based on Zolotov’s advice, the agency was created, with Zolotov allegedly overseeing it later as a member of the active reserve. Baltik-Eskort provided protection to high ranking Saint Petersburg officials, including Sobchak and Putin. The agency also served as a mechanism for the collection of tribute and *chorniu nal* (“black cash”) for Putin’s purposes.

From 2000 to 2013, Zolotov was the Chief of the Security of the Prime Minister of Russia and President of Russia Vladimir Putin. During this time, he commanded security officers, known in Russia as “Men in Black,” as they wore black sunglasses and dressed in all-black suits. It has been reported that Zolotov has friendly relations with Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.

On 12 MAY 2014, Zolotov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia and Commander of the Internal Troops of Russia. On 05 APR 2016, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Russia and, by separate presidential decree, was also named a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): Commands and controls the entirety of the Russian National Guard, which is used within Russia and occupied areas of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Zolotov has been a career government officer. During the era of the Soviet Union, he served in the KBG Border Guard. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he served the Russian Federation in the (i) Federal Protective Service, (ii) Internal Troops, and (iii) National Guard.

Incidents and Events of Note: In AUG 2022, Zolotov told Putin “I would like to emphasize that we can feel that the population of the liberated areas is supporting us. They realize that we are defending their right to a peaceful life and their children’s happiness” and further provided “National Guard troops are accomplishing a wide range of objectives to maintain law, order, and security, and to resume peaceful life in the liberated territories of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, as well as in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.”

On 21 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Zolotov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Zolotov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Zolotov pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The same day, the U.K. sanctioned Zolotov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 14 MAR 2022, Zolotov said in comments on the National Guard's website that “I would like to say that yes, not everything is going as fast as we would like, but we are going towards our goal step by step and victory will be for us.”

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Zolotov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Zolotov in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The same day, Australia sanctioned Zolotov for his involvement in Ukraine.

On 02 MAR 2021, the E.U. imposed restrictive measures on Zolotov saying he was "responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations," as it relates to the quashing of pro-Navalny protests in 2021.

On 11 SEP 2018, Zolotov published a video message where he challenged Navalny to a duel and promised to make "good, juicy mincemeat" out of Navalny.

In AUG 2018, Zolotov became a target of an Anti-Corruption Foundation investigation. Alexei Navalny alleged a theft of > \$29 million in procurement contacts for the National Guard of Russia. Navalny was soon thereafter imprisoned.

On 06 APR 2018, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Zolotov and twenty-three other Russian nationals for being an official of the Russian Federation government, pursuant to E.O. 13661.

16. VALENTINA MATVIYENKO

Title(s):

Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly

Role(s):

Allowed Putin to start a war in Ukraine. Signed off on use of military on 22 FEB 2022.



Biographical Summary: Valentina Matviyenko was born in Ukraine on 07 APR 1949. In 1972, she graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Chemistry and Pharmaceutics. From 1984–1986, she served as First Secretary of the Krasnogvardeisky District CPSU Committee in the city of Leningrad. In 1985, she graduated from the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. Between 1986–1989 she served as Deputy Chair at the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council. In 1989, she was Elected People’s Deputy of the USSR. In 1991, she completed a Senior Diplomatic Staff Course at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and joined the diplomatic corps, where she served until 1998, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. From 1991–1994, she served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR and the Russian Federation to the Republic of Malta. Between 1995–1997, she served as Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Liaisons with the Constituent Entities of the Federation, the Parliament, Public and Political Associations, member of the Foreign Ministry Collegium. From 1997–1998, she served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Greece. Between 1998–2003, she served as Deputy Prime Minister. In 2003, she was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District and elected the Governor of St Petersburg.

On 31 AUG 2011, she took her seat on the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation as a representative of the executive authority of the city of St Petersburg. On

21 SEP 2011, she was unanimously elected Speaker of the Federation Council, and re-elected to this office in 2014 and 2019. Matviyenko has served as a permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation since SEP 2011. In NOV 2011, she was elected Chair of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA CIS).

As Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly, Valentina Matviyenko is the presiding officer of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament. It is the third highest position, after the President and the Prime Minister, in the government of Russia. In the case of incapacity of the President and Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Federation Council becomes Acting President of Russia.

Summary of Role(s): Allowed Putin to start a war in Ukraine. She signed off on use of the military on 22 FEB 2022.

Organizational Membership: Matviyenko is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 06 OCT 2022, at the G20 Parliamentary Speakers' Summit summit in Indonesia, Matviyenko proposed to Ukraine's delegation that the two countries begin peace negotiations "today" and said: "Let's sit down at the negotiating table today, at the G20 venue. The Russian parliament and the Ukrainian parliament. Let's try to understand each other, find an agreement". The Ukrainian parliament rejected the offer. Speaking to journalists after the session, Matvienko said that the negotiations she was proposing could not be about Russia's annexation of Ukraine's occupied territories. She said, "We're willing to put an end to further military action in Ukraine, but on the terms offered by Russia."

On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced a mobilization of military reservists and Matviyenko, as well as other top political officials, addressed the outrage within the country in the following days. Matviyenko said that she was aware of reports that some men, who were ineligible for the draft, had been called up to fight. In a message to Russia's regional governors, who Matviyenko said had "full responsibility" for implementing the mobilization, Matviyenko wrote: "Ensure the implementation of partial mobilization is carried out in full and absolute compliance with the outlined criteria."

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. again sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Matviyenko in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 24 JUN 2020, Australia sanctioned Matviyenko for publicly supporting in the Federation Council the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine on 01 MAR 2014.

On 02 APR 2020, Switzerland sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 14 MAR 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 14 MAR 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 17 MAR 2014, the U.S. sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 17 MAR 2014, Canada sanctioned Matviyenko.

On 01 MAR 2014, Matviyenko publicly supported, in the Federation Council, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.

17. SERGEY/SERGEI KUZHUGETOVICH SHOYGU/SHOIGU

Title(s):

Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Under Shoygu's command and orders Russian troops have held military drills in the illegally annexed Crimea and have been positioned at the border with Ukraine. Shoygu is ultimately responsible for any military action against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Shoygu (“Shoygu”) was born 21 MAY 1955 in Chadan, Tuvan Autonomous Oblast. Shoygu graduated with a civil engineering degree from Krasnoyarsk Polytechnic Institute in 1977. In his younger years, Shoygu worked as an engineer improving emergency and rescue systems for Russia. He also served as a representative in one of the major regional factories. In 1990, he made his way to Moscow and undertook a position with the Government under construction/architecture.

As the collapse of the USSR, there was a need to restructure internal disasters and emergencies. In 1991, he was appointed chief of the Russian Rescue Corps, where he built a team to improve emergency systems within Russia. In 1994, he rose to ministerial-level position, as Minister he found himself at the front-lines of disasters that consisted of improper infrastructure.

Shoygu held the Ministry of Emergency Services position for roughly 20 years, during this time he garnered the reputation as Russia’s “savior”. In MAY 2012, President Putin appointed Shoygu as Governor of Moscow. Months later in NOV of 2012, Shoygu was appointed as Russia’s Minister of Defense, working to improve military morale and prestige. Shoygu replaced a discredited minister, Anatoliy Serdukov. During his time as Minister of Defense, Shoygu had the challenge of organizational reform. Shoygu has served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States since 2012. Shoygu has no military background but has served as defense minister for nearly a decade.

Summary of Role(s): Under Shoygu’s command and orders Russian troops have held military drills in the illegally annexed Crimea and have been positioned at the border with Ukraine. Shoygu is ultimately responsible for any military action against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Shoygu is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 NOV 2022, Shoygu appeared on Russian State television with Sergey Surovikin approving of Russia’s military withdrawal from Ukraine’s Kherson City.

On 23 OCT 2022, Shoygu said, without providing evidence, that Ukraine could escalate the war with a dirty bomb—or an explosive that contains radioactive waste material. The U.K., U.S., French, and other governments rejected this pretext for escalation.

On 21 SEP 2022, Shoygu said “I cannot but emphasize the fact that today, we are at war not so much with Ukraine and the Ukrainian army as with the collective West, at this point, we are really at war with the collective West, with NATO.” On the same day, Putin announced the annexation of portions of Ukraine as Russian territory and threatened to use nuclear weapons to protect Russian territory.

On 18 MAR 2022, the New Zealand sanctioned Shoygu.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Shoygu.

On 01 MAR 2022, the Japan sanctioned Shoygu.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada and Australia sanctioned Shoygu.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. and Switzerland sanctioned Shoygu.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Shoygu “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

On 21 FEB 2022, Shoygu spoke in favour of a proposal to recognise Donetsk and Luhansk as independent republics.

On 11 FEB 2022, Shoygu met U.K. Defense Secretary Ben Wallace. Shoygu denied that Russia was planning an invasion of Ukraine.

On 29 AUG 2021, Shoygu said "Russia doesn't consider Ukraine as a threat."

In 2021, just before the Myanmar military's 01 FEB 2021 coup, Shoygu visited Myanmar to finalize a new deal to supply arms to the country.

18. RUSLAN KHADZHISMELOVICH TSALIKOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Ranks fourth in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership and is responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Ruslan Tsalikov (“Tsalikov”) was born on 31 JUL 1956 in Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz), North Ossetian ASSR. He graduated from North Ossetian State University of K.L. Khetagurov in 1978. From 1978 until 1983, Tsalikov was an intern researcher at the Moscow Institute of National Economy of G.V. Plekhanov. In 1983 he received a degree from the Moscow Institute of National Economy.

From 1983 to 1987, Tsalikov was a lecturer on labour economics and later became a subdean of the Economics Faculty at North Ossetian State University. From 1987 to 1989 he was Economic Affairs General Director, and from 1989 to 1990 Tsalikov worked as Chief Controller of Control-and-Auditing Directorate in the Ministry of Finance of (RSFSR).

From 1990 until 1994, Tsalikov worked as Minister of Finance of North Ossetia. From 1994 to 2000, Tsalikov was the Chief of the Main Financial and Economic Administration under Boris Yeltsin. From 2000 to 2005 he worked for Ministry of Emergency Situations. He was promoted to the State Secretary by Vladimir Putin, a position which he held from 2005 to 2007. In 2010, Tsalikov became a head of Ministry of Emergency Situations.

From MAY to NOV 2012 Tsalikov was the Vice Governor of the Moscow Region. He was made Acting Governor of Moscow Region on 06 NOV 2012 and served until 08 NOV 2012, when he

was replaced by current Governor Andrei Vorobyov. On 15 NOV 2012, Tsalikov was promoted to Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.

In DEC 2015, by decree of the Russian President, Tsalikov was appointed the First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Role(s): Ranks fourth in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership and is responsible for the Russian war effort at large. In his various public appearances, such as his participation in an “anti-fascist” conference organised by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, he has expressed support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. His actions show that he actively supports, justifies and defends Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Tsalikov.

21 SEP 2022, Tsalikov was present at a meeting where Putin announced a partial mobilization in Russia, announced it was annexing portions of Ukraine via sham referendums and would consider such areas Russian territory, and Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Tsalikov.

On 06 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Tsalikov.

On 18 MAR 2022, the Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Tsalikov.

On 15 MAR 2022, U.S. sanctioned Tsalikov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. On the same day, the U.K. also sanctioned Tsalikov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Tsalikov.

19. DMITRY VITALYEVICH BULGAKOV

Title(s):

Former Deputy Minister of Defense
(2015 – SEP 2022)

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Vitalyevich Bulgakov (“Bulgakov”), born 20 OCT 1954 in Verkhneye Gurovo, Russia. He joined the army in 1972 and studied at the Volsk Higher Military School of Logistics. Between 1982-1984 he graduated from the Military Academy of Logistics and Transport. In 1992, he became a Major General. From 1994-1996, he also studied from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, after in 1996 he was promoted to lieutenant general.

From 1996-1997, Bulgakov served in many roles such as, Deputy Commander for logistics, Deputy Chief of logistics of Trans-Baikal Military District and Chief of logistics staff of the Moscow Military District. From 1997-2008, he served as Chief of Staff of Logistics of the Armed Forces of Russia, in 2008 he became Colonel General. From 02 DEC 2008 to 27 JUL 2010, he became the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense. In FEB 2011, he was given the rank of Army General.

From 2015-2017, Bulgakov was in charge of issues relating to a railway that would bypass Ukraine and since 2015 he was in charge of supplying Russian troops in Syria. In 2019 he led the Operational Group of the Russian Ministry of Defense for multiple forest fires.

Bulgakov was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev in SEP 2022, due to the Russian army's widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine. From 2015-2017, Bulgakov was in charge of issues relating to a railway that would bypass Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In SEP 2022, Bulgakov was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev due to the Russian army's widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine.

On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Bulgakov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Bulgakov.

In SEP 2022, Bulgakov was dismissed and replaced by Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev due to the Russian army's widespread logistical problems in the invasion of Ukraine.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Bulgakov.

On 18 MAR 2022, the Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Bulgakov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Bulgakov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

On 25 FEB 2022, the Australia sanctioned Bulgakov.

On 16 SEP 2014, Canada sanctioned Bulgakov.

20. PAVEL ANATOLYEVICH/ANATOLEVICH POPOV

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Pavel Anatolyevich Popov (“Popov”) was born 01 JAN 1957, in Krasnoyarsk, RSFSR, USSR. In 1978 graduated from Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School. After he served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany of the Soviet Army. In 1986, he transferred to the Far Eastern Military District as a commander. In 1990, he graduated from Frunze Military Academy. After his graduation from 1990-93, he served as Chief of Staff, deputy commander of the civil defense regiment of the Central Asian Military District. From 1993-96, he served as First Deputy Head of the East Siberian Regional Center of the EMERCOM of Russia. Years later in 1999, he became Head of the Siberian Regional center of the EMERCOM of Russia. During his time as Head, he supervised rescue operations, delivering humanitarian cargo and construction materials, extinguishing fires and other emergencies.

On 12 JUN 2004, Popov was awarded the military rank of Colonel General. That same year, he was appointed head of the Civil Protection Academy of the Russian Emergencies Ministry, until 2008. From 2008-2013, he was Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations.

On 07 NOV 2013, Popov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense and became a member of the Russian Ministry Defense. Popov oversaw the creation of the National Center for Defense Management of Russia.

In DEC 2015, Popov was promoted to General of the Army.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Popov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Popov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Popov.

On 21 MAR 2021, Canada sanctioned Popov.

On 02 MAR 2021, the U.S. sanctioned Popov.

On 15 OCT 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Popov for connection to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.

21. GENNADY VALERYEVICH ZHIDKO

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Actively involved in the deployment of troops to Ukraine and oversaw the implementation of an order to deploy Russian minors to the Ukrainian war theatre. Actively supports, justifies and defends Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko (“Zhidko”) was born on 12 SEP 1965 in Yangiabad, Uzbekistan. In 1987, he graduated from the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School. Zhidko served in the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga and Volga-Ural Military Districts (Totskoye, Totsky District, Orenburg Oblast). Zhidko rose from platoon commander to division commander, was promoted to captain, and then to colonel. He received awards for organizing fire training from the commander of the Ural Military District, Colonel-General Alexander Baranov. Zhiko was also the commander of the 92nd motorized rifle regiment (Dushanbe, Tajikistan).

In 1997, Zhidko graduated from the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 2007, he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

From AUG 2007 to JUL 2009, Zhidko was the Commander of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the North Caucasian Military District, based in Volgograd. During his tenure, he continued the work of Major General Aleskandr Lapin to establish trusting relationships with military groups, improve combat and technical training.

From JUL 2009 to JAN 2011, Zhidko was the Deputy Commander of the 20th Guards Army of

Moscow, then Western Military Districts with headquarters in Voronezh. From JAN 2011 to JAN 2012 he was Chief of Staff First Deputy Commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District, based in Saint Petersburg. Zhidko participated in the formation of this unit.

From JAN 2015 to SEP 2016, Zhidko was Chief of Staff First Deputy Commander of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army. From SEP 2016 to NOV 2017 he was Commander of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District with headquarters in Samara. The army under his tenure repeatedly took part in surprise exercises and checks. During the Zapad 2017 Exercise, the army units were deployed from Samara to the Kola Peninsula. On 20 FEB 2016, Zhidko became Major General.

In 2016, Major General Zhidko served as chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria. From 22 NOV 2017 to 03 NOV 2018, Zhidko was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. On 11 JUN 2018, Zhidko became Lieutenant General. In NOV 2018, Zhidko was appointed commander of the Eastern Military District.

On 11 JUN 2020, Zhidko became a Colonel General. On 12 NOV 2021, Zhidko was appointed head of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces (GVPU).

In JUN 2022, Zhidko was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Aleksandr Dvornikov.

In OCT 2022, Sergey Surovikin was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Zhidko.

Summary of Role(s): Actively involved in the deployment of troops to Ukraine and oversaw the implementation of an order to deploy Russian minors to the Ukrainian war theatre. Actively supports, justifies and defends Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In OCT 2022, Sergey Surovikin was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Zhidko.

On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Zhidko.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Zhidko.

In JUN 2022, Zhidko was appointed Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, replacing Aleksandr Dvornikov.

On 06 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Zhidko.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Zhidko.

On 15 MAR 2022, U.K. and U.S. sanctioned Zhidko.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Zhidko.

22. TATIANA/TATYANA VIKTOROVNA SHEVTSOVA

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Tatiana Viktorovna Shevtsova (“Shevtsova”) was born on 22 JUL 1969 in Kozelsk, USSR. She attended and later graduated from Leningrad Institute of Finance and Economics in 1991. From that year on she worked as a tax collector for the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation. Shevtsova was appointed deputy manager of the Federal Tax Service in 2004. In MAY 2010, Shevtsova was appointed adviser to the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. On 04 AUG 2010, she was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, with responsibility for finances, under a Presidential Decree. Shevtsova is entrusted with supervising the military-economic bloc and the financing of armed forces. Forbes Russia included Shevtsova on a list of the top richest *siloviki* (state and military administration officials) of Russia (13th place in 2013).

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Promulgating information to mobilized Russian military members about payments.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 NOV 2022, Shevtsova said that mobilized citizens would receive payments for next month ahead of schedule, by DEC 25, instead of in JAN 2023.

On 06 JUN 2022, Canada sanctioned Shevtsova.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Shevtsova.

On 15 MAR 2022, U.K. sanctioned Shevtsova.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Shevtsova.

23. YURI/YURIY EDUARDOVICH SADOVENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense
Head of the Office of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation
Colonel General of the Russian armed forces

Role(s):

Responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Yuri Eduardovich Sadovenko (“Sadovenko”) was born on 11 SEP 1969, in Zhytomyr, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. He graduated from Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School in 1990 and the same year began serving in the Russian Armed Forces where he was a participant in combat operations. Four years later he served at the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM). There, he rescued and provided humanitarian aid until 2002. From 2002 to 2007 he was the Assistant to the Minister at EMERCOM. In 2007, he became the Head of the Office of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. In 2012 he became the Head of the Executive Office of Moscow Oblast. On JAN 2013 Sadovenko was appointed a Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Supervisor of the Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Sadovenko is a Colonel General.

Summary of Role(s): Ranks seventh in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership and is responsible for the Russian war effort at large. Involved in the deployment of troops to Ukraine and has openly supported and justified Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in his public appearances.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Sadovenko.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Sadovenko.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Sadovenko.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Sadovenko, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The U.K. sanctioned Sadovenko the same day.

On 25 FEB 2022, the Australia sanctioned Sadovenko.

On 16 SEP 2014, the Canada sanctioned Sadovenko.

24. ALEXANDER VASILYEVICH FOMIN

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin (“Fomin”) was born on 25 May 1959 in Leninogorsk, Russia. In 1984 Fomin graduated from the Military Institute of the Red Banner of the Ministry of Defense. He has been serving as Deputy Minister of Defense since 2017.

Summary of Role(s): Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Reported by Russian state media to be one of the members of the Russian-imposed administration in the occupied Kherson oblast.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In NOV 2022, when Ukraine re-took Kherson City, Fomin, reported by Russian state media to be one of the members of the Russian-imposed administration in occupied Kherson Oblast, said Henichesk has been declared the temporary administrative capital of Kherson Oblast (the region Russia claims to have annexed). He said: “All the main authorities are concentrated there.”

In AUG 2022, Fomin held talks with Major General Nidal Abu Dukhan from the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces to discuss military and intelligence cooperation.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Fomin.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Fomin.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Fomin.

On 27 MAR 2021, Formin attended Myanmar's Armed Forces Day as an honored guest, just after Myanmar military's 01 FEB 2021 coup.

25. TIMUR VADIMOVICH IVANOV

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for the Russian war effort at large. Responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities, including in Russian occupied Ukrainian territories.



Biographical Summary: Timur Vadimovich Ivanov (“Ivanov”) was born on 15 AUG 1975 in Moscow. His father is Vadim Gennadyevich, the general director of Crystal Development LLC since 2004. In 1997, Ivanov graduated from the Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics of the Moscow State University. From 1997 to 1999, he worked in various commercial organizations. From 1999 to 2012, he worked at enterprises of the fuel and energy complex of Russia. He holds his academic degree: a candidate of economic sciences (dissertation “Financial and organizational models of NPP construction projects” which he defended in 2011. In 2012, he served as Deputy Prime Minister of the Moscow Oblast, under governor Sergey Shoygu. From 2013 to 2016, he was the General Director of Oboronstroy JSC, a subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense. On 23 May 2016, by decree of the President of Russia, Ivanov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia. During the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia in 2020, he supervised the construction of 16 multifunctional medical centers of the Ministry of Defense for the treatment of patients with COVID-19.

Summary of Role(s): In his position in the Ministry of Defense, Ivanov oversees issues related to property management and quartering of troops, housing and medical support of the Russian

Armed Forces, and is responsible for the construction, reconstruction and overhaul of facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defense and military mortgages.

Organizational Membership: Responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities, including in Russian occupied Ukrainian territories. Ranks tenth in the overall hierarchy of the Russian military leadership. Given his key position in the Russian Federation's military enterprise, he is responsible for the Russian war effort at large. He has made various visits to Luhansk and Donetsk to inspect facilities under construction by Russian occupying forces. Additionally, he has handed various state awards to Russian military personnel wounded in Russia's war. Actively supports and defends the war against Ukraine.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Ivanov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Ivanov.

On 01 JUL 2022, Ivanov visited occupied Mariupol to inspect construction of fortifications in the residential neighbourhoods.

On 06 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Ivanov.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Ivanov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Ivanov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The U.K. sanctioned Ivanov the same day.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Ivanov.

26. YUNUS-BEK BAMATGIREYEVICH YEVKUROV/EVKUROV

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense
Member of the Supreme Council of the “United Russia” party

Role(s):

Responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Yunus-Bek Bamatgireyevich Yevkurov/Evkurov (“Yevkurov”), an ethnic Ingush, was born on 23 JUL 1963 in Tarskoye village, Prigorodny District, North Ossetian ASSR, Soviet Union, into a peasant family of 12 children. He has five sisters and six brothers. He graduated from School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia, an autonomous republic in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. Yevkurov married Mareta Yevkurova on 23 DEC 2007. The couple have five children; their first son was born on 01 NOV 2008. He is a career soldier, paratrooper, and Hero of the Russian Federation who was involved in numerous conflicts where Russia played a key role, including Kosovo (1999) and Chechnya.

Yevkurov was conscripted into the Soviet Army in 1982, serving in the Naval Infantry of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, he graduated from the Ryazan School of Airborne Troops. Yevkurov continued his military education, graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in 1997 and from the General Staff Academy in 2004.

In JUN 1999, Yevkurov was stationed in the Bosnian town of Ugljevik with the Russian peacekeepers under the auspices of SFOR. On 12 JUN, he led a task force on a swift 500-km-long march, which aimed to secure the Pristina International Airport ahead of the NATO

troops, thus ensuring a Russian presence in Kosovo after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. This led to a standoff with NATO troops.

Yevkurov has had various positions of command within the Russian Airborne Troops and has participated in counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus. During the course of the Second Chechen War in 2000, he was in command of the 217th Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division). While on a reconnaissance mission, Yevkurov's team discovered a house where a group of captured Russian soldiers was held. Having neutralized the guards and infiltrated the building, the team was surrounded by Chechen reinforcements, resulting in armed combat. The Russian troops were able to break through the encirclement while Yevkurov was providing cover for the evacuation of the wounded. He personally carried a soldier to safety despite sustaining an injury himself. Twelve imprisoned soldiers were rescued. On 13 APR 2000, Yevkurov was presented with the Hero of Russia award for his courage, the country's highest title of honor.

In 2004, Yevkurov was appointed to be the Intelligence Division Deputy Commander of the Volga-Urals Military District.

On 30 OCT 2008, Yevkurov replaced the highly unpopular Murat Zyazikov when President Dmitry Medvedev appointed him as the head of Ingushetia. The following day, the People's Assembly of the Republic of Ingushetia, the republic's regional unicameral parliament voted in favor of Yevkurov's appointment, making him the third Head of Ingushetia. Zyazikov's dismissal and Yevkurov's appointment were received with much enthusiasm from the Ingush population. As head of Ingushetia, he was reportedly able to stabilize the crime situation and bring about positive social changes within the Russian republic.

On 22 JUN 2009, Yevkurov was seriously injured following a car-bomb attack on his motorcade in the city of Nazran. In the incident, a Toyota Camry filled with explosives rammed Yevkurov's convoy in what was believed to be a suicide bomb attack. One escorting policeman died on the spot; Yevkurov's driver and cousin Ramzan died a few days later in a hospital. Yevkurov's brother Uvais was among the injured. Yevkurov suffered a ruptured liver, a severe concussion, and several cracked ribs, but was expected to survive following surgery. Yevkurov was then airlifted to a hospital in Moscow and was sent to intensive care with damage to his skull and internal organs. He regained consciousness from a coma two weeks after the attack. Yevkurov was released from the hospital in Moscow on 12 AUG 2009, more than seven weeks after the attack, but continued to receive rehabilitation. Speaking to reporters upon leaving the hospital, Yevkurov warned that "those who refuse to lay down their arms and surrender will be killed." In a radio interview on 17 AUG 2009, Yevkurov accused the U.S., Great Britain and Israel of being behind the destabilization of the North Caucasus in order to "prevent Russia from reviving the former Soviet might."

Though no group claimed responsibility, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev accused Islamist militants of carrying out the attack, condemning the “terrorist attack”. Speaking on Russian television, Medvedev claimed that Yevkurov "did a lot to restore order ... and the bandits obviously didn't like that kind of activity". Russian news agency RIAN, quoting an unnamed Kremlin source, reported that executive authority in Ingushetia was temporarily transferred to the prime minister, Rashid Gaisanov, who became acting Head by Russian presidential decree. Gaisanov remained the acting head of Ingushetia until Yevkurov returned to office in SEP 2009.

After the attack, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed the Kremlin had ordered him to fight insurgents in Ingushetia, and during his subsequent visit to Ingushetia on 24 JUN pledged to revenge ruthlessly. On 04 JUL, a convoy of Chechen troops sent by Kadyrov into Ingushetia in response to the suicide bombing was ambushed by militants. The attack caused nine Chechen deaths, with 10 others severely wounded. On 09 JUL, Ingushetia's Interior Ministry announced the arrest of several suspects, including the Chechen rebel commander Rustaman Makhauri, allegedly involved in the attack on Yevkurov.

In SEP 2018, Yevkurov and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov signed a border agreement following secret negotiations, prompting activists in Ingushetia to claim the pact was invalid because it represented an illegal transfer of territory to Chechnya. Because of the deal, Yevkurov's popularity in the region plunged dramatically. Several mass protests in Ingushetia against the deal were violently dispersed by police and dozens of people were detained and later fined or jailed. Some protesters faced criminal charges. Ingush opponents of the deal claimed that Ingush land was being unjustly handed over to Chechnya, whose strongman leader Kadyrov had been accused of interfering in the affairs of neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan.

Yevkurov resigned on 24 JUN 2019 after months of controversy and amid ongoing tensions in Ingushetia sparked by the controversial border deal/land swap agreement with Chechnya.

Yevkurov was appointed a deputy defense minister of Russia by President Vladimir Putin on 08 JUL 2019. In this decree, Putin also promoted Yevkurov from major general to lieutenant general. On 08 DEC 2021, he was further promoted to colonel general.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for the Russian war effort at large. Senior official of the body, organization, institution responsible for the destabilization of Ukraine and Russian military aggression, which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Actively supported and implemented actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine. In his public appearances, he openly justifies Russia’s war against Ukraine. By means of his public

appearances and participation in reward and medal ceremonies, he rallies domestic support for the war.

Organizational Membership: Member of the Supreme Council of the party “United Russia.”

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Yevkurov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Yevkurov.

On 21 May 2022, Yevkurov’s nephew Captain Adam Khamkhoev was a commander of an airborne assault company and died.

On 06 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Yevkurov.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Yevkurov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Yevkurov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The U.K. sanctioned Yevkurov the same day.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Yevkurov.

27. NIKOLAY ALEKSANDROVICH PANKOV

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov (“Pankov”) was born on 02 DEC 1954 in the village of Maryino, Kady district of the Kostroma Oblast region, RSFSR, USSR, and has been the Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of the Defense of the Russian Federation since 13 SEP 2005. He is the General of the Reserve Army and has received several military awards. He was educated at the FSB Academy, has a PhD in Law, and is an Associate Professor. He is married and has a son and a daughter.

In 1974 Pankov enlisted for military service in the Armed Forces. He served in the border troops of the USSR, in the North-Western border district. After being transferred to the reserve in 1976, he served on the USSR State Security Committee. He graduated from the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky in 1980, and in 1989 he completed postgraduate studies.

In 1994 Pankov became the Academic Secretary of the Academy of the FSB of Russia. In 1997-1998 he was Head of the Department of Affairs of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation. In 1998 he was also appointed as Chief of Staff of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

In APR 2001, along with Sergei Ivanov, Pankov was transferred to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation where he assumed the post of head of the Department of Affairs of the Ministry. Later, in JUL 2001, he was appointed head of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. In JUN 2002 Pankov became Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation for Personnel - Head of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. While in this position, he oversaw the system of higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense.

By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 12 JUN 2004, Pankov was awarded the military rank of General of the Army. In OCT 2004, he was appointed head of the Personnel and Educational Work Service of the Ministry of Defense, and in SEP 2005 he became Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defense - Deputy Minister of Defense. He was in charge of the Main Directorate of Personnel, the Main Directorate of Educational Work, and the Main Directorate of the Civil Service of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. In this position, Pankov carries out general management of the Military University, the Military Institute of Physical Culture and a number of pre-university educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Under the leadership of Pankov, 40 higher military universities were reduced, and the main blow was dealt to those of them that trained the most high-tech personnel for the Russian army. At the same time, the teaching staff of military universities was reduced seven times. The main motive for such a reorganization of military education is the release and subsequent sale of buildings belonging to military universities. During Pankov's tenure, 200,000 officers were also dismissed from the army. This reduction in the personnel of the Russian Armed Forces reportedly cost the state 1.65 trillion rubles.

On 30 MAR 2009, Pankov was dismissed from reserve military service and transferred to the category of federal civil servant, while retaining the position of Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. On 17 JUN 2011, he was awarded the highest class rank of a state federal employee - Active State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 1st class, a promotion from Acting State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 2nd class which he received 30 APR 2010.

In DEC 2010, the Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with Neviss-Komplekt LLC for the transfer of funds and expositions of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg from the Stock Exchange building on the Spit of Vasilyevsky Island to the Kryukov barracks on Labor Square. The museum's move to the new building was supervised by State Secretary Pankov. In DEC 2012, the Main Military Investigation Department found out that a majority of the payment was made on the basis of fictitious reporting documents. Pankov signed the work acceptance certificate for the building, although the work was barely half completed. Without Pankov's signature the criminals could not have access to the money. At that stage of the investigation, it

was revealed that those actions caused damage to the state in the amount of more than 400 million rubles. Many involved in the scam received real prison terms, yet Pankov was not convicted, despite the fact that the defendants called him a key participant in the scam. Pankov was however obliged to reimburse about 600 million rubles through court proceedings.

Nikolai Pankov is one of the few who has retained the post of Deputy Minister of Defense after the dismissal of Anatoly Serdyukov and the appointment of Sergey Shoygu to the post of Russian Defense Minister in NOV 2012. Pankov also played a key role in Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's dacha scandal near Anapa. Pankov went to Anapa and convinced city deputies to transfer a site within the Krasnodar Territory to the Ministry of Defense, allegedly for the construction of a radar station, claiming without which "the country's defense will fall." The deputies allocated the land, but instead of the radar station, a 600m² residential building with a swimming pool and a boathouse for yachts was built. Retired Russian military Col. Viktor Baranets claimed "A whole railway troops battalion or two were used to build the road to that dacha. Hundreds of spruce and fir trees and thousands of lawn rolls were flown there from Moscow as hundreds of ordinary conscript soldiers were used as slave labor to plant all that. A whole defense ministry plane full of Spanish-made furniture was flown from Spain to equip that dacha."

Since 15 APR 2015 Pankov has been the head of the Supervisory Board of the Central Sports Club of the Army. From 2015 to 2018, he oversaw the All-Russian Military Patriotic Public Movement.

After the creation in 2018 of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which was headed by the Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov, part of the military command and control bodies for which Pankov was responsible, passed to him, while the Main Directorate of Personnel and the Directorate of Physical training and sports remained with Pankov.

On 01 JUL 2021, President Vladimir Putin appointed State Secretary - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Nikolai Pankov as his official representative at the ratification by the State Duma and the Federation Council of the agreement on the establishment of a logistics point for the Russian Navy in Sudan. On 01 JUN 2021, Sudan announced the revision of the agreement with the Russian Federation on the establishment of a base on the Red Sea.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for Human Resources and personnel support matters. Provides support for, and has oversight over, Russian armed forces involved in the invasion of Ukraine. He is responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Pankov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Pankov.

On 04 MAY 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Pankov.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Pankov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Pankov, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Pankov.

Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov (Deputy Minister of Defense) is frequently confused with, especially in photo usage, Nikolay Vasilyevich Pankov (Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation).

28. ALEKSEY YURIEVICH KRIVORUCHKO

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense

Role(s):

Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksey Yurievich Krivoruchko (“Krivoruchko”) was born on 17 JUL 1975 in Stavropol. He is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation with the overall responsibility for armaments.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for any military actions against Ukraine. Krivoruchko has overall responsibility for armaments, including oversight of the Ministry’s stocks of weapons and military equipment. Krivoruchko is also responsible for their elimination within the framework of the implementation of international treaties assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The Russian Ministry of Defense took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 16 AUG 2022, after the Army-2022 Forum, Russian state media reported that Krivoruchko Russian Armed Forces will receive more than 3,700 new equipment pieces as a result of performance of contracts signed at the conference and more than 100 materiel and special equipment units will be repaired and upgraded.

On 31 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Krivoruchko.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand Sanctioned Krivoruchko.

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The U.K. sanctioned Krivoruchko the same day.

On 26 FEB 2022, Krivoruchko reportedly signed a document, that was later published, on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation which ordered to destroy the bodies of Russian soldiers who died in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Krivoruchko.

On 04 SEP 2021 Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phan Van Giang received Krivoruchko in Hanoi on the occasion of his attending the closing ceremony of the “Sniper Frontier” and “Emergency Area” contests of the Army Games 2021 in Vietnam. At the reception, General Giang highlighted the time-honored friendship between the two countries and emphasized that Vietnam always attaches much importance to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia and considers it a top priority in the country’s foreign policy. The Vietnamese defense minister said that over the past time, leaders of the two countries have paid attention to fostering defense cooperation, thus creating a momentum to expand the bilateral cooperation in other fields. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the two defense ministries have actively supported each other in their pandemic fight.

In DEC 2019, in an exclusive conversation with Olga Belova, host of the TV program “The Main”, Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Alexei Krivoruchko spoke of the Russian army's modernization and future challenges. Krivoruchko stressed that in 2020 the Russian Army must reach a more than 70% level of modernity. The most important field of development is the nuclear triad. “We will continue to rearm our army with ‘RS-24 Yars’,” he said. The Navy's development would continue and “the Navy will probably receive the biggest impetus, precisely in the part of the ships of the long-range maritime zone,” Krivoruchko stated. “Of course there were difficulties [in 2019], they remain and will always be. One can also say that the 2019 state defense orders were fulfilled by more than 99%. All the main tasks that awaited the Ministry of aDefense and industry are fully completed. And this allowed us to bring the level of modernity in the Armed Forces to ... more than 68%. Therefore, we can say with confidence that the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces have been completed.”

When asked about the sphere of the defense industry in the coming year, Krivoruchko said, “The challenges of 2020 are also difficult. We must reach the level of modernity surpassing 70%. This goal was reflected in the President’s May decrees. I have no doubt that we will achieve these indicators. As for some of the most important areas, it is hard

to highlight something. ... I would like to note first everything that concerns our nuclear triad. We will also continue rearmament. We have the highest rate of modernity here. ... We will continue to rearm our army with 'RS-24 Yars'. ... One of the most significant news, which will await us in the year 2020 is the development of the Navy. We will continue to build, and we will lay [the keel] for eight additional ships. Also, additional contracts will be signed at the 'Army of Russia' forum. Therefore, probably, the Navy will receive the biggest impetus, precisely in the part of the ships of the long-range maritime zone."

When asked about hypersonic and laser weapons, and if it was correct to say the one who has these weapons will control the world, Krivoruchko said, "Indeed, these are the areas of the highest priority in all the armies of the modern world. If we start with laser weapons, we already (as the president and the defense minister said) have such weapons in service. I'm talking about the 'Peresvet' complexes. But this is not the only system that we are developing, which will soon go into service. I must say that this is one of the highest priority areas. And all the works are in a full swing. And, I think, in the near future we will show something."

When asked about the nuclear triad, Krivoruchko said, "All this is important and requires efforts, one might say the same amount of it. As for nuclear weapons, this is certainly a priority. Here, everything goes smoothly. Laser weapons are also an important area. Hypersound - as you already know, we are here at the forefront. Complexes such as the 'Dagger' are already in service. 'Zircon' is already in service with the Armed Forces then, in the near future, the tests will all be completed..."

When asked about Russia's foreign policy situation and its effect on defense, Krivoruchko said, "Of course, we are following this issue closely. And there were attempts, including sanctions, to influence it [state defense order]. That is no secret, literally 5-7 years ago a lot of foreign equipment and components were used in our armament (engines, component base). Today there are no such problems. The import substitution process has been fully completed. We do not have a single supply disruption due to import substitution, therefore, they [sanctions] have no effect on [state defense order] today. But, of course, there were such attempts. Precisely for that sanctions were imposed against the military-industrial complex. Our industry dealt with them, and in the process was able to gain new expertise, new areas [of competency]. ..." "You can definitely say ... that all the equipment that goes to the Armed Forces is modern technology. This is true for all types of troops: the technology of the REP troops, aviation, the navy, land equipment. All weapons are not only at the level of the analogs of other countries, but are well superior to them. And this is also not a secret: the operation in Syria showed it. It is therefore quite clear: We have modern, complex and efficient systems. [They are] significantly cheaper than other countries' models. ..."

29. DMITRY EVGENYEVICH SHUGAEV

Title(s):

Director of Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation

Role(s):

Responsible for control and supervision in the field of military-technical cooperation, as well as the development of state policy in the field of military-technical cooperation, thus making him responsible for the Russian war effort at large.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Evgenyevich Schugaev (“Schugaev”) was born 11 AUG 1965 in Moscow. Schugaev graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987. Schugaev has a PhD in economics.

Schugaev has served as an Executive Director of CJSC “Legal Profile.” He also worked as Consultant to the Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport; Assistant to the First Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport; and the Chief of Staff to the Director General of Rosoboronexport. Schugaev was also the Head of the Office of the General Director of the State Corporation “Rostekhnologii” (Rostec).

Schugaev was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Transport and Exhibition Complex “Russia” and the company “Marketing Investment Projects”. He was also the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Inter RAO UES (a diversified energy holding company) and Ramport Aero OJSC (an international aviation holding company).

Organizational Membership: Member of the Board of Directors of Russian Corporation for Instrumentation and Information Systems (RKS OJSC), Ramenskoye International Airport OJSC and Rosoboronexport JSC.

Summary of Role(s): The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is a

federal executive body responsible for control and oversight in the field of military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign countries. The service reports to the President and is in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The Director of the FSVTS is under direct authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Responsible for control and supervision in the field of military-technical cooperation, as well as the development of state policy in the field of military-technical cooperation, thus making him responsible for the Russian war effort at large.

Organizational Membership: Shugaev is Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board of “National Center for Aircraft Construction.”

Incidents and Events of Note: On 01 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Shugaev.

On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Shugaev.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Shugaev.

On 06 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Shugaev.

On 06 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Shugaev.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Shugaev.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Shugaev.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Shugaev, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

30. ALEXANDER ALEKSANDROVICH MIKHEEV

Title(s):

Director General of Rosoboronexport

Role(s):

Weapons Exporter.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Aleksandrovich Mikheev (“Mikheev”) was born on 18 NOV 1961 in Moscow, Russia. In 1985, Mikheev graduated from the Moscow Institute of Civil Aviation Engineering with a degree in aeronautical design. Alexander acquired a graduate degree from the Military Academy of the Russian Armed Forces in 2004 and a degree in money and credit from the Russian Government Financial Academy in 2006.

He was formerly filling in as the administrator of the Russian Helicopter Federation. Afterward, he moved to Rosoboronexport organization as a CEO who exports weapons. As of 2022, many reports guarantee that Mikheev’s complete and total assets are assessed at 5,000,000 dollars.

Summary of Role(s): Assists in the exportation of weapons world wide: Rosoboronexport sells everything from helicopters, to tanks, to missile systems, to submarines. Conducts commercial activities in sectors of the economy that provide a significant source of income for the Russian government.

Organizational Membership: Rosoboronexport Organization.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 12 OCT 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Mikheev.

On 03 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Mikheev.

On 06 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Mikheev.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Mikheev.

On 16 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Mikheev.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Mikheev, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The E.U. and U.K. sanctioned Mikheev the same day.

On 26 FEB 2022, Taras Ostapchuk, 55, a Ukrainian chief engineer for over 10 years on Mikheev's 156-foot yacht, the Lady Anastasia, attempted to scuttle it in Mallorca, Spain. The Lady Anastasia was later seized by Spanish authorities pursuant to sanctions.

31. VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH KOLOKOLTSEV

Title(s):

Minister of Internal Affairs

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Alexandrovich Kolokoltsev (“Kolokoltsev”) was born on 11 MAY 1961 in Nizhny Lomov, Penza region.

In 1982, he began his career working with a special unit specializing in foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow. In 1984, he became platoon commander of a separate patrol battalion in the Gagarinskiy district executive committee in Moscow. In 1989, Kolokoltsev graduated from the Higher Political College of the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR. Post-grad he returned back to the police force and slowly worked his way to head of the police department in the Kuntshevski district.

During the 1990’s, Kolokoltsev worked in many Organized Crime Departments in different police stations throughout Moscow. In 1997, he started working in the ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation and the Department of Organized Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Interior of Russia in Moscow. Roughly 02 years later he was appointed chief of the Regional Operational Search Bureau of the Department on Organized Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Interior of Russia. In 2010 he was given the rank of Militsiya Lieutenants-general and after re-attestation in 2011, was appointed by Presidential decree to the position of the Chief of Moscow Police as lieutenant-general.

In 2012, Kolokoltsev was appointed as Minister of Interior, replacing Rashid Nurgaliyev. In 2020 he resigned for 02 days before being reinstated (as part of constitutional amendments).

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On Nov 16 2022, according to Russian state media Kolokoltsev said, when discussing Russian regions bordering Ukraine and Russian occupied territories, “I can say right off the bat that the situation is difficult but under control. We have deployed 15 joint police task forces to the regions, particularly from other regions of the country, including officers who underwent teamwork cohesion as part of a temporary operational group in the North Caucasus regions.”

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 04 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 28 FEB 2022, Australia and Canada sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 25 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Kolokoltsev.

On 02 AUG 2019, the Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, wrote a letter to the Kolokoltsev, regarding the action taken by law enforcement agencies to disperse the largely peaceful protests in Moscow on 27 JUL 2019, and recommended that the Russian authorities ensure that human rights are respected in the context of policing of assemblies.

On 06 APR 2018, the U.S. sanctioned Kolokoltsev pursuant to E.O. 13661.

32. SERGEY VIKTOROVICH LAVROV

Title(s):

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov (“Lavrov”) was born on 21 MAR 1950 in Moscow. He graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1972 with a focus on international relations. After being admitted to university, Lavrov was sent to a student construction brigade for a month to build the Ostankino Tower. After graduating he was employed in the Soviet Embassy in Sri Lanka - at the time there was a close market and economic cooperation between both countries. Lavrov was tasked with analyzing the situation in the country, translator and assistant to Rafiq Nishonov and eventually Lavrov gained diplomatic rank of attache.

In 1976, Lavrov returned to Moscow and served as a secretary in the Section for the International Economic Relations, analyzing and working with various international organizations, such as the United Nations. In 1981, he served as Senior Advisor at the United Nations in New York , returning in 1988 to Moscow becoming Deputy Chief of the Section of the International Economic Relations of the USSR.

Between 1990-1992 Lavrov served as Director of the International Organization of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. During this time, he was tasked to watch over activities concerning Human Rights and International Cultural Cooperation. In 1994, he returned to work with the United Nations, as Permanent Representative of Russia. The following years he served as President of the UN Security Council: DEC 1995, JUN 1997, JUL 1998, OCT 1999, APR 2002, and JUN

2003. In 1994, in his role as Permanent Representative of Russia with the UN, he signed the Budapest Memorandum - where Russia guaranteed the security of the borders of Ukraine.

In MAR 1994, President Putin appointed Lavrov as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: Between JUL and AUG 2022, Lavrov traveled to Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, Myanmar and Cambodia, in a showing of Russia's continued shift in foreign policy.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Lavrov.

On 04 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Lavrov.

On 01 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Lavrov.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada and Australia sanctioned Lavrov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the E.U., U.K., and U.S. sanctioned Lavrov.

Lavrov has propogandized the conflict on the world stage in too multitudinous a way to capture here.

33. MARIA VLADIMIROVNA ZAKHAROVA

Title(s):

Director of the Information

Role(s):

Promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Central figure of government propaganda.



Biographical Summary: Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova (“Zakharova”), born on 24 DEC 1975 in Moscow. In 1981 she moved with her family to Beijing when her father, Vladimir Zakharov was appointed to the Soviet embassy there. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, her family left Beijing in 1991 and moved back to Russia in 1993.

In 1998 Zakharova graduated from the Faculty of International Journalism at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in the field of orientalism and journalism. Zakharova carried out her pre-diploma apprenticeship at the Russian Embassy in Beijing.

From 2003 to 2005, Zakharova worked at the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. From 2005 to 2008, she was the press secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York City. She returned to the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 2008 to 2011.

On 10 AUG 2015, Zakharova was appointed Director of the Information and Press Department by order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Zakharova is the first woman to have held the position.

Summary of Role(s): Promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Central figure of government propaganda.

The Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MFA Russia).

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 JUL 2022, Canada sanctioned Zakharova.

On 02 JUN 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Zakharova.

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan and New Zealand sanctioned Zakharova.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Zakharova.

On 08 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Zakharova.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Zakharova.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Zakharova because she “supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”

Zakharova has propogandized the conflict on the world stage in too multitudinous a way to capture here.

34. MIKHAIL VLADIMIROVICH MISHUSTIN

Title(s):

Prime Minister

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Mikhail Vladimirovich Mishustin (“Mishustin”) was born on 03 MAR 1966 in Moscow. In 1989, Mishustin graduated from the Moscow State University of Technology-Stankin with a degree in Computer-Aided Design. In 2003, he completed a PhD in Economics at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics. In 2010 he received a DSc in Economics from the Academy of National Economy under the Government of the Russian Federation. From 1992–1998, Mishustin Held various positions at the International Computer Club. From 1998–1999 Mishustin served as the Deputy Head of the State Tax Service of Russia. From 1999–2004 Mishustin served as the Deputy Minister for Taxes and Levies of the Russian Federation. From 2004–2006 Mishustin served as Head of the Federal Agency for Real Estate Cadastre. From 2007–2008 Mishustin served as Head of the Federal Agency for the Management of Special Economic Zones. From 2008–2010 Mishustin served as President of the UFG Group (OFG Invest). From 2010–2020 Mishustin served as Head of the Federal Taxation Service of the Russian Federation. On 16 JAN 2020, Mishustin was appointed Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. As Prime Minister, Mishustin is the head of the Russian government, the chief executive of the Russian Cabinet, and the second-most powerful figure in the Russian Federation. In general, the prime minister serves more of an administrative role, nominating members of the Cabinet and taking the lead in fully implementing domestic and foreign policy as formulated by the president. In case of the president's death, resignation or impeachment, the prime minister becomes a temporary president until new presidential elections which must take place within three months.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 21 OCT 2022, Putin appointed Mishustin as head of a “coordination council” to strengthen the coordination of federal and regional authorities in ensuring that the Russian military has adequate supplies in Russia's war against Ukraine. The council is expected to report to Putin weekly.

On 10 MAY 2022, Japan sanctioned Mishustin.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Mishustin.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Mishustin. The same day, Mishustin had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko, to follow up on the 14 MAR 2022 meeting.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Mishustin.

On 14 MAR 2022, Mishustin met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko. Two agreements were signed by the Finance Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Yury Seliverstov and Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation, Timur Maksimov after the talks: (1) Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on amending provisions of certain Russian-Belarusian intergovernmental agreements; (2) Protocol No.2 on amendments to the 06 OCTr 2021 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on providing a state financial loan to the Government of the Republic of Belarus.

On 28 FEB 2022, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland sanctioned Mishustin.

On 25 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Mishustin. The same day, and the day after Russia invaded Ukraine, Mishustin met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko.

35. ANDREI/ANDREY REMOVICH BELOUSOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Implementing the Russian Government's economic policy and is responsible for Russia's economic growth and the stabilisation of the Russian markets.



Biographical Summary: Andrei Removich Belousov (“Belousov”) was born on 17 MAR 1959 in Moscow, RSFSR, USSR. In 1981, Belousov graduated, with honors, from the Lomonosov Moscow State University, Department of Economics achieving a DSc in Economics. From 1981 to 1986, Belousov began his career as an intern researcher and a junior researcher at the Central Economic Mathematical Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences. From 1986 through 2006, he progressed through the positions of junior researcher, researcher, senior researcher and laboratory head at the Institute of Economics and Scientific and Technical Progress Forecasts at the USSR Academy of Sciences (later the Institute of National Economy Prognostication at the Russian Academy of Sciences). From 2000 through 2006 he held the position of General Director at the Center for Macroeconomic Analyses and Short-Term Prognostication.

Belousov shifted into politics in 2000, when he became an External Advisor to the Prime Minister, a position he held until 2006. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Deputy Minister of Economic Development. From 2008 until MAY 2012 he was a Director at the Government Department of Economy and Finance.

On 21 MAY 2012, Belousov took office as First Deputy Prime Minister and was appointed Minister of Economic Development by Presidential Executive Order. From 24 JUN 2013, he became a Presidential Aide, appointed again by Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role(s): Implementing the Russian Government's economic policy and is responsible for Russia's economic growth and the stabilisation of the Russian markets. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 29 SEP 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Belousov.

On 29 JUL 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Belousov.

On 21 JUL 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Belousov.

36. DMITRY YURYEVICH GRIGORENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister
Chief of the Government Staff

Role(s):

Directly involved in the coordination of military supplies in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Yuryevich Grigorenko (“Grigorenko”) was born in 1978 in the Tyumen Region. He graduated from Kuban Agricultural Institute and the Institute of International entrepreneurship and management in the specialty specialized in finance.

In 2000 he worked as a Tax specialist, Chief of State Tax Inspector of Interregional inspectorate for large taxpayers. Later in 2003 he was transferred to the Ministry of Tax and Collection and the Federal Tax Service Deputy Chief of the analysis program, head of taxation of commercial organizations and tax accounting of management. In 2008 he was made head of the Department of Administration income Tax of Commercial Organizations and Tax accounting of the Management of administration tax income.

In 2012 he became Head of Department of Income Tax and Special Tax Modes. In 2014 he became Head of Department of Taxation in the Federal Tax Service and later in the same year became Deputy Manager of Federal Tax Service. Grigorenko was responsible for setting up new local tax legislation for the territory of Crimea following its annexation in 2014.

Grigorenko was elected as deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Government staff in JAN 2020. In MAY 2020, he joined the supervisory board of VTB Bank, the second biggest Russian bank, replacing Anton Siluanov.

Summary of Role(s): Directly involved in the coordination of military supplies in Ukraine as a member of the “coordination council”. In his previous position as Deputy Director of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation, Grigorenko was responsible for the creation of new local tax legislation on the territory of Crimea after its annexation in 2014.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 21 OCT 2022, Putin appointed Grigorenko as one of Mishustin's deputies to a “coordination council” to strengthen the coordination of federal and regional authorities in ensuring that the Russian military has adequate supplies in Russia's war against Ukraine. Grigorenko is tasked with handling regulatory and financial issues on the council. The council is expected to report to Putin weekly.

On 05 JUL 2022, Japan sanctioned Grigorenko.

On 02 JUN 2022, the U.S. again sanctioned Grigorenko.

On 06 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Grigorenko.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Grigorenko.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Grigorenko, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. The U.K. sanctioned Grigorenko the same day.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Grigorenko. The same day, according to Russian state media, Grigorenko met with Putin and discussed “improving control and oversight activities in Russia”.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Grigorenko.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Grigorenko “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine” and “for providing financial and material support, and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine.”

37. YURY PETROVICH TRUTNEV

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Yury Petrovich Trutnev (“Trutnev”) was born 01 MAR 1956 in Perm, Perm Krai, RSFSR, USSR. In 1978 he graduated from the Perm Polytechnic Institute with a degree in Mining Engineering. During his time in university he interned with Oil Companies, Polaznaneft and Komineft, as a drill operator. He also was junior research associate at PermNIPIneft, developing oil and gas production equipment. From 1981-88, Trutnev worked at Perm City and Regional Young Communist League committees. In 1988 he founded the Kontakt physical fitness and recreation association.

In 1990, Trutnev, was CEO of EKS Limited Co. Then in 1996, CEO of shareholding company E.K.S. International Compromising EKS Group Enterprises.

In 1996, Trutnev began his political career, being elected mayor of Perm and Governor of the Perm Region in 2000. In 2004, he was appointed Natural Resources Minister. In 2013 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District in the First Medvedev Cabinet. He was again re-appointed in 2018 with the Second Medvedev Cabinet and once again in 2020 with the Mishutin Cabinet.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates the work of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: In NOV 2022, at the fourth meeting of the Russia-China Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation and Development of the Far East and Baikal Region of Russia and of Northeast China, which took place via videoconference, Trutnev said “Russian-Chinese relations of all-round partnership and strategic interaction continue to develop dynamically in all areas. China is Russia’s main economic partner in the Far East. In 2021, trade between Far Eastern regions and the PRC increased by almost 30 percent. In JAN-AUG 2022, it rose by 45.5 percent, to reach \$12.1 billion.” Further, Trutnev said “I believe that we have the opportunity to develop our cooperation even further. There are currently 2,760 projects with a total investment of \$107.6 billion being implemented in the Far East using state support measures.” Also, Trutnev explained “The development of cross-border infrastructure is very important for us. Two cross-border bridges between Russia and China have been put into service, and now we need to increase traffic volumes on them.”

On 28 SEP 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Trutnev.

On 07 JUL 2022, Trutnev said that oil output at Sakhalin 01 had plummeted to just 10,000 barrels per day from 220,000 bpd due to “restrictions.”

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. and Australia sanctioned Trutnev.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Trutnev.

In MAR, Trutnev notified Japan of Russia’s unilateral suspension of negotiations on a bilateral peace treaty.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Trutnev.

38. VIKTORIA/VICTORIA VALERIEVNA ABRAMCHENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Extensively involved in promulgating food related import/export information from Russia as well as answering questions regarding grain exports from Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktoria Valerievna Abramchenko was born on 22 MAY 1975 in Chernogorsk, Khakass Autonomous Okrug, Krasnoyarsk Territory, RSFSR, USSR. Abramchenko graduated from Krasnoyarsk State Agrarian University in 1998 and from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in 2004.

From 1998 to 2000, Abramchenko worked at the Committee for Land Resources and Land Management (Roskomzem) of the Russian Federation. For one year, from 2000 to 2001, she worked at the Land Cadastre Chamber. From 2001 through 2005, she held various positions including Deputy Department Head at the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography and the Federal Agency for Real Estate Cadastre.

From 2005 through 2011, Abramchenko worked at the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and was the Deputy Director of the Ministry's Department of Real Estate. From 2011 to 2012, she was the Deputy Head of the Federal Service for State Registration. From 2012 through 2015, she held the position of Director, Department of Land Policy, Property Relations and State Property at the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. Then from 2015 to 2016, she held the position of State Secretary, Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. From 2016 until 2020, she again held the position of Deputy Minister of Economic

Development of the Russian Federation, Head of the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography.

On 21 JAN 2020, she Abramchenko appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation by a Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role(s): Extensively involved in promulgating food related import/export information as well as answering questions regarding grain exports from Ukraine. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: Unknown.

39. YURY IVANOVICH BORISOV

Title(s):

Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos (JUL 2022 – PRES)

Former Deputy Prime Minister (18 MAY 2018 – JUL 2022)

Role(s):

Top manager of the company that develops and manufactures military products that have been used by Russia in its war in Ukraine. Formerly, as Deputy Prime Minister, was in charge of weapons industries.



Biographical Summary: Yury Ivanovich Borisov (“Borisov”) was born on 31 DEC 1956 in Vyshny Volochek, Tver Region. In 1974, Borisov graduated from the Kalinin Suvorov Military School. In 1974, he then graduated from the Pushkin Higher Command School of Air Defense Radio Electronics. In 1985 Borisov graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University. He obtained his PhD in engineering.

From 1978 through 1998, Borisov served as an officer in the Soviet Armed forces and the Russian Armed Forces. From 1998 to 2004, he held the position of Director General of the Modul Research and Technical Center. From 2004 to 2008, he became the head of the radio electronics industry and control system department at the Federal Agency for Industries as well as becoming the deputy head of the agency. From JUL of 2008 until MAR 2011, he served as Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.

In MAR 2011, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation. On 15 NOV 2012 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation by Presidential Executive Order.

On 18 MAY 2018 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. In JUL 2022, Borisov transitioned from Deputy Prime Minister, where he was in charge of weapons industries, to Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos. Denis Valentinovich Manturov, the Minister of Industry and Trade, replaced Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister. Also in JUL 2022, Borisov announced that Russia will pull out of the International Space Station after 2024.

Summary of Role(s): Top manager of the company that develops and manufactures military products that have been used by Russia in its war in Ukraine

Formerly, as Deputy Prime Minister, was in charge of weapons industries, including technological and nuclear engineering supervision, military-technical co-operation with foreign countries and equipping the Russian state border. He coordinated the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In JUL 2022, Borisov transitioned from Deputy Prime Minister, where he was in charge of weapons industries, to Chief of Russia's space agency Roscosmos. Denis Valentinovich Manturov, the Minister of Industry and Trade, replaced Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister. Also in JUL 2022, Borisov announced that Russia will pull out of the International Space Station after 2024.

40. DMITRY NIKOLAEVICH CHERNYSHENKO

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister for Tourism, Sport, Culture and Communications
Board Memer, Russian Railways

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Nikolaevich Chernyshenko (“Chernyshenko”) was born on 20 SEP 1968 in Saratov. Chernyshenko graduated from Stankin Moscow State Technological University with a degree in Computer Aided Design, with a Systems Engineer major. In 1989 he founded InformatiKa Marketing Service, one of the country’s first computer graphics studios. In 1993 he co-founded MediaArts, one of Russia’s largest communication holdings. He managed MediaArts, which specialized in advertising and sports marketing, for 12 years.

From 2005 to 2007, Chernyshenko held the position of General Director of the Sochi 2014 Bid Committee. From 2007 to 2014 he was the President of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Organizing Committee and the Sochi 2014 Paralympic Organizing Committee. Chernyshenko served as the President and Executive Board Chairman of the Kontinental Hockey League from 2014 until 2020. During this time he was also the Chief Executive Officer of Gazprom-Media Holdings.

On 01 JAN 2020, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role(s): Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: President of Kontinental Hockey League, Board Chairman of Gazprom-Media, Member of the Supervisory Board of Sberbank of Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 22 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Chernyshenko.

In NOV 2022, Chernyshenko co-chaired the 19th meeting of Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission with Deputy Prime Minister of Cuba, Ricardo Cabrisas.

On 24 OCT 2022, Chernyshenko met with Putin at the Kremlin.

On 04 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Chernyshenko.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Chernyshenko.

On 28 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Chernyshenko.

Chernyshenko was removed from the IOC Coordination Commission Beijing 2022 by the International Olympic Committee, due to his involvement in the Russian doping scandal.

41. TATYANA ALEKSEEVNA GOLIKOVA

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Tatyana Alekseevna Golikova (“Golikova”) was born on 09 FEB 1966, in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. In 1987 she graduated from Moscow's Plekhanov Institute of Economics, with a degree in Labor Economics. Upon graduation, she began working as a junior researcher at the State Labor Committee’s Labor Research Institute, wages department until 1990 where she became the leading economist, chief economist, Head of the Budget Policy and Analysis section of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Department. In 1995, Golikova obtained the position of Deputy Head of the Budget Department, Head of the General Department of the Finance Ministry’s Consolidated Budget Division. From 1996 until 1998, she was the Deputy Head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Department. From APR 1998 through AUG 1998, Golikova was the Head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Department and member of the Finance Ministry’s board. From AUG 1998 through JUN 1999, she was the Head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Policy Department and a member of the Finance Ministry’s board.

From JUN 1999 through JUN 2002, Golikova held the position of Deputy Finance Minister and held the position of First Deputy Finance Minister from AUG 2002 until APR 2004. In APR 2004, Golikova was against in the role of Deputy Finance Minister. On SEP 24, 2007, she was appointed Healthcare and Social Development Minister. On MAY 18, 2018 she took office as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Role(s): Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: In AUG 2022, Golikova said that 236,000 Russian workers were either on furlough or reduced hours as of the end of JUL, and that they are not part of officially 03 million people registered as unemployed in Russia.

On 30 SEP 2022, Golikova attended a ceremony celebrating Putin's attempted annexation of several Ukrainian territories.

42. MARAT SHAKIRZYANOVICH KHUSNULLIN

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development

Role(s):

Responsible for Russian governmental policies about occupied Crimea, including providing water to Crimea and Sevastopol.



Biographical Summary: Marat Shakirzyanovich Khusnullin (“Khusnullin”), born 09 AUG 1966, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, RSFSR, USSR. In 1990, he graduated from Kazan State Finance and Economics Institute with a degree in economics. Continuing his postgraduate education at Open University, taking a degree in Professional Management. In 2006, he also received a Candidate of Science in economics.

Between the years 2001-2010, Khusnullin served as Minister of Construction Architecture, Housing and Utilities of the Republic of Tatarstan. The program at the time was focused on development of large cities, bringing in a large amount of federal investments.

On 21 JAN 2020, Khusnullin was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for construction and regional development under the Mishustin cabinet. In FEB 2022, he was placed under the E.U.sanctions list for being responsible for actions and policies that threaten independence, stability and security of Ukraine.

Summary of Role(s): Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies. As Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Construction and Regional Development, Khusnullin is responsible for Russian governmental policies about occupied Crimea, including providing water to Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 OCT 2022, Khusnllin announced the Russian retreat from Kherson City. The same day, Khusnllin stated “several thousand” children from Kherson Oblast are “already in other regions of Russia, resting in rest homes and children’s camps.”

On 30 SEP 2022, Australia sanctioned Khusnllin.

In MAY 2022, Khusnllin also visited Kherson City and inspected the local port, a cargo railway station and a factory.

On 08 MAY 2022, Khusnllin visited Mariupol and eastern Ukrainian town of Volnovakha among other territories.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Khusnllin.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Khusnllin.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Khusnllin.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Khusnllin “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.”

43. ALEXANDER VALENTINOVICH NOVAK

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Valentinovich Novak (“Novak”) was born on 23 AUG 1971 in the town of Avdeyevka in Ukraine.

In 1993, Novak graduated from the Norilsk Industrial Institute with a degree in Economics and Management for the Steel Industry. Then, in 2009, he graduated from the Lomonosov Moscow State University earning a degree in management.

Novak began his career in 1988 as a hydrometallurgy machine operator, 1st grade and worked his way up to becoming a technician, assistant engineer for labor efficiency and wages, economic expert, and finance office head of the accounts department at Zavenyagin Steel Combine, Norilsk by 1997. In 1997, he held the position of Department Head, board head, deputy director for economics at Zavenyagin Steel Combine, Norilsk. From 1999 to 2000, Novak became the deputy director for economics and deputy director for personnel at Norilsk Mining Company Transpolar Branch.

From 2000 to 2002, he served as Norilsk Deputy Mayor for economics and finance, Norilsk First Deputy Mayor. From 2002 through 2007, Novak held the position of Deputy Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in charge of the Central Finance Board of the territorial administration, and from 2007 through 2008, Novak was the First Deputy Governor and Prime Minister of the Krasnoyarsk territory. From 2008 until May 2012 he served as the Deputy Minister of Finance. On 21 MAY 2012, Novak was appointed Minister of Energy by Presidential Executive Order. On

10 NOV 2020, Novak was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Presidential Executive Order and took office as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation the same day.

Summary of Role(s): Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 22 NOV 2022, Novak said “[Russia does] not plan to supply oil and petroleum products to countries that will apply the principle of a price cap with the subsequent reorientation of supplies to market-oriented partners or with a production reduction.” The same day, New Zealand sanctioned Novak.

On 28 OCT 2022, Canada sanctioned Novak.

In OCT, Novak was a keynote speaker at the 2022 Russian Energy Week forum, which was held in Moscow from 12-14 OCT 2022.

On 30 SEP 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Novak.

44. ALEXEI/ALEXEY LOGVINOVICH OVERCHUK

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister

Role(s):

Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Alexei Logvinovich Overchuk (“Overchuk”) was born on 09 DEC 1964 in Korostyshev, Zhitomir Region, Ukraine.

In 1986, Overchuk graduated from the Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy with a degree in Economic Cybernetics, and a PhD in economics.

Overchuk began his career in 1986, working as a senior laboratory technician at the Economic Cybernetics Department and progressed by 1993 to have held the positions of: junior research fellow, research fellow and senior research fellow at the laboratory for economic mechanism improvement at the Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. From 1993 to 1998, Overchuk worked as chief specialist, deputy head of the International Cooperation Department of the Russian State Committee on Land Resources and Land Management. From APR to JUL 1998, Overchuk served as the Head of the Department of State Registration of Real Estate Rights at the Russian State Land Committee. From JUL to DEC of 1998, he served as the Head of the Information and Analysis Department at the Russian State Land Committee and from 1999 through 2000 he served as the Head of the Information and Analysis Department at the Russian Land Policy Committee.

In AUG of 2000, Overchuk was appointed deputy head of the Russian Federal Cadastre Service. In APR 2004, he became the acting deputy head, before becoming the official Deputy Head of the Federal Real Estate Cadastre Agency in JUL 2004. From 2007 through 2008, Overchuk held

the position of deputy head of the Federal Agency on Special Economic Zones Management. From 2008 through 2010, Overchuk held senior positions at UFG Asset Management Group. In 2010, Overchuk became the advisor to the head of the Federal Taxation Service and was appointed deputy head of the Federal Taxation Service in 2011. On 21 JAN 2020, Overchuk was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia by a Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role(s): Deputy Head of the state body, responsible for destabilization of Ukraine. His responsibilities in government include Eurasian integration, cooperation with international organisations (CIS, BRICS, G20, etc.) and planning and organising international events with the Prime Minister. Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 SEP 2022, Yerevan and Deputy Prime Minister Mghar Grigoryan of Armenia signed a program of economic cooperation between Russia and Armenia until 2025.

In SEP 2022, Overchuk participated in the Russian-Armenian interregional forum in Yerevan.

45. DMITRY ANATOLYEVICH MEDVEDEV

Title(s):

Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev (“Medvedev”) was born on 14 SEP 1965 in Leningrad. He is married to Svetlana Medvedeva, and has one son, Ilya, who was born in 1995. Medvedev holds a PhD in law and the title of associate professor. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Leningrad State University in 1987, and completed post-graduate studies there in 1990. From 1990-1999 he taught at St Petersburg State University, and from 1990-1995 he also served as Adviser to Chairman of the Leningrad City Council, expert consultant with St Petersburg City Hall's Committee for External Affairs.

In 1999 he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government Executive Office, and from 1999-2000 he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. In 2000, he was appointed First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. He served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom from 2000-2001, Deputy Chairman of this board later in 2001, and then in JUN 2002 was re-appointed Chairman of the Board. In OCT 2003, Medvedev was again appointed Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. In NOV 2005 he was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister.

On 07 MAY 2008, Medvedev assumed the office of President of the Russian Federation while Putin became the Russian Prime Minister due to term limits. On 08 MAY 2012, Medvedev was appointed by Putin as the prime minister, while Putin ascended back to the presidency. On 15 JAN 2020 Medvedev resigned from his role as Prime Minister—along with the rest of the

government—to allow Putin to make sweeping constitutional changes. On 16 JAN 2020, Putin appointed Medvedev to the new office of deputy chairman of the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.

Organizational Membership: United Russia since 2011.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 27 SEP 2022, Medvedev said Russia had the right to defend itself with nuclear weapons if the “very existence” of Russia was at risk, including any supposedly annexed territories in Ukraine.

On 27 JUL 2022, Medvedev shared a map on Telegram, described as predictions of “Western analysts”, showing Ukraine, including its occupied territories, mostly absorbed by Russia, as well as Poland, Romania and Hungary.

On 06 JUL 2022, Medvedev wrote on Telegram that it would be “crazy to create tribunals or courts for the so-called investigation of Russia’s actions”, claiming the idea of “punishing a country that has one of the largest nuclear potentials” may potentially pose “a threat to the existence of humanity.” Medvedev accused the United States of creating “chaos and devastation around the world under the guise of ‘true democracy’”, concluding his message by saying “the US and its useless stooges should remember the words of the Bible: ‘Judge not, lest you be judged; so that one day the great day of His wrath will not come to their house, and who can stand?’”

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Medvedev.

On 25 MAR 2022, Australia sanctioned Medvedev.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Medvedev.

On 16 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Medvedev.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Medvedev.

On 02 MAR 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Medvedev.

On 01 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Medvedev.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Medvedev.

Medvedev has propogandized the conflict on the world stage in too multitudinous a way to capture here.

46. SERGEI/SERGEY BORISOVICH IVANOV

Title(s):

Special Representative of the President on Issues of Environmental Activities, Ecology and Transport

Role(s):

Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergei Borisovich Ivanov (“Ivanov”) was born 31 JAN 1953 in Leningrad. In 1975 he graduated from Leningrad State University from the English branch of the Department of Philology. Starting in the late 1970’s he worked on staff for the external intelligence services. In 1976 he graduated from Higher Courses of the KGB with a postgraduate degree in counterintelligence. After this he served in the Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast KGB Directorate. In 1981, he studied at the Red Banner Institute of KGB.

In the 1980s, Ivanov served as Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, working for the KGB. In NOV 1999, he was appointed as secretary of the Security Council of Russia. In this position he was to coordinate daily work of the council, but role was unclear because at the time it was a relatively new position. In DEC 1999, Ivanov was appointed as Russia’s Minister of Defense where his responsibility for overseeing military reform was emphasized. Then in MAY 2001, he was elected chairman of the Council of Commonwealth of Independent States Defense Ministers.

In NOV 2005, Ivanov was then appointed to the post of Deputy Prime Minister in Mikhail Fradkov’s Second Cabinet, focusing on the manufacturing industry and export of arms. In FEB 2007, President Putin then promoted him to First Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility over defense industry, aerospace industry, nanotechnology and transport. In JUN 2007, he was then

appointed chairman of the Government Council for Nanotechnology In DEC 2011, he was then appointed Chief of Staff of Presidential Administration of Russia.

On 12 AUG 2016, Ivanov was relieved from his Chief of Staff position by Putin and he was then given the role of special envoy for transportation and the environment.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Ivanov.

On 04 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Ivanov.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Ivanov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. and E.U. sanctioned Ivanov.

On 24 FEB 2022, the Canada sanctioned Ivanov.

On 24 JUN 2020, Australia sanctioned Ivanov.

On 20 MAR 2014, the U.S. sanctioned Ivanov.

Ivanov's son, Sergei Sergeevich Ivanov, is CEO of the Russian state owned mining company Alrosa.

47. VYACHESLAV VIKTOROVICH VOLODIN

Title(s):

Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly

Role(s):

Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin (“Volodin”) was born 04 FEB 1964 in the Khvalynsky District. Volodin graduated from Saratov Institute of Mechanization of Agriculture in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering. In 1995 he received a legal degree in the Russian State Service Academy and in 1996 a PhD in law from the Interior Ministry’s St. Petersburg Institute.

In 1990 Volodin was elected as a member of the City Council of Saratov. In 1992 Volodin was the Deputy Head of Administration of Saratov. Then in 1994, Deputy Chairman of the Saratov Regional Duma, in 1996 he became Governor of Saratov Region. In 1999 he was elected to the State Duma as Deputy Chairman and Head of the Fatherland-All Russia party.

In OCT 2010 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and in DEC 2011, became the First Deputy Chief of State of the Presidential Executive Office. In JAN 2017, he became a member of the Supreme Council of the United Russia Party and in OCT 2019, the 10th Chairman of the State Duma.

Summary of Role(s): Responsible for overseeing the political integration of the annexed Ukrainian region of Crimea into the Russian Federation. Responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 03 OCT 2022, Volodin formalized the illegal seizure of four discrepancies in the recorded vote, Volodin said the votes were unanimous, and attributed any discrepancy as a “technical failure.”

On 09 SEP 2020, among other Russian senior officials, met with Li Zhanshu, who is the third in the PRC’s leadership as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Li told Russian lawmakers: “On the Ukraine issue, for example, the United States and NATO are expanding directly on Russia's doorstep, threatening Russia's national security and the lives of Russian citizens. Given the circumstances, Russia has taken necessary measures. China understands, and we are coordinating on various aspects.” Li also said at the meeting: “I believe Russia was cornered. In this case, to protect the core interests of the country, Russia gave a resolute response.”

On 21 SEP 2022, Putin announced a mobilization of military reservists and Volodin, as well as other top political officials, addressed the outrage within the country in the following days. Volodin said that she was aware of reports that some men, who were ineligible for the draft, had been called up to fight. In a message, Volodin said he “Appeals are coming in” and “Each case should be dealt with separately. If a mistake is made, it must be corrected.” He added “All levels of government must understand their responsibility.”

On 06 JUL 2022, Volodin discussed the U.S. purchase of Alaska when he said “When they attempt to appropriate our assets abroad, they should be aware that we also have something to claim back.”

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Volodin.

On 11 MAR 2022, the U.S. again sanctioned Volodin.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Volodin.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Volodin.

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Volodin.

On 10 JUN 2020, Australia sanctioned Volodin.

On 02 APR 2020, Switzerland sanctioned Volodin.

On 03 MAR 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Volodin.

On 28 APR 2014, the Canada sanctioned Volodin.

48. DMITRY VIKTOROVICH KOCHNEV

Title(s):

Director of the Federal Protective Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Dmitry Viktorovich Kochnev (“Kochnev”) was born on 01 MAR 1964 in Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union. From 1982 to 1984 Kochnev served in the Armed forces of the USSR. He then served in the law enforcement agencies of the USSR and Russia from 1984 to 2002. In 2002 he started working in the state security bodies of the Russian Federation. He was promoted to colonel in 2006.

Kochnev was the head of the Russian Presidential Security Service from JUN 2015 to MAY 2016, and was acting head from JUN 2015 to DEC 2015. On 26 MAY 2016 Kochnev was appointed the Director of the Federal Protective Service. In early JUN 2021 he was promoted to the rank of army general.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Federal Protective Service (FSO) is a federal government agency that is concerned with the tasks related to the protection of several high-ranking state officials, mandated by the relevant law, including the President of Russia, as well as certain federal properties. The FSO includes the Russian Presidential Security Service and also has about 20,000 troops and controls the nuclear briefcase that can be used in the event of a nuclear war.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Kochnev.

49. ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER VASILYEVICH BORTNIKOV

Title(s):

Director of the Federal Security Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vasilievich Bortnikov (“Bortnikov”) was born on 15 NOV 1951 in Perm, Russia. He is a Russian intelligence officer who has served as the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) since 12 May 2008. He graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Railway Engineers in 1973 and joined the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1975 after graduating from Dzerzhinsky KGB Higher School in Moscow.

From 1975 to 2004, he worked in the secret police system in Leningrad/Saint-Petersburg. In 2004, he became Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, the Head of the Economic Security Service. In May 2008, Bortnikov was appointed Director of the FSB of Russia, chairman of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, and a permanent member of the Security Council of Russia.

Aleksandr Bortnikov is also a member of the board of directors for Russia’s largest shipping company and hydrocarbon transporter, Sovkomflot.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation's principle security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union's KGB. As Director, Aleksandr Bortnikov oversees the entirety of the FSB and is a member of President Putin’s inner circle.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 02 MAR 2021, the U.S. and Canada sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 01 OCT 2020, Australia sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 02 APR 2020, Switzerland sanctioned Bortnikov.

On 14 MAR 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Bortnikov.

In 2014, the E.U. and Canada imposed sanctions against Bortnikov for Russia's military intervention in Ukraine.

50. SERGEI BORISOVICH KOROLEV/KOROLYOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergei Borisovich Korolev (“Korolev”) was born on 25 JUL 1962, in Frunze, Kirghiz SSR, USSR. Korolev was from a military family—his late father was the commander of a military unit, Korolyov’s father was friends with Viktor Zubkov and went on hunting with him.

Korolev worked for a private security firm in the 1990s and for the third department of the Economic Security Service of the Federal Security Service Directorate for the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region in the early 2000s. In 2007 Korolev was appointed advisor to the Minister of Defense and oversaw the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation. Between 2011 and 2012 Korolev headed the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of Russia.

On 08 JUL 2016, Sergei Korolev was promoted to the head of the Economic Security Service of the FSB of Russia. In this position, his duties, among others, included providing Vladimir Putin with dossiers on members of the government. On 24 FEB 2021, by decree of the President of Russia, he was appointed First Deputy Director of the FSB of Russia. In early JUN 2021, Korolev was awarded the rank of General of the Army.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation's principle security agency and is the main successor

to the Soviet Union's KGB. As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Korolev works directly for the agency's director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Organizational Membership: Supervisory Board of the National Research Center "Kurchatov Institute". Supervisory Board of Rosatom.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 01 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Korolev.

On 29 JUL 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Korolev.

On 21 JUL 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Korolev.

On 18 MAY 2022, Australia sanctioned Korolev.

On 21 APR 2022, the U.K sanctioned Korolev.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Korolev.

51. VLADIMIR GRIGORIEVICH KULISHOV

Title(s):

First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service
Head of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service

Role(s):

FSB's Border Service under his command took part in systematic "filtration" operations and forced deportations of Ukrainians from the occupied territories of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Grigorievich Kulishov ("Kulishov") was born on 20 JUL 1957 in Russia's southern Rostov region. In 1979, he graduated from the Kiev Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers and after graduation worked at a Rostov-in-Don-based civil aviation plant. In 1982, he joined Russia's state security agencies. He graduated from the USSR KGB Higher School.

Since 2000, Kulishov has been working in the central administration of the Federal Security Service in Moscow. In JUL 2003, he was appointed head of the Federal Security Service department for Saratov region. In 2004, he was appointed first deputy head of the Federal Security Service anti-terrorism directorate, and later he became head of the Federal Security Service department for the Chechen Republic. Since JUN 2008, Kulishov has been deputy director of the Federal Security Service and deputy head of administration of the National Anti-terrorism Committee.

Summary of Role(s): The functionaries of the FSB's Border Service under his command took part in systematic "filtration" operations and forced deportations of Ukrainians from the occupied territories of Ukraine. Russian border guards illegally subjected Ukrainian citizens to lengthy interrogations, searches and detentions. The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation's principle security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union's KGB. As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Korolev works directly for the agencies director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 01 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Kulishov.

On 12 OCT 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Kulishov.

On 06 OCT 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Kulishov.

On 06 AUG 2014, Canada sanctioned Kulishov.

52. NIKOLAI PLATONOVICH PATRUSHEV

Title(s):

Secretary of the Security Council

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Multitudinous propagandizer.



Biographical Summary: Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev (“Patrushev”) was born on 11 JUL 1951 in Leningrad. He was a general in Russia’s Army and has a PhD in law. Patrushev is a Russian politician, security officer and intelligence officer who served as Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is the main successor organization to the Soviet KGB (excluding foreign intelligence), from 1999 to 2008, and he has been Secretary of the Security Council of Russia since 2008.

He graduated from Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute in 1974, where he worked as an engineer until joining the KGB in 1975. From 1974-1975 he attended the Higher Courses of the KGB with the USSR Council of Ministers in Minsk. In 1975 he began to work at the counter-intelligence section of the KGB regional directorate for the Leningrad region where he later ended up being chief of the service for combatting contraband and corruption. Upon finishing year-long refresher courses at the Higher School of the KGB (now the FSB Academy), in JUN 1992, he was appointed Minister of State Security of Karelia, a post he held until 1994.

In 1994 Patrushev was appointed chief of the FSK Directorate of Internal Security, under Director Sergei Stepashin. After Stepashin’s resignation on 30 JUN 1995, Patrushev received the senior post of Deputy Chief of the FSB's Organisation and Inspection Department. In 1998 he was chief of the Control Directorate of the Presidential Staff from MAY-AUG, and from

AUG-OCT he was Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff. In OCT 1998 he was appointed Deputy Director of the FSB and chief of the Directorate for Economic Security. In APR 1999, he became FSB First Deputy Director—and on 09 AUG the same year a decree by President Boris Yeltsin promoted him to Director, replacing Vladimir Putin.

Has been Secretary of the Security Council since 12 MAY 2008. This position is equivalent to the U.S. national security adviser.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 15 NOV 2022, Patrushev said that Western-supplied arms and foreign mercenaries were priority targets for Russia's forces fighting in Ukraine.

On 09 NOV 2022, Patrushev met with the Iranian president in Tehran following a meeting with Shamkhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of Iran.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Patrushev.

On 01 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Patrushev.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Patrushev.

On 01 OCT 2020, Australia. sanctioned Patrushev.

On 02 APR 2020, Switzerland sanctioned Patrushev.

On 14 MAR 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Patrushev.

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Patrushev.

On 06 APR 2018, the U.S. sanctioned Patrushev, pursuant to E.O. 13661.

On 06 AUG 2014, Canada sanctioned Patrushev.

Patrushev has propogandized the conflict on the world stage in too multitudinous a way to capture here.

53. RASHID GUMAROVICH NURGALIYEV/NURGALIEV

Title(s):

Deputy Secretary of the Security Council

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Rashid Gumarovich Nurgaliyev (“Nurgaliyev”) was born in Zhetikara, Kazakh SSR, on 08 OCT 1956 and is of Volga Tatar ethnicity. He graduated from Kuusinen State University in Petrozavodsk in 1979. He later received a doctoral degree in economics. His thesis was on the “economic aspects of the formation of business undertakings in modern Russia”.

Nurgaliyev worked in the KGB Directorate of Karelia from 1981 to 1995. He then worked for its successor, the Security Ministry of Karelia from 1992 until 1994. In 1995 he moved to Moscow and was appointed chief inspector of the Inspectorial Directorate of Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), which became the Federal Security Service (FSB) by JUN 23 1995, and head of a section of FSB Internal Security Department led by Nikolai Patrushev.

In 2002 he became the first deputy minister of interior of Russia. Nurgaliyev became minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003. He was removed from office on 21 MAY 2012 and Vladimir Kolokoltsev replaced him in the post. Two days after his dismissal, on 23 MAY 2012, he was made Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF). Nurgaliyev holds the rank of Army General.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) is a constitutional body of the Russian president that works out the president’s decisions on national security affairs and matters of strategic interest. The SCRF acts as a forum for coordinating and integrating national security policy. Nurgaliev is a non-permanent member of the SCRF.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 28 SEP 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 10 MAY 2022, Japan sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 01 OCT 2020, Australia sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 29 SEP 2020, Switzerland sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 12 SEP 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 06 AUG 2014, Canada sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

On 25 JUL 2014, the E.U. sanctioned Nurgaliyev.

54. SERGEY YEVGENYEVICH NARYSHKIN

Title(s):

Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin (“Naryshkin”) is a Russian politician and businessman who has served as the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service since 2016. He was born 27 OCT 1954 in St. Petersburg. He graduated from the Leningrad Mechanical Institute with the diploma of an “engineer radio mechanic.” It was there he met his future wife Tatyana Yakubchik, a fellow student, with whom he has two children - Andrey and Veronica. He likes to begin his mornings with a swim. His swim routine recently sparked a controversy when it was discovered that he frequents a pool owned by the controversial Azeri billionaire God Nisanov.

In 1982, Naryshkin was appointed Deputy Vice-Rector of the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute. Naryshkin and Putin met around that same time – when they both worked at the KGB regional headquarters in Leningrad, right after Naryshkin had graduated from one of Moscow’s most prestigious institutions – the Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB. Putin and Naryshkin, codenamed Comrades Platov and Naumov at the Red Banner Institute, spent a year learning the essentials of spy craft from veteran foreign intelligence officers. Putin learned German, Naryshkin learned French. Interestingly, neither was part of the powerful group of Middle East specialists (known as the Middle Eastern “mafia”) that came to dominate the higher rungs of the KGB’s foreign intelligence arm in the late 1980s and in the SVR after the collapse of the USSR.

Naryshkin and Putin had a lot of things in common, especially the traumas of losing close family members during the Nazi blockade of the city. Both also had parents who did not belong to the Communist elite. They grew up outside party ruling circles and had to confront the challenges of adulthood on their own. Driven by personal ambition to climb up the social ladder, they figured a job in the KGB – the most powerful Soviet institution outside the Communist Party – would enable them to make their mark on the world.

Naryshkin was dispatched as a diplomat to Brussels, working in the Soviet Embassy from 1988 to 1992. By day, he worked in the embassy's economic section, and by night Naryshkin recruited spies to steal Western science and technology secrets for the Soviet military-industrial complex. With the USSR on the verge of an economic collapse in the mid-to-late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev's KGB had put technical secrets at the top of its espionage agenda, even higher than political intelligence. His career as a spy came to an end when a fellow Soviet intelligence officer defected to the CIA and exposed Naryshkin's cover.

From 1992 until 1995, he worked in the Committee for Economy and Finance of Saint Petersburg Mayor Office. After he left, he became the chief of the external investment department of Promstroybank—a position he would hold until 1997. From 1997 until 1998, Naryshkin led the Investment Department of the Leningrad Oblast government.

From 1996 to 2004, Naryshkin had a seat on the board of Philip Morris Izhora, the Russian affiliate of the American tobacco giant, while at the same time working for the city government. He became a rich man by mingling his government and business positions.

From 1998 until 2004, he was the Chairman of the Committee for External Economic and International Relations of the government of Leningrad Oblast. In early 2004, he was a deputy head of the economic department of the Russian presidential administration. From MAR through SEP 2004, Naryshkin was a deputy chief of staff of the Russian government.

Since 2004, he has been a member of the board of directors of Sovkomflot and a deputy chairman of the board of directors of Rosneft. Since 31 AUG 2004, Naryshkin has also been Chairman of the Board of Directors of Channel One of the Russian television.

Since 13 SEP 2004, he has been a Minister, Chief of Staff of the Government of Russia. On 15 FEB 2007, President Vladimir Putin announced that Naryshkin had been appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for external economic activity, focusing on collaboration with the Commonwealth of Independent States. In MAY 2008, Naryshkin was appointed chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia. In MAY 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev appointed him chairman of the Historical Truth Commission.

Naryshkin was elected to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament in DEC 2011. When the Duma began meeting for its new term on 21 DEC 2011, Naryshkin was elected as Chairman of the State Duma; he received 238 votes in favor of his candidacy, while 88 deputies opposed him. In JUN 2012, Naryshkin signed a resolution on setting up a culture council under the State Duma speaker. The council is “a standing advisory body”. The tasks of the council are “the examination and drafting of initiatives on topical problems of legislative regulations in culture and associated industries, the development of recommendations on culture for the use in lawmaking”. On 02 SEP 2013, Naryshkin stated that there are no political prisoners in today’s Russia.

Since the rise of tensions between the E.U. and Russia in 2014, Naryshkin was perceived as one of the main coordinators of contacts with European far-right and far-left parties supporting Russian foreign policy in Europe.

In SEP 2016, Naryshkin was appointed as chief of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Publicly supported the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine. Publicly supported the Russia-Crimea reunification treaty and the related federal constitutional law.

Organizational Membership: United Russia. Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA).

Incidents and Events of Note: On 14 NOV 2022, Naryshkin met with CIA Director William Burns and discussed the consequences of using nuclear weapons.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. again sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Naryshkin.

In JAN 2022, echoing a constant Russian theme, the SVR boss compared the government of Ukraine to the Nazis who invaded and occupied much of Russia during 1941-1945. Given that the Nazis are equated in Russian minds with absolute evil, Naryshkin’s metaphor sounded like an alarming call to all Russians to defeat another looming fascist invasion.

In DEC 2021, Naryshkin dismissed reports of a possible invasion of Ukraine asserting that it was “malicious propaganda by the U.S. State Department”. Days before Russia invaded Ukraine in FEB 2022, Naryshkin received widespread attention in the global press for visibly trembling and “stutter[ing] uncomfortably” as Putin humiliated him publicly for “fumbling” his response to the Russian President’s questioning during a Security Council meeting concerning recognizing the Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

On 10 JUN 2020, Australia sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 02 APR 2020, Switzerland sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 12 MAR 2020, the E.U. sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Naryshkin.

On 12 MAR 2014, Canada sanctioned Naryshkin.

As a result of the 2014 Crimean crisis, the federal government of the U.S. under Barack Obama blacklisted Naryshkin and other close friends of the Russian president, including Sergei Ivanov and Gennadi Timchenko. Nevertheless, he officially visited the U.S., along with other Russian top security chiefs, at the end of JAN 2018.

55. ANTON EDUARDOVICH VAINO

Title(s):

Manager of the Presidential Administration

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Provided support to, or promoted a policy or action which destabilized Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Anton Eduardovich Vaino (“Vaino”) was born on 17 FEB 1972 in Tallinn. He graduated from the MGIMO, Faculty of International Relations, in 1996. From 1996 to 2001, he was an employee of the Russian Embassy in Japan, the Second Asia Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

In 2002-2004, Vaino worked in the Office of the Protocol of the President of the Russian Federation. Between 2004 and 2007, he was Deputy Head of the Protocol and Organizational Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation. In 2007, Vaino was appointed First Deputy Head of Protocol of the President of the Russian Federation. In 2007-2008, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Between APR 2008 and DEC 2011, Vaino served as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government. From DEC 2011 to MAY 2012, he was the Chief of Staff of the Government. Between MAY 2012 and AUG 2016, he served as a Deputy Head of the Presidential Executive Office. On 12 AUG 2016, he was appointed head of the Presidential Administration.

Summary of Role(s): As the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office, Vaino plays an active role in Kremlin decision-making process by taking part in the Russian ‘Security Council’ and influencing the elaboration of decisions by the President in the field of Russia’s defense and

national security. Vaino also attends meetings on socio-economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Vaino.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Vaino.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Vaino.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. and Canada sanctioned Vaino.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Vaino.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia and Switzerland sanctioned Vaino.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Vaino.

56. ALEKSANDR PETROVICH CHUPRIYAN

Title(s):

Former Acting Minister of Emergency Situations (SEP 2021–MAY 2022)

Role(s):

Former official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Petrovich Chupriyan (“Chupriyan”) was born 23 MAR 1958 and is a Russian statesman, and political military commander, who is serving as the Acting Minister of Emergency Situations since 08 SEP 2021.

Aleksandr Chupriyan was born in Ukhta on 23 MAR 1958. He graduated from high school. From 1976 to 1978 he served in the Soviet Army. In 1979, Chupriyan was a firefighter in the service of the Fire Department of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. He graduated from the courses of the middle commanding staff of the fire department in 1980. In 1980, he was the chief of the guard of the 14th militarized fire department of the 7th detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade. In 1982, he was the deputy head, then in 1983, he was promoted to the head of the 3rd militarized fire brigade of the 7th detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade, the Fire Department of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Leningrad City Executive Committee. In 1987, he was the deputy chief of the 1st detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade.

In 1989, Chupriyan graduated from the Higher Engineering Fire-Fighting School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR with a degree in fire-fighting and safety engineering. The same year, Chupriyan was the head of the 1st detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade. In 1993,

Chupriyan was the Deputy Head of the State Fire Service Directorate of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. In 1996, he was the Deputy Head of the Department of the Saint-Petersburg University of the State Fire Service of the EMERCOM of Russia. In 1997, he was the acting Head of the State Fire Service Directorate of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region.

In 2003, he was the Head of the Main Directorate of the State Fire Service of the EMERCOM of Russia.^[6] Since 2005, he was the Head of the North-West Regional Center of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters. Between 2006 and 2018, Chupriyan was the Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters.

In JUN 2018, Chupriyan was appointed as the First Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations. In SEP 2021, Chupriyan was appointed as Acting Minister of Emergency Situations. On 25 MAY 2022, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Chupriyan, who served as Acting Minister of Emergency Situations since SEP 2021.

Summary of Role(s): The Minister of Emergency Situations, is the head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and is one of the five “presidential” ministers along with the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice. The Minister of Emergency Situations bears personal responsibility for performance assigned to the Ministry of emergency situations of Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 25 MAY 2022, Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Chupriyan, who served as Acting Minister of Emergency Situations since SEP 2021.

On 18 MAY 2022, Australia sanctioned Chupriyan.

On 21 APR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Chupriyan.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Chupriyan.

In early FEB 2022, Chupriyan visited the southern regions bordering Ukraine to prepare for “mass evacuations”.

57. MAXIM GENNADYEVICH RESHETNIKOV

Title(s):

Minister of Economic Development

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Maxim Gennadyevich Reshetnikov (“Reshetnikov”) was born 11 JUL 1979. He graduated from the Perm State University at the Department of Economic Cybernetics in 2000 with a degree in economics and mathematics. In 2002, he obtained a degree in linguistics-translator. The following year, 2003, he obtained a degree in Economic Sciences.

Starting in 2000, Reshetnikov worked with the Sterlinggroup Forecast and then began working in the Administration of the Perm Region, Perm Territory at the time. Following that he worked as head of the budget revenue and expense planning department, head of the regional finance and investment department, deputy head of the Main Directorate of Economics, First Deputy Chairman of the Regional Planning Department, and Director of the Department. Between 2006-2007, he was First Deputy Head of the Administration of the Governor of the Perm Krai. In 2007-2008, he became Deputy Director of the Department of the Intergovernmental Relations of the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation. From JUN 2008 to OCT 2009, he was Director of the Department for Monitoring and Evaluating the Performance of Government agencies of the Subject of the Russian Federation in the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation.

From OCT 2009–DEC 2010, he was appointed Director of the Department of Public Administration, Regional Development and Local-Self Government of the Apparatus of the Government of the Russian Federation. From DEC 2010 to APR 2012, he was First Deputy

Chief of Staff of the Mayor and the Government of Moscow. Then from APR 2012-FEB 2017, he was Minister of the Government of Moscow, Head of the Department of Economic Policy and City Development.

In FEB 2017, he was temporarily appointed, by President Putin, as acting Governor of Perm Krai, winning the election by SEP 2017. In DEC. 2017 he joined the United Russia Party and in JAN 2020, he was appointed Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation in Mikhail Mishustin's Cabinet.

Summary of Role(s): As Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov is responsible for infrastructure development programmes in Crimea and Sevastopol, most notably under the federal target programme "Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and Sebastopol until 2022" which has been extended until 2025. He has made public statements outlining the plans and priorities of the government of the Russian Federation concerning the economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership: United Russia. Member of the Supervisory Council of the VTB Bank, a State-owned bank and associated with Dmitriy Grigorenko, member of the Supervisory Council of VTB Bank.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 JUN 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 02 JUN 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 06 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Reshetnikov.

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Reshetnikov.

58. IGOR SHCHEGOLEV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Central Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Shchegolev (“Shchegolev”) was born on 10 NOV 1965 in Vinnitsa, Ukraine. In 1982, he attended the Moscow State Linguistic University and graduated in 1984. He then attended Leipzig University, and graduated in 1988 as a philologist. After graduating, he joined the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (now the Information Telegraph of Russia *aka* ITAR-TASS). From 1988 to 1993, Shchegolev served as the Editor of the European Department at the TASS/ITAR-TASS news agency. Between 1993 and 1997, he served as an ITAR-TASS correspondent in Paris. Upon his return to Russia in 1997, he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the European Department of ITAR-TASS and deputy director of the ITAR-TASS news service.

In 1998, he left ITAR-TASS to work in government. Initially, he served as deputy head of the government corps of press officer, then briefly as the press secretary for Yevgeniy Primakov, but returned to lead the press officer corps. In 2000, he was appointed to the post of press secretary for then-acting President Vladimir Putin. At the end of 2001, he became the head of Presidential Protocol, which involved coordinating presidential trips overseas and within Russia. In 2004, his duties expanded to be head of Kremlin Protocol. He remained in this role until 12 MAY 2008, when he was appointed Minister of Communications and Mass Media, as part of Putin’s second cabinet.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Shchegolev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal

subjects with federal laws. The Central Federal District comprises the Central and Central Black Earth economic regions and eighteen federal subjects (Oblasts). As of the 2010 Census, 38,427,539 Russians live in the Central Federal District.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Shchegolev is a member of the United Russia political party, given his relationship and close proximity to the de facto leader of that party, Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Schegolev.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 04 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 25 FEB 2022, the E.U., U.S. and Australia sanctioned Shchegolev.

On 06 OCT 2014, Canada sanctioned Shchegolev.

59. VLADIMIR VASILYEVICH USTINOV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Southern Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Vasilyevich Ustinov (“Ustinov”) was born on 25 FEB 1953 in Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, Russian SFSR, USSR. From 17 MAY 2000 to 02 JUN 2006, he served as the Prosecutor General of Russia. He also held the post of Minister of Justice until 2008.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Ustinov serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Southern Federal District shares borders with Ukraine, the Azov Sea, and the Black Sea, as well as Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea. As of the 2010 Census, 16,319,253 Russians live in the Southern Federal District.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Ustinov is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 28 SEP 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Ustinov.

On 07 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Ustinov.

On 08 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Ustinov.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Ustinov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. and Canada sanctioned Ustinov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Ustinov, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 06 APR 2018, Ustinov was sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 13661, for being an official of the Government of the Russian Federation.

60. ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH GUTSAN

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vladimirovich Gutsan (“Gutsan”) was born on 06 JUN 1960 in Siversky, Russian SFSR, USSR. From 13 APR 2007 to 07 NOV 2018, he served as the Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia. Since 07 NOV 2018, he has served as the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Northwestern Federal District. Additionally, since 19 NOV 2018, he has served as a member of the Security Council.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Gutsan serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Northwestern Federal District comprises the Northern, Northwestern, and Kaliningrad economic regions and eleven federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 13,616,057 Russians live in the Northwestern Federal District.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Gutsan is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Gutsan.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Gutsan.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Gutsan.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Gutsan.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Gutsan.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Gutsan.

61. ANATOLY ANATOLYEVICH SERYSHEV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Siberian Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Anatoly Anatolyevich Seryshev (“Seryshev”) was born on 19 JUL 1965 in Koblyakovo, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1988, he graduated from the Irkutsk Institute of National Economy with a degree in economics. In 1990, he graduated from the Higher Courses of the KGB of the Soviet Union with a degree in officer with higher specialized education. From 1988 to 2016, he served in the security agencies, though no further information about such service is available.

From 2011 to 2016, Seryshev held the position of Head of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service in the Republic of Karelia. From 2016 to 2018, he served as deputy director of the Federal Customs Service. On 13 JUN 2018, Seryshev was appointed Assistant to the President of Russia. On 12 OCT 2021, he was appointed as the 6th Plenipotentiary Representative in the Siberian Federal District.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Seryshev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Siberian Federal District comprises the West Siberian (part) and East Siberian economic regions and ten federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 17,178,298 Russians live in the Siberian Federal District.

Organizational Membership: While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Gutsan is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 SEP 2022 Ukraine sanctioned Seryshev.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Seryshev.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Seryshev.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Seryshev.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Seryshev.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Seryshev.

62. NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH TSUKANOV

Title(s):

Former Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District (26 JUN 2018 – 9 NOV 2020)

Role(s):

Former official of body responsible for aggression against Ukraine in Crimea.



Biographical Summary: Nikolay Nikolayevich Tsukanov (“Tsukanov”) was born on 22 MAR 1965 in Lipovo, Russian SFSR, USSR. Upon graduating from school in 1980, Tsukanov entered a local special professional technical college (SPTU) and obtained a specialist degree as an electrical welder. From 1983 to 1985, he served in the Soviet army in a space communications guard battalion stationed in Czechoslovakia.

After 1985, he began to gain prominence as a local Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist League) leader. In the 1990s, he became a relatively successful businessman. In 1999, he graduated from the Higher School of Privatization and Entrepreneurship with a specialization in law.

In 2005, Tsukanov was elected to the post of Mayor of Gusec. In 2009, he would become the head of the Gusec municipal area. In MAR 2009, he became chairman of the Council of municipal formations of Kaliningrad Oblast. In 2010, he was elected secretary of the local political council of the United Russia party. On 28 SEP 2010, he became Governor of Kaliningrad Oblast. On 26 JUN 2018, Tsukanov replaced Igor Kholmanskikh as the presidential envoy to the Ural Federal District. On 09 NOV 2020, Vladimir Yakushev replaced Tsukanov as the presidential envoy to the Ural Federal District.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Tsukanov serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Ural Federal District comprises the Central (part) and West Siberian economic regions and six federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 12,080,526 Russians live in the Ural Federal District.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: Unknown.

63. IGOR ANATOLYEVICH KOMAROV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Anatolyevich Komarov (“Komarov”) was born on 25 May 1964 in Engels, Russia. Komarov is a Russian industrialist, financier and manager. He graduated from the Moscow State University in 1986 with a speciality in Economics.

From 1992 to 2002 he worked in credit and financial institutions in executive positions. He was Deputy General Director of OJSC Mining and Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel for Economics and Finance from 2002 to 2008. On 01 Oct 2009 Komarov was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of ZAO GM-AVTOVAZ. On 16 Oct 2013 Komarov resigned as president of JSC AVTOVAZ and on 23 Oct 2013 by the order of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation DA Medvedev was appointed deputy head of the Federal Space Agency.

In MAR 2014, the government appointed the head of the United Rocket and Space Corporation. On 24 May 2018, Komarov was dismissed from office as the General Director of Roscosmos State Corporation. Since 07 SEP 2018 Komarov has been the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. Komarov serves as a liaison between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the Volga Federal District.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 SEP 2022, Ukraine sanctioned Komarov.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Komarov.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Komarov.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Komarov.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Komarov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Komarov.

64. YURY/YURIY YAKOVLEVICH CHAIKA/CHAYKA

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Yury Yavoklevich Chaika (“Chaika”) was born 21 May 1951 in Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, Russian SFSR, USSR. Chaika is a Russian lawyer and politician, Presidential Envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District since 2020. Previously he served as Prosecutor General of Russia from 2006 to 2020 and Minister of Justice from 1999 to 2006.

Chaika began his career as an electrician working in a shipyard. After serving in the army, Chaika graduated from Sverdlovsk Institute of Law in 1976 and began work at Irkutsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office where he served as an investigator and a deputy district prosecutor. In 1983, he became head of the investigations at the East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office. From 1984 to 1992, Chaika worked in various positions for the Irkutsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office, the regional Communist Party and the East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office. In 1992, he was appointed Irkutsk Oblast prosecutor.

In 1995, he became the first deputy Russian prosecutor general. He was appointed by then Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov, his former classmate from Sverdlovsk Institute of Law. Chaika served as acting prosecutor general for a brief spell between APR and AUG 1999. From AUG 1999 to JUN 2006, he served as justice minister. On 23 JUN 2006, Chaika became Russian prosecutor general, effectively swapping jobs with his predecessor Vladimir Ustinov who took up the post of justice minister. On 22 JAN 2020 he was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to North Caucasus Federal District after resigning from his previous post.

Summary of Role(s): The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. Chaika serves as a liaison between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the North Caucasian Federal District.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 OCT 2022, Japan sanctioned Chaika.

On 29 JUL 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Chaika.

On 21 JUL 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Chaika.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Chaika.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Chaika.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Chaika.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Chaika.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Chaika.


65. IGOR VIKTOROVICH KRASNOV

Title(s):

Prosecutor/Attorney General

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Igor Viktorovich Krasnov (“Krasnov”) was born on 24 DEC 1975 in Arkhangelsk. Krasnov was a member of the Lenin Komsomol, a communist youth organization. Krasnov began his service as an investigator in the Kholmogorsky district of the Arkhangelsk region. He graduated from the Law Faculty of Pomor State University.

He started serving in the prosecutor's office in 1997. From 2006 to 2007, Krasnov was an investigator of the central office of the General Prosecutor's Office. In 2007, he joined the Investigative Committee at the prosecutor's office of the Russian Federation. In 2011, he was appointed senior investigator for important cases of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.

On APR 30 2016, Krasnov was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation by Alexander Bastrykin. On JAN 20, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that the Federation Council approve Krasnov as the Prosecutor General of Russia.

Krasnov has the rank of Lieutenant General of Justice as well as the rank of Actual State Counselor of Justice, which is the highest class rank in the prosecutor's office. Krasnov is also a member of the Security Council of Russia.

Summary of Role(s): The Prosecutor General of Russia heads the system of official prosecution in known courts and heads the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The Prosecutor General is the most powerful component of the Russian judicial system.

The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia prosecutes in court on behalf of the State and represents the interests of a citizen or of the State in court in cases determined by law. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia also supervises the observance of laws by bodies that conduct detective and search activity, inquiry, and pretrial investigation. Furthermore, the Office of the Prosecutor General supervises the observance of laws in the execution of judicial decisions in criminal cases, and is also entrusted in the application of other measures of coercion related to the restraint of personal liberty of citizens.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 08 AUG 2022, Krasnov announced the removal of 138,000 websites which he explained were sources of “fake news” which included information about the Kremlin and the invasion of Ukraine.

On 30 SEP 2022, Australia sanctioned Krasnov.

On 28 SEP 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Krasnov.

On 21 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Krasnov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Krasnov.

On 03 MAR 2022, Japan sanctioned Krasnov.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Krasnov.

On 02 MAR 2021, the E.U. and U.S. sanctioned Krasnov for the sentencing of the Russian opposition leader, Alexey Navalny.

66. DENIS VALENTINOVICH MANTUROV

Title(s):

Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Space Industry (JUL 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Denis Valentinovich Manturov (“Manturov”) was born 23 FEB 1969 in Murmansk, Russia. Manturov graduated from the State Moscow University in 1999 and graduated in 2006 from Russian State Academy for State Service under the President of Russia.

Manturov started his career in politics as Deputy Director General of Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant in 1998 and in 2000 he became Commercial Director of The Mil Moscow Helicopters Plant. In 2001 Manturov became Deputy Chairman of Federal State Investments Corporation and later in 2003 he became Director General of United Industry Corporation, Oboronprom and later 2007 Manturov started as Deputy Minister of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation. In 2008, Manturov assumed the role of Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of Russia. In 2012, Manturov was appointed as acting Minister of Industry and Trade and was re-approved.

In JUL 2022, Manturov replaced Yury Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Board Member of United Aircraft Corporation of Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 07 NOV 2022, Manturov and Lavrov met with the Minister of External Affairs of India, S. Jaishankar.

On 28 OCT 2022, Canada sanctioned Manturov.

In JUL 2022, Manturov replaced Yury Borisov as Deputy Prime Minister.

67. ALEKSANDR/ALEKSANDER VYACHESLAVOVICH KURENKOV

Title(s):

Minister of Emergency Situations (25 MAY 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.

Member of the so-called ‘People’s Council’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Kurenkov (“Kurenkov”) was born 02 JUN 1972 in Moscow Oblast. In 1995, he began working as a physical culture teacher at Moscow School No. 312 while also studying at the Moscow State Academy of Physical Culture, where he graduated in 1998. He ended his teaching career in 1999 to join the Federal Security Service, where he held several posts until 2002, when he transferred to the Federal Protective Service.

He graduated from the Moscow Psychological-Social Institute in 2004. Kurenkov worked as a Federal Protective Service officer on the protective detail of then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov between 2007 and 2008, with Zubkov later becoming Putin’s first deputy chairman. Kurenkov, according to Ministry of Emergency Situations sources, became a “Putin adjutant” about 2015.

On 25 MAY 2022, Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Aleksandr Chupriyan.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Member of the so-called ‘People’s Council’ of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 19 OCT 2022, Ukraine sanctioned on Kurenkov alongside other Russian officials because of their involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 25 MAY 2022, Kurenkov was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations, replacing Aleksandr Chupriyan.

On 26 APR 2022, Canada sanctioned Kurenkov alongside other Russian officials because of their involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On 08 APR 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Kurenkov for having supported and implemented actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and further destabilised Ukraine.

68. MIKHAIL YEVGENYEVICH MIZINTSEV

Title(s):

Deputy Minister of Defense (SEP 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Mizintsev led the siege of the Ukrainian Sea of Azov port of Mariupol and is known as the “butcher of Mariupol.”



Biographical Summary: Mikhail Yevgenyevich Mizintsev (“Mizintsev”) was born 10 SEP 1962 in Averinskaya. Mizintsev started his military career in the Soviet Union in 1980 and continued to serve in the Russian Ground Forces after the Soviet Union disbanded.

Mizintsev allegedly orchestrated bombing campaigns during the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, including at the Battle of Aleppo. He was accused of arranging a brutal bombing campaign that annihilated Aleppo.

During Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mizintsev commanded soldiers during the Siege of Mariupol, where he became known as the “butcher of Mariupol.”

On 24 SEP 2022, Mizintsev was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, replacing Dmitry Bulgakov. Mizintsev holds the rank of colonel general. Mizintsev was previously head of the National Defense Control Center of Russia.

Summary of Role(s): Official of the body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. Mizintsev, now Deputy Minister of Defense, was previously head of the National Defense Control Center of

Russia. Mizintsev led the siege of the Ukrainian Sea of Azov port of Mariupol and is known as the “butcher of Mariupol.”

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 01 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 24 SEP 2022, Mizintsev was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense, replacing Dmitry Bulgakov.

On 10 JUN 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 03 JUN 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 06 APR 2022, Australia sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 31 MAR 2022, the U.K sanctioned Mizintsev.

On 14 MAR 2022, Canada sanctioned Mizintsev.

69. ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH DVORNIKOV

Title(s):

Commander in Chief of the Southern Military District (JUL 2016 – PRES)

Former Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine (APR – JUN 2022)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Former top official responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Vladimirovich Dvornikov (“Dvornikov”) was born on the 22 AUG 1961 in Ussuriysk, Primorskiy Krai, Russia. Dvornikov graduated from the Ussuriysk Suvorov Military School in 1978 and joined the Soviet Army. Dvornikov also attended the Moscow High Command Training School until graduating in 1982. From 1982, he served in the Far Eastern Military District as a platoon and then company commander, and as a battalion chief of staff. In 1991, Dvornikov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Dvornikov became a deputy battalion commander in the Western Group of Forces.

Between 1992 and 1994, Dvornikov commanded the 154th Separate Motor Rifle Battalion of the 6th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. In 1995, he became chief of staff and deputy commander of the 10th Guards Tank Division's 248th Motor Rifle Regiment. Dvornikov became regimental commander in 1996.

In 1997, he transferred to command the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division in the Moscow Military District. Between 2000 and 2003 he was chief of staff and then commander of the 19th Motor Rifle Division in the North Caucasus Military District.

In 2005, Dvornikov became deputy commander and chief of staff of the 36th Army in the Siberian Military District. In 2008, he took command of the 5th Red Banner Army. Dvornikov became deputy commander of the Eastern Military District in 2011. From MAY 2012 to JUN 2016, he served as chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Central Military District. Between NOV and DEC 2012, he was acting commander of the district.

On 13 DEC 2012, Dvornikov became a lieutenant general. On 13 DEC 2014, Dvornikov was promoted to colonel general.

In SEP 2015, Dvornikov became the first commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria during the Russian military intervention in Syria. Dvornikov is known as the “Butcher of Syria.”

In JUL 2016, Dvornikov became the Southern Military District’s acting commander and was confirmed to the position on 20 SEP 2016. The Southern Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia. It is the smallest military district in Russia by geographic size. The Southern Military District allegedly includes Ukraine’s Crimea and Sevastopol.

On 23 JUN 2020, Dvornikov was promoted to the rank of army general.

In APR 2022, Dvornikov was appointed the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. In JUN 2022, Dvornikov was replaced by Gennady Zhidko.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. Former top official responsible for all Russian forces in Ukraine. Responsible for the actions of the Black Sea Fleet and other military forces of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on 25 NOV 2018 which prevented access by Ukrainian vessels to their coast on the Sea of Azov.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 01 NOV 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Dvornikov.

In JUN 2022, Dvornikov was replaced by Gennady Zhidko.

On 10 MAY 2022, Japan sanctioned Dvornikov.

In APR 2022, Dvornikov was appointed the Commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.

On 12 MAR 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Dvornikov.

On 16 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Dvornikov.

On 08 APR 2021, Australia sanctioned Dvornikov.

On 31 DEC 2020, the U.K. sanctioned Dvornikov.

On 15 MAR 2019, Canada sanctioned Dvornikov.

In MAR 2019, the E.U. sanctioned Dvornikov due to his role in the Kerch Strait incident.

70. VIKTOR NIKOLAYEVICH SOKOLOV

Title(s):

Acting Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet (AUG 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Commands the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov (“Sokolov”) was born 04 APR 1962. He graduated the M.V. Frunze Higher Naval School in Leningrad on 30 JUN 1985. He was sent to serve in the Pacific Fleet where he rose from the position of commander of the mine-torpedo warfare department aboard a ship, to eventually command a minesweeper. Sokolov was then appointed chief of staff of the 187th division of minesweepers from SEP 1993 until SEP 1994, and then as commander of the 81st division of minesweepers of the Pacific Fleet, from SEP 1994 until AUG 1995. On 30 JUL 1998, he graduated the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy.

In 1998 Sokolov became head of the operational management department at the Pacific Fleet's headquarters, followed by chief off staff and then commander of a brigade of surface ships. He took the advanced courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and on graduating in 2006, became deputy commander, and then commander, of the Primorsky Flotilla. In 2012 he moved to the Northern Fleet and took command of the Kola Flotilla.

Sokolov returned to the Pacific Fleet as head of the operational management department of the fleet's headquarters until JUN 2000, after which he became chief of staff of the Primorsky Flotilla's 165th brigade of surface ships, and then the brigade's commander from SEP 2002 until SEP 2004. Sokolov was then once more on secondment for training purposes, studying at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces from SEP 2004 until JUL 2006,

before again returning to the Pacific Fleet, this time in the post of deputy commander of the Primorsky Flotilla from AUG that year. In AUG 2010 he was advanced to commander of the Flotilla, holding the post until SEP 2012, when he was moved to the Northern Fleet to take command of the Kola Flotilla. In AUG 2013 he was appointed deputy commander of the Northern Fleet.

In mid 2016 Sokolov was assigned to command a detachment of the Northern Fleet, based around the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy, for operations off the coast of Syria during the Russian intervention there.

Sokolov served as deputy commander of the Northern Fleet for almost seven years, before being appointed head of the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy on 17 JAN 2020.

On 17 AUG 2022, Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander, replacing Igor Osipov.

Summary of Role(s): Commands the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy—the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 17 AUG 2022, Sokolov was appointed Russian Black Sea Fleet acting commander, replacing Igor Osipov.

71. ALEKSANDR ALEKSEYEVICH MOISEYEV

Title(s):

Commander in Chief of the Northern Military District/Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command
(MAY 2019 – PRES)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Alekseyevich Moiseyev (“Moiseyev”) was born 16 APR 1962 in the settlement of Borskoe in the Gvardeysky District of Kaliningrad Oblast, in the Soviet Union. In 1981 he was called up for military service in the Ural Military District, and between 1982 and 1987 he studied at the A. S. Popov Naval Radio-Electronic Institute in Leningrad.

Moiseyev then joined the Northern Fleet, where he initially served as an engineer on nuclear-powered submarines. After starting in the engineering branch, he moved into specialising in combat and warfare control. Commended for his service and promoted, he took command of his own boat, from which he performed the first commercial space launch in the navy’s history, as well as the first commercial payload that had ever been sent into orbit from a submarine. He undertook further study at the Naval Academy and the Military Academy of the General Staff, interspersed with the command of submarine squadrons.

In 2018 he took command of the Black Sea Fleet, and oversaw a period of expansion within the fleet. He has also courted controversy with regards to relations with Ukraine following the Russian military intervention in Ukraine from 2014 onwards, and the Kerch Strait incident in NOV 2018.

In MAY 2019, he was appointed commander of the Northern Military District/Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (“Northern Military District”). The the Northern Military District is the third largest military-administered district by geographic size.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: Unknown.

72. ALEXANDR CHAIKO

Title(s):

Commander in Chief of the Eastern Military District (NOV 2021 - OCT 2022)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Yuryevich Chaiko (“Chaiko”) was born on 27 JUL 1971 in Golitsyno, Moscow Oblast. In 1988, he graduated from the Moscow Suvorov Military School before continuing his education at the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School where he graduated in 1992.

In JUN 2013, Chaiko was the Deputy Army Commander of the Central Military District. On 08 JUL 2014, he was appointed Commander of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Red Banner Army, after the reconstruction of the 1st Guards Red Banner Tank Army in 2014, he became the Commander of the 1st Guards Red Banner Tank Army of the Western Military District until APR 2017. In 2015, he also served as first chief of staff of the Grouping of Forces of the Russian Armed Forces Syria. He was promoted to a lieutenant general on 12 DEC 2016.

From SEP 2019 to NOV 2020 and from FEB 2021 to JUN 2021, he was the Commander of the Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of Russia in Syria. On 11 JUN 2021, Chaiko was promoted Colonel General.

On 12 NOV 2021, Chaiko became the Commander of the Eastern Military District. The Eastern Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and the second largest military district in Russia by geographic size.

Chaiko earned a global reputation as a brutal leader in Syria in 2019 and 2020. Human Rights Watch states that he may be responsible for widespread attacks against hospitals, schools and populated areas in the Idlib Governorate. The attacks killed 1600 civilians and displaced 1.4 million people.

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, troops under Chaiko's command tortured and executed hundreds of Ukrainian civilians during the Kyiv offensive. As of OCT 2022, Chaiko is no longer leading the Eastern Military District after major Russian losses in northeast Ukraine in SEP 2022 and Ukraine's recapture of Lyman, in the Donetsk region.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: As of OCT 2022, Chaiko is no longer leading the Eastern Military District after major Russian losses in northeast Ukraine in SEP 2022 and Ukraine's recapture of Lyman, in the Donetsk region. There is currently mixed reporting on who is head of the Eastern Military District: both Rustam Muradov and Gennady Zhidko have been independently reportedly as leading the Eastern Military District.

73. RUSTAM USMANOVICH MURADOV

Title(s):

Commander in Chief of the Eastern Military District (OCT 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Rustam Usmanovich Muradov (“Muradov”) was born 21 MAR 1973 in Chinar, Derbentsky District of the Dagestan ASSR within the Russian SFSR, then Soviet Union. Muradov studied at the local Chinar high school. He then graduated from the Kazan Suvorov Military School. Being in military service since 1990, he graduated from the Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School and Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with honors in 1995.

In 1996, he was a platoon and company commander. In 2008, he was appointed the commander of the 242nd Motor Rifle Regiment, and until 2009, served as the commander of the 17th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. From 2009 to 2012, he was commander of the 36th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade of the Eastern Military District. In 2012, he was promoted to a major general. From 2012 to 2013, he served as the head of the 473rd Lysychansk District training center of the Central Military District. From 2013 to 2015, he studied in the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

From 2015 to 2017, he served as the First Deputy Chief and Chief of Staff of the 41st Russian Combined Arms Army. In 2016, he was the representative of Russia at the Joint Russian-Ukrainian Center for Control and Coordination of Ceasefire and Stabilization of the Line of Delimitation of the Parties (JCCC) in Donbas. On 05 MAR 2016, in Donbas, Muradov,

along with other representatives of the Russian side in the JCCC, came under fire for about 20 minutes.

In 2017, he was appointed as a military adviser in Syria. Muradov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation in the same year. Then, he served as the Commander of the 2nd Guards Red Banner Army of the Central Military District until Andrey Kolotovkin replaced him in 2018. Since then, he's the Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District. He was promoted to lieutenant general on 20 FEB 2020 by the decree of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. On 11 NOV 2020, he was appointed the commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, after a peace agreement ending the war over the region. He was replaced by Major General Mikhail Kosobokov on 09 SEP 2021.

On 07 OCT 2022, General Muradov was appointed Commander of Eastern Military District. The Eastern Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and the second largest military district in Russia by geographic size.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. While the Eastern Military District is based in Russia's Far East, much of its personnel is currently taking part in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Muradov led troops in Ukraine's eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 11 APR 2022, Japan sanctioned Muradov.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Muradov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Muradov.

On 04 MAR 2022, Switzerland sanctioned Muradov.

On 28 FEB 2022, the E.U. sanctioned Muradov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Muradov.

74. ALEKSANDR PAVLOVICH LAPIN

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Central Military District (NOV 2017 – OCT 2022)

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Aleksandr Pavlovich Lapin (“Lapin”) was born 01 JAN 1964 in Kazan. In 1997, he graduated from the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy. After graduation, he served in the 58th Combined Arms Army as the commander of a separate tank battalion. Since 1999, Lapin was the chief of staff, commander of the 429th Motor Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motor Rifle Division. From 2001 to 2003, he became the Chief of Staff of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Carpathian-Berlin Division. From 2003 to 2006, Lapin became the commander of the 205th Motorized Rifle Cossack Brigade and promoted to major general. From 2006 to 2007, he was the commander of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division.

In 2009, Lapin graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. After graduating from the academy, Lapin was deputy commander of the 58th Army.

From APR 2012 to JUL 2014, Lapin commanded the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army. In 2014, he was awarded the military rank of Lieutenant General. From 2014 to 2017, Lapin was the Chief of Staff-First Deputy Commander of the Eastern Military District.

In 2017, Lapin became the chief of staff of the grouping of the Russian troops and forces in Syria. He was promoted to colonel general in 2019. From SEP to NOV 2017, Lapin was the Head of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

On 22 NOV 2017, Lapin was appointed commander of the Central Military District. The Central Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the largest military district in Russia by geographic size and population at 54.9 million people.

Lapin was promoted to the rank of colonel general in 2019. Over the summer of 2022, Putin awarded Lapin the “Hero of Russia”, the highest honorary title of Russia.

On 29 OCT 2022, Lapin was dismissed as Commander of the Central Military District. Alexander Linkov was reportedly appointed acting commander of Russia’s Central Military District.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. He was the commander of the Army Group “Center” of the Russian Army Forces during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 29 OCT 2022, Lapin was dismissed as Commander of the Central Military District. Alexander Linkov was reportedly appointed acting commander of Russia’s Central Military District.

Over the summer of 2022, Putin awarded Lapin the “Hero of Russia”, the highest honorary title of Russia.

On 06 MAY 2022, Canada sanctioned Lapin.

In late MAR 2022, Lapin visited the front line and awarded a medal to his son, the commander fighting in Sumy and Chernihiv, just before the Russian army withdrew.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Lapin.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Lapin.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Lapin.

75. ALEKSANDER LINKOV

Title(s):

Acting Commander in Chief of the Central Military District (NOV 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: There is not much information about Aleksander Linkov (“Linkov”) online. However, he previously chaired the organisational and mobilisation department of the Central Military District. Linkov holds the rank of major general.

On 03 NOV 2022, Linkov was appointed Acting Commander of Russia’s Central Military District. The Central Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the largest military district in Russia by geographic size and population at 54.9 million people.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 03 NOV 2022, Alexander Linkov was appointed Acting Commander of Russia’s Central Military District.

76. ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH ZHURAVLYOV

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Western Military District (NOV 2018 – JUN 2022)

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Alexander Alexandrovich Zhuravlyov (“Zhuravlyov”) was born on 05 DEC 1965 in Golyshmanovo, Tyumen Oblast, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union.

Zhuravlyov graduated from the Chelyabinsk Higher Tank Command School in 1986 and the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy in 1996. In 2008 Zhuravlyov graduated from the General Staff Academy. Zhuravlyov was stationed in Czechoslovakia (1986–1991), the Volga (1991–1994), Far Eastern (1994–2006), North Caucasus (2008–2008), Central (2010–2015), and Southern Military Districts (2015). He has served as the chief of staff of the 58th Army and as commander of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army before being transferred to the Southern Military District in 2015, having previously been promoted to lieutenant general in 2014.

In JUL 2016, Zhuravlyov was appointed as the commander of the Russian military forces in Syria, replacing Aleksandr Dvornikov. He held this post until DEC 2016, when he was replaced by Andrey Kartapolov.

On 22 NOV 2017, Zhuravlyov was appointed commander of the Eastern Military District, replacing Sergey Surovikin, who transferred to command the Russian Aerospace Forces. In JAN 2018, he once again took command of the contingent of Russian military forces stationed in Syria, having taken over from Sergey Surovikin.

In NOV 2018, Zhuravlyov was appointed commander of the Western Military District.

As commander of the Western Military District, Zhuravlyov was responsible for the Russian troops that invaded northern Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, before Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine on 09 APR 2022.

On 13 MAY 2022, CNN reported that newly collected evidence identified Zhuravlyov ordering the use of 17 cluster bombs, cluster munition fired from the 300mm Smerch multiple rocket launcher, by the 79th Rocket Artillery Brigade against civilian targets in Kharkiv on 27–28 FEB 2022.

In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Zhuravlyov. The Western Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the second smallest military district in Russia by geographic size. The Western Military District is headquartered in the General Staff Building in Saint Petersburg.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. As commander of the Western Military District, Zhuravlyov was responsible for the Russian troops that invaded northern Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, before Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine on 09 APR 2022.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Zhuravlyov. However, it is alleged that from JUN to SEP 2022 Andrei Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.

On 13 MAY 2022, CNN reported that newly collected evidence identified Zhuravlyov ordering the use of 17 cluster bombs, cluster munition fired from the 300mm Smerch multiple rocket launcher, by the 79th Rocket Artillery Brigade against civilian targets in Kharkiv on 27–28 FEB 2022.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Zhuravlyov.

On 15 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Zhuravlyov.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Zhuravlyov.

77. ANDREI SYCHEVOI

Title(s):

Former Commander in Chief of the Western Military District (JUN – SEP 2022)

Role(s):

Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Andrei Sychevoi (“Sychevoi”) was born 16 MAY 1969 in Troitskaya, Krymsky District, Krasnodar Krai, Russian SFSR. Sychevoi holds the rank of Lieutenant General.

In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov. However, it is alleged that from JUN to SEP 2022 Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.

Summary of Role(s): Former top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia. The Western Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the second smallest military district in Russia by geographic size. The Western Military District is headquartered in the General Staff Building in Saint Petersburg.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In SEP 2022, Roman Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov. However, it is alleged that from JUN to SEP 2022 Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.

78. ROMAN BORISOVICH BERDNIKOV

Title(s):

Commander in Chief of the Western Military District (SEP 2022 – PRES)

Role(s):

Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.



Biographical Summary: Roman Borisovich Berdnikov (“Berdnikov”) was born on 31 AUG 1974 in the town of Kamen-na-Obi, Altai Territory. From 1981 to 1989 he studied at the city school No. 4. In 1989, he entered the Suvorov Military School in Kiev and graduated in 1991. Berdnikov later graduated from the Moscow Higher Military Command School in 1995.

After commanding a regiment for 2.5 years, Berdnikov became a deputy brigade commander. He took command of the 59th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the Eastern Military District in FEB 2012 and was promoted to the rank of major general on 11 JUN 2014. He continued commanding the brigade until AUG 2014, when he joined the Military Academy of the General Staff.

He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on 10 DEC 2020. In OCT 2021, he was appointed Commander of the Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Berdnikov was still in Syria as of 09 MAY 2022, when he reviewed the Victory Day Parade at Khmeimim Air Base.

In SEP 2022, Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov. However, it is alleged that from JUN to SEP 2022 Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.

The Western Military District is one of the five military districts in Russia and is the second smallest military district in Russia by geographic size. The Western Military District is headquartered in the General Staff Building in Saint Petersburg.

Summary of Role(s): Top official responsible for one of the five military districts in Russia.

Organizational Membership: Unknown.

Incidents and Events of Note: In SEP 2022, Berdnikov was appointed Commander in Chief of the Western Military District, according to Russian State Media replacing Alexander Zhuravlyov. However, it is alleged that from JUN to SEP 2022 Andrei Sychevoi held this position until he was allegedly captured by Ukrainian forces.

Berdnikov was still in Syria as of 09 MAY 2022, when he reviewed the Victory Day Parade at Khmeimim Air Base.

79. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH YAKUSHEV

Title(s):

Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District (NOV 2020 – PRES)

Role(s):

Official of body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine.



Biographical Summary: Vladimir Vladimirovich Yakushev (“Yakushev”) was born on 14 JUN 1968 in Neftekamsk. From 1986 to 1988, he served in the Army. In 1993, he graduated from University of Tyumen with a degree in law. From 1993-1998, Yakushev had a progressive banking career. In 1997, he graduated from University of Tyumen with a degree in economy.

In 2001, Yakushev started his political career as vice governor of Tyumen Oblast. From from 2005 to 2018, he was Governor of Tyumen Oblast. Yakushev was Minister of Construction, Housing and Utilities from 18 MAY 2018 to 09 NOV 2020.

On 09 NOV 2020, Yakushev was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Ural Federal District, replacing Nikolay Tsukanov.

Summary of Role(s): Official of body responsible for ongoing war in Ukraine. The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Yakushev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Ural Federal District comprises the Central (part) and West Siberian economic regions and six federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 12,080,526 Russians live in the Ural Federal District.

Organizational Membership: United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note: On 09 NOV 2020, Yakushev was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Ural Federal District.

On 06 APR 2022, the U.S. sanctioned Yakushev.

On 24 MAR 2022, the U.K. sanctioned Yakushev.

On 18 MAR 2022, New Zealand sanctioned Yakushev.

On 28 FEB 2022, Canada sanctioned Yakushev.

On 25 FEB 2022, Australia sanctioned Yakushev.



THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK

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Considerations for the Setting up of
The Special Tribunal for Ukraine
on the Crime of Aggression



Global Accountability Network
July 2022



The Ukraine Task Force of The Global Accountability Network Presents:

***Considerations for the Setting up of
The Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression***

LEAD WRITERS: Professor David M. Crane, Kanalya Arivalagan, Rohan Bhattacharjee, Lotta Lampela

EDITORS: Professor David M. Crane, Kelly Adams, Kanalya Arivalagan, Rohan Bhattacharjee, Mia Bonardi, Lotta Lampela, Christopher Martz, Kate Powers

THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK: UKRAINE TASK FORCE, 2022

PROJECT LEADER: Professor David M. Crane, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Christopher Martz

DIRECTORS:

Kelly Adams

Kanalya Arivalagan

Mia Bonardi

Matthew McCartin

The Ukraine Task Force (UKTF) aims to produce non-partisan, high quality analysis of open-source materials and to catalogue that information relative to applicable bodies of law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The UKTF primarily creates documentation products in a narrative and graphical format, as well as a quarterly and annual trend analysis of ongoing crimes. Furthermore, the UKTF publishes issue-specific white papers. Its clients include Transnational NGOs, the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, and the Public Interest International Law & Policy Group (PILPG). The UKTF is working closely with Ukrainian partners, including the Ukraine Bar Association (UBA), which has graciously provided volunteers for our investigative efforts.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Over many decades, the international community has experimented with various justice mechanisms to hold those who commit atrocity crimes accountable. Until the early 1990's, there were few efforts to do so. The idea grew out of a bold new step by the victorious allies at the end of World War II. The International Military Tribunals (IMT) at Nuremberg and Tokyo became the cornerstones for future efforts.

After the Cold War, the international community faced back-to-back atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A more relevant and active United Nations Security Council (UNSC) created two ad hoc tribunals under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). These two tribunals would last for twenty years and cost billions of dollars, but bringing justice for many human lives proved to be worth this cost and effort. After seeing the results of these tribunals, the international community realized that international justice could be achieved.

This was the age of accountability which saw a two-decade long development of modern international criminal law that developed the jurisprudence that allows consideration of prosecuting Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin commanders accountable for the invasion of Ukraine today. New theories and structures were created in Sierra Leone and Cambodia, with the long-held idea of a permanent court coming to fruition in 2002. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is now twenty years old and is the leading justice mechanism for Ukraine in holding perpetrators accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and perhaps incitement to genocide.

The international crime of aggression, stemming from the crimes against peace theories of Nuremberg, has risen to the forefront of international concern related to the invasion of Ukraine by Russian Federation forces. The invasion is, purely and simply, an act of aggression. Aggression has not yet been prosecuted in the modern era, as the International Criminal Court currently does not have the jurisdiction to prosecute this international crime perpetrated in Ukraine as discussed in Section IV.A.2. Thus, a new justice mechanism must be created.

This white paper lays out a practical way by which the crime of aggression can be investigated and prosecuted through the establishment of an international tribunal for Ukraine just as it has been done successfully in Sierra Leone. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) showed that the UN and a Member State can enter into a bilateral treaty to create an international court to prosecute military and political leaders for committing international crimes, including the prosecution of a sitting Head of State.

International tribunals are and will remain viable alternatives to other justice mechanisms such as the ICC, regional courts, and domestic courts. With proper planning, such tribunals have been efficient and effective in addressing atrocities. This would be a way to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the invasion of Ukraine by Russian Federation forces.

The approach of this white paper is to review the creation, set up, and subsequent operations of the first hybrid international tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and take those successful lessons learned to map out proven methodologies for the creation of the Special Tribunal for Ukraine.

We have done this before, and we can do it again. The necessary experience, jurisprudence, and proper rules of procedure and evidence to investigate, indict, and prosecute Vladimir Putin and his commanders for the crimes of aggression in the invasion of Ukraine are readily available. The political moment is upon us, and it is time to execute.

II. JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR UKRAINE

A. ICC

The ICC was established in 1998 by the Rome Statute.¹ It acts as a permanent international criminal tribunal under which individuals who commit or attempt to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or the crime of aggression, may be prosecuted and held accountable for their conduct.² Per the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise subject matter jurisdiction when one or more of these four core international crimes are committed, and can exercise territorial jurisdiction when these crimes are committed by a State Party national, in the territory of a State Party, or in a State that has accepted jurisdiction of the ICC on an ad hoc basis.³

Alternatively, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where the crimes were referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the UNSC pursuant to the resolution adopted in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.⁴ The Prosecutor may begin an investigation before issuing a warrant if the crimes were referred to by the UNSC, or if a State Party requests an investigation for crimes that appear to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the ICC.⁵ Even otherwise, the Prosecutor may initiate a preliminary investigation on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, *proprio motu* (on its own initiative).⁶ The Prosecutor is expected to analyze the seriousness of the information received, and may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, inter-governmental or non-governmental organizations, or other reliable sources that the Prosecutor deems appropriate.⁷ If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, the Prosecutor must seek authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber to begin a formal investigation.⁸ If the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC based on the criteria listed above, it shall authorize the investigation.⁹

In early March 2022, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan announced that his office had launched investigations on “any past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or

¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Art. 71, available at: <https://iccforum.com/rome-statute> [hereinafter Rome Statute].

² Rome Statute, Art. 71.

³ Rome Statute, Art. 12.

⁴ Rome Statute, Art. 13.

⁵ Rome Statute, Art. 14.

⁶ Rome Statute, Art. 15.

⁷ Rome Statute, Art. 15.

⁸ Rome Statute, Art. 15.

⁹ Rome Statute, Art. 15.

genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person.”¹⁰ His decision was grounded in Article 14 of the Rome Statute, following State referrals from 39 State Parties.¹¹ While ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, in the context of the Russian Federation’s invasion into Ukraine on 24 February 2022, is in no way questionable, the same cannot be concluded for its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

For the ICC to have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the aggressor must be a State Party to the Rome Statute.¹² Russia, the aggressor here, is not a State Party to the Rome Statute.¹³ Alternatively, the ICC could have jurisdiction if the UNSC requested the ICC to investigate the matter.¹⁴ Such a request will not be forthcoming because of Russia’s veto power.¹⁵

Thus, the ICC has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, and in this case, it is imperative for the international community to explore other alternatives as discussed in Section IV.A.2. An international tribunal is the most prudent path forward.

B. Hybrid International War Crimes Tribunal

1. History

The conventional understanding that national leaders could act with impunity within territories under their control had been expressed succinctly by Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, in 1915.¹⁶ Writing about the United States’ role in the Armenian genocide, Morgenthau noted that “[he] had no right to interfere...the treatment of Turkish subjects by the Turkish Government was purely a domestic affair . . .”¹⁷ This historically accepted principle, however, underwent a dramatic transformation in 1945 when the Nuremberg trials took place.

Founded after deliberations in London by the victorious allies, the IMT was set up as the first international criminal body to recognize the authority to universally condemn and prosecute international crimes, setting precedence that the rest of the world must care about the human rights violations within the border of other States.¹⁸ Although Nuremberg trials did not serve as an

¹⁰ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: “I have decided to proceed with opening an investigation”, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Feb. 28, 2022), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-i-have-decided-proceed-opening>.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² Rome Statute, Art. 15 *bis*(4).

¹³ Jaime Lopez & Brady Worthington, *The ICC Investigates the Situation in Ukraine: Jurisdiction and Potential Implications*, *Law Fare* (Mar. 10, 2022), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/icc-investigates-situation-ukraine-jurisdiction-and-potential-implications>.

¹⁴ Rome Statute, Art. 13.

¹⁵ Shelby Magid & Yulia Shalomov, *Russia’s veto makes a mockery of the United Nations Security Council*, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2022), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-veto-makes-a-mockery-of-the-united-nations-security-council/>.

¹⁶ Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story: Talaat Tells Why He “Deports” The Armenians*, 217 (1918), <https://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/morgenthau/Morgen25.htm>.

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ Caitlin E. Carroll, *Hybrid Tribunals are the Most Effective Structure for Adjudicating International Crimes Occurring Within a Domestic State*, L. SCHOOL STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 1 (2013), https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1090&context=student_scholarship.

exemplar for future tribunals due to its tainted perception of having furthered “victor’s justice,” it pioneered international humanitarian law and established helpful legal precedent.¹⁹ Since then, the world has witnessed the establishment and successes of numerous international criminal tribunals – namely, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).²⁰

The foremost strength as manifested by all these tribunals, however, was its proven ability to “pierce the veil of immunity” otherwise enjoyed by senior government officials in their respective national courts.²¹

2. *Piercing the veil of immunity*

Heads of State and senior government officials have immunity from jurisdiction of national courts of other States, under principles of customary international law.²² That decision was reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the *Yerodia* judgment, where the court held that the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of Congo had jurisdictional immunity from an arrest warrant issued by a magistrate in Belgium, notwithstanding serious charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.²³ The idea of immunity stems from the age-old conception that one sovereign state does not adjudicate on the conduct of another state.²⁴ However, the same principle of jurisdictional immunity is inapplicable for international criminal tribunals. This is partly because of the inapplicability of the principle of sovereign equality since international criminal tribunals are not organs of States and they instead derive their mandates from the international community.²⁵ In addition, the inapplicability of jurisdictional immunity has solid grounding in a bedrock of formidable legal precedence. The SCSL’s reasoning from a seminal case illustrates exactly that.²⁶

The Appeals Chambers of the SCSL ultimately held that Charles Taylor, then-incumbent President of Liberia, did not have immunity from criminal prosecution by an international criminal tribunal that stemmed from his official status as Head of State.²⁷

First, there was legal precedence of numerous instances of international criminal tribunals, distinctly noting within their statutes that the official status of defendants would not serve as impediments to the court’s personal jurisdiction over them. Examples include provisions in Article 7 of the IMT Charter also known as the Nuremburg Charter – a reformulation of which was

¹⁹ *Id.* at 3.

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ Larry D. Johnson, *United Nations Response Options to Russia’s Aggression: Opportunities and Rabbit Holes*, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 1, 2022), <https://www.justsecurity.org/80395/united-nations-response-options-to-russias-aggression-opportunities-and-rabbit-holes/>.

²² Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14), <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/121/121-20020214-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

²³ *Id.* at 23.

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ *See* Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.* at 25.

incorporated by the International Law Commission in its report and accepted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) as early as 12 December 1950; Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY; Article 6(2) of the Statute of the ICTR; Article 27(2) of the Statute of the ICC; and subsequently, Article 6(2) of the Statute of SCSL.²⁸ Article 6(2) of the Statute of the SCSL serves as a helpful illustration of the language of such incorporation into similar Statutes: “The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such a person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”²⁹

The ICJ’s *Yerodia* judgment, although holding that the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs had immunity from a Belgium court, also significantly observed that “Ministers for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before *certain international criminal courts*.”³⁰ Most pertinently, the ICJ, specifically listed the ICTY, ICTR, and the “future” ICC as examples of “certain international criminal courts,” which would have jurisdiction in such cases.³¹

The SCSL reemphasized its international character. Referencing its international mandate that stems from UNSC Resolution 1315, the SCSL pointed out its similarities in competence and jurisdiction to that of the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC, and asserted that it shared traditional characteristics with classical international organizations, dispelling any notion that courts not established by the UNSC’s Chapter 7’s “coercive” authority was not sufficiently international.³²

A special tribunal established by bilateral agreement between the UN Secretary General and the Government of Ukraine, backed by a UNGA resolution as in the recent case of the ECCC (explained in greater detail in Sections 7.A.1 and 7.A.2), would similarly be able to pierce through this veil of immunity that protects Russian leaders from prosecution. This is especially pertinent since the crime of aggression, as defined in Article 8 *bis*, is a “leadership crime” – holding only the senior-most authorities culpable, who usually would have enjoyed immunity under customary international law.³³ Of course, among other reasons, an international tribunal would also be seen as the most legitimate, enjoying a broader international mandate due to the role of the UNGA and international support.

To avoid any constitutional concerns that may arise during *ex ante* review by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU), the agreement between Ukraine and the UN should specify that the new tribunal will be international and not domestic or hybrid (which would avoid conflict with Constitution of Ukraine’s Article 125 prohibiting any “special or extraordinary court.”)³⁴ It should

²⁸ *Id.* at 21-25.

²⁹ *Id.* at 22.

³⁰ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, *supra* note 22, at 26 (emphasis added).

³¹ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, *supra* note 22, at 26.

³² Prosecutor v. Taylor, *supra* note 25, at 19.

³³ *Supra* note 21. The definition in the Rome Statute is narrower than the one used in the Nuremberg trials, where a leader was considered to be one who had the “actual power to shape and influence the policy of their nation, prepare for, or lead their country into or in an aggressive war.” Nikola Hajdin, *The Nature of Leadership in the Crime of Aggression: The ICC’s New Concern*, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 543 (2017).

³⁴ Alexander Komarov & Oona Hathaway, *The Best Path for Accountability for the Crime of Aggression Under Ukrainian and International Law*, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 11, 2022), <https://www.justsecurity.org/81063/the-best-path-for-accountability-for-the-crime-of-aggression-under-ukrainian-and-international-law/>.

also specify that the tribunal is auxiliary, not complementary to the domestic courts, avoiding conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine's Article 124.³⁵

However, please note that Ukraine could also cure either prohibition through an amendment of its Constitution. To amend the Constitution of Ukraine, the people must vote through a national referendum, a new and democratic process recently signed into law in 2021.³⁶ Such a referendum can be a change to an already existing amendment or an addition to the amendments.³⁷

C. *An EU regional court*

Another alternative is the establishment of a European-regional hybrid tribunal. The proposals for regional hybrid tribunals have resurfaced many times, most recently in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis. It was proposed then that Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan in particular, could invoke protective jurisdiction given the acute destabilization in the region.³⁸ NATO or another regional organization such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation or the Arab League could also create such a tribunal.³⁹ Although this proposal did not ultimately come into fruition, it was endorsed by many legal scholars and most notably by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.⁴⁰

A similar proposal in the present circumstances may be considered, with the Council of Europe (CoE) as an appropriate forum. Ukraine joined the CoE on 9 November 1995.⁴¹ While it is true that the Council does not have the direct authority to establish such a tribunal, Article 15(a) of the Statute of the CoE shows an illuminating path forward.

Article 15(a) of the CoE Statute permits the Committee of Ministers to consider adopting “a common policy” to further the “aim of the Council of Europe.”⁴² Among the most prominent aims of the CoE, as manifested by its placement within the very first article in Article 1(a) of the CoE Statute, is to “achieve greater unity between its members.”⁴³ It is under this broad phrasing that the Council could decide to establish a hybrid tribunal.⁴⁴ While the exercise of such authority requires a unanimous vote of the Committee of Ministers under Article 20(a)(vi), achieving such unanimity should not be a cause for concern because of the high political will in that region.⁴⁵

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ Alisa Shushkovska & Harald Jepsen, *Ukraine adopts new and improved referendum law*, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Feb. 18, 2021), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-adopts-new-and-improved-referendum-law/>.

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ Beth Van Schaack, *Options for Accountability in Syria*, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014), <https://www.justsecurity.org/10736/options-accountability-syria/>.

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ Al Arabiya News, *ICC's Bensouda would support Syria Special Tribunal if ICC path is blocked*, AL ARABIYA NEWS (May 20, 2020), <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2014/05/18/Interview-ICC-prosecutor-to-examine-alleged-British-crimes-in-Iraq-war>.

⁴¹ *Ukraine*, COUNCIL OF EUR., <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/ukraine> (last visited June 27, 2022).

⁴² Statute of the Council of Europe, Art. 15(a), May 5, 1949, ETS No. 001.

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ Kevin Jon Heller, *The Best Option: An Extraordinary Ukrainian Chamber for Aggression*, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 16, 2022), <https://opiniojuris.org/2022/03/16/the-best-option-an-extraordinary-ukrainian-chamber-for-aggression/>.

Russia is no longer a member of the CoE, and none of the 46 Member States have publicly defended Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the European Union Parliament, the most united it has ever been, has already adopted a resolution calling for a "special international tribunal" to investigate Russian leaders for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.⁴⁶ Most notably, however, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) itself, has already adopted a *unanimous* resolution, urging for the setting up of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, with a mandate to "investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression allegedly committed by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation."⁴⁷ Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that unanimity on such a vote is likely. Such a regionally supported hybrid tribunal could be based on the Extraordinary African Chambers that successfully prosecuted the former President of Chad, Hissène Habré.⁴⁸

For the concept of an Extraordinary Ukrainian Chamber for Aggression (EUCA), such a structure could work complementarily. A treaty creating an "Extraordinary Ukrainian Chamber for Aggression" could be adopted pursuant to normal CoE processes: the text would be negotiated within the institutional framework of the CoE; the Committee of Ministers would adopt the final text of the treaty; then, the treaty would be presented to Member States for their signature.⁴⁹ The treaty would provide, *inter alia*, that the EUCA be a part of Ukraine's judicial system, have jurisdiction over aggression, that EUCA judges and prosecutors be drawn from Ukraine and/or from various CoE Member States, and that Ukraine and CoE Member States jointly finance EUCA's work and carry out investigations on a collaborative basis.⁵⁰

The constitutionality of such a hybrid court, however, functioning within the Ukrainian judicial system, might violate the Constitution of Ukraine's Article 125. First, since EUCA will have a distinct procedure for deciding cases, and it will be created to replace other domestic courts which currently have jurisdiction over the matter, it will likely be seen as an "extraordinary court."⁵¹ Second, the process of creation of a domestic court, within the Ukrainian judicial system, may not allow for international involvement.⁵² Third, the creation of the EUCA may be seen as a challenge to the supremacy of the Supreme Court of Ukraine. Lastly, the EUCA might be determined not to fit within the "territoriality and specialization" on which the Ukrainian judiciary is based.⁵³ Therefore, it is best if a purely international tribunal is formulated rather than a hybrid one.

⁴⁶ European Parliament Press Release 20220517IPR29931, *Ukraine: MEPs want a Special International Tribunal for Crimes of Aggression* (May 19, 2022), <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220517IPR29931/ukraine-meps-want-a-special-international-tribunal-for-crimes-of-aggression>.

⁴⁷ Council of Europe., *PACE calls for an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to hold to account perpetrators of the crime of aggression against Ukraine*, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Apr. 28, 2022) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/pace-calls-for-an-ad-hoc-international-criminal-tribunal-to-investigate-war-crimes-in-ukraine>.

⁴⁸ Heller, *supra* note 45.

⁴⁹ Heller, *supra* note 45.

⁵⁰ Heller, *supra* note 45.

⁵¹ Komarov & Hathaway, *supra* note 34.

⁵² Komarov & Hathaway, *supra* note 34.

⁵³ Komarov & Hathaway, *supra* note 34.

D. Domestic Courts

1. Ukraine

Prosecutions against war crimes and crimes against humanity are proceeding in the fullest vigor within the Ukrainian legal framework. While it is noteworthy that Ukraine's prosecutor general has opened over 9,000 investigations into Russian war crimes and crimes against humanity, a Ukrainian court, in lightning speed, has already convicted one Russian soldier for war crimes under its domestic war crimes statute, for the killing of a 62-year-old civilian on 28 February 2022.⁵⁴

Further prosecutions in Ukraine are in progress and may even take place under Article 437 of Ukraine,⁵⁵ criminalizing the act of aggression against Ukraine.

2. EU Member States

In March 2022, Ukraine's prosecutor formed a joint investigation team (JIT) on the aggressive war and crimes committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine, within the framework of investigations initiated in Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania.⁵⁶ As of 16 March 2022, the Polish prosecutor's office had already interviewed 300 witnesses relating to Russian war crimes, and the ICC Prosecutor had announced that he was coordinating with Polish prosecutors to ensure access to evidence for its own prosecutions.⁵⁷ While investigations on the crime of aggression are underway in Poland and Lithuania, grounded in universal jurisdiction,⁵⁸ it is important to note that universal jurisdiction is hardly an exhaustive legal basis for such investigations.⁵⁹ Instead, Ukraine's delegation of its own grounds of criminal jurisdiction (discussed further in Section IV.B), through bilateral or multilateral agreements with other EU Member States, can also most effectively serve as legal alternatives to universal jurisdiction.⁶⁰ This

⁵⁴ Peggy McGuinness & Ezra N. Rash, *Understanding International Justice for Atrocity Crimes in Ukraine*, NYSBA (June 7, 2022), <https://nysba.org/understanding-international-justice-for-atrocity-crimes-in-ukraine/>.

⁵⁵ CRIMINAL CODE OF UKRAINE, Art. 437 (Ukr.), available at, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/criminal_code_0.pdf.

⁵⁶ Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation, INT'L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 2, 2022), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-receipt-referrals-39-states>.

⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁵⁸ Universal jurisdiction is where a State can prosecute those who commit the four international core crimes, even if the individual is not from the State prosecuting. *Universal Jurisdiction*, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., <https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/> (last visited June 27, 2022). Furthermore, *jus cogens* refers to a peremptory norm within general international law that are so morally abhorrent that universal jurisdiction arises out of the obligation to prevent and punish those who violate it. The non-exhaustive list of *jus cogens* include genocide, crimes against humanity, slavery. Int'l Law Comm'n Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc A/74/10, ¶ 56, Conclusion 23 (2019), available at <https://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2019/english/chp5.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Diane Orentlicher, *How States can Prosecute Russia's Aggression With or Without "Universal Jurisdiction,"* JUST SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2022), <https://www.justsecurity.org/80818/how-states-can-prosecute-russias-aggression-with-or-without-universal-jurisdiction/>.

⁶⁰ *Id.*

is because the EU, similar to the role of European External Action Service during the post-conflict reconstruction of the Balkan States,⁶¹ has the infrastructure to provide judicial assistance.⁶²

III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

There are four international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression.⁶³ The first three developed over time from 18th century and are codified in the Rome Statute, which details each of these crimes.⁶⁴ For instance, Article 6 defines genocide, Article 7 details the scope of crimes against humanity, and Article 8 discusses war crimes. The fourth core international crime, the crime of aggression, developed in the 20th century and adopted much later in 2017.⁶⁵

A. Genocide

Article 6 of the Rome Statute explicitly states that for there to be a charge of genocide, the perpetrator must commit *any one* of the enumerated acts, with the specific “intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”⁶⁶ The enumerated acts include:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.⁶⁷

The ICTR has charged and tried individuals for violations of Article 6 of the Rome Statute. In *Prosecutor V. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze*, the Prosecutor charged the leaders of the political party in Rwanda, led by Barayagwiza, with genocide and incitement of genocide. The Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR), the dominant political party, used a “common media front” to incite genocide against the Tutsi population.⁶⁸ In what became dubbed as “The Media Case,” the three individuals charged were convicted “of direct and public incitement to genocide, conspiracy, and instigating genocide, extermination, and persecution” in trial at the

⁶¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁶² See *EU Projects with Bosnia and Herzegovina*, EU (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/bosnia-and-herzegovina/eu-projects-bosnia-herzegovina_en?s=219.

⁶³ Eur. Union Agency for Crim. Just. Coop, *Core International Crimes*, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR CRIM. JUST. COOP., <https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/crime-types-and-cases/crime-types/core-international-crimes> (last visited June 15, 2022).

⁶⁴ *Crimes Against Humanity*, OFF. ON GENOCIDE PREVENTION & RESP. TO PROTECT, <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml> (last visited June 15, 2022).

⁶⁵ CICC, *The Crime of Aggression*, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., <https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/explore/icc-crimes/crime-aggression> (last visited June 15, 2022).

⁶⁶ ICC, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, INT’L CRIM. CT. 1, 3, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf> (last visited June 15, 2022).

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ Catharine A. MacKinnon, *International Decisions*, 103 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 97-8 (Jan. 2009), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20456724>.

ICTR.⁶⁹ The Appeals Chamber detailed that the charge of inciting genocide can be successful when noting that incitement to genocide led to an “outbreak of mass physical killing.”⁷⁰ The Appeals Chamber looked specifically at the time between the broadcast of such incitement and the killing of persons.⁷¹ The temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR was meant to also include “continuous” crimes that served to achieve the goal of genocide, i.e. planning.⁷² In this instance, the Appeals Chambers held that the start of the temporal jurisdiction was 1 January 1994, instead of 6 April 1994, the actual start of genocide.⁷³

However, all of the elements of the crime must be met during that time as well. For Ngeze, one of the defendants, the causation element was not met. The Appeals Chamber held that there was more of causal connection post 6 April 1994 compared to the connection prior that date, thus reversing the conviction of Ngeze. The Appeals Chamber could not determine if Ngeze’s actions “substantially contributed to genocide.”⁷⁴ But, in order to create preventative measures for future genocidal acts, both the Trial and Appeals Chambers held that “incitement [is] punishable whether or not the incited acts occurred.”⁷⁵

The majority consensus from both the Trial and Appeals Chamber is that media can incite genocide and be used as a tool to persecute.⁷⁶ It held that “media leaders can be held responsible for incitement through media or for acts media cause, and that this causal link need not be proven exclusive or essential.”⁷⁷

B. Crimes against humanity

Article 7⁷⁸ defines crimes against humanity as “a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”⁷⁹ This statute has a *mens rea* of “knowledge” for the Prosecutor to prove, but this element does not require that the perpetrator had actual knowledge of the attack, but rather the *intent* “to further such an attack.”⁸⁰ Furthermore, the crimes against humanity can occur either during conflict or peacetime.⁸¹

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² Sophia Kagan, *The "Media case" before the Rwanda Tribunal: The Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgement*, 3 Hague Just. J. 83, 86 (2008), [http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/HJJ-JJH/Vol_3\(1\)/Media_Case_Kagan_EN.pdf](http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/HJJ-JJH/Vol_3(1)/Media_Case_Kagan_EN.pdf)

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ *Id.* at 88.

⁷⁵ MacKinnon, *supra* note 68.

⁷⁶ MacKinnon, *supra* note 68, at 99.

⁷⁷ MacKinnon, *supra* note 68, at 99.

⁷⁸ For detailed analysis of this section, please refer to Kelly Adams et al., *Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine: The Breach of International Humanitarian Law by the Russian Federation*, GLOB. ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK 26-7 (Apr. 2022), <https://syrianaccountabilityproject.syr.edu/docs/russian-war-crimes-against-ukraine-the-global-accountability-network.pdf>.

⁷⁹ Rome Statute, Art. 7(1).

⁸⁰ ICC Elements, Art. 8(2).

⁸¹ Leila N. Sadat, *Putting Peacetime First: Crimes Against Humanity and the Civilian Population Requirement*, 31 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 197, 197 (2017), <https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol31/iss2/1>.

Generally, the ICC has routinely held that there must be a certain level of direct control the perpetrator must have in order to be responsible for the conduct of those under the individual's command.⁸²

C. War crimes

Article 8⁸³ of the Rome Statute details the scope of what war crimes means, including war crimes that occur during international or non-international conflict.⁸⁴ The first subsection of Article 8 lists the grave breaches and the next subsection details other violations of laws of armed conflict.⁸⁵ The ICC Prosecutor need only prove that the perpetrator had the “awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. . .”⁸⁶ Generally, the Prosecutor must prove all the elements of a crime, including that the perpetrator either “directed or participated in the conduct,” in order to convict the individual.⁸⁷

D. Crime of Aggression

The crime of aggression, a part of Article 8, has the caveat of *bis* – meaning that it was inserted by resolution RC/Res.6 in 2010 by State Parties to the Rome Statute.⁸⁸ It is a relatively new crime that has been codified as one of the core international crimes. Historically, the act of war was not seen as a violation of international law; however, after World War II, the sentiment towards aggression shifted regarding the existing territories and its political independence.⁸⁹ When first drafting the crime of aggression, the drafters noted two caveats: “individual or collective self-defence by states involving the use of force is authorized by article 51 of the Charter and...the use of force can be authorized by the UN Security Council as under article 42 of the UN Charter.”⁹⁰

For the sake of clarity, the timeline for codifying the crime of aggression is as follows:

- 24 October 1945 – The UN included “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.⁹¹

⁸² Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III's “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” ¶ 30 (ICC June 8, 2018).

⁸³ For detailed analysis of this section, please refer to Kelly Adams et al., *Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine: The Breach of International Humanitarian Law by the Russian Federation*, GLOB. ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK 27-8 (Apr. 2022), <https://syrianaccountabilityproject.syr.edu/docs/russian-war-crimes-against-ukraine-the-global-accountability-network.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Rome Statute, Art. 8.

⁸⁵ Rome Statute, Art. 8(a-c).

⁸⁶ ICC Introduction, Art. 8(c).

⁸⁷ ICC Elements, Art. 8.

⁸⁸ Rome Statute, Art. 8 *bis*(1).

⁸⁹ Int'l Crimes Database, *Crime of Aggression*, INT'L CRIMES DATABASE, <https://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Crimes/CrimeOfAggression> (last visited June 15, 2022).

⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁹¹ *The Crime of Aggression – A Brief History*, THE GLOB. CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION & IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, <https://crimeofaggression.info/history/> (last visited June 29, 2022).

- December 1974 – The UNGA adopted Resolution 3314(29) to define the crime of aggression in order to provide guidance to the UNSC as to what that crime would entail.⁹²
- July 1998 – While discussing what to add as crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, the crime of aggression was included, but the definition and jurisdiction over the crime was deferred.⁹³
- February 2009 – The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression “found a consensus agreement” as to how the crime of aggression can be defined.⁹⁴
- 11 June 2010 – The 2010 Kampala Review Conference integrated the definition of the crime of aggression, thus allowing State Parties to pass Resolution RC/Res.6.⁹⁵
- 2017 - The “Assembly of States Parties will have to take a further one-time decision to activate the Court’s jurisdiction, no earlier than 2017. Also, one year must have passed since the 30th ratification before the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.”⁹⁶

Article 8 *bis* of the Rome Statute dictates that “planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person” who has direct control over either the political or military branch of the State is a “manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”⁹⁷ The perpetrator need not have made a “legal evaluation” for the purpose of using armed forces within the confines of the UN Charter’s definition.⁹⁸ The Prosecutor must construe the term “manifest” as an objective qualification.⁹⁹

It is necessary for the perpetrator to either plan, prepare, initiate, or execute the act of aggression and be in a position in which the individual has the power to exercise control over the political or military branch or direct either branch to perform the act of aggression.¹⁰⁰ Second, the act of aggression must have been committed.¹⁰¹ Third, the perpetrator must have been aware that such an act was inconsistent with the definition set forth in UN Charter.¹⁰² Fourth, the act must have constituted a manifest violation of the UN Charter.¹⁰³ Last, the “perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a manifest violation” of the UN Charter.¹⁰⁴

⁹² *Id.*

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁵ *Id.*

⁹⁶ *Id.*

⁹⁷ Int’l Crimes Database, *supra* note 89.

⁹⁸ ICC Introduction, Art. 8 *bis*(2).

⁹⁹ ICC Introduction, Art. 8 *bis*(3).

¹⁰⁰ ICC Elements, Art. 8 *bis*(2); more than one person may meet the requirements.

¹⁰¹ ICC Elements, Art. 8 *bis*(3).

¹⁰² ICC Elements, Art. 8 *bis*(4).

¹⁰³ ICC Elements, Art. 8 *bis*(5).

¹⁰⁴ ICC Elements, Art. 8 *bis*(6).

Article 8 *bis*'s non-exhaustive list includes "invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State" within the territory of another State, "bombardment by the armed forces, blockade of the ports . . . , an attack by the armed forces of a State against that of another State," whether it is on land, by sea or air, and others.¹⁰⁵ This non-exhaustive list was meant to assist the UNSC in its determination as to what amounts to a crime of aggression, rather than focus solely on criminal accountability.¹⁰⁶ Once the UNSC finds that an act amounts to a crime of aggression, it is a matter of having jurisdiction over the perpetrator.

IV. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES OVER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

The Nuremberg Charter and the Tokyo Charter set up the first international tribunals that broke "the monopoly over criminal jurisdiction" on international crimes and created a jurisdictional template for future international tribunals.¹⁰⁷ The temporal, territorial, personal, and subject-matter jurisdiction of an international tribunal is a result of lobbying and negotiations, tailored to the situation within the international political comfort zone.¹⁰⁸

A. *Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court*

The Rome Statute sets the jurisdictional framework for the ICC, permitting it to prosecute individuals for the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole" for one or more of the four core international crimes.¹⁰⁹ The ICC jurisdiction can be considered general, with the exception of the crime of aggression.¹¹⁰

In addition to the ICC and special international tribunals, States may exercise universal jurisdiction over the core international crimes under customary international law.¹¹¹ Again, as to the crime of aggression, this right is however contested as discussed below in Section IV.A.2.¹¹²

1. *ICC's Jurisdiction over War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide*

With regard to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the ICC's jurisdiction begins after the Rome Statute's entry into force or with the entry into force for a State Party.¹¹³ It covers cases where one or more of the four core international crimes have been committed by a State Party national, in the territory of a State Party, in the territory of a state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC, or by a national of a state that has accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC by

¹⁰⁵ Rome Statute, Art. 8 *bis*(2)(a-g).

¹⁰⁶ Int'l Crimes Database, *supra* note 89.

¹⁰⁷ Eileen Skinnider, *Experiences and Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia*, 3 APYIHL 243, 246 (2007). *See also*, Michael J. Matheson & David Scheffer, *The Creation of Tribunals*, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 173, 182 (2016).

¹⁰⁸ *See e.g.*, Matheson & Scheffer, *supra* note 107, at 173.

¹⁰⁹ Rome Statute, Art. 5.

¹¹⁰ *See e.g.*, Michael J. Matheson & David Scheffer, *supra* note 107, at 186.

¹¹¹ Michael P. Scharf, *Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression*, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 388 (2012).

¹¹² Based on an "understanding" between the negotiators of the crime of aggression amendment, it was not to be interpreted as creating a right for national courts to prosecute the crime of aggression under universal jurisdiction. *Id.* at 359-360.

¹¹³ Rome Statute, Art. 11.

lodging a declaration with the Registrar of the ICC.¹¹⁴ The ICC may only prosecute natural persons who were not under the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.¹¹⁵

There are three jurisdictional triggers for the ICC: (1) a referral by a State Party, (2) a referral by the UNSC, acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and (3) an investigation initiated by the ICC Prosecutor.¹¹⁶ The Prosecutor may initiate a preliminary examination *proprio motu* (on their own initiative) but must seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to begin a formal investigation *proprio motu*. If the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it authorizes the commencement of the investigation.¹¹⁷

Neither Ukraine nor Russia is a State Party to the Rome Statute, but Ukraine has officially accepted the ICC jurisdiction by submitting two declarations pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. The first declaration, submitted in April 2014, accepted ICC jurisdiction with respect to alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014; the second, submitted in September 2015, extended this time period on an open-ended basis to encompass ongoing alleged crimes committed throughout the territory of Ukraine from 20 February 2014 onwards.¹¹⁸ With these declarations, Ukraine has accepted the ICC jurisdiction “for the purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the perpetrators and accomplices of acts committed in the territory of Ukraine” from 21 November 2013 onwards.

2. *Why Not the Crime of Aggression?*

The jurisdictional regime of the crime of aggression is different from that of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. While the Rome Statute, negotiated in 1998, included the definition of the other three core international crimes, it was not until 2009 that the States Parties were able to agree on the definition of the crime of aggression.¹¹⁹ The conditions for jurisdiction were established a year later,¹²⁰ and they are significantly narrower than in the other three situations. Based on the Rome Statute Articles 15 *bis* and 15 *ter*, the ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction over crimes of aggression committed by nationals of States not party to the Rome Statute or on those States’ territories, unless the UNSC, acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter,

¹¹⁴ Rome Statute, Art. 12.

¹¹⁵ Rome Statute, Arts. 25-26.

¹¹⁶ Rome Statute, Art. 13.

¹¹⁷ Rome Statute, Art. 15.

¹¹⁸ *Ukraine*, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (June 2, 2022, 9:00 PM), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine>.

¹¹⁹ Jennifer Trahan, *Revisiting the History of the Crime of Aggression in Light of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine*, 2 ASIL INSIGHTS 1, 1-2 (Apr. 19, 2022), https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ASIL_Insights_2021_V26_I2.pdf. Note that the negotiations were open to all UN Member States or members of International Atomic Energy Agency or specialized agencies. RETHINKING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION. INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 257 (Stefanie Bock & Eckart Conze eds., 2020) (ebook).

¹²⁰ Jennifer Trahan, *supra* note 119, at 3.

refers the situation to the Prosecutor.¹²¹ The temporal jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression was activated as of 17 July 2018.¹²² No jurisprudence exists yet.

In principle, the triggers for ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression are similar to the other core international crimes (State Party referral, Security Council referral, *proprio motu*). In practice, however, the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is largely controlled by the UNSC. Should the Prosecutor wish to proceed with an investigation of a crime of aggression *proprio motu*, they must first verify if the UNSC has made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the state concerned and notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the ICC.¹²³ The Prosecutor may proceed if the UNSC has made such a determination; the Prosecutor may also proceed in the absence of such a determination within six months after the notification, only if the UNSC does not specifically request the Prosecutor to cease proceedings and the Pre-Trial Division has authorized the commencement of the investigation.¹²⁴

Since neither Russia nor Ukraine is a State Party to the ICC, the Prosecutor does not have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression committed by Russian nationals in Ukraine under Article 15 *bis*. With Russia's veto power and practice in the UNSC,¹²⁵ it is unrealistic to expect a Security Council referral under Article 15 *ter*.

However, with the conflict ongoing, the international community must look for other solutions to prosecute Russian perpetrators for the crime of aggression.

B. Ukraine's Delegation of Jurisdiction

There are many ways in which Ukraine could delegate its jurisdiction. First, Ukraine can delegate its territorial jurisdiction to a built-for-purpose aggression tribunal, as well as to one or more States willing to prosecute the crime of aggression.¹²⁶ Second, Ukraine can also delegate its passive personality¹²⁷ jurisdiction that enables it to punish crimes committed by foreign nationals against Ukrainian citizens.¹²⁸ Finally, Ukraine can delegate the jurisdiction pursuant to the protective principle, which enables States to prosecute "crimes committed by foreign nationals outside of their territory which threaten their vital interests."¹²⁹ "[T]he principle's rationale is . . . based on the necessity to protect vital State interests, including sovereignty, security, political

¹²¹ Interestingly, the resolution activating the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime of aggression seems to go even further, stating that the article enters into force only for those States Parties that have accepted or ratified the amendment. Assembly of State Parties to the ICC Res. ICC-ASP/16/Res.5 (Dec. 14, 2017), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/sites/asp/files/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP16/ICC-ASP-16-Res5-ENG.pdf.

¹²² *Id.*

¹²³ Rome Statute, Art. 15 *bis*.

¹²⁴ Rome Statute, Art. 15 *bis*.

¹²⁵ On 25 February 2022, Russia vetoed a draft resolution intended to end the Russian Federation's military offensive against Ukraine. *Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation Wields Veto*, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 25, 2022), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm>.

¹²⁶ *Id.*

¹²⁷ The passive personality principle allows states, in limited cases, to claim jurisdiction to try a foreign national for offenses committed abroad that affect its own citizens. *See Orentlicher, supra* note 59.

¹²⁸ Orentlicher, *supra* note 59.

¹²⁹ Orentlicher, *supra* note 59.

independence and governmental functions.”¹³⁰ Since the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine poses similar national security threats to the sovereignty of other similarly situated States in the region, such as Poland, the source of this jurisdiction is not just limited from the Ukrainian delegation of jurisdiction but can be exercised independently by the neighboring States as well.

Relying on Ukrainian delegations of jurisdiction has its advantages for other States. Most notably, it will allow States to bypass the prevailing debate on whether universal jurisdiction includes the crime of aggression in the first place, which would authorize their national courts to exercise jurisdiction in these circumstances. This prevailing debate is among the foremost factors for which many States are reluctant to start investigations.¹³¹ Relying on an unambiguous delegation of Ukrainian jurisdiction would help alleviate any hesitation.

However, there are two pertinent concerns with the above approach. First, the issue of immunities for government officials in national courts will remain ever more relevant in such arrangements. Second, the scheme’s compliance with the provisions of the Ukrainian Constitution is also questionable.

Article 124 of the Constitution disallows the delegation of judicial powers to other bodies.¹³² It is on this basis that the CCU had pronounced that the Rome Statute was inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine, since in the eyes of the CCU, the jurisdiction of the ICC was “complementary” to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian courts and thereby, encroached upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ukrainian courts.¹³³ This contrasts with the CCU upholding the European Court of Human Right’s (ECHR) jurisdiction over Ukraine, reasoning that the ECHR’s jurisdiction was “auxiliary,” and provided for jurisdiction only “after all domestic remedies have been exhausted,” thereby, not crossing into the exclusive functions of the Ukrainian courts.¹³⁴ While a specific amendment was passed by the Parliament to exempt the ICC from this provision, the provision remains an important detriment to the delegation of Ukrainian jurisdiction.¹³⁵

C. Jurisdiction of an International Court – The Special Tribunal for Ukraine

The elements of the jurisdiction of international tribunals are situation-specific. In the following, possible options are considered for the jurisdictional framework of a Special Tribunal for Ukraine.

First, regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, it seems widely accepted that the Special Tribunal for Ukraine should only have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to limit the tribunal’s focus

¹³⁰ Orentlicher, *supra* note 59.

¹³¹ Alexander Komarov & Oona Hathaway, *Ukraine’s Constitutional Constraints: How to Achieve Accountability for the Crime of Aggression*, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 5, 2022), <https://www.justsecurity.org/80958/ukraines-constitutional-constraints-how-to-achieve-accountability-for-the-crime-of-aggression/>.

¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ *Id.*

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ *Id.*

and eliminate redundancy with the ICC's efforts.¹³⁶ The Ukrainian government agrees with this method since it has expressed willingness to align the Ukrainian domestic definition of the crime of aggression to the one governed by the Rome Statute Article 8 *bis*.¹³⁷

Second, previous prominent hybrid international tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), have had limited personal jurisdiction over those “who bear the greatest responsibility” and “over the senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible. . .”¹³⁸ Similarly, the Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression as a leadership offense that can only be attributed to “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression.”¹³⁹ Thus, there is substantial precedence for narrowing the scope of the jurisdiction to political and military leaders.

Third, different options are being considered for the start of the period covered by the tribunal. The first option presented by the White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal would be to start the jurisdiction in 2014, which would allow for processing Russian acts, including cyberattacks, since the beginning of the conflict in Crimea.¹⁴⁰ The other option would be to limit the temporal jurisdiction to the most recent invasion, which commenced on 24 February 2022. Ukraine seems to favor temporal jurisdiction that starts in February 2014.¹⁴¹ Regardless of the decision, with the conflict ongoing, the temporal jurisdiction should not have an ending date.¹⁴²

Last, regarding territorial jurisdiction, there would be jurisdiction encompassing either the “aggressor state” and the “victim state,” including the role of Belarus which must be considered an aggressor state as well.¹⁴³

D. Other Mandates for the International Justice Mechanisms

1. Ukraine

For various reasons including efficiency and reconciliation, international criminal law and practice support trials close to the affected community.¹⁴⁴ Ukraine has already sentenced Russian soldiers for war crimes under Part 1 of Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.¹⁴⁵ Chapter 20

¹³⁶ Jennifer Trahan, *White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Recommended by the UNGA and negotiated by the UN and Ukraine*, 1, 2 (May 22, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (on file with author) (hereinafter “White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal”).

¹³⁷ Dr. Anton Korynevych, Ambassador-at-large in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Address at the Public International Law and Policy Group Expert Roundtable: Putin: Pathways to Prosecution (June 3, 2022).

¹³⁸ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 1; Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Art. 2.

¹³⁹ Rome Statute, Art. 8 *bis*.

¹⁴⁰ White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal, *supra* note 136, at 3.

¹⁴¹ Dr. Anton Korynevych, *supra* note 137.

¹⁴² White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal, *supra* note 136, at 3.

¹⁴³ White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal, *supra* note 136, at 3.

¹⁴⁴ Heller, *supra* note 45.

¹⁴⁵ Rebekah Yeager-Malkin, *Russia soldiers sentenced to 11.5 years in prison for war crimes in Ukraine*, JURIST (May 31, 2022, 02:58 AM), <https://www.jurist.org/news/2022/05/russia-soldiers-sentenced-to-11-5-years-in-prison-for-war-crimes-in-ukraine/>.

of the Ukrainian Criminal Code, governing criminal offenses against peace, security of mankind and international legal order, also includes a provision on planning, preparation, and waging of an aggressive war under Article 437.¹⁴⁶ Thus, a Ukrainian domestic court could exercise jurisdiction over crimes of aggression.

2. European Union or EU Member States

Some have suggested a hybrid tribunal created by an agreement between Ukraine and the European Union.¹⁴⁷ The European Union does not have any jurisdiction over criminal law,¹⁴⁸ but it did establish the Special Investigative Task Force to investigate inhumane treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo in 2011, and was instrumental in the establishment of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office for the consequent criminal proceedings in 2015. The Specialist Chambers were established by an exchange of letters between the President of Kosovo and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs/Vice President of the Commission.¹⁴⁹

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers is a hybrid tribunal operating within the Kosovo justice system but with a chamber in the Netherlands, and an international staff.¹⁵⁰ It has jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of certain crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under Kosovo law, committed between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000.¹⁵¹ The jurisdiction encompasses natural persons of Kosovo/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) citizenship or persons accused of committing crimes against persons of Kosovo/FRY citizenship.¹⁵² The

¹⁴⁶ An English translation of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is available on the SHERLOC portal of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Sherloc, UNODC, https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/uploads/res/document/ukr/2001/criminal-code-of-the-republic-of-ukraine-en_html/Ukraine_Criminal_Code_as_of_2010_EN.pdf (last visited June 20, 2022). The formulation is similar to the definition of "crimes against peace" in the UN Charter establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal. Michael P. Scharf, *supra* note 111, at 369.

¹⁴⁷ Heller, *supra* note 45. Heller included an option of a hybrid tribunal created by agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe. Russia however ceased to be a member of the organization as of March 16, 2022, thus voiding the opportunity. Upon its withdrawal, Russia informed of its intention to denounce the European Convention on Human Rights. Comm. of Ministers, *Resolution CM/Res (2022)2 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe* (Mar. 16, 2022). The Council of Europe has since added its support to the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for the investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression, "on the basis of a multilateral treaty concluded by a group of States" and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. Eur. Parl. Ass., *Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights*, Doc. No. 15510 (Apr. 26, 2022).

¹⁴⁸ For a concise summary on the topic, see *Division of Competences within the European Union*, EUR-LEX, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/division-of-competences-within-the-european-union.html> (last visited June 3, 2022).

¹⁴⁹ In practice, the HR/VP committed to the extension of the mandate of the EULEX Mission in Kosovo, which had been agreed upon by the Council of the European Union in Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP. Law 04/L-274 on the Ratification of the International Agreement between the Republic of Kosovo and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Apr. 23, 2014, https://www.scp-ks.org/sites/default/files/public/04-l-274_a.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Nationals of the 27 EU member states and additional contributing states (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United States) are eligible to apply. *KSC at a Glance*, KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS, https://www.scp-ks.org/sites/default/files/public/content/ksc_at_a_glance-en.pdf (last visited June 3, 2022).

¹⁵¹ Reported in the CoE Parliamentary Assembly Report 12462. Eur. Parl. Ass., *Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights*, Doc. No. 12462 (Jan. 7, 2011).

¹⁵² *KSC at a Glance*, *supra* note 150.

situation in Kosovo, which had been recognized by the UNSC in its resolution 1244, is not directly comparable to the situation in Ukraine.¹⁵³ In theory, however, a similar hybrid model might be feasible in the case of the crimes of aggression committed in Ukraine.

Thus far, the EU efforts have been focused on supporting Ukraine and the ICC in prosecutions.¹⁵⁴ In May 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution addressing “the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine,” calling for the EU institutions to support the establishment of a “special international tribunal for the punishment of the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the political leaders and military commanders of Russia and its allies.”¹⁵⁵ Since the resolution refers to established multilateral forums such as the UN and the CoE,¹⁵⁶ there is no indication that the EU is looking to host the tribunal.

Several European Union Member States have opened investigations into crimes committed in Ukraine, but only few have appropriate universal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in their criminal codes.¹⁵⁷ Three EU Member States have viable options under their respective penal codes: Estonia has universal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression; the Czech Republic over “preparation of aggressive war;” and Bulgaria over “crimes against peace.”¹⁵⁸ An uncharted option could be a coalition of the willing, built around one or more of these countries.

V. THE MANDATES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS

A. “Those responsible”- ICTY & ICTR vs “Greatest Responsibility”- SCSL

The ICTY and ICTR, established in the aftermath of the Cold War, provided in Article 1 of their respective statutes that they “shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.”¹⁵⁹ Contrastingly, the SCSL Statute conferred on the tribunal “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law violations.¹⁶⁰ This shift in the mandate, pronounced by the statutes, notably within the span of only a decade, can be understood by looking at the underlying contexts of the period.

In resolutions preceding the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, the UNSC repeatedly emphasized its resolve to bring to justice all those persons responsible for the commission of international

¹⁵³ S.C. Res 1244 (June 10, 1999).

¹⁵⁴ *EU solidarity with Ukraine*, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/eu-solidarity-ukraine/> (last visited June 20, 2022).

¹⁵⁵ Resolution of 19 May 2022 on the fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine. EUR. PARL. DOC. P9 TA (2022) 0218. Art. O.

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*

¹⁵⁷ The German Code of Crimes against International Law criminalizes aggression in Section 13 of the VStGB, but the law applies only if the perpetrator is a German national or if the offense is directed against Germany. OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE & TRIAL INT’L, UNIV. JURISDICTION L. & PRAC. IN GER. 11-17 (Mar. 2019).

¹⁵⁸ The scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. U.N. Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General prepared on the basis of comments and observations of Governments*, UNGA A /65/181 29-30 (July 29, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Charles Chernor Jalloh, *Prosecuting Those Bearing “Greatest Responsibility:” The Lessons of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 863, 863 (2013).

¹⁶⁰ *Id.*

crimes.¹⁶¹ This is because the international community faced a climate of ongoing hostilities, and the immediate policy goal was to end further commission of heinous offenses.¹⁶² Resolutions, overstating the international community's abilities to bring to justice a wider set of perpetrators, were meant to be a deterrent, becoming an intrinsic part of the statutes.¹⁶³ While the tribunals enjoyed broad scopes of authority when there was a clear anticipation and support for justice, the aspirations were soon tempered by realities of "tribunal fatigue."¹⁶⁴

There were discussions among powerful countries, especially the United States, about the viability of the ad-hoc Chapter 7 tribunal model.¹⁶⁵ It was driven primarily by concerns about the slow pace of the international trials and the spiraling costs of the courts.¹⁶⁶ While the total expenditures of ICTY and the ICTR were \$1.2 billion and \$1 billion respectively,¹⁶⁷ the total expenditure of the SCSL was \$300 million.¹⁶⁸ For various pragmatic reasons, such as the need to show concrete results in the early days, those ad hocs also ended up prosecuting otherwise insignificant perpetrators, such as Duško Tadić and Jean-Paul Akayesu.¹⁶⁹ These factors led to a deliberate decision, in a move to what was perceived to be a more financially viable and a more politically acceptable model, to limit the jurisdiction of future courts, like the SCSL.¹⁷⁰ Notably, even the Rules of Procedures of the ICTY and the ICTR later went on to reflect "greatest responsibility," a sign of a wider shift in the acceptable mandates of international criminal tribunals.¹⁷¹

The UNSC's decision to limit the jurisdiction of the SCSL to those with the "greatest responsibility," therefore, was driven by pragmatic, political, economic, and other realpolitik considerations.

B. A Recommendation for the Special Tribunal for Ukraine

Because the crime of aggression, as defined in article 8 *bis*, is a "leadership crime," it is not necessary to specify that those to be prosecuted would only be those who bear "the greatest responsibility," as the SCSL's Statute did, because the definition of the crime already limits those who may be prosecuted.¹⁷²

If the scope were to be defined anyway, then limiting the scope to those with the "greatest responsibility" would be the most prudent due to the challenging political and economic realities of the world today.

¹⁶¹ Joseph Rikhof, *Who are Most Responsible in International Criminal Law?*, 3 PKI GLOB. JUST. J. 77, 77 (2019).

¹⁶² *Id.*

¹⁶³ Jalloh, *supra* note 159, at 876.

¹⁶⁴ Jalloh, *supra* note 159, at 878.

¹⁶⁵ Jalloh, *supra* note 159, at 878.

¹⁶⁶ Jalloh, *supra* note 159, at 878.

¹⁶⁷ Rupert Skilbeck, *Funding Justice: The Price of War Crimes Trials*, 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 6 (2008).

¹⁶⁸ Lansana Gberie, *The Special Court for Sierra Leone rests – for good*, AFRICA RENEWAL (Apr. 2014), <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2014/special-court-sierra-leone-rests-%E2%80%93-good>.

¹⁶⁹ Jalloh, *supra* note 159.

¹⁷⁰ Jalloh, *supra* note 159.

¹⁷¹ Jalloh, *supra* note 159.

¹⁷² White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal, *supra* note 136, at 5.

VI. PROSECUTING SITTING HEADS OF STATE

For the first time since the Nuremberg trials, the international community is looking to bring perpetrators of the crime of aggression to justice.

Head of State immunity from jurisdiction in other States has for centuries been considered a core principle of sovereignty,¹⁷³ recognized by the ICJ.¹⁷⁴ The sitting Heads of State enjoy immunity *ratione personae*, personal or procedural immunity, which protects them from being adjudicated by the courts of another state. Immunity *ratione materiae*, substantive or functional immunity, instead shields the acts committed as a Head of State, and it extends also to former heads of state.¹⁷⁵ Functional immunity, as explained below, has eroded in international criminal law since the Nuremberg trials.¹⁷⁶ Contemporary international criminal law recognizes that the principle is not absolute.¹⁷⁷

The Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, the SCSL, and the ICC all include a provision stating that the official position of the accused shall not relieve them of criminal responsibility.¹⁷⁸

The ICJ elaborated on the issue of immunity in *Yerodia*. It implied that while prosecuting sitting Head of States was outside of domestic courts' jurisdiction, even when international crimes have been committed, the immunity of an incumbent Head of State could be waived by an international court.¹⁷⁹

The SCSL conviction of Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, stands out as the only successful case of prosecuting a former Head of State in an international court. The former Yugoslav President, tried at the ICTY, died in detention before his judgment was rendered,¹⁸⁰ and the President al-Bashir of Sudan, indicted by the ICC on 4 March 2009, is still at large.¹⁸¹

In fact, there appears to be a trend protesting international jurisdiction over Heads of State and avoiding cooperation with the ICC. Since the issuance of his arrest warrant, al-Bashir has reportedly visited several UN and ICC Member States without being turned away or arrested.¹⁸²

¹⁷³ See, e.g., Brian Man-ho Chok, *Let the Responsible be Responsible: Judicial Oversight and Over-Optimism in the Arrest Warrant Case and the Fall of the Head of State Immunity Doctrine in International and Domestic Courts*, 30 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 489, 496 (2015).

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 51 (Feb. 14).

¹⁷⁵ Scharf, *supra* note 111, at 383.

¹⁷⁶ See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, *Heads of state and other government officials before the International Criminal Court: the uneasy revolution continues*, ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INT'L CRIM. CT. 96, 100-101 (Margaret deGuzman & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2020).

¹⁷⁷ See Chok, *supra* note 173, at 489.

¹⁷⁸ The ICTY Statute, Art. 7(2); The ICTR Statute, Art. 6(2); The SCSL Statute, Art. 6(2); Rome Statute, Art. 27. On the debate on the meaning of Article 27 of the Rome Statute, see Sadat, *supra* note 179.

¹⁷⁹ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, *supra* note 174, at ¶ 51. See also, Scharf, *supra* note 111, at 384.

¹⁸⁰ *Indicted genocide suspect Slobodan Milosevic died of heart attack – UN*, UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 12, 2006), <https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/03/171842-indicted-genocide-suspect-slobodan-milosevic-died-heart-attack-un>.

¹⁸¹ *Al Bashir Case*, INT'L CRIM. CT. (June 11, 2022, 10:35 AM), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir>.

¹⁸² *Omar al-Bashir*, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT., <https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/cases/omar-albashir> (last visited June 21, 2022).

Some countries, such as the Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan), have justified their inaction by Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute, which provides that “[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.”¹⁸³ Thus, Jordan asserted that Heads of State retain their immunity under international law so long as they remain in office and refused to surrender al-Bashir to the ICC without Sudan’s consent.¹⁸⁴ However, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC concluded that there was “no immunity that Jordan would have been required to ‘disregard’ by executing the Court’s arrest warrant” and “there was no need for a waiver by Sudan of Head of State immunity.”¹⁸⁵ The ICC firmly stated that “[n]o immunities under customary international law operate in such a situation to bar an international court in its exercise of its own jurisdiction.”¹⁸⁶

The following section will briefly examine the case of Charles Taylor to understand the elements that led to its success. After that, the lessons learned are laid out for the crime of aggression committed by the Russian military forces under the command of President Putin in Ukraine.

A. Case Study - the Indictment and Prosecution of President Charles Taylor of Liberia

The indictment, prosecution, and consequent conviction of the former Liberian President, Charles Taylor, broke the shield of international impunity of Heads of State for the first time since the Nuremberg trials. The conviction Charles Taylor on 26 April 2012 by the SCSL was “a major departure from the impunity that heads of state traditionally enjoyed”¹⁸⁷ and, in the words of the SCSL itself, opened a “new era of accountability.”¹⁸⁸ The Taylor case also created a new precedent for the indictment of sitting Heads of State: President Taylor was indicted on 7 March 2003 and would not resign until five months later.¹⁸⁹

One of the keys to the success of the SCSL was its mandate¹⁹⁰ and its jurisdiction, established in the Statute of the SCSL. The SCSL had the “power to prosecute persons who [bore] the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, had threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”¹⁹¹ The Statute expressly waived the immunity of high-level officials:

¹⁸³ Rome Statute, Art. 98(1).

¹⁸⁴ Sadat, *supra* note 176, at 98.

¹⁸⁵ Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, ¶ 7 (May 6, 2019).

¹⁸⁶ *Id.*, ¶ 2.

¹⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Even a ‘Big Man’ Must Face Justice. Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor*. HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 25, 2012), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/25/even-big-man-must-face-justice/lessons-trial-charles-taylor>.

¹⁸⁸ Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Summary Judgement, ¶ 102 (Apr. 26, 2012).

¹⁸⁹ Kirsten Keith, *Blood Diamonds and War Crimes: The Case against Charles Taylor*, 15 S.CROSS U. L. REV. 99, 99 n.3 (2012).

¹⁹⁰ See David Crane, *Hybrid Tribunals - Internationalized National Prosecutions*, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 803 (2007).

¹⁹¹ The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 1(1).

“The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”¹⁹²

Taylor’s original indictment in March 2003 was on seventeen counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law with individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 6(1) and with superior responsibility pursuant to Article 6(3) of the SCSL Statute.¹⁹³ Upon the SCSL Prosecutor’s request, the indictment and the arrest warrant were kept under seal.¹⁹⁴ An opportunity to serve the indictment to Taylor arose early June 2003, when the Liberian President was visiting Ghana for then-ongoing peace talks. The Prosecutor made the decision to have the indictment delivered to the Ghanaian authorities on 4 June 2003, but President Kufour, who was chairing the peace talks, refused to act on it and instead, he helped Taylor flee.¹⁹⁵ The following day, the Prosecutor published a press release announcing the indictment and declaring Taylor’s arrest warrant outstanding.¹⁹⁶

Two months later, in August 2003, arguably to escape international justice, Taylor agreed to resign his Presidency. Feeling protected by West African governments and the Security Council, he accepted an offer of safe haven in Nigeria.¹⁹⁷ Through counsel, he contested SCSL’s jurisdiction based on his functional immunity, but in May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of SCSL dismissed the challenge.¹⁹⁸ By Spring 2006, enough domestic, regional, and international momentum had been gathered for Nigeria to arrest Taylor and transfer him to Liberia, where the UN peacekeepers took him into the custody of the SCSL.¹⁹⁹

The trial before the Trial Chamber of the SCSL opened on 4 June 2007, and the process came to its conclusion on 26 September 2013, when the Appeals Chamber upheld Taylor’s conviction and sentence.²⁰⁰ The former President of Liberia was convicted as individually responsible on eleven counts for planning, aiding, abetting the commission of crimes pursuant to Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute.²⁰¹ The Trial Chamber however found that the Prosecution failed to prove

¹⁹² *Id.* at Art. 6(2).

¹⁹³ Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003), <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/003/SCSC-03-01-I-001.pdf>. The indictment was amended twice in the following years. The final indictment included five counts of crimes against humanity, five counts of war crimes, and one count of other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Statute entitled the SCSL to prosecute also certain crimes under Sierra Leonean Law, but Taylor was not indicted for any such crimes. Charles Chernor Jalloh, *The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case*, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 229, 248-249 (2015).

¹⁹⁴ Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-Disclosure (Mar. 7, 2003), <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/003/SCSL-03-01-I-003.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ Jalloh, *supra* note 193, at 250-251.

¹⁹⁶ Press Release, SCSL Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of David M. Crane, Chief Prosecutor (June 5, 2003), <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-060503.pdf>.

¹⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch, *supra* note 187.

¹⁹⁸ Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), ¶ 52 (May 31, 2004).

¹⁹⁹ Jalloh, *supra* note 193, at 250-257.

²⁰⁰ Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE AND THE RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, <http://www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html> (last visited June 11, 2022).

²⁰¹ *Id.*

Taylor's superior responsibility under Article 6(3) beyond a reasonable doubt.²⁰² As Taylor showed no remorse, the judges adopted a punitive approach and sentenced Taylor to fifty years in prison.²⁰³

Each phase of the ten-year process was "marked by high legal and political drama,"²⁰⁴ including international debate between pragmatists and idealists of international criminal law.²⁰⁵ Regardless, the Taylor trial created important jurisprudence for cases against Heads of State, and reoriented "international criminal justice toward a punitive model in response to atrocities."²⁰⁶ It has been considered a "testament to the potentially valuable role that international criminal tribunals can make to the enhancement of regional and global security."²⁰⁷

B. Prosecuting President Vladimir Putin

Crimes of aggression have not been the subject of an international tribunal since the Nuremberg trials. Now, the elements of the crime of aggression are present in Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory in February 2022 – if not already in 2014 – and there appears to be no doubt about the command responsibility of President Vladimir Putin.

1. The Law

In adjudicating international criminal cases involving Heads of State, the issues of jurisdiction and immunity are inevitably linked. The jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal over the crime of aggression in Ukraine has been discussed in Section IV.A.2. It seems established that in addition to Ukraine exercising territorial jurisdiction, another domestic court could exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, or an international tribunal could have such jurisdiction. The above brief study on the issue of immunity appears to narrow down the options for prosecuting an incumbent leader of a State to international and hybrid tribunals.

In sum, current international criminal law allows the indictment and prosecution of Heads of State by international and hybrid tribunals, whether they be of a permanent, ad hoc, or hybrid nature. The cases of Presidents Milošević, Taylor, and al-Bashir²⁰⁸ provide important jurisprudence on the sovereign equality of States not preventing an international criminal tribunal from indicting or prosecuting a Head of State over a crime within its jurisdiction.

²⁰² Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013), <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A-1389.pdf>.

²⁰³ Shahram Dana, *The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*, 42 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 615, 630 (2014).

²⁰⁴ Jalloh, *supra* note 193, at 236.

²⁰⁵ See Jalloh, *supra* note 196, at 250-54. On the peace versus justice debate; *see generally*, Kenneth A. Rodman, Kenneth A. Rodman, *Peace Versus Justice*, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOB. JUST. 824 (Chatterjee D.K. ed., 2011).

²⁰⁶ Dana, *supra* note 203, at 686.

²⁰⁷ Jalloh, *supra* note 193, at 237.

²⁰⁸ Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia); Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I; Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09.

The question of indictment and adjudication over the crime of aggression *in absentia* must be addressed, as well. Based on the ICJ jurisprudence, cases of universal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression should never be tried without the suspect present, but investigations and indictments *in absentia* may be acceptable.²⁰⁹ Thus, it would seem that with its organic statute allowing, a special tribunal could have the jurisdiction to indict a sitting Head of State, even *in absentia*. For the prosecution to commence, however, will require the presence of the suspect.

2. *The Political Realities: A patchwork of precedents, clock ticking*

Bringing Russian military and political leadership, let alone President Putin himself, to justice over the crime of aggression is no easy feat.

First, Ukraine and its like-minded allies must find a way of establishing a special tribunal with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and over a sitting Head of State. The SCSL was established by an agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000,²¹⁰ but a referral from the UNSC here is currently an unrealistic expectation. The ECCC, established with the support of General Assembly Resolution 57/2208 of 27 February 2003, could instead provide inspiration for an UN-led process.

Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions, such as recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.²¹¹ As only votes cast in favor or against are counted towards the total number of votes,²¹² abstentions are crucial. The UNGA Resolution on Aggression against Ukraine,²¹³ adopted on 2 March 2022, gained as many as 141 votes in favor, with 5 countries against and 35 countries abstaining.²¹⁴ It seems promising, but the outrage of the UN community, with momentum for action with it, tends to fade away quickly. On 7 April 2022, the UNGA vote on the suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council (HRC) consisted of only 93 in favor, 24 against, with 58 abstaining.²¹⁵

Looking at the geopolitical picture, the vote on suspending Russia from the HRC seems to reflect a realistic projection. Based on the global reaction on this invasion, approximately a third of the world is taking measures against Russia, a third has supported Russia's actions, and the final third struggles to stay neutral.²¹⁶ In order to get the support – or agreement to abstain from voting – of countries in the middle such as India, Brazil, or Saudi Arabia, concessions will have to be made. Recognizing the power of a precedent, guaranteeing immunity for the Heads of State may be a factor.

²⁰⁹ Scharf, *supra* note 111, at 387.

²¹⁰ Accessible at *Digital Library*, UNITED NATIONS, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/420605?ln=en>.

²¹¹ U.N. General Assembly Rules of Procedure, Rule 83.

²¹² *Id.* at Rule 86.

²¹³ G.A. Res. ES-11/1 (Mar. 2, 2022).

²¹⁴ Twelve countries were counted as non-voting. *Digital Library*, UNITED NATIONS, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039?ln=en>.

²¹⁵ A.Res. ES-11/3 (Apr. 7, 2022).

²¹⁶ *Russia can count on support from many developing countries*, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 30, 2022), <https://www.eiu.com/n/russia-can-count-on-support-from-many-developing-countries/>.

When discussing whether the UNGA must also come to an agreement on establishing a Special Tribunal with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression including the ability to indict sitting Heads of State is when another set of challenges arises. The indictment alone will be a delicate matter. Putin enjoys the support of a large part of his people,²¹⁷ and international condemnation of a lawfully elected leader of a country could further alienate the Russian people from the West. Without entering a debate on peace versus justice, the possible counterproductive effect on global stability in the longer term needs to be acknowledged. In Charles Taylor's case, it has been suggested that the indictment by SCSL contributed to his loss of power,²¹⁸ but for the above reasons, a similar unfolding is unlikely in Russia. While the Trial Chamber of the SCSL underscored Charles Taylor's "betrayal of public trust,"²¹⁹ the situation in Ukraine is not directly comparable to the one in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Even if President Putin were to step down for any reason other than a coup, it is highly unlikely that the Russian government would extradite him to be prosecuted.²²⁰ The countries supporting the Russian government could equally be expected to follow the approach of Jordan or the African Union in the case of President al-Bashir of Sudan.²²¹ Even so, recognizing the odds against getting President Putin in front of a Special Tribunal, the case must be brought forward. The world needs to see the international community react to the Russian crime of aggression. For countries bordering powerful, aggressive neighbors, inaction would be a terrifying message and a possible forecast of their short-term future.

VII. THE UNITED NATIONS AND SETTING UP OF A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR UKRAINE FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

A. *In general*

1. *The Security Council*

The UNSC's authority to establish an international criminal tribunal, stems from Article 39 and Article 41 of the UN Charter, which gives it the authority to determine the existence of any threat to international peace, "recommend," and "decide" on appropriate measures, "not involving the use of armed force."²²² The ICTY and the ICTR were established in accordance with the exercise of these powers. However, such was not the case with the SCSL.

²¹⁷ Peter Hobson, *Putin's approval rating soars since he sent troops into Ukraine, state pollster reports*, Reuters (April 8, 2022, 9:42 AM), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-approval-rating-soars-since-he-sent-troops-into-ukraine-state-pollster-2022-04-08/>.

²¹⁸ Jalloh, *supra* note 193, at 229.

²¹⁹ Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 101-103 (Apr. 26, 2012).

²²⁰ For an insightful analysis on the societal foundations of the regime, see Graeme Robertson & Samuel Greene, *The Kremlin Emboldened: How Putin Wins Support*, 28 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 4, 2017, at 86-100.

²²¹ The African Union initially adopted a joint decision not to cooperate with the ICC in executing of the arrest warrant issued against Al-Bashir. See generally, Dire Tladi, *The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of international law*, 34 SAYIL 57 (2009), <https://cpb-us-e2.wpmucdn.com/sites.uci.edu/dist/9/798/files/2012/11/Tladi-AU-and-ICC.pdf>.

²²² U.N. Charter, Art. 39, 41.

While there was a Security Council resolution of 14 August 2000 (notably not invoking Chapter 7) requesting the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone, the SCSL was *not* created by the Security Council (as the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals had been) but created by bilateral agreement between Sierra Leone and the UN.²²³ The establishment of the SCSL is the foremost example of the UN's authority to establish an international criminal tribunal, without the help of the UNSC's enforcement authority under Article 41 of the UN Charter.

2. *The General Assembly*

The UNGA has no direct authority to establish an international criminal tribunal.²²⁴ Under Articles 10, 11, 12 and 14 of the UN Charter, the UNGA's powers are limited to making recommendations, as confirmed by the ICJ in the *Certain Expenses* case.²²⁵ The UNGA lacks the ability to take enforcement action, which is the exclusive prerogative of the UNSC. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber made clear in the *Tadić* case, the establishment of a criminal tribunal (i.e. the creation of compulsory criminal jurisdiction) is a form of such coercive or enforcement action.²²⁶ It must be noted, however, that such direct authority to create tribunals, is not necessary in the matter of Ukraine. The GA could, instead, take steps to support an exercise of criminal jurisdiction possessed by one or more UN Member States. The foremost example is the GA's creation of the ECCC.²²⁷

In the case of the ECCC, the UNGA introduced a resolution recommending the UN Secretary General to enter into a bilateral agreement with the Government of Cambodia for establishing a criminal tribunal. The resolution establishing the ECCC was approved by the General Assembly (resolution 57/228 of May 13, 2003.).²²⁸ This recent precedence is a perfect illustration of the UNGA's ability to create such a tribunal, without the help of the UNSC.²²⁹ The only additional requirement would be the government of Ukraine's participation and consent to the agreement.²³⁰

²²³ Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Summary Judgment, ¶¶ 101-103 (Apr. 26, 2012).

²²⁴ Derek Jinks, *Does the U.N. General Assembly have the authority to establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Syria?*, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 2014), <https://www.justsecurity.org/10721/u-n-general-assembly-authority-establish-international-criminal-tribunal-syria/>.

²²⁵ *Certain Expenses of the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J 151, 165 (July 20).

²²⁶ Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 37-40, 44 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).

²²⁷ Jennifer Trahan, *U.N. General Assembly Should Recommend Creation of Crime of Aggression Tribunal for Ukraine: Nuremburg Is Not the Model*. JUST SECURITY (Mar. 7, 2022), <https://www.justsecurity.org/80545/u-n-general-assembly-should-recommend-creation-of-crime-of-aggression-tribunal-for-ukraine-nuremberg-is-not-the-model/>.

²²⁸ *Id.*

²²⁹ *Id.*

²³⁰ *Id.*

3. *The Role of the Secretary General*

Article 98 of the UN Charter empowers the UN Secretary General to perform “functions as are entrusted to it by the [General Assembly or the Security Council]”²³¹ When the UNGA, or the UNSC for that matter, passes a resolution recommending the Secretary General to enter into a bilateral agreement with the Government of Ukraine, the Secretary General is duty-bound to follow those instructions and finalize a bilateral agreement.²³² This was the route followed for both the creation of the SCSL and ECCC.²³³

In ordinary circumstances, the Secretary General has also used his “good offices” to mediate in an international conflict and play an integral role in global issues.²³⁴ “Good offices” refers to “steps taken publicly and in private, drawing upon [the Secretary General’s] independence, impartiality and integrity, to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading.”²³⁵ Examples of the use of such “good offices” vary from Hammarskjöld’s promotion of an armistice between Israel and Arab States, Javier Perez de Cuellar’s negotiation of a cease-fire to end the Iran-Iraq War, to the incumbent Secretary General Antonio Guterres’s role in the promotion of multilateral climate-change agreements.²³⁶ It is unlikely that such “good offices” would be of much use in the present context, considering Mr. Guterres’s vehement condemnation of Russia.

B. A Suggested Methodology – A Bilateral Treaty

1. The General Assembly authorizes the SG to enter into negotiations with the Republic of Ukraine to set up a Special Tribunal

To start the process, the Government of Ukraine could write to the Office of the UN Secretary General asking to negotiate for the creation of a tribunal.²³⁷ The UNGA could request, by the passing of a resolution by the requisite two-thirds majority, that the Secretary General enter into negotiations with Ukraine to conclude a bilateral agreement and establish a Ukrainian international tribunal for the crime of aggression. As stated before, the UNGA does not have the direct authority to create the tribunal. However, such direct authority is unnecessary as illustrated by the case of ECCC.²³⁸ The UNGA created the ECCC by passing Resolution 57/228, requesting the Secretary General to continue bilateral negotiations between the Government of Cambodia and the Secretary

²³¹ U.N. Charter, Art. 98.

²³² *Id.*

²³³ Trahan, *supra* note 227.

²³⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, *The Role of the UN Secretary-General*, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 5, 2021), <https://www.cfr.org/background/role-un-secretary-general>.

²³⁵ UN, *The Role of the Secretary General*, UNITED NATIONS, <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/the-role-of-the-secretarygeneral#:~:text=The%20Charter%20describes%20the%20Secretary,and%20other%20United%20Nations%20organs> (last visited June 18, 2022).

²³⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, *supra* note 234.

²³⁷ White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal, *supra* note 136, at 5.

²³⁸ G.A. Res. 57/228.

General to establish an extraordinary court.²³⁹ After the end of bilateral negotiations, the UNGA passed Resolution 57/228(b), which approved the ECCC.²⁴⁰

2. *The Secretary General enters into negotiations with Ukraine – A bilateral treaty*

The UNGA's recommendation to the Secretary General will provide him with the political mandate to negotiate the creation of the tribunal and conclude a treaty between the United Nations, as an international institution with legal personality, and the Government of Ukraine.²⁴¹

3. *Ukraine's role – Parliamentary approval*

While the authority to conclude treaties are with the President of Ukraine under Article 106(3) of the Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) holds the ultimate authority to approve the treaties and "consent to the binding character of international treaties of Ukraine."²⁴² Such approved treaties, consented to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada, become a part of the national legislation of Ukraine under Article 9 of the Constitution.²⁴³ The CCU can also issue advisory opinions to the President and his Cabinet, on the constitutionality of the treaty, if requested by the President or his Cabinet, under Article 151 of the Constitution.²⁴⁴

C. *Appointment of Key Tribunal Personnel – Practical considerations*²⁴⁵

1. *In general: A rolling series of appointments*

Not everyone that will work for the tribunal needs to be hired all at once because that would be inefficient. Personnel should be brought on where necessary and where needed to accomplish the mandate of the tribunal. In addition, contractors can be brought on throughout the life of the tribunal as needed so that not everyone has to be an employee of the tribunal all at once. Contracting out specific and needed services will save money while maximizing effort.

2. *The Prosecutor*

A prosecutor must not only be a good lawyer but an experienced diplomat and politician in his or her own right. In addition, the Prosecutor must have international criminal law experience at the highest level. We have individuals who have been international prosecutors and have set up international courts and tribunals. There is no need to hire an individual who has little to no experience in prosecution at the international level. Moreover, selecting someone based on

²³⁹ G.A. Res. 57/228.

²⁴⁰ G.A. Res. 57/228(b).

²⁴¹ White Paper on the Model Special Tribunal, *supra* note 136, at 5.

²⁴² CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE, June 28, 1996, Art. 106(3).

²⁴³ CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE, Art. 9.

²⁴⁴ CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE, Art. 151.

²⁴⁵ The remaining sections are direct reflections of the Founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Professor David M. Crane, who used these techniques, leading to the successful establishment of what was the world's first hybrid international war crimes tribunal.

geographic location or regional/international political purposes is a futile gesture and could prove to be counterproductive. Thus, experience must be the focus rather than political gestures.

3. The Registrar

Like the prosecutor, only an individual who has been an experienced registrar in an international tribunal or court should be considered. Again, there are numerous persons internationally who have that experience. The position of registrar is critical for efficient running of the tribunal. Prior experience will ensure that the tribunal will run smoothly and accomplish its mandate.

4. The Judiciary

Judges for any court or tribunal should have international judicial experience with a proven track record of judicial abilities in a court at the trial level or the appellate level. Today, there is a broad base of experience within international judicial circles and that pool of jurists must be where the judges will be appointed for this tribunal.

D. Funding Options

Funding is always a challenge. It is subject to the ebb and flow of political and diplomatic perspectives and concerns. Fortunately, there are past case studies that demonstrate how best to fund this new tribunal. The basic rule is that there cannot be any appearance of impropriety, such as using funding to influence the accomplishment of the tribunal's mandate or other outcomes.

1. UN funding

The standard methodology is to place the funding of the tribunal within the budgetary process of the UN system. Though cumbersome and slow, a UN-funded tribunal has a consistent stream of monies that the tribunal can rely on to accomplish its mandate. The oversight of the expenditures would be accomplished within the UN system as well. Also, consider a series of subvention grants as an alternative method.

2. State party contributions

Another option would be to seek voluntary contributions by any and all States Parties who have an interest in the tribunal and its mandate. The contributions would be annually based on a submitted budget by the tribunal. Oversight would be through an appointed management committee overseen by the UN Office of the Legal Advisor. This system has worked in the past with the SCSL and it has been found to be more efficient than the established UN funded procedures. The challenge is that it puts the burden for raising funds on the tribunal's senior personnel. This can be a distraction as well as potentially raising the appearance of impropriety because of its capability of influencing outcomes. Contributions can be not only in cash, but also property and the secondment of personnel.

E. Location of the Special Tribunal for Ukraine

Initial location of the tribunal would be where it is most practical and efficient. A temporary location should be considered to ensure that choosing a permanent location does not slow down the initial set up of the tribunal. The two important factors in location are both political factors and security. A possible early location could be The Hague or in Geneva via UN facilities. A permanent location should be closer to Ukraine for symbolic and political reasons, but a downside of the tribunal being in Ukraine is that it could detract from the appearance of independence and impartiality and may face a very real threat of destruction by the Russian Federation and its allies. Thus, Warsaw, Poland would be within a close proximity to Ukraine, yet allowing for securing the tribunal from outside threats.

F. Logistical Considerations – Further practical considerations

1. Personnel

The focus on hiring persons should be around the mandate of the tribunal and its mission. Personnel should have experience in operating at the international level, particularly in working with international courts and tribunals. Hiring should be done in a graduated and on a “as needed” basis. The hiring of contractors is an important consideration as opposed to career UN personnel. Since the focus will be on experience, use of UN career personnel may be appropriate and necessary. If the hiring process is within the UN administrative system, then the lack of an ability to quickly bring on needed personnel has to be factored in the initial set up of the tribunal. If the tribunal personnel hiring system is outside the UN administrative system, efficiency in bringing on personnel will increase and make it easier to hire based on need or hire contractors. Pay scales and grading of positions would be similar to the UN system for ease of personnel transition and budgeting. This method was used by the Special Court for Sierra Leone with great success.

2. Translators and Associated Services

There is a strong need for qualified interpreters and translators from the very beginning for simultaneous translation capability which will be required for defendants and victim testimony alike. The languages of immediate need would be Russian and Ukrainian. Accommodating other languages can be accomplished on a case-by-case basis.

3. Buildings

It is imperative that the buildings that house the tribunal can withstand attempts by outside forces to destroy the facilities. Hardening of the site will be very important and use of military facilities should be considered. It may not be necessary to build a tribunal facility unless procurement of buildings by other means proves futile.

4. *Transportation*

Secure vehicles will be necessary to ensure safety of tribunal personnel. Armored cars and other vehicles are a requirement due to a very real threat. These vehicles can be donated by interested States Parties to the tribunal.

5. *Security for the tribunal*

Security is going to be an expensive and constant need for personnel, property, victims/witnesses, residences, etc. The risk of destruction, harassment, and kidnapping is very real. Close protection of key tribunal personnel is paramount, including for all witnesses. Location of the tribunal will be critical and influences the risk assessments and security that is needed for protection. Again, location on a military base may be necessary, and use of a UN or domestic armed force must be considered as well.

G. *The importance of setting up a strategic plan: Build the plan around the mandate*

A strategic plan is essential for an efficient creation of an international tribunal. A suggested template can be found in the Appendix A, which provides a guide. Such a plan assists all organs of the tribunal to coordinate and build a justice mechanism that meets the mandate given to it by the international community. A plan also allows the oversight organization to understand the progress of the new tribunal in accomplishing its mandate and allow for further assist in funding and budgeting.

H. *A prosecution plan – Practice Tips*

1. *Consider not just the law, but the politics, diplomacy, practical, as well as cultural perspectives*

A prosecutor needs to create a prosecution plan that establishes culpability of potential actors based on the mandate, the facts, and the law. The creative documents will in large measure lay out the crimes over which the tribunal has the subject matter jurisdiction, as well as *in personem* and temporal jurisdiction. In this case, the crime in question is the crime of aggression, an established international crime.²⁴⁶

Along with considering the law, an experienced prosecutor should also consider the political and diplomatic setting and ramifications of charging perpetrators for international crimes. How does the investigation and indictment of various senior actors, to include a sitting Head of State, impact the region where the atrocity takes place? Ethically, a prosecutor cannot consider or consult with any outside actors related to the alleged crimes for a favor or influence, yet a prosecutor can certainly develop professional and even personal relationships with various political or diplomatic actors to maintain the practical support necessary to accomplish the tribunal's mandate. Diplomats will appreciate understanding the overall strategic plan, being briefed on the status of various

²⁴⁶ *The Crime of Aggression – A Brief History*, *supra* note 91.

actions, and being asked for their perspectives politically and practically on the overall effectiveness of the tribunal.

Practically, the prosecutor answers to many constituents locally, regionally, and internationally: UN organizations, States Parties, regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, various elements of civil society, the press and media, and most importantly, the victims and their families. Each of these constituents has direct or indirect interest in the overall plan, the impact of the tribunal's actions on their individual missions and mandates, and in coordinating their actions with the work of the tribunal. These constituents need to be consulted and methodologies developed to work with the tribunal. All this was done with great effectiveness by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

2. Is the justice we seek the justice they want?

The final consideration is more of a recognition of how the local and regional cultural entities view justice and what they would consider a just result to the tribunal's work. A key question to ask is: **Is the justice we (the international community) seek, the justice they (the victims) want?** At the end of the day, the only focus for any international tribunal is seeking justice for the victims. All of this is for and about the victims. Considering and factoring a type of cultural perspective into the prosecution plan will greatly assist the victims in understanding that their interest is the priority.

I. Other considerations

1. Political "buy in"

The bright red thread of the creation and sustainment of international tribunals is politics. This is not political influence, but the simple fact that these justice mechanisms are creatures of political events and political compromise. Politics are in the DNA of any tribunal or court. The efficient and successful efforts by a tribunal in achieving its mandate is through the political support of the international community. Without it, the justice mechanism will not succeed in achieving justice for the victims of an atrocity.

2. Involving academia

Academics are an important resource to assist the tribunal at many levels. This support can come in the form of research as well the provision of interns. An academic consortium made up of various universities and think tanks is a very efficient use of bona fide experts in the fields of modern international humanitarian and criminal law. Interns are an excellent source of onsite support to trial teams and other tribunal offices.

3. Outreach

This is an essential and absolute requirement. Outreach within the region and location of the atrocities establishes confidence and understanding within the locality of the crimes and with the victims. As a tribunal is for and about the victims, they need to be heard, listened to, and asked for

their perspectives. This can be done by using various media techniques. Most importantly, town-hall meetings with senior tribunal personnel are critical. Without an outreach program, the ultimate success of the tribunal will be in question. The Special Court for Sierra Leone set the standard for a successful outreach program.

4. An advisory board?

There is broad experience practically and academically within the international community related to atrocity accountability. The establishment of an advisory board to assist various organs of the tribunal may be of use and possibly ensure that various issues, concerns, and challenges are wholly and carefully considered.

5. The importance of NGOs

Nongovernmental organizations are an important resource and should be used appropriately to support the tribunal within their individual mandates. NGO's have unique perspectives and information, and drawing upon this will enhance efficiency. The establishment of an NGO or civil society advisory board has shown to be an effective way of coordination within the NGO community.

6. Building a relationship with the press and other media

The press and social media will tell the "story" of the tribunal and ensure that the efforts of the tribunal are known and highlighted in a way that assists the tribunal in ensuring political and practical buy in for the tribunal's work. Social media is also an untapped and misunderstood medium that can assist the tribunal in ensuring awareness and understanding of the actions by the tribunal. Regular meetings and conferences with the press helps build understanding and trust between the tribunal and media outlets, as well as informing the interested public.

7. Witness protection

Due to the circumstances of the conflict and the ability of the Russian Federation to reach potential witnesses, worldwide victim and witness protection is critical and will be an expensive and necessary program. Experienced witness protection personnel will have to be hired and various covered locations will need to be considered to ensure that the tribunal's witnesses are kept safe to testify at future trials.

A witness support unit should be created for witness protection within the Office of the Prosecutor. A standard practice within the United States, for example, is ensuring the safety of critical witnesses. Safety is one consideration; another is to ensure the witness is telling the truth. There is a pool of experienced witness support personnel internationally and the creation of such a unit is encouraged. This was done successfully by the Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone.

8. *A Public Defender's Office*

International tribunals need to be seen as fair and open by all participants and observers. All alleged defendants are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in an open tribunal. Fundamental fairness is key. Defense teams need to be given equal support to ensure that fairness. An office that ensures defense teams are supported shows that a tribunal is truly fair.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

The setting up of an international war crimes tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression perpetrated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine is very possible. The international community must take this political moment to hold Vladimir Putin and his commanders accountable for all of their crimes, including the crime of aggression. Heads of State are no longer immune for their acts while in office when they have committed international crimes.

An international tribunal created with a proper mandate of greatest responsibility, with the support of Ukraine, funded appropriately based on a sustainable budget, with a proper organization based on a realistic strategic plan and prosecution plan, will prove to be the most effective way of dealing with the crime of aggression perpetrated by the Russian Federation.

Strongmen around the world are watching and waiting to see what the international community does in response to the Russian aggression. If we do nothing or create a “half measure,” it will create a precedent, leading the world into a dark and unstable place. A Special Tribunal for Ukraine is the most efficient and effective justice mechanism to uphold the rule of law and restore international peace and security not just in the conflict zone, but around the world.

IX. APPENDICES

A. *General Milestones for the Set Up of the Special Tribunal for Ukraine*

1. Create a working group of interested States. The goal is to make a recommendation for an effective and efficient justice mechanism to hold the Russian Federation and its leadership accountable an act of aggression for the invasion of Ukraine.
2. Draft a United Nations General Assembly resolution that calls for accountability for the aggressive invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, authorizing the UN Secretary General to take all necessary actions to ensure there is accountability for the Russian Federation's unlawful actions and including negotiations with Ukraine to create an international tribunal for the crime of aggression.
3. Enter into negotiations with Ukraine to create an international war crimes tribunal called the UN Special Tribunal for Ukraine.
4. Create a management committee within the Office of the Legal Advisor of the UN after agreement and signing.

5. Hold a donors' conference for interested State Parties for funding and in-kind contributions.
6. Establish the organs of the tribunal with the appointment of a Chief Prosecutor/Deputy and Registrar first.
7. Begin putting together the Office of the Prosecutor and Registry.
8. Open an initial office in New York or Geneva. Begin planning a set up of an operational location, to include a field office in Ukraine.
9. Create a Trial Chamber and an Appeals Chamber when appropriate, after full operational capacity by the Office of the Prosecutor and Registry.

B. Suggested Strategic Considerations

Mandate of the Special Tribunal: Prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crime of aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation and other associated international crimes.

Two possible initial location(s): New York, The Hague, Geneva.

Possible operational location(s): Warsaw, Poland; Berlin, Germany; Paris, France, along with field offices in Ukraine when and where possible/needed.


C. Funding

- Funding must be voluntary and overseen by a Management Committee within the UN Office of the Legal Advisor.
- In-kind contributions could be solicited as well as office space, furniture, information technology, vehicles, personnel secondment, security, etc.
- Estimated initial first year costs are \$25 million (based on the initial cost of the UN SCSL, 2002-03). The goal is to hold a donors' conference annually to raise those funds.


D. Organizational Charts

See next page.


Organizational Chart - General




Office of the Prosecutor



Chambers



Office of the Registrar





THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK

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**PROPOSAL FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
&
ACCOMPANYING PROPOSAL FOR A STATUTE
OF A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR UKRAINE
ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION**



Ukraine Task Force of the Global Accountability Network

7 September 2022



The Ukraine Task Force of The Global Accountability Network Presents:

**PROPOSAL FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND
ACCOMPANYING PROPOSAL FOR A STATUTE OF A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR UKRAINE ON THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION**

7 September 2022

LEAD WRITERS: Ambassador (Ret.) Hans Corell, The Honorable Irwin Cotler, P.C., O.C, O.Q., Ad.E., Professor David M. Crane, Lotta Lampela

EDITORS: Rohan Bhattacharjee, Mia Bonardi, Aaron Ernst, Lotta Lampela

THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK: UKRAINE TASK FORCE, 2022

PROJECT LEADER: Professor David M. Crane, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court of Sierra Leone

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Christopher Martz

DIRECTORS: Kelly Adams, Kanalya Arivalagan, Mia Bonardi, Matthew McCartin

The Ukraine Task Force (UKTF) aims to produce non-partisan, high-quality analysis of open-source materials and to catalogue that information relative to applicable bodies of law; including the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The UKTF primarily creates documentation products in a narrative and graphical format, as well as a quarterly and annual trend analysis of ongoing crimes. Furthermore, the UKTF publishes issue-specific white papers. Its clients include Transnational NGOs, the United Nations, the U.S. Department of State, and the Public Interest International Law & Policy Group (PILPG). The UKTF is working closely with Ukrainian partners, including the Ukraine Bar Association (UBA), which has graciously provided volunteers for our investigative efforts.

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I. A Critical Moment in Modern History: Countering Aggression

This past February there was a paradigm shift in the geopolitical balance of the global community. A paradigm, put together almost eighty years ago under a United Nations (UN) to resolve disputes peaceably with resort to force as a last measure, was brushed aside by a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The invasion by the Russian Federation into Ukraine, a fellow Member State, was a singular assault on a rules-based world order where strongmen act, not to maintain international peace and security, but in their own national interests. This approach to world order has not been seen since the 1930s. We have gone back to the future, and it augurs poorly for the UN and the rule of law unless action under the rule of law happens to counter the threat.

Decisions made by Member States of the UN in the next several weeks will determine the type of world order that will take shape for the rest of this century. Since, the world's democracies came together, took appropriate steps to sanction Russian actions, and began an accountability process for the many international crimes perpetrated by the Russian Federation. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is investigating allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity as it was set up to do according to its international mandate. At many levels, discussions of creating a justice mechanism for the crime of aggression are taking place in Europe and North America. The ICC lacks jurisdiction in this matter regarding the crime of aggression, but the need for a tribunal or court to account for that aggression by the Russian Federation is critical.

The crime of aggression perpetrated by the Russian Federation must be dealt with under the rule of law. The invasion by the Russian Federation is not a European problem, but an international one. This aggression challenges the very idea of the UN Charter, and an appropriate response should be led by the UN to hold President Putin and his inner circle accountable for the invasion and successive criminality. The UN was created to deal with aggression of the kind that the Russian Federation has now committed. If the UN chooses to do little or nothing now, then the question arises: Why have a United Nations?

Despite all this, there is a clear and legally appropriate path to maintaining the rule of law and protecting the UN paradigm. Since the invasion in February of 2022, the UN General Assembly has condemned the invasion, as well as the violations of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation by significant majorities. This is an appropriate cornerstone for further action to create a Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression to account for the Russian Federation's invasion into Ukraine.

This white paper contains a sample UN General Assembly Resolution recommending to the UN Secretary-General that he enter into a bilateral treaty with Ukraine to establish a Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression, as well as a creative statute for that tribunal. It is important to note that a similar effort by the UN happened in 2001-2002 when it created the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the world's first hybrid international tribunal. Asked by Sierra Leone to help create a justice mechanism to account for international crimes, the UN Secretary-General entered into a bilateral treaty to create the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

The materials in this white paper build upon important lessons learned in Sierra Leone to create a model by which the UN can once again use to set up a Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime

of Aggression. We have done this before, and we can do it again. The three drafters of this model contained in this white paper were instrumental in creating the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This white paper shows the international community a practical and real-world model to seek justice for the people of Ukraine and accountability for their violators.

A Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression should be designed to work closely with the ICC, working in coordination in all investigatory efforts, sharing expertise, and seeking a common purpose. Providing efficiencies, the two justice mechanisms must work together.

We would in this context like to mention that we have read with great respect the letter dated 12 August 2022 from the representatives of Latvia, Liechtenstein and Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (UN document A/ES-11/7-S/2022/616). It contains very important information and proposals. Against this background, we concluded – based in particular on our experiences from the Special Court for Sierra Leone – that it would be of assistance to Ukraine, other UN Member States, and the Secretary-General to present this white paper.

We would also like to refer to the result of the Fourteenth International Humanitarian Law Roundtable, organized by the Robert H. Jackson Center on 29 and 30 August 2022. An important part of the discussions focused on the creation of a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. During the discussions, several speakers emphasized the need for urgent action here. The following is a quote from the Principles Document reflecting the debates among the participating present and former prosecutors in international criminal tribunals as well as legal practitioners, experts, academics, and stakeholders:

There is an urgent need for a viable proposal for the creation of a competent international tribunal with appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes of aggression against the people of Ukraine. With that said, any domestic or international tribunals' work, including those exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, should not diminish but enhance the work of the ICC.¹

The time to act is now. Vladimir Putin's ultimate weapon is time, distraction, and distortion. As time goes on, the world moves on as well. After a long hard and cold winter with fuel rationing, the international community, particularly Europe, may have less resolve in 2023 in dealing with accountability for domestic and international crimes committed in Ukraine by the Russian Federation. It happened in Syria and it can happen with Ukraine.

If we appease our way out of the Ukraine crisis with little to no accountability for Russian aggression, it will be a signal to the rest of the world's tyrants, strongmen, and dictators that the United Nation's paradigm based on the rule of law is a sham. Democracies around the world must remain strong in holding the Russian Federation accountable. The content of this white paper is a part of this accountability and gives the UN the opportunity to hold strong.

Ambassador (Ret.) Hans Corell

The Hon. Irwin Cotler

Dr. David M. Crane

¹ The Second Chautauqua Principles, August 30, 2022 (see Annex A).

II. Proposal for a Resolution by the United Nations General Assembly²

77/__. Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression³

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among nations,⁴

Recalling the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means,⁵

Recalling also the obligation under Article 2 (2) of the Charter, that all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter,⁶

Determined to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from the Charter, treaties, and other sources of international law can be maintained,⁷

Recalling General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, entitled “Uniting for peace”, and taking into account that the lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council at its 8979th meeting has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,⁸

Taking note of Security Council resolution 2623 (2022) of 27 February 2022, in which the Council called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in document S/Agenda/8979,⁹

Reaffirming its resolutions A/ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 and A/ES-11/2 of 24 March 2022,

Deeply concerned about the very serious crimes committed within the territory of Ukraine against the people of Ukraine and at the prevailing situation of impunity,¹⁰

Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures

² The footnotes are not for inclusion in the final document but to facilitate the analysis of the formulations in the draft.

³ The document number is intentionally left blank.

⁴ UNGA Res. A/ES-11/1, preambular paragraph 1.

⁵ *Id.*, preambular paragraph 2.

⁶ *Id.*, preambular paragraph 3.

⁷ Adapted from the preambular paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations.

⁸ UNGA Res. A/ES-11/1, preambular paragraph 5.

⁹ *Id.*, preambular paragraph 4.

¹⁰ Adapted from S/RES/1315 (2000), preambular paragraph 1.

at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,¹¹

Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,¹²

Reaffirming the importance of compliance with international humanitarian law, and *reaffirming further* that persons who commit or authorize serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for those violations and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law,¹³

Taking note in this regard of the letter dated dd mm 2022 from the President of Ukraine to the Secretary-General (S/2022/____, annex),¹⁴

Recognizing the desire of the Government of Ukraine for assistance from the United Nations in establishing a strong and credible tribunal that will meet the objectives of bringing justice and ensuring lasting peace,¹⁵

Noting with appreciation the steps already taken by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in response to the referrals by States Parties to open an investigation into the Situation in Ukraine,

Noting further the negative impact of the security situation on the administration of justice in Ukraine and the pressing need for international cooperation to assist in strengthening the judicial system of Ukraine,¹⁶

Acknowledging the important contribution that can be made to this effort by qualified persons from other Member States of the United Nations, international organizations, and non-profit organizations to expedite the process of bringing justice and reconciliation to Ukraine and the region,¹⁷

Reiterating that the situation in Ukraine continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,¹⁸

Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,¹⁹

¹¹ Rome Statute, preambular paragraph 4.

¹² *Id.*, preambular paragraph 5.

¹³ S/RES/1315 (2000), preambular paragraph 6.

¹⁴ Date and document number are intentionally left blank.

¹⁵ S/RES/1315 (2000), preambular paragraph 9.

¹⁶ *Id.*, preambular paragraph 11.

¹⁷ *Id.*, preambular paragraph 12, with “non-profit organizations” added.

¹⁸ *Id.*, preambular paragraph 13.

¹⁹ Rome Statute, preambular paragraph 11.

1. *Reiterates* the need for the full implementation of resolutions A/ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, entitled “Aggression against Ukraine”, and A/ES-11/2 of 24 March, 2022, entitled “Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine”,

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Ukraine to create an independent Special Tribunal consistent with this resolution, and *expresses* its readiness to take further steps expeditiously upon receiving and reviewing the report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 8 below,²⁰

3. *Recommends* that the subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal should cover the crime of aggression, including the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, committed within the territory of Ukraine,²¹

4. *Recommends further* that the Special Tribunal should have personal jurisdiction over persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State,²²

5. *Underlines* that official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression,²³

6. *Expresses appreciation* for the efforts of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, noting that the Special Tribunal shall be complementary to its jurisdiction, and *urges* the Special Tribunal to develop liaison and coordination offices with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,

7. *Emphasizes* the importance of ensuring the impartiality, independence and credibility of the process, in particular with regard to the status of the judges and the prosecutors,²⁴

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly on the implementation of this resolution, in particular on his consultations and negotiations with the Government of Ukraine concerning the establishment of the Special Tribunal, including recommendations, no later than 30 days from the date of this resolution,²⁵

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to include recommendations on the following:

- (a) any additional agreements that may be required for the provision of the international assistance which will be necessary for the establishment and functioning of the Special Tribunal;
- (b) the level of participation, support and technical assistance of qualified persons from Member States of the United Nations that will be necessary for the efficient, independent and impartial

²⁰ Adapted from S/RES/1315 (2000), operative paragraph 1.

²¹ *Id.*, operative paragraph 2.

²² *Id.*, operative paragraph 3.

²³ Adapted from the Rome Statute, Art. 27(1).

²⁴ Adapted from S/RES/1315 (2000), operative paragraph 4.

²⁵ *Id.*, operative paragraph 6.

functioning of the Special Tribunal;

(c) the amount of voluntary contributions, as appropriate, of funds, equipment and services to the Special Tribunal, including through the offer of expert personnel that may be needed from States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations,²⁶

10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.²⁷

²⁶ *Id.*, operative paragraph 8.

²⁷ *Id.*, operative paragraph 9.

III. Proposal for a Statute of a Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression²⁸

Having been established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Ukraine pursuant to General Assembly resolution ____ (2022) of dd mm yyyy,²⁹ the Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression (hereinafter "The Special Tribunal") shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.

Article 1 **Competence of the Special Tribunal**

1. The Special Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, committed in the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014.

Article 2 **Crime of Aggression³⁰**

1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:

- (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
- (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
- (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
- (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
- (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
- (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of

²⁸ Unless otherwise indicated, this Statute mirrors the general structure and language of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, accessible at <http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf>. The footnotes are not for inclusion in the final document but to facilitate the analysis of the formulations in the draft.

²⁹ The document number and date are intentionally left blank.

³⁰ Definition as in the Rome Statute, Art. 8*bis*.

another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

Article 3 **Individual Criminal Responsibility**

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in article 2 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.

2. The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.

3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in article 2 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Special Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

Article 4 **Concurrent Jurisdiction**

1. The Special Tribunal and the national courts of Ukraine shall have concurrent jurisdiction.

2. The Special Tribunal shall have primacy over the crime of aggression over the national courts of Ukraine. At any stage of the procedure, the Special Tribunal may formally request a national court to defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

3. The Special Tribunal shall act in coordination with the International Criminal Court. In the event of the same individuals being prosecuted by the Special Tribunal and the International Criminal Court, the Special Tribunal shall have primacy over the crime of aggression.

Article 5 **Non bis in idem**

1. No person shall be tried before a national court of Ukraine for the crime of aggression referred

to in article 2 of the present Statute for which he or she has already been tried by the Special Tribunal.

2. A person who has been tried by a national court for the crime of aggression referred to in article 2 of the present Statute may be subsequently tried by the Special Tribunal if:

- a. The act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or
- b. The national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility or the case was not diligently prosecuted.

3. In considering the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a crime under the present Statute, the Special Tribunal shall take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed by a national court on the same person for the same act has already been served.

Article 6 **Amnesty**

An amnesty or any other types of immunity granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal in respect of the crime of aggression referred to in article 2 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.

Article 7 **Organization of the Special Tribunal**

The Special Tribunal shall consist of the following organs:

- a. The Chambers, comprising of two Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber;
- b. The Prosecutor; and
- c. The Registry.

Article 8 **Composition of the Chambers**

1. The Chambers shall be composed of eleven (11) independent judges, who shall serve as follows:

- a. Six judges shall serve in the Trial Chambers, of whom two shall be judges appointed by the Government of Ukraine with the concurrence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (hereinafter “the Secretary-General”), and four judges appointed by the Secretary-General;³¹

³¹ Alternatively: Six judges shall serve in the Trial Chambers, appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (hereinafter “the Secretary-General”).

b. Five judges shall serve in the Appeals Chamber, of whom two shall be judges appointed by the Government of Ukraine with the concurrence of the Secretary-General, and three judges appointed by the Secretary-General.³²

2. Each judge shall serve only in the Chamber to which he or she has been appointed.

3. The judges of the Appeals Chamber and the judges of the Trial Chamber, respectively, shall elect a presiding judge who shall conduct the proceedings in the Chamber to which he or she was elected. The presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber shall be the President of the Special Tribunal.

4. If, at the request of the President of the Special Tribunal, an alternate judge or judges have been appointed by the Government of Ukraine or the Secretary-General, the presiding judge of a Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber shall designate such an alternate judge to be present at each stage of the trial and to replace a judge if that judge is unable to continue sitting.

Article 9 **Qualification and Appointment of Judges**

1. The judges shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. They shall be independent in the performance of their functions, and shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source.

2. In the overall composition of the Chambers, due account shall be taken of the experience of the judges in international law at the international criminal law level, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and criminal law. To be considered as a judge, they must have prior trial experience at the international level.

3. The judges shall be appointed for a three-year period and shall be eligible for reappointment.

Article 10 **Rules of Procedure and Evidence**

1. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone obtaining at the time of the establishment of the Special Tribunal shall be applicable *mutatis mutandis* to the conduct of the legal proceedings before the Special Tribunal.

2. The judges of the Special Tribunal as a whole may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or adopt additional rules where the applicable Rules do not, or do not adequately, provide for a specific situation.

³² Alternatively: Five judges shall serve in the Appeals Chamber, appointed by the Secretary-General.

Article 11
The Prosecutor

1. The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, committed in the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014. The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Special Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source.
2. The Office of the Prosecutor shall have the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evidence and to conduct on-site investigations. In carrying out these tasks, the Prosecutor shall, as appropriate, be assisted by the Ukrainian authorities concerned.
3. The Prosecutor shall be appointed by the Secretary-General for a three-year term and shall be eligible for re-appointment. He or she shall be of high moral character and possess the highest level of professional competence, and have extensive experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases. The Prosecutor must have prior prosecutorial experience as a prosecutor at the international level.
4. The Prosecutor shall be assisted by a Ukrainian Deputy Prosecutor, and by such other Ukrainian and international staff as may be required to perform the functions assigned to him or her effectively and efficiently.

Article 12
The Registry

1. The Registry shall be responsible for the administration and servicing of the Special Tribunal.
2. The Registry shall consist of a Registrar and such other staff as may be required.
3. The Registrar shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and shall have prior international registry experience. He or she shall serve for a three-year term and be eligible for re-appointment.
4. The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry. This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements, counseling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Tribunal and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses.

Article 13
Rights of the Accused

1. All accused shall be equal before the Special Tribunal.
2. The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special Tribunal for the protection of victims and witnesses.

3. The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the provisions of the present Statute.

4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, he or she shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

- a. To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he or she understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her;
- b. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his or her defence and to communicate with counsel of his or her own choosing;
- c. To be tried without undue delay;
- d. To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
- e. To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him or her;
- f. To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand or speak the language used in the Special Tribunal;
- g. Not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt.

Article 14 **Judgement**

The judgement shall be rendered by a majority of the judges of the Trial Chamber or of the Appeals Chamber, and shall be delivered in public. It shall be accompanied by a reasoned opinion in writing, to which separate or dissenting opinions may be appended.

Article 15 **Penalties**

1. The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted person imprisonment for a specified number of years. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall, as appropriate, have recourse to the practice regarding prison sentences similar to those practices in the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

2. In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chamber should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.

3. In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chamber may order the forfeiture of the property, proceeds and any assets acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, and their return to their rightful owner or to the State of Ukraine.

Article 16
Appellate Proceedings

1. The Appeals Chamber shall hear appeals from persons convicted by the Trial Chamber or from the Prosecutor on the following grounds:
 - a. A procedural error;
 - b. An error on a question of law invalidating the decision;
 - c. An error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
2. The Appeals Chamber may affirm, reverse or revise the decisions taken by the Trial Chamber.
3. The judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal shall be guided by the decisions of other international criminal courts and tribunals.

Article 17
Review Proceedings

1. Where a new fact has been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings before the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision, the convicted person or the Prosecutor may submit an application for review of the judgement.
2. An application for review shall be submitted to the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber may reject the application if it considers it to be unfounded. If it determines that the application is meritorious, it may, as appropriate:
 - a. Reconvene the Trial Chamber;
 - b. Retain jurisdiction over the matter.

Article 18
Enforcement of Sentences

1. Imprisonment shall be served per agreement with appropriate State Parties. If circumstances so require, imprisonment may also be served in any of the States which have concluded with the International Criminal Court an agreement for the enforcement of sentences, and which have indicated to the Registrar of the Special Tribunal their willingness to accept convicted persons. The Special Tribunal may conclude similar agreements for the enforcement of sentences with other States.
2. Conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the State of enforcement subject to the supervision of the Special Tribunal. The State of enforcement shall be bound by the duration of the sentence, subject to article 19 of the present Statute.

Article 19
Pardon or Commutation of Sentences

1. If, pursuant to the applicable law of the State in which the convicted person is imprisoned, he or she is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the State concerned shall notify the Special Tribunal accordingly. There shall only be pardon or commutation of sentence if the President of the Special Tribunal, in consultation with the judges, so decides on the basis of the interests of justice and the general principles of law.
2. The Special Tribunal will have the final decision on any pardon or commutation of sentence.

Article 20
Working Language

The working language of the Special Tribunal shall be English, with due regard for the importance of the Russian and Ukrainian languages to the proceedings.

Article 21
Annual Report

The President of the Special Tribunal shall submit an annual report on the operation and activities of the Tribunal to the Secretary-General and to the Government of Ukraine.

Annex A. The Second Chautauqua Principles
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The Second Chautauqua Principles

August 30, 2022

In the spirit of humanity and peace, we who assembled here at the Chautauqua Institution recognize the prevailing impunity enjoyed by atrocity criminals around the world compels the international criminal justice system and individual practitioners to renew our commitment to a global vision of the rule of law and to develop and refine practical responses to atrocity crimes and to secure justice for victims and accountability for perpetrators.

To that end, after presiding over robust debates driven by legal practitioners, experts, academics, and stakeholders, I offer the following principles to practitioners, diplomats, and politicians grappling with these realities:

I. Atrocity Prevention is the Foundation of Accountability.

Atrocities rarely appear suddenly. Instead, the commission of human rights abuses often involving the targeting of the judiciary and the rule of law, the narrowing of space for civil society, and the commission of torture and other abuses typically precede atrocities. International human rights bodies and other global stakeholders should heed these warning signs and employ best practices in addressing looming crises. This may help to avert an atrocity cascade in which human rights abuses become endemic and a situation devolves into massive and systemic violations, war becomes more likely, and the commission of crimes against humanity near inevitability.

II. The Future of Accountability Presents New Challenges to Combating Impunity.

A commitment to prosecuting atrocities at the state and international level is essential to the principle of accountability and to combat impunity. States should incorporate the International Criminal Court (ICC) crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression in their national legislation to be able to prosecute core crimes. The ICC and other global actors should continue to enhance the universal reach of the Rome Statute by encouraging ratification by States, and by entering into cooperative arrangements with non-State Parties who may support the goals of the Court.

In considering the future of accountability, global stakeholders should consider developing new institutions at the national or regional level including hybrid tribunals or internationalized national courts. International courts with jurisdiction over transnational crimes may be a useful addition as well. These should incorporate Rome Statute crimes and modes of liability should be based upon customary international law. There is a legal duty to prevent genocide under the Genocide Convention if there is a likelihood of its commission. There is also a duty codified in common article I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to respect and ensure all obligations under the Conventions including the prohibition of war crimes are respected. States should negotiate and adopt a treaty on crimes against humanity that contains a similar obligation.

Criminal prosecutions should also be paired with other transitional justice mechanisms supporting local needs including, for example, established truth and reconciliation commissions. Global stakeholders should look to empower local communities to address human rights abuses, address atrocity crimes, and intervene in a context-sensitive and inclusive manner. The international community should consider the adoption of new crimes to address new or ongoing harms. These could include developing a model law on Ecocide, accounting for cyber-attacks, and other new modalities of war in existing legal frameworks. Additionally, a global investigative mechanism must be established with adequate support from the international community to ensure quality fact-finding missions can be completed in a timely and efficient manner to inform judicial proceedings and ensure due process.

III. Current Law and Existing Judicial Mechanisms are Insufficient to Adequately Secure Justice for the Crime of Aggression.

In the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Tribunal the crime of aggression was recognized as “the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” While the crime of aggression is defined in Article 8*bis* of the Rome Statute and represents customary international law, no competent judicial institutions have jurisdiction to prosecute those most responsible for this crime. States should consider fixing this jurisdictional gap at the ICC.

On February 24, 2022, nearly seventy-six years after the IMT’s landmark judgment, Russia launched an unlawful invasion of Ukraine. Both national and international judicial systems need to prosecute those most responsible for the crimes of aggression committed in Ukraine. International tribunal jurisprudence, which renders head of state immunity inapplicable regarding international crimes, including the crime of aggression, should inform their prosecution strategies. It is also essential that, in the event of its establishment, any tribunal or court addressing the unlawful invasion into Ukraine is fair, impartial, and not directed at any particular party or State. Any new tribunal or court must adhere to a clear evidentiary standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

There is an urgent need for a viable proposal for the creation of a competent international tribunal with appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for the crimes of aggression against the people of Ukraine. With that said, any domestic or international tribunals’ work, including those exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, should not diminish, but enhance the work of the ICC.

IV. New Legal and Practical Approaches are Required to Curtail Unlawful Acts Perpetrated by Mercenaries and other Irregular Forces Engaged and Directed by States.

As States continue to engage in the use of mercenaries and irregular forces, the legal definition of a mercenary must reflect the common characteristics of modern mercenaries. To wit, the nationality limitations codified in Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions should be removed in order to ensure that maligned State actors cannot use loopholes in the existing definition to insulate themselves from criminal liability. All other appropriate practical and legal measures should also be taken to ensure mercenaries and irregular forces act as lawful combatants and all high contracting parties remain in compliance with the duties

international humanitarian law requires. Finally, because States bear responsibility for the unlawful acts of their agents, States engaging in the use of mercenaries and irregular forces should provide those forces the same international humanitarian law training they would to armed forces.

As chair of the Fourteenth International Humanitarian Law Roundtable, I call upon the international community to keep the spirit of the Nuremberg Principles alive by calling to attention and putting into action the Principles included herein.



Fatou Bensouda

Chair, 14th International Humanitarian Law Roundtable